HENDERSON v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following his guilty plea to aiding burglary, a Class C felony, Mathew Henderson filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court (“PC Court”) denied Henderson's petition, and he now appeals from that denial. Henderson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Henderson raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether Henderson received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

II. Whether Henderson's guilty plea lacked a factual basis.

Facts

[3] In March 2009, Henderson accompanied Aaron Flynn to the Jasper County home of Rosalba Ricchio, who was Flynn's landlord. Flynn thought Ricchio “was going to turn [him into] the police,” and he “was going to go kill her.” PCR Tr. Vol. II p. 21. Henderson was wearing a Halloween mask. Flynn and Henderson forcibly removed Ricchio from her residence and transported her to Newton County, where Flynn killed her. Flynn, Henderson, and Henderson's cousin then buried Ricchio's body. The mask was found in Ricchio's residence, and Henderson's DNA was on the mask.

[4] The State charged Henderson with murder in Newton County. Henderson pleaded guilty and received a sentence of fifty-five years in the Department of Correction. In Jasper County, the State charged Henderson with confinement resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class B felony; confinement with a deadly weapon, a Class B felony; and burglary, a Class C felony.¹ Henderson was represented by Attorney Mark Callaway in Jasper County and pleaded guilty to aiding burglary, a Class C felony.

[5] At the guilty plea hearing in Jasper County, Henderson testified as follows:

Q. Okay, and while you were, and while you were in Jasper County, State of Indiana, did you aid in the breaking and entering of the dwelling of a Rosalba Ricchio?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you did so with intent of committing a felony, theft?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that correct? And you knew at the time that that's what was going on?

A. Yes, sir.

* * * * *

Q. You didn't have any permission to enter the house of Rosalba Ricchio. Is that correct?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. You didn't have permission, did you?

A. No, I didn't.

Ex. Vol. III p. 19. The Jasper County trial court then found that “the factual basis to the offense of Aiding in Burglary has been established.” Id. at 20.

[6] The trial court questioned Henderson as follows:

THE COURT: Do you understand the charge to which you are pleading is Aiding in Burglary, and that in order to be guilty of that the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. I will read the information to you that's been filed․ [O]n or about March 9th, 2009, in Jasper County, State of Indiana, Mathew A. Henderson did aid in the breaking and entering of the dwelling of Rosalba-Silvana Ricchio, to-wit: residence, with the intent to commit a felony therein, to-wit: theft ․

Do you understand the charge against you?

MR. CALLAWAY: I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's all right. Go ahead.

MR. CALLAWAY: We just had to clear something up, your Honor.

THE COURT: Pardon?

MR. CALLAWAY: I apologize. We [ ] just had to clear something up.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand that by pleading guilty to this charge, Mr. Henderson, you are admitting the truth of all of the material facts that I've just read to you?

MR. HENDERSON: Yes, your Honor.

* * * * *

THE COURT: Do you feel that your plea of guilty is your own free and voluntary act?

MR. HENDERSON: Yes, your Honor.

Id. at 25-26, 29. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Henderson to eight years in the Department of Correction to be served consecutively to the sentence for murder in Newton County.

[7] Henderson filed a petition for post-conviction relief in 2020, which he amended in April 2024. Henderson argued that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis. An evidentiary hearing was held in October 2024.

[8] At the hearing, Attorney Callaway testified that he did not recall the evidence used to support the burglary conviction, but it was his habit to review “all of the discovery” before negotiating a plea agreement. PCR Tr. Vol. II p. 13. He “would have reviewed” all of the discovery, including the lab reports, videos, and police report. Id. at 17. Attorney Callaway “always went over with a client ․ what the elements are and what would be ․the necessary elements to be pled to.” Id. Attorney Callaway did not recall Henderson expressing any concerns regarding the elements of the offense.² Attorney Callaway “investigated this case with the thoroughness that [he] did every case” and he was satisfied with the investigation. Id. at 16. Given that Henderson had pleaded guilty in Newton County to murder, Attorney Callaway did not “see a reasonable defense” to the Jasper County charges. Id.

