Kristepher A. Curtsinger, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Police officers arrested Kristepher A. Curtsinger after he shot his neighbor's van and pool while standing on his own front porch. Curtsinger appeals the two-year sentence the trial court imposed after the jury determined he was guilty of Level 6 felony criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon. He challenges the court's identification of sentencing factors and asks this Court to revise his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Concluding that the court did not abuse its sentencing discretion, and that Curtsinger has not demonstrated grounds for revising his sentence, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Curtsinger lived next door to Brian Lynn and Kelly Reider in Mitchell, Indiana for over a decade. It appears that they lived on large residential lots. Around two years before the events at issue, Curtsinger began firing guns on his property, and sometimes bullets entered his neighbors’ property. Lynn and Reider stopped having family members over to visit out of fear that they could be harmed by a stray bullet. On holidays, they would rent space elsewhere to host their family. In addition, when Reider was working from home and heard gunshots, she moved to the opposite side of her home in hopes that the external and internal walls would stop an errant bullet. At times, Lynn had to pause mowing his lawn because he heard gunshots on Curtsinger's property and was afraid of being hit. Lynn had called the police about Curtsinger's reckless shooting, to no apparent effect.

[3] On June 25, 2024, Lynn returned home from work between five-thirty and six in the evening . He heard the sound of gunshots coming from Curtsinger's property. Later, Lynn heard a loud noise. He looked outside at his van and saw that one of its windows had been shattered. As Lynn walked out his front door, he continued to hear gunshots. He looked over at Curtsinger's house and saw Curtsinger standing on his front porch, facing Lynn's property. Lynn walked over to his van, suspecting at first that a fallen tree limb from recent storms may have caused the damage. He soon realized that the window had been shattered by a gunshot, and the window frame was also damaged.

[4] Lynn called 911. After the call, Lynn contacted another neighbor, who walked over to look at the van. Curtsinger continued firing his gun while Lynn and his neighbor waited for police to arrive. Lynn heard bullets striking trees on his property.

[5] Next, Lynn's neighbor called 911 to report that Curtsinger was continuing to shoot. During that call, a bullet struck Lynn's above-ground swimming pool. Based on where Lynn was standing when the pool was hit, he was concerned that he was in the line of fire.

[6] Once an officer arrived, he and the neighbor searched Lynn's van and found a spent round on the floor. When a second officer arrived, they both went to Curtsinger's house to speak with him. One of the officers saw shell casings and unfired rounds on the front porch. He also saw holes in the exterior wall of the house on the porch. Curtsinger denied firing his gun from the front porch, claiming that he had been shooting in his back yard that day.

[7] The officers searched Curtsinger's house and found two handguns. Ballistics testing revealed that one of the handguns had fired the spent round that was found in Lynn's van.

[8] The State charged Curtsinger with Level 6 felony criminal recklessness committed with a deadly weapon. The jury determined he was guilty. At sentencing, the trial court determined that the aggravating circumstances of the offense outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Curtsinger to two years, all executed. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sentencing Discretion – Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

[9] Curtsinger argues that the trial court erred in identifying an aggravating sentencing factor and overlooked several mitigating factors. In general, sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Wills v. State, 269 N.E.3d 1273, 1281-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Where, as in the current case, the sentence is within the range set by statute, we review the court's sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1282. “An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id.

[10] “When imposing a sentence for a felony, a trial court must enter a sentencing statement including reasonably detailed reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Higginson v. State, 209 N.E.3d 15, 24-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). A court abuses its sentencing discretion “when it fails to issue a sentencing statement, gives reasons for imposing a sentence that are not supported by the record, omits reasons clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or considers reasons that are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 25.

[11] Curtsinger argues that the trial court erred in identifying his juvenile history as an aggravating factor because his only juvenile case was resolved by informal adjustment rather than a formal adjudication. We agree. “[A] court may not consider a ‘[defendant's] juvenile contacts with the justice system not reduced to an adjudication as part of the criminal history aggravator of his sentence.’ ” Barbee v. State, 269 N.E.3d 888, 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Morrell v. State, 121 N.E.3d 577, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied), trans. denied. In Curtsinger's case, he is correct that his juvenile history consists of one case that was resolved through informal adjustment. Therefore, the trial court erred in considering that case as an aggravating factor. See Morrell, 121 N.E.3d at 579 (trial court erred in considering unadjudicated cases in juvenile history as part of criminal history); but see Hamilton v. State, 233 N.E.3d 461, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (trial court did not err in considering informal juvenile adjustments as part of criminal history), trans. denied. But the trial court gave his juvenile history only “slight weight,” noting the case was thirty years old. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 346. In addition, the trial court identified two unchallenged aggravating circumstances: the harm to the victims was greater than necessary to establish the elements of the offense; and Curtsinger violated the terms of his pretrial release by smoking marijuana. We will address the effect of the erroneous aggravator after reviewing Curtsinger's claims relating to mitigating factors.

