WATKINS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Kevin J. Watkins, pro se, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Watkins raises several issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In Watkins’ direct appeal, this Court stated the facts and procedural history as follows:

On December 18, 2015, burglars broke into Watkins's house and stole four guns and a television. Watkins reported the crime to the police and indicated that he believed two kids in the neighborhood committed it, but he did not identify any suspects. On December 20, 2015, Watkins confronted X.T., a teenage boy in the neighborhood, about the burglary. During the confrontation, Watkins was armed and wearing a badge when he handcuffed X.T., accused him of burglarizing Watkins's home or knowing who did, and threatened X.T. that if Watkins's property was not returned, “it's going to be a blood bath by Christmas.”

Around the same time, Watkins confronted fifteen-year-old Satori Williams's girlfriend about the burglary, threatening that if he did not get his property back, “there will be a blood bath on Christmas Eve.” Then, on December 22, 2015, Watkins tried to intervene in an armed robbery investigation at a nearby fast-food restaurant; he wanted to review the surveillance footage because he believed the teenagers he suspected of burglarizing his home may have been involved in the robbery.

On Christmas Eve 2015, Williams and sixteen-year-old Timmee Jackson were walking to visit friends, but they never arrived at their destination. At some point, their families and friends began calling the boys’ cell phones and searching the neighborhood. During the search, Williams's mother stopped at Watkins's house because the boys’ route that night would have taken them directly past it; the boys also could have taken a shortcut through his yard to reach their destination. Watkins's wife told Williams's mother that they did not know anything about the missing boys. Williams's mother did not see Watkins or his Chevrolet Suburban that night.

When the search resumed the next morning, Williams's mother and sister returned to Watkins's house. Watkins's Suburban was in the driveway, and Watkins was outside. When Williams's sister asked where Williams was, Watkins said that he had never met him. He also spoke about the burglary and how the neighborhood kids were trouble. During the conversation, Williams's mother and sister noticed a large amount of blood on the grass, leaves, and sidewalk of Watkins's front yard. When Williams's mother asked about it, Watkins suggested it belonged to a wild animal. Williams's mother put a bloody leaf in a plastic bag and called the police as soon as she left.

A police officer arrived at Williams's mother's home later that morning; his mother reported her son missing, showed the officer the bloody leaf she had taken from Watkins's yard, and gave him Watkins's address. The officer went to Watkins's house; Watkins was outside with a cleaning bucket. The officer observed blood on the leaves in the yard and blood on the porch and doorframe, and he smelled a strong odor of bleach as he approached the front door. When back-up officers arrived, they discovered drag marks in the leaves with a trail of blood leading from the front of the house to the backyard to an abandoned house next door. The blood was later confirmed through DNA analysis to belong to Williams and Jackson.

Police learned that Watkins owned a bail-bond business located in a strip mall on Massachusetts Avenue. Police went there, and while looking inside the dumpster behind the business, they saw a 4.5-millimeter caliber black BB gun, a red and black flannel shirt, dark jeans, and a large pair of shoes that were the same size that Watkins had in his home. The jeans and shoes were covered in mud and blood; later testing revealed that the blood belonged to the two teenage boys.

Surveillance footage recovered from a nearby business showed Watkins's Suburban driving into his business's parking lot at 8:30 p.m. on Christmas Eve and 3:48 a.m. on Christmas Day. Watkins was photographed carrying a shovel, changing his clothes, and putting items in the dumpster, including a pair of pants. After obtaining a search warrant for Watkins's business, police found blood inside; again, this blood was later discovered to belong to the boys.

Police also searched Watkins's vehicle. The carpet in the back of the SUV was stained with blood. A bottle of bleach was next to a large garbage bag, which was stuffed with blood-soaked leaves, the packaging for a tactical tomahawk, a bone chip from one of the boy's skulls, brain matter, and what was later determined to be Williams's severed finger. The garbage bag also contained blood-soaked clothing and shoes that matched what the boys were wearing when last seen on Christmas Eve; Williams's sweatshirt and t-shirt had slashes in the back and shoulder from a sharp-edged object.

