FORD v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Brittney Ford admitted to violating her community corrections placement by using marijuana, the trial court revoked her placement and ordered her to serve a portion of her remaining sentence incarcerated at the Hancock County Jail. She appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her placement. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural

[2] In 2020, when Ford was pulled over for an expired license plate, the officer discovered she had a suspended license, she was driving a stolen vehicle, and she possessed methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Ford was charged with three felony and four misdemeanor offenses, including possession of methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. In January 2025, pursuant to a plea agreement, she was convicted of Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The court sentenced her to two years to be executed on home detention through community corrections.

[3] In August 2025, Ford's community corrections case manager filed a violation report listing multiple violations committed by Ford: (1) allowing the battery on her GPS tracker to get too low or run out completely; (2) leaving and arriving home outside of scheduled times; (3) testing positive for THC; and (4) failing to make any payments toward her outstanding balance of $1,830.00 in fees. In light of these violations, the case manager indicated that Ford was “not a good candidate for Home Detention” and recommended that she “spend the remainder of her sentence in the Hancock County Jail.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 195.

[4] At the revocation hearing, the trial court advised Ford of her rights and explained the alleged violations. Upon being asked whether she “wish[ed] to admit or deny the violation[,]” she responded by saying, “[T]he positive drug screen I'm pretty sure was Marijuana, [ ] I do admit to that” and said it was an accident. Transcript at 6. The court then reiterated to her that she could consult with an attorney before deciding whether to admit or deny the allegations. Ultimately, she said she “ha[d] no choice but to admit because it's true.” Id. at 7. The State said it had “nothing to add to the factual [basis] beyond what the Court ha[d] already advised her of as far as the violation.” Id. The court then asked Ford whether “that was a sufficient factual basis to [her]” and she responded affirmatively. Id. The court said it would “find then that [she] committed the violation as set forth in the Violation Report.” Id.

[5] In discussing possible sanctions, Ford told the court that she had completed the Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT) Program, had found an apartment and two jobs, and reiterated that the positive drug screen was an accident. She told the court that although she was fine returning to home detention, “it's really hard on” her to “make things happen for [her] to get the money to be able to pay” the home detention fees. Id. at 10. So she asked to be put on “GPS” or probation instead. Id. The State recommended that she serve 365 days—slightly less than the 399 days remaining of her sentence—in the Hancock County Jail. The trial court noted her struggles with community corrections and marijuana use and sentenced her to 300 days executed in the Hancock County jail. Ford now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Ford argues the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her community corrections placement. “Our standard of review of an appeal from the revocation of a community corrections placement mirrors that for revocation of probation.” Johnson v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1224, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We review a trial court's decision to revoke probation, and thus a community corrections placement, for an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court has abused its discretion if its “decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. at 1230. We will not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Puckett v. State, 183 N.E.3d 335, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

[7] Revocation of a community corrections placement, like a probation revocation, has two steps. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant violated their community corrections placement, and if the State proves as much by a preponderance of the evidence, “then the trial court must determine if the violation warrants revocation[.]” Johnson, 62 N.E.3d at 1229. “Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke” a community corrections placement. DePalma v. State, 258 N.E.3d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), reh'g denied, trans. denied). However, whether the court's sanction is appropriate turns on the severity of the violation, including “whether the defendant committed a new criminal offense.” Id. (quoting Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ind. 2013)).

[8] Ford contends revocation of her community corrections placement was unwarranted “when her sole proven violation was [a] one[-]time use of marijuana.” Appellant's Brief at 7. Although the record indicates Ford possibly admitted to all the violations alleged in the report,¹ even if we assume the only proven violation was her use of marijuana—based on her explicit admission—the trial court still did not abuse its discretion in revoking her community corrections placement.

[9] As noted above, a single proven violation can support revocation. Ford admitted to using, and thus possessing, an illegal substance. She therefore committed a new criminal offense. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11 (defining the crime of possession of marijuana); see also Decker v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1101, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (noting an admission to smoking marijuana was sufficient to prove defendant possessed marijuana), trans. dismissed. What's more, this offense is similar to the underlying charge for which she was serving a sentence and indeed was a crime she was initially charged with before pleading guilty. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 2; see also DePalma, 258 N.E.3d 1085 (defendant's positive screen “for the very same drugs that were in his system” when he was arrested showed he “had not learned from his prior mistakes but instead engaged in the very same behavior that resulted in his conviction”). Ford also explicitly told the court that she had issues with community corrections, and the court took that into consideration in deciding revocation was warranted. The court also showed her leniency by only sentencing her to 300 days executed rather than the 399 days remaining on her sentence or the 365 days recommended by the State.

[10] We recognize that Ford stated that she was making progress in her life and the marijuana use was an accident. However, the trial court was neither required to believe her self-serving testimony, Fitzgerald v. State, 26 N.E.3d 105, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), nor balance aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the appropriate sanction. Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Given these facts, Ford has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her community corrections placement. See DePalma, 258 N.E.3d at 1085 (finding no abuse of discretion where defendant “had been compliant with probation for six months and tested positive for drugs only one time”); see also Decker, 704 N.E.2d at 1104 (finding no abuse of discretion in revoking community corrections placement where defendant admitted to taking “a couple of puffs” of a marijuana cigarette).²

Conclusion

[11] For the reasons stated above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Ford's community corrections placement and ordering her to serve 300 days of the remainder of her sentence.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the hearing, the following dialogue ensued:[State]: ․ The State has nothing to add to the factual [basis] beyond what the Court has already advised her of as far as the violation.The Court: Okay. All right. Is that sufficient for a factual basis to you Ms. Ford?Ms. Ford: Um yes, sir.The Court: Okay. I'll find then that you committed the violation as set forth in the Violation Report.Tr. at 7 (emphasis added). The violations noted in the violation report were explained to Ford at the beginning of the hearing, see id. at 5, and she did not object to the court's finding above that it would find she had committed “the violation as set forth in the [ ] Report.” Id. at 7. She also did not object to the insinuation that she admitted to each violation when the trial court asked whether she had “a recommendation for a sentence ․ for . . no[t] completing Home Detention[,] for testing positive for an illegal substance and owing $1,830[.]” Id. at 10. However, the court's continuous use of “violation” in the singular makes it possible the court was referring to only the violation she admitted to.

2.   As noted by another panel of this Court in DePalma,in Gibson v. State, 154 N.E.3d 823, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), we recognized that Decker was one of a few cases in which this Court had improperly applied a Strickland standard when reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on appeal from a probation revocation hearing. We also noted, however, that “the question of the proper standard of review was [not] raised in any of those cases, much less decided.” Id. Thus, even though Decker may have applied the wrong standard on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel issue, it remains good law on the revocation issue.258 N.E.3d at 1086 n.2.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.