[12] Curtsinger argues that the trial court erred in overlooking or rejecting several proposed mitigating factors. The trial court is not required to accept the defendant's view of what constitutes a mitigating factor or assign proposed mitigators the same weight as the defendant suggests. Fisher v. State, 264 N.E.3d 696, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “When a defendant claims a trial court abused its discretion by failing to find a mitigating circumstance, the defendant must establish the claimed mitigator is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Higginson, 209 N.E.3d at 27.

[13] Curtsinger told the trial court that his sixteen-year-old daughter would experience undue hardship if he was incarcerated because he would lose his veteran's benefits and they would lose their home. “Many persons convicted of serious crimes have one or more children and, absent special circumstances, trial courts are not required to find that imprisonment will result in an undue hardship.” Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999). The trial court rejected undue hardship to a dependent as a mitigating factor, determining that the officers’ photograph of Curtsinger's front porch displayed holes in the exterior siding that were “clearly bullet holes․ Very clearly.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 345. In substance, the court concluded that Curtsinger's reckless behavior had created an unsafe “environment” for his daughter. Id. at 346.

[14] Curtsinger argues that no witness conclusively identified the holes as bullet holes, but the court was permitted to review the photographic evidence and form its own opinion. Further, there is ample other evidence to show that Curtsinger had created an unsafe environment for his daughter, including a history of recklessly shooting his guns from his porches and leaving live ammunition on his front porch. Finally, according to the presentence investigation report, Curtsinger's daughter was living with a stepsibling at the time of the sentencing hearing, and Curtsinger failed to allege that her placement was inappropriate. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Curtsinger's proposed mitigator. See Edmonds v. State, 840 N.E.2d 456, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (no error in rejecting alleged mitigator of undue hardship to dependents; defendant's children were being cared for by relative), trans. denied.

[15] Next, Curtsinger argues the trial court erroneously rejected his proposed mitigator that he would respond affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment. Curtsinger asked the trial court to consider his lack of an adult criminal history and the probation officer's opinion that he would respond well to probation. The trial court stated,

I usually almost always agree with [the probation officer]. And this is no reflection upon him. Um, but I don't think you will respond to probation or short-term imprisonment. I'm going to give that a very—people that, people, I see people everyday [sic] that use drugs. I don't see people every day that shoot at their neighbor's house. Clearly in the line of sight.

Tr. Vol. 2, p. 347. In addition, in response to Curtsinger's statement during allocution that he did not see himself as a dangerous person, the trial court stated, “You are clearly a danger.” Id. at 346. In sum, the court explicitly considered the proposed mitigator and rejected it based on its assessment that Curtsinger was not taking his misconduct seriously. We also note that during Curtsinger's pretrial release, he continued to break the law by using marijuana. The court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this proposed mitigator. See Ware v. State, 816 N.E.2d 1167, 1177-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (no abuse of discretion in rejecting proposed mitigator that defendant would respond affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment; trial court explicitly considered mitigator and rejected it based on assessment of defendant's failure to take responsibility for actions).

[16] Next, Curtsinger claims the trial court overlooked the mitigator that his offense was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur. Specifically, he notes that he is barred from owning a gun because he is now a convicted felon. The trial court did not directly address this mitigator, but the record supports a conclusion that the mitigator is inapplicable. Curtsinger fired his gun recklessly, including occasionally shooting onto his neighbor's property, for two years before the day at issue. Prior calls to the police by neighbors did not correct his behavior and culminated in Curtsinger shooting his neighbor's van and pool while the neighbor was in the line of fire. And while Curtsinger was on pretrial release, he continued to show an unwillingness to comply with the law by using marijuana. Finally, during sentencing Curtsinger appeared not to understand that he would be barred from possessing firearms, stating he did not “plan on ever possessing them again” and that he would be willing to “grant” his neighbors peace of mind by refraining from owning a gun. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 335-36. We cannot conclude that this mitigator is significant and clearly supported by the record. See Ware, 816 N.E.2d at 1178 (no error in rejecting mitigator that crime was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur; defendant's offense was not isolated incident but was part of series of wrongful acts).

[17] Finally, Curtsinger argues the trial court overlooked as a mitigating factor that he was willing to pay restitution. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(b)(9) (2024) states that a sentencing court may consider whether a defendant “has made or will make restitution to the victim of the crime for the injury, damage, or loss sustained.”