On December 26, 2015, Watkins was arrested for the murders of Williams and Jackson. While being transported, Watkins said, “those kids were a bunch of gangsters, I knew I should have left them alone, now I'm going to jail.” On December 29, 2015, the State charged Watkins with two counts of murder.

On February 22, 2016, a fisherman found Jackson's body in a shallow grave next to a retention pond close to Watkins's business. A tomahawk was recovered from the bottom of the retention pond that matched the packaging for the tactical tomahawk found in Watkins's vehicle. On April 10, 2016, Williams's body was found buried in a shallow grave in a field in Shelby County.

At some point after the discovery of the bodies, police obtained a warrant for Watkins's cell phone records, which indicated his cell phone location on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day. His cell phone connected to cell phone towers near where each body was discovered. The records revealed that sometime between 9:22 p.m. and 10:36 p.m. on Christmas Eve, Watkins changed the date on his cell phone from December 24 to December 13.

Autopsies of the bodies confirmed that their deaths had been caused by multiple chop wounds to their heads. Their injuries were nearly identical and were located on the side and rear of their bodies; neither body had any wounds on the front. The forensic pathologist concluded that both boys sustained more than one incapacitating blow and that the size of the chop wound injuries were consistent with the size of the blade on the tactical tomahawk recovered from the retention pond.

Before trial, the State filed a notice of intent to offer evidence pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), seeking to introduce testimony regarding Watkins's confrontation of X.T. This testimony included the facts that, on December 20, 2015, Watkins went to X.T.’s residence; that Watkins spoke to X.T. about the burglary of his house; that Watkins was armed and handcuffed X.T.; that Watkins presented himself as a law enforcement officer before identifying himself as a bail bondsman; and that Watkins said, “if the guns don't come up it's going to be a bloodbath.” A pretrial hearing took place, during which Watkins objected to the admission of this evidence.

Following the hearing, the trial court ruled that the State would be permitted to introduce this testimony.

Watkins v. State, No. 18A-CR-1153, 2018 WL 6055378, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2018) (mem.) (record citations omitted), trans. denied.

[3] The State then filed a supplemental notice of its intent to offer evidence pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b). In particular, in paragraph 2A of the supplemental notice, the State sought to introduce evidence that Watkins’ daughter had confronted Williams’ girlfriend, Tashima Yarbrough, and made a statement that she knew Yarbrough and Williams had committed the burglary of Watkins’ home. Then, in paragraph 2B, the State sought to introduce evidence that Watkins had confronted Yarbrough and that, during that confrontation, Watkins had said: “If I don't get my guns, my TVs, and my daughter's money back, I'm gone [sic] go back to my old gangster ways.” Direct Appeal App. Vol. 2 at 210. And, in paragraph 2C, the State sought to introduce evidence that Watkins’ daughter had been working in a restaurant when it was robbed and that, during the police investigation, Watkins went to the restaurant while armed with a pistol and asked to view the surveillance footage because he believed those robbers were the same people who had burgled his home. The court concluded that the State could not introduce the evidence as outlined in paragraph 2A; that the State could not introduce the evidence in paragraph 2B, though the court would “consider further argument” if the State could mitigate the prejudice from the statement regarding the Watkins’ old gangster ways; and that the State could introduce evidence as outlined in paragraph 2C. Id. at 220.

[4] The court held a jury trial on February 26 through March 2, 2018.

During the trial, over Watkins's objection, Lonzell Ratcliff, who was X.T.’s mentor, testified that on December 20, 2015, he went to X.T.’s home to take X.T. to an event and that when he arrived, he saw X.T. had been handcuffed behind his back. Ratcliff had asked Watkins who he was, and Watkins responded that he was an officer, although he later admitted that he was a bondsman. Ratcliff believed that Watkins was a police officer because he was armed with a handgun and was wearing a badge. Watkins claimed that X.T. was either responsible for the burglary of his home or that he knew who was. Ratcliff testified that Watkins threatened X.T. that if Watkins's property was not returned, “it's going to be a blood bath by Christmas.” Watkins then released X.T. from the handcuffs and left the residence.