[9] Flynn testified and claimed that Henderson thought they were just going to Ricchio's house to retrieve Flynn's belongings. After they murdered Ricchio and buried her body, Flynn claimed that he returned to Ricchio's residence alone, stole several items, and left muddy footprints in the residence. Although Flynn had previously admitted that he and Henderson “had agreed to abduct and kill Ms. Ricchio,” Flynn now testified that was “[n]ot true at all.” Id. at 29. Flynn also denied that Henderson “pulled the telephone cord out of the wall.” Id. Flynn, however, admitted to telling multiple stories regarding Ricchio's death.

[10] Henderson also testified and claimed that he accompanied Flynn to retrieve his belongings and Flynn “out of nowhere, just goes psychopathic and want[ed] to kill” Ricchio. Id. at 46. Henderson denied burglarizing Ricchio's residence. Henderson, however, admitted to telling multiple different versions of the events surrounding Ricchio's death. Henderson admitted that the plea agreement was explained to him, he had the opportunity to discuss it with his counsel, and his rights were explained to him.

[11] In August 2025, the PC Court denied Henderson's petition for post-conviction relief and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Henderson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Henderson challenges the PC Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a defendant may present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence. Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b). “The scope of potential relief is limited to issues unknown at trial or unavailable on direct appeal.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681. “Issues available on direct appeal but not raised are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata.” Id. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; P.-C.R. 1(5).

[13] When, as here, the petitioner “appeals from a negative judgment denying post-conviction relief, he ‘must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision.’ ” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000)). When reviewing the post-conviction court's order denying relief, we will “not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions,” and the “findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019). When a petitioner “fails to meet this ‘rigorous standard of review,’ we will affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting DeWitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169-70 (Ind. 2001)).

I. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

[14] First, Henderson argues that he received ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Henderson must show that: (1) his counsel's performance fell short of prevailing professional norms; and (2) his counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 682 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

[15] A showing of deficient performance “requires proof that legal representation lacked ‘an objective standard of reasonableness,’ effectively depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. (quoting Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ind. 2007)). We strongly presume that counsel exercised “reasonable professional judgment” and “rendered adequate legal assistance.” Id. Defense counsel enjoys “considerable discretion” in developing legal strategies for a client. Id. This “discretion demands deferential judicial review.” Id. Finally, counsel's “[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.” Id.

[16] In the context of a guilty plea, for the prejudice component, the petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that he would have rejected the guilty plea and insisted on going to trial instead.” Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1284. In making this showing, the petitioner “cannot simply say that [he] would have gone to trial,” he instead “must establish rational reasons supporting why [he] would have made that decision.” Id. Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail. Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. 2006).

[17] Henderson argues that, had his trial counsel properly investigated, he would have learned that the aiding burglary charge lacked evidentiary support. According to Henderson, Flynn and Henderson were invited guests in Ricchio's residence, only Flynn's muddy boot prints were found in the house, and there was no evidentiary support for the breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony element of aiding burglary. The PC Court rejected Henderson's argument and found:

6. The Petitioner simply made allegations in the Amended Petition that were conclusory in nature, and did not provide any evidence or facts to indicate that his attorney was ineffective. There was no testimony that Attorney Callaway failed to investigate the case, that he failed to advise the Petitioner of any defense, nor that Attorney Callaway had deficient performance due to his failures to investigate the case and his failure to advise the Petitioner of any defense(s).

* * * * *

9. Petitioner asserts that Attorney Callaway failed to investigate the case and that if he would have then he would have learned that the burglary charge lacked evidentiary support. As [sic] the Defendant was an invited guest and had no intent to commit a felony in the home. The Court does not find that Petitioner has met the burden of proof as Henderson and Flynn testified to various versions of the events of that day. Also, Attorney Callaway testified that he went over the essential elements of the crime and Henderson wanted to take the plea once it was explained to him.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 115-16.

[18] Henderson pleaded guilty to aiding burglary, a Class C felony. At the time of Henderson's offense, Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-1 provided: “A person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it, commits burglary, a Class C felony.” Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-4 provides: “A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense ․” Evidence of Henderson aiding in the breaking and entering of Ricchio's residence with the intent to commit theft was, therefore, required as a factual basis for Henderson's conviction.

