COPPESS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Andrew Coppess shot Justin Fahenstock during an attempted robbery, leaving Fahenstock paralyzed for life. Fahenstock identified Coppess as the shooter. Against the backdrop of this evidence and Coppess's accomplice's agreement to testify against him, Coppess pleaded guilty to four felonies with a 30-year sentencing cap.

[2] Days later, before sentencing, an inmate allegedly told Coppess that the accomplice had “set up” Coppess out of jealousy over a woman with whom both had been romantically involved. Coppess moved to withdraw his plea, but the trial court denied the motion. Coppess appeals, claiming the court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the plea agreement and allow him to proceed to trial. We affirm.

Facts

[3] On March 8, 2024, Coppess and his accomplice, Brandon Young, attempted to rob Fahenstock at an Anderson apartment complex. During the attempted robbery, Coppess shot Fahenstock, leaving him paralyzed. The State charged both Coppess and Young with Level 2 felony attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury; Level 3 felony aggravated battery; and Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. The trial court ordered Coppess and Young to be tried jointly. And while Coppess awaited trial, he was charged in a separate case with possession of a narcotic drug in a penal facility, a Level 5 felony.

[4] On May 29, 2025, Young signed a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of robbery resulting in bodily injury in exchange for a capped sentence and his agreement to testify truthfully against Coppess. A few days later, Coppess entered into a plea agreement as well. Coppess's agreement provided that he would plead guilty to all charges in both the attempted robbery and drug prosecutions cases in exchange for a sentence for which the executed portion would not exceed more than 30 years.

[5] At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court asked Coppess a series of questions to confirm his intent to enter into the plea agreement. The court advised Coppess of his rights, and Coppess confirmed that he wished to waive them by pleading guilty. Coppess confirmed that he had reviewed the agreement with his counsel, understood the agreement's terms, and had voluntarily entered into the agreement. The trial court took the guilty plea under advisement and set a date for sentencing.

[6] Before the sentencing hearing, however, Coppess learned from another inmate—whom he could not produce and whose full name he did not know—that Young had been bragging at the Madison County Jail that he “set up” Coppess for revenge. App. Vol. II, p. 226. Young allegedly was upset that Coppess had been in a romantic relationship with Young's girlfriend at the time of the attempted robbery.

[7] Coppess moved to withdraw his guilty plea based on Young's alleged comments. Coppess argued that this uncorroborated jailhouse conversation about Young's statements and motive “directly bears on the reliability, credibility, and independence of Young's testimony and undermines confidence in the factual basis and voluntariness of Mr. Coppess's plea.” Id. at 227. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and sentenced Coppess to an aggregate term of 30 years. He appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] On appeal, Coppess argues only that the court erred in not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea. Indiana Code § 35-35-1-4 governs motions to withdraw a guilty plea filed after the defendant has pleaded guilty but before the trial court has imposed a sentence. This statute specifies that the trial court “shall” allow the withdrawal of the plea upon proof that it is “necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(c). Absent this showing, the court “may allow” the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b).

[9] When seeking to overturn a trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was entitled to withdrawal of the guilty plea. Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). To meet this burden, the defendant must provide specific facts justifying withdrawal. Id.

[10] And on appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the appellant faces a “high hurdle” and a “presumption in favor of the ruling.” Price v. State, 255 N.E.3d 554, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995)). We reverse the trial court's ruling only for an abuse of discretion. Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 868; Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b).¹ In making this determination, we examine the defendant's statements at the guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was offered “freely and knowingly.” Jeffries v. State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001)). Having done so, we conclude that Coppess has failed to overcome the presumption, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.

I. No Manifest Injustice

[11] Coppess claims that his newly discovered evidence constitutes a manifest injustice requiring withdrawal. “Instances of manifest injustice may include any of the following ․ : a defendant is denied the effective assistance of counsel, the plea was not entered or ratified by the defendant, the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made, the prosecutor failed to abide by the terms of the plea agreement, or the plea and judgment of conviction are void or voidable.” Id. at 778.

[12] Coppess argues that a manifest injustice occurred here because the revelations about Young's ulterior motive undermined Young's credibility as a witness in Coppess's prosecution and thereby negatively impacted the State's ability to prove the charges against Coppess. Coppess also contends the revelations about Young compromised the factual basis and voluntariness of his plea.

[13] But this argument ignores a critical fact: Fahenstock—the paralyzed victim—specifically identified Coppess as the person who shot him. Even if Young harbored a grudge against Coppess, Fahenstock's eyewitness testimony provided an independent basis for Coppess's conviction. Young's alleged motive to “set up” Coppess does not negate Fahenstock's identification.

[14] Moreover, the record provides ample evidence that Coppess understood his plea and entered into it knowingly and voluntarily. See id. (explaining that manifest injustice occurs when a guilty plea is not knowing or voluntary). Coppess gave direct, unequivocal answers at his plea hearing. He confirmed that he understood the effect of the plea, reviewed it with counsel, and entered into it of his own free choice. Coppess does not point to any evidence to support his claimed lack of understanding.

[15] As to the newly discovered evidence, Coppess points to no evidence other than his own uncorroborated testimony about a possible set up. Coppess was unable to produce the inmate at the hearing or provide any means to verify the inmate's alleged claims. Coppess could not even provide the full name of the inmate who conveyed the information. The trial court reasonably concluded that Coppess had not proven the existence of the purported newly discovered evidence by a preponderance of the evidence.

[16] But even if Coppess had a relationship with Young's girlfriend, Coppess would have been aware that Young might have a motive to testify against him based on that relationship. This information would have been known to Coppess at the time he entered his plea. The inmate's alleged revelation to Coppess that Young bragged about this motive does not transform already-known facts into newly discovered evidence. Given all these circumstances, we conclude that Coppess failed to show any manifest injustice requiring withdrawal of his guilty plea.

II. No Abuse of Discretion

[17] Absent a showing of manifest injustice, the trial court “may allow” the defendant to withdraw their guilty plea “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). Coppess argues that because the State made no claim of prejudice, the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. “However, lack of prejudice to the State did not mean the trial court was required to grant his motion; it meant only that the court retained discretion to grant [the] motion ‘for any fair and just reason[.]’ ” Asher v. State, 128 N.E.3d 526, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Indiana Code § 35-35-1-4(b)). Coppess makes no persuasive argument as to the existence of fair and just reasons that would have required the trial court to allow withdrawal of his guilty plea.

[18] As Coppess has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Coppess frames this issue in constitutional terms, likening his situation to a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. We find this comparison inapt under these circumstances and therefore rely on precedent applying an abuse of discretion standard to rulings on motions to withdraw a guilty plea.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.