Watkins also testified at trial and admitted to killing the boys with his tomahawk, but he claimed that he had done so in self-defense. He said that in the days following the burglary of his house, he feared that he was under attack. When he was in his front yard on Christmas Eve, two people came running around the corner toward him and that one of them pulled out and pointed a black gun at him. He reached for the tactical tomahawk on his belt and began striking that person. He then testified that the other person tried to grab him during the altercation and that because he feared that the second person may also have been armed, he started striking the second person with the tomahawk as well. Watkins said that he did not see a weapon in the second person's hand before he began striking him with the tomahawk.

Watkins claimed that he could not recall how many times he struck the boys or where he struck them. He testified that after he killed them, he thought about calling the police but decided against it. Instead, he dragged the bodies into his backyard and then to the abandoned house next door before putting them in his vehicle, driving to his business, and eventually burying them where they were later discovered. He testified that he had tossed the tomahawk in the retention pond and disposed of the items found in the dumpster behind his business; that he bought a new shirt at a nearby gas station; that he put the items found in the garbage bag in his vehicle in that bag; and that he was trying to clean up the scene when the police arrived on Christmas Day.

Watkins, 2018 WL 6055378, at *3 (record citations omitted).

[5] During the trial, Yarbrough testified that Watkins’ daughter had confronted her and said that Yarbrough and Williams had robbed Watkins’ house. Yarbrough additionally testified that Watkins came to her house and said that “if I don't get my TV, guns, cash back there will be a blood bath on Christmas Eve.” Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 97. Also during trial, Detective Steven Gray testified that, while he was transporting Watkins, Watkins stated that “those kids were a bunch of gangsters[.] I knew I should have left them alone, now I'm going to jail.” Trial Tr. Vol. 5 at 222.

[6] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Watkins guilty as charged. Prior to sentencing, Watkins’ trial attorney submitted a lengthy sentencing memorandum that had been prepared by a Master Social Worker. That memorandum outlined Watkins’ history, including that his father had killed his mother when he was ten months old, that Watkins had been bullied as a child, that he had been sexually abused by a family member, that he had been shot while performing his job, and that Watkins suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) for which he never received treatment. At a sentencing hearing, Watkins’ trial attorney argued that Watkins had experienced “hardship[s]” in his life and that he “suffers from PTSD.” Trial Tr. Vol. 6 at 240. Following the hearing, the court identified Watkins’ PTSD as one of several mitigators, found that the mitigators balanced the aggravators, and sentenced Watkins to the advisory sentence of fifty-five years on each count, to run consecutively.

[7] Wakins appealed his conviction and sentence. In particular he asserted that the trial court had erred when it admitted evidence about his confrontation with X.T. because it violated Indiana Evidence Rules 403 and 404(b), that the evidence was insufficient to rebut his claim of self-defense, and that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

[8] On direct appeal, this Court held that the trial court did not err when it admitted evidence of Watkins’ encounter with X.T. because that evidence was offered to “show that he had intent to attack teenage boys in the neighborhood and to disprove his self-defense claim.” Watkins, 2018 WL 6055378, at *4. This Court also found that a reasonable juror could have concluded that Watkins was not under any threat of attack at the time of the offenses such that the evidence was sufficient to rebut his claim of self-defense. And this Court held that his sentence was not inappropriate. Accordingly, this Court affirmed his convictions and sentence.

[9] Thereafter, Watkins, pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In that petition, Watkins raised the following ten issues:

• That his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object when Yarbrough testified that Watkins’ daughter said that Yarbrough and Williams had robbed Watkins, which testimony violated the court's order prohibiting paragraph 2A evidence. According to Watkins, this testimony “falsely suggested to [the] jury that Watkins had knowledge of who Satori Williams was” and “established a false motive[.]” P.C. App. Vol. 2 at 29.