[19] In support of his argument that he did not aid in the breaking and entering of Ricchio's residence, Henderson relies upon his post-conviction testimony and Flynn's post-conviction testimony. Henderson and Flynn, however, both changed their versions of the events multiple times over the course of the investigation and proceedings, and their current version of events differs from their earlier explanations. The PC Court was not obligated to believe Henderson's and Flynn's current version of events. Henderson is merely requesting that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Back v. State, 162 N.E.3d 593, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge credibility of witnesses when reviewing the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief.”), trans. denied.

[20] Attorney Callaway testified that he routinely reviewed the discovery and investigated the case before negotiating a plea agreement. Henderson's current assertion that he was an invited guest to Ricchio's residence is belied by the fact that he went to Ricchio's residence wearing a Halloween mask and his admissions at the guilty plea hearing to breaking into the residence. Under these circumstances, Henderson has failed to demonstrate that Attorney Callaway's performance was deficient. Because Henderson failed to demonstrate that his attorney's performance was deficient, we need not address Henderson's arguments regarding prejudice by his attorney's alleged deficient performance. The PC Court's denial of Henderson's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not clearly erroneous.

II. The guilty plea was supported by a factual basis.

[21] Next, Henderson argues that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis. Indiana Code Section 35-35-1-3(b) provides in relevant part that “the court shall not enter judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied from its examination of the defendant or the evidence presented that there is a factual basis for the plea.” “The factual basis requirement primarily ensures that when a plea is accepted there is sufficient evidence that a court can conclude that the defendant could have been convicted had he stood trial.” Oliver v. State, 843 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Butler v. State, 658 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind. 1995)), trans. denied. “A finding of factual basis is a subjective determination that permits a court wide discretion which is essential due to the varying degrees and kinds of inquiries required by different circumstances.” Id. “A factual basis exists when there is evidence about the elements of the crime from which a court could reasonably conclude that the defendant is guilty.” Id.

[22] Our Supreme Court has recognized “four methods for eliciting evidence to prove a factual basis to support a guilty plea.” Ellis v. State, 67 N.E.3d 643, 647 n.5 (Ind. 2017).

First, the State may present evidence on the elements of the charged offenses. Second, the defendant's admission of the truth of the allegations in the information read in open court would suffice. Third, the defendant's acknowledgment that he/she understands the nature of the crimes charged and that his/her plea is an admission of those charges. And fourth, the defendant's sworn testimony regarding the events underlying the charges may likewise show his/her commission of the acts giving rise to the charged crimes.

Id.

[23] Here, Henderson testified under oath at the guilty plea hearing that he “aid[ed] in the breaking and entering of the dwelling of Rosalba Ricchio;” that he did so “with intent of committing a felony, theft;” that he “knew at the time that that's what was going on;” and that he did not have permission to enter Ricchio's residence.³ Ex. Vol. III p. 19. When questioned by the trial court, Henderson admitted “the truth of all of the material facts” stated in the charging information. Id. at 26. This evidence was sufficient to establish a factual basis for Henderson's guilty plea. Henderson's reliance on his testimony at the post-conviction hearing, which contradicts his testimony at the guilty plea hearing, is merely a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we cannot do. See Back, 162 N.E.3d at 600. The PC Court's denial of this claim was not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[24] The PC Court's denial of Henderson's petition for post-conviction relief is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Flynn in Newton County and Jasper County. In Newton County, Flynn pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to sixty-five years in the Department of Correction. In Jasper County, Flynn pleaded guilty to forgery.

2.   Attorney Callaway recalled Henderson asking jurisdictional questions about whether he could be charged with crimes in two counties.

3.   Henderson claims that he initially testified that he had permission to enter but later acknowledged that he did not have permission to be in Ricchio's residence. See Ex. Vol. III p. 19. We agree with the State that “[i]t is unclear from the face of the record whether [Henderson] initially misheard or misunderstood the question or whether he initially equivocated as to that element of the crime.” Appellee's Br. p. 24. Regardless, Henderson, in the next sentence, unambiguously stated that he did not have permission to be in Ricchio's residence.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.