[18] At sentencing, the deputy prosecutor conceded that Curtsinger's willingness to pay was a mitigating factor. The trial court ordered Curtsinger to pay restitution to Lynn and Lynn's insurer but did not identify payment of restitution as a mitigating factor. Curtsinger did not begin to make payments to Lynn before the sentencing hearing. Cf. Miller v. State, 659 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (defendant paid for victim's counseling sessions before sentencing). In addition, Curtsinger told the trial court that he had severe financial problems and was at risk of losing his home, which undercuts the value of his offer to pay restitution. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to determine Curtsinger's offer to pay was a mitigating factor.

[19] In sum, the trial court erred in identifying one aggravating factor, but Curtsinger does not challenge two other valid aggravating factors. The trial court gave only slight weight to Curtsinger's juvenile history but determined that the factor that the harm to the victims was greater than necessary to prove the elements of the offense was “a very significant aggravator.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 346. In addition, we have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Curtsinger's four proposed mitigating circumstances. Under these circumstances, we are confident that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence absent the reference to Curtsinger's juvenile history, and remand for resentencing is not required. See Higginson, 209 N.E.3d at 26 (no remand for resentencing necessary despite erroneous aggravating factor; valid aggravating factors supported the trial court's sentencing decision).

II. Sentencing Review Under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[20] Curtsinger asks the Court to reduce his sentence by an unspecified amount. Article 7, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise sentences. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) implements this authority, stating that this Court may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-2301 | February 27, 2026 Page 10 of 14 trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[21] The primary role of appellate review under Rule 7(B) “is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case.” Crum v. State, 239 N.E.3d 858, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). As a result, when conducting our review we do not ask “whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Woodcock v. State, 163 N.E.3d 863, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. A grant of relief under Rule 7(B) is reserved “for exceptional cases.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 613 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam).

[22] We may look at any factors in the record when assessing the nature of the offense and character of the offender. Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The defendant bears the burden of proving that a revised sentence is warranted. Keener v. State, 267 N.E.3d 1137, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[23] “The advisory sentence is the starting point our legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Woodcock, 163 N.E.3d at 877. At the time Curtsinger committed his offense, the advisory sentence for a Level 6 felony was one year, with a maximum of two and a half years and a minimum of six months. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b) (2019). The trial court sentenced Curtsinger to an enhanced but not maximum sentence of two years.

[24] “Our analysis of the ‘nature of the offense’ requires us to look at the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Curtsinger endangered his neighbors and those passing through the neighborhood by repeatedly shooting his gun from his front porch. He continued shooting even after he struck Lynn's van, hitting Lynn's pool while Lynn and his neighbor were nearby. Further, Curtsinger tried to deceive officers about firing shots from his front porch, even though the officers spotted shell casings and unfired rounds.

[25] As the trial court noted, Curtsinger's reckless shooting imposed a cost upon his neighbors that was much higher than was necessary to prove the elements of the offense. Lynn's insurer determined that his van was a total loss, and the swimming pool was destroyed. In addition, Curtsinger's uncharged history of reckless shooting caused Lynn and Reider to live in fear, choosing to bar family from visiting their home and incur the expense of renting spaces for family gatherings. Lynn felt afraid when mowing the lawn, and when Reider was working from home and heard Curtsinger firing his gun, she moved to the opposite side of her house.

[26] Turning to Curtsinger's character, our analysis “involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 990-91. Curtsinger was forty-nine years old at sentencing. He is a veteran. Curtsinger has no formal adult criminal history and no juvenile adjudications. But his lack of adjudicated offenses must be weighed against his history of using methamphetamine and marijuana. Curtsinger began using methamphetamine after his wife died, several years before the day at issue. And he used marijuana beginning at age fifteen. By the time this case was filed, Curtsinger was using marijuana on a monthly basis, and he continued to do so until he was taken into custody after the trial.

[27] Curtsinger argues that he is a single father who has been taking care of his sixteen-year-old daughter. But that argument is undercut by his use of methamphetamine for several years and his failure to enter a drug treatment program despite being hospitalized for a methamphetamine-related mental health crisis. Also, he put his daughter at risk by recklessly firing his guns off of his front and back porches over two years. Finally, at the time of sentencing, Curtsinger's daughter was living with an adult stepsibling, and there is no evidence that her placement is inappropriate.

[28] Curtsinger also argues that he was remorseful for his misconduct. But the trial court rejected Curtsinger's assertion that he was not a dangerous person or a threat, concluding that Curtsinger posed a danger to others. The court, as the finder of fact, was not convinced that Curtsinger had committed to changing his conduct. Further, the record demonstrates that he had not been deterred from reckless shooting by previous police visits and continued to endanger others until he faced a criminal charge. In sum, Curtsinger has failed to prove that his sentence is an outlier in need of correction under Appellate Rule 7(B).

Conclusion

[29] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[30] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Altice, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.