• That his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object when Yarbrough testified that Watkins had said that, if he did not have his items returned, there would be a blood bath on Christmas Eve. Watkins alleged that this testimony violated the court's order prohibiting paragraph 2B evidence and that it “caused the jury to be bias[ed] and partial[.]” Id. at 30.

• That his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object to perjury. In particular, Watkins contends that Yarbrough perjured herself when she testified at trial that Watkins had said that there would be a blood bath on Christmas Eve, which was different from her deposition testimony that Watkins had threatened to go back to his old gangster ways.

• That his trial counsel has been ineffective for failing to object to Detective Gray's testimony, which he alleged constituted perjury. Watkins argued that Detective Gray testified at trial that Watkins had said that the kids were gangsters and that he was now going to jail, which was different than a memo Detective Gray had written, which said that the kids were a bunch of gangsters who had been messing with Watkins.

• That his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his “traumatic mental illness[.]” Id. at 32.

• That his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to sufficiently present a defense of diminished capacity “based on mental disease and defect.” Id. at 32

• That his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to call Cherish Carter as a witness, who would have testified that she never heard Watkins threaten a blood bath on Christmas Eve.

• That his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that Williams was involved with a gang.

• That his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “argue Indiana's stand your ground law in conjunction with Watkins’ traumatic mental state of mind.” Id. at 34.

• That his appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to present an issue well. Specifically, he asserted that, in its Appellee's brief, the State erroneously claimed that X.T.’s testimony was offered to show motive and intent, which was contrary to the State's 404(b) notice, which sought to introduce that evidence to show motive and identity. Watkins contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a reply brief to highlight that error.

[10] Watkins also requested to subpoena Carter, which request the post-conviction court denied. The post-conviction court held a fact-finding hearing on Watkin's petition during which both Watkins’ trial and appellate counsel testified. Watkins’ trial counsel testified that, regarding Watkins’ PTSD, he had had “extensive discussion[s]” and “consulted with other attorneys” before making the decision “not to open that door.” P.C. Tr. at 52. He also testified that he “talked with” Watkins about that as well. Id. Watkins’ appellate counsel testified that he did not file a reply brief because he had “addressed” the 404(b) issue in his initial brief and that a reply brief would not be “appropriate.” Id. at 17. Following the hearing, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law finding that Watkins had failed to show deficient performance by his attorneys or that there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial or appeal would have been different had the attorneys performed as Watkins alleged they should have. As such, the court denied Watkins’ petition. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[11] As our Supreme Court has stated:

“The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” Campbell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 271, 273-74 (Ind. 2014). “When appealing the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment.” Id. at 274. In order to prevail on an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the evidence leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993). Further, the post-conviction court in this case entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court's findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).

Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 681-82 (Ind. 2017).

Effectiveness of Trial Counsel

[12] On appeal, Watkins first asserts that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). See Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009). To satisfy the first prong, “the defendant must show deficient performance: representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052). To satisfy the second prong, “the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable probability (i.e. a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052).

Id. at 682. Failure to satisfy either of the two prongs will cause the claim to fail. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002). Indeed, most ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone. Id. On appeal, Watkins raises nine allegations of ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, which we consolidate into the following seven issues. We address each argument in turn.

2A Evidence

[13] Watkins first asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of evidence that he contends violated the court's prohibition on the admission of evidence from paragraph 2A of the State's supplemental 404(b) notice. In paragraph 2A, the State sought to introduce evidence that Watkins’ daughter went to Williams’ residence, confronted Yarbrough, and stated that she knew that Yarbrough and Williams had committed the burglary of Watkins’ house. The court ruled that the State could not introduce that evidence.

[14] Watkins first asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of Amber Partlow, Williams’ mother. During the trial, the State asked Partlow if she had learned of a burglary at Watkins’ home. Partlow responded that she was aware of the burglary and that she had learned of the burglary when Watkins’ daughter “came to [her] home and assaulted [Williams’] girlfriend[.]” Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 74. Partlow then started to testify as to what Watkins’ daughter was yelling, but Watkins’ counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The court sustained the objection. Thus, contrary to Watkins’ arguments, his counsel objected to Partlow's testimony before she could testify that Watkins’ daughter had accused Yarbrough and Williams of the burglary. Nothing in Partlow's testimony was prohibited by the court's order excluding paragraph 2A evidence, and Watkins’ trial counsel did not perform deficiently.

[15] Still, Watkins contends that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to Yarbrough's testimony that Watkins’ daughter had confronted her and said that she and Williams had “robbed [Watkins’] house[.]” Id. at 94. But even if we were to agree with Watkins that that testimony violated the court's order, we cannot say that the brief testimony by Yarbrough placed Watkins in a position of grave peril or that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for counsel's deficient performance. Indeed, Watkins’ trial lasted several days and consisted of more than thirty-five witnesses. And the evidence demonstrated that Watkins attacked two boys with a hatchet fourteen times; that the injuries were to their backs and sides, not their fronts, despite Watkins’ allegations that they had attacked him; and that he took extensive steps to cover up his crimes. Thus, Yarbrough's one statement was brief in the context of the trial as a whole. We cannot say that, had Watkins’ counsel objected to that one statement, there is a reasonable probability that the results of this trial would have been different.

2B Evidence

[16] Watkins next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Yarbrough's testimony that, when Watkins approached her at her house, he stated: “if I don't get my TV, guns, cash back there will be a blood bath on Christmas Eve.” Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 97. Watkins first argues that this testimony violated the court's order prohibiting paragraph 2B evidence.

[17] Again, prior to trial, the State filed a supplemental notice to introduce 404(b) evidence. In paragraph 2B of that notice, the State sought to introduce evidence that Watkins had approached Yarbrough and told her: “If I don't get my guns, my TVs, and my daughter's money back, I'm gone [sic] go back to my old gangster ways.” Direct Appeal App. Vol. 2 at 210. The court ruled that the State could not offer that evidence but that it would reconsider if the State could mitigate the prejudice from that evidence. The statement “of gravest concern” to the court was the reference to Watkins’ “old gangster ways.” Id. at 220.

[18] We do not agree with Watkins that Yarbrough's testimony violated the court's order. The State did not elicit, and Yarbrough did not provide, any reference to “old gangster ways,” which was the main concern of the trial court. Instead, Yarbrough testified to a different threat that Watkins made in her presence.¹ Because Yarbrough did not provide any prohibited testimony, Watkins’ trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.

[19] Still, Watkins contends that his trial counsel should have objected to Yarbrough's testimony because it constituted perjury. Specifically, he asserts that Yarbrough's trial testimony and her pretrial deposition statements “don't match” and, as such, her statement during trial was “perjured testimony.” Appellant's Br. at 33-34. We cannot agree.

[20] A person commits perjury when the person “makes a false, material statement under oath or affirmation, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true” or “has knowingly made two (2) or more material statements, in a proceeding before a court or grand jury, which are inconsistent to the degree that one (1) of them is necessarily false.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-1(a). However, it is well settled that “contradictory or inconsistent testimony by a witness does not constitute perjury.” Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 253 (Ind. 1997). Here, even though Yarbrough's pretrial deposition statement, which referenced Watkins’ “old gangster ways,” was different from her trial testimony, which referenced a blood bath on Christmas Eve, there is no indication that Yarbrough lied when she gave her trial testimony. And those two statements are not so inconsistent such that one must be false. Yarbrough's testimony did not constitute perjury, and Watkins’ counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to it on that ground.

Detective Gray's Testimony

[21] Watkins next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Gray's testimony. Watkins contends that Detective Gray's trial testimony constituted perjury because it differed from a statement he had made prior to trial. During the trial, Detective Gray testified that, while he was transporting Watkins, Watkins stated: “those kids were a bunch of gangsters, I knew I should have left them alone, now I'm going to jail.” Trial Tr. Vol. 5 at 222. But in support of his petition for post-conviction relief, Watkins presented as evidence an “inter-department communication” from Detective Gray to another detective in which Detective Gray wrote that, while transporting Watkins, Watkins said “that those boys are a bunch of gangsters and that they have been messing with [Watkins] for a few days.” P.C. Ex. at 68 (capitalization removed). However, again, there is no indication that Detective Gray's trial testimony, even though slightly different from what he wrote in an office memo, was a lie. And the two statements were not so different such that one must be false. We cannot say that Watkins’ trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Gray's testimony.

Mental Illness

[22] Watkins also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his PTSD. And he claims that his counsel's failure to investigate the issue and raise it before the jury left him in a “disadvantageous circumstance” and caused the jury to see him only as “hostile and hell bent on revenge.” Appellant's Br. at 39.

[23] However, contrary to Watkins’ claim, his trial counsel testified that he was aware of Watkins’ PTSD and that he had had an “extensive discussion” with other attorneys in his office and his co-counsel and ultimately decided “not to open that door.” P.C. Tr. at 52. And Watkins’ trial counsel “talked with” Watkins about that as well. Id. In other words, Watkins’ trial counsel investigated the issue and then made the strategic decision to not present the issue of Watkins’ PTSD to the jury. “Few points of law are as clearly established as the principle that [t]actical or strategic decisions will not support a claim of ineffective assistance.” See McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Watkins’ trial counsel was not ineffective on this ground.

Defense

[24] Next, Watkins contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his “mental disease and defect” as a defense. Appellant's Br. at 39. He maintains that evidence of his PTSD “would likely have bolstered” his defense. Id. at 51. However, as outlined above, Watkins’ trial counsel was aware of Watkins’ PTSD but made the strategic decision not to open that door in front of the jury. And, again, we cannot question trial counsel's strategic decisions. Watkins’ trial counsel put forth a self-defense claim and thoroughly presented that to the jury, highlighting that Watkins had recently been robbed, that the two boys had approached Watkins in the dark, that one of the boys appeared to have a gun, and that the other attempted to grab Watkins. Watkins has not shown that his counsel was ineffective.

Failure to Call a Witness

[25] Watkins also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Carter as a witness.² According to Watkins, Carter would have testified that she never heard Watkins threaten a blood bath by Christmas Eve and that he “didn't want” to hurt any kids. Appellant's Br. at 43. However, even if we were to agree that Watkins’ trial counsel should have called Carter as a witness, he has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different.

[26] Assuming the jury heard from Carter that she did not hear Watkins threaten a bloodbath, that is not evidence that he did not actually make that threat. And both Yarbrough and X.T.’s mentor testified that Watkins indeed threatened a blood bath on Christmas Eve if his items were not returned. And whether or not Watkins had any advanced knowledge that Williams had robbed him, the undisputed evidence is that Watkins brutally killed two teenagers on Christmas Eve. Based on the context of the whole trial, we cannot say that, but for any error in counsel's failure to call Carter as a witness, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Victim's Gang Activity

[27] Watkins additionally alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit testimony from Yarbrough that Williams was associated with a gang. Watkins contends that, without this evidence, the jury was left to believe that the two teenagers were “simply innocent” victims. Appellant's Br. at 48. And he maintains that, had the jury known that Williams was part of a gang, they would have been more likely to believe his self-defense theory.

[28] But, again, we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Watkins’ trial would have been different had his counsel elicited that testimony from Yarbrough. Watkins maintained throughout trial that he did not know either of the victims prior to the offense. If Watkins did not know either victim, then he could not have known that one was a gang member with a propensity to carry weapons, and he would not have been any more fearful of them than he already claimed to be.

[29] In any event, the evidence to negate Watkins’ claim of self-defense was abundant. Indeed, the evidence showed that, after the burglary of his home, Watkins confronted teenagers, twice threatened a bloodbath on Christmas Eve, delivered fourteen chop wounds to the two victims’ backs and sides, delivered no wounds to the front of the victims’ bodies despite his allegations that they were attacking him, and took significant steps to hide his crime. Thus, regardless of whether Williams had any gang affiliation, the evidence readily refuted Watkins’ defense. Watkins has not shown any prejudice from his counsel's failure to present this evidence.

Appellate Counsel

[30] Finally, Watkins contends that he was denied effective assistance from his appellate counsel. We apply the same standard of review to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as we apply to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1070, 1078 (Ind. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 886 (2001). Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims fall into three categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (3) failure to present issues well. Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 724 (Ind. 2013).

[31] Here, Watkins claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a reply brief to point out what he claims was an error in the State's appellee's brief. In essence, Watkins contends that his appellate counsel failed to present the issue on appeal well. “However, claims of inadequate presentation of certain issues, as contrasted with the denial of access to an appeal or waiver of issues, are the most difficult for defendants to advance and for reviewing tribunals to support.” Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 270 (Ind. 2014). This is so “because such claims essentially require the reviewing court to reexamine and take another look at specific issues it has already adjudicated to determine whether the new record citations, case references, or arguments would have had any marginal effect on their previous decision.” Id. (citations omitted, emphasis in original).

[32] Prior to trial, the State sought to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence regarding Watkins’ encounter with X.T. In its motion, the State specifically stated that I intended to use that evidence “to show motive and identity[.]” Direct Appeal App. Vol. 2 at 164. The court allowed the State to present that evidence. Then in response to Watkins’ direct appeal, the State argued that the evidence was admissible to show “Watkins’ motive and intent to commit the charged crimes[.]” Direct Appeal Appellee's Br. at 22. Now, Watkins contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a reply brief to point out that the State had changed its theory of admissibility from motive and identity to motive and intent.

[33] But we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that the results of Watkins’ appeal would have been different had his appellate counsel filed a reply brief. First, Watkins’ counsel thoroughly argued in his initial brief that the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Rule 404(b). Indeed, Watkins’ appellate counsel argued that the court had abused its discretion when it allowed the State to present evidence of his encounter with X.T. because it served “no purpose but to invite the ‘forbidden inference’: that[,] because he committed the prior offenses, he had a propensity to commit the charged crimes.” Direct Appeal Appellant's Br. at 12. His counsel additionally argued that, even if admissible under any of the exceptions to Evidence Rule 404(b), the prejudice outweighed any probative value. And he argued that any error was not harmless. Thus, his appellate counsel fully briefed the challenged issue.

[34] Further, it is well settled that, in affirming an evidentiary ruling, “this Court is not bound by any legal theory for admitting or excluding the evidence.” Cobb v. State, 222 N.E.3d 373, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Rather, this court may affirm a trial court's judgment on any theory supported by the record. Id. Thus, regardless of what theory the State presented in its Appellee's Brief, and regardless of whether that theory was different than what the State had initially presented to the trial court, this Court was free to affirm on any legal basis supported by the record, which is what this Court did. Watkins has not shown that he was prejudiced by his appellate counsel's performance.

Conclusion

[35] We agree with the post-conviction court that Watkins has not shown that his trial counsel was ineffective for any of the alleged grounds or that he was prejudiced by any error. Similarly, he has not shown that he was prejudiced by his appellate counsel's failure to file a reply brief. We therefore affirm the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Ratcliff also testified that Watkins threatened that “it's going to be a blood bath by Christmas” if he did not get his stolen items back. Trial Tr. Vol. 5 at 112. Watkins does not challenge this testimony or otherwise make any claim that his trial counsel should have objected to Ratcliff's testimony.

2.   Within this issue, Watkins briefly asserts that the post-conviction court “perpetuated the cycle of unethical behavior by yet again excluding the witness Cherish Carter, by refusing to honor [the] subpoena request[.]” Appellant's Br. at 41. To the extent this is an attempt to argue that the post-conviction court abused its discretion by denying the subpoena request, Watkins has failed to make cogent argument and, thus, has waived any argument on this issue.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.