J.J., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After J.J. was adjudicated delinquent for conduct that would be Level 5 felony auto theft if committed by an adult,¹ the trial court committed him to the wardship of the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). J.J. appeals the disposition, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by placing him in the DOC. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 10, 2025, seventeen-year-old J.J. stole a vehicle. While fleeing police, J.J. crashed into three other vehicles but did not stop. At the time, J.J. had several prior adjudications for auto theft. The State filed a delinquency petition, alleging J.J. committed acts that would constitute the following crimes if committed by an adult: auto theft with a prior unrelated conviction, resisting law enforcement, and three counts of leaving the scene of an accident. At the initial hearing, the trial court found J.J. “is a danger to the community” and ordered him to be detained at a county juvenile detention center. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 19. At a pretrial hearing one week later, the trial court found continued detention “is in the youth's best interest and for the safety of the community. Mom refuses to take him home.” Id. at 30. J.J. remained in detention throughout these proceedings.²

[3] At the scheduled factfinding hearing in August, J.J. admitted to committing auto theft as described in the petition. The trial court accepted the admission, adjudicated J.J. a delinquent child, and dismissed the remaining allegations.

[4] The probation department completed a predispositional report, which summarized J.J.’s history of delinquent behavior and treatment. This was J.J.’s ninth juvenile referral since 2022, and his seventh adjudication for auto theft.³ J.J.’s risk assessment score put him in the high-risk category to reoffend, in part because he does not follow his mother's rules, has been suspended and expelled from school multiple times, and has a history of illegal drug use. He refused to participate in mental health counseling and refused to take a substance use assessment. He had received various prior services, including probation, home detention, and placement in a residential program from which he was unsuccessfully discharged. J.J. was also previously committed to the DOC, where he earned his GED and went to individual and group therapy. According to J.J.’s mother (“Mother”), he “did really well” in therapy at the DOC. Id. at 40. But he discontinued therapy after his release from the DOC in late 2024. He also participated in home-based therapy at some point and was prescribed medication, but he refused to take the medication and quit therapy after two weeks. Mother said she was now willing to have J.J. home and to provide supervision and support. Probation recommended J.J. be ordered to participate in home-based therapy and substance use counseling while serving home detention.

[5] At the dispositional hearing, Kaitlyn Lutane, the probation officer who completed the predispositional report, testified that after filing the report, she learned J.J. was not allowed to stay with Mother under the terms of her housing program until he received mental health treatment. Lutane started looking into residential placements, but since she learned of the housing issue on the last business day before the hearing, she had not heard back from most of the programs.⁴ Because home detention was no longer an option, Lutane recommended at the hearing that J.J. be placed in a residential program “[i]f we can find” one. Tr. Vol. 2 at 16. But she acknowledged J.J.’s age and his criminal history made it unlikely he would be accepted for residential treatment.

[6] Mother had reported to probation that J.J. has diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, impulse-control disorder, and paranoia stemming from past traumas. Mother elaborated on a source of J.J.’s trauma during her testimony at the dispositional hearing: while on a home pass from residential treatment, J.J. was robbed and shot four times, suffering lasting injuries. She had been unable to find a caseworker compatible with J.J. to provide mental health treatment.

[7] J.J.’s counsel asked the court to hold J.J. in detention until probation got an answer on residential programs and to place him there if one was available. The State noted this was J.J.’s seventh referral for auto theft and stated it did not believe J.J. was an “appropriate fit” for residential treatment. Id. at 26. The State asked the trial court to place J.J. in the DOC where he could participate in substance use and psychiatric treatment. The court noted this was J.J.’s ninth referral and “[i]n looking back he's had basically every kind of service that we can offer[,]” including residential treatment. Id. The court ordered that J.J. be placed in the DOC and undergo appropriate treatment there.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by committing J.J. to the DOC.

[8] “Juvenile courts enjoy significant discretion in crafting an appropriate disposition for juveniles found delinquent.” B.K. v. State, 235 N.E.3d 142, 143 (Ind. 2024). We review a chosen disposition for abuse of discretion, which occurs when a trial court misinterprets the law or issues a decision clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2024). In conducting this review, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. A.F. v. State, 247 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[9] Although a trial court is provided with “wide latitude and great flexibility” when fashioning an appropriate disposition, R.G. v. State, 212 N.E.3d 720, 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citation omitted), the juvenile justice system aims to rehabilitate rather than punish, J.T. v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Therefore, a trial court must consider the following factors when choosing between dispositional options:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

I.C. § 31-37-18-6 (1997); see also M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (describing the trial court's discretion as “subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy of favoring the least harsh disposition”), trans. denied, cert. denied. Ultimately, commitment to the DOC “should be treated as a last resort.” G.W., 231 N.E.3d at 190 (quoting C.H. v. State, 201 N.E.3d 202, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)).

[10] J.J. contends the trial court abused its discretion by committing him to the DOC because the court (1) did not allow time to conduct a “thorough investigation” into pending placement options, (2) did not evaluate placement options in the context of J.J.’s needs, and (3) did not make an individualized determination of the least restrictive alternatives. Appellant's Br. at 9. J.J. compares his case to Q.H. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[11] In Q.H., this Court reversed the juvenile's placement in DOC because the trial court “could not reasonably determine ․ that commitment to the DOC was the least restrictive disposition[.]” Id. at 1204–05. The juvenile was thirteen years old, had committed his first juvenile offense—a “relatively minor” one—and the predispositional report failed to mention or investigate the juvenile's emotional and psychological needs so the trial court could determine the least restrictive disposition consistent with the juvenile's best interests and community safety. Id. at 1205. This Court noted the omissions in the report could have been corrected before disposition if the trial court had granted the continuance requested by the juvenile or ordered an examination to obtain the relevant information.

[12] This case is distinguishable from Q.H. The juvenile in Q.H. was very young and had committed a relatively minor first offense. The juvenile's cognitive and emotional difficulties were documented in school and juvenile detention records, yet the predispositional report did not mention these challenges or evaluate the dispositional options in light of those needs. In placing the juvenile in the DOC, the trial court in Q.H. relied on the inadequate predispositional report. Here, by contrast, J.J. was a few months shy of turning eighteen years old, and he had been adjudicated delinquent nine times in the last four years. J.J.’s conduct had not escalated, but it also had not improved despite having received services and multiple less restrictive placements during that time. And the predispositional report did address J.J.’s needs, as it documented his alleged diagnoses, the treatment he had received, and the treatment he had refused.

[13] Probation recommended home detention based on Mother's stated willingness to house J.J. and provide supervision and support while he obtained community-based services. When probation learned at the last minute that home detention was not a viable option, it inquired about residential placement. Although J.J. requested disposition be withheld until probation could thoroughly investigate residential placement options, probation also said such a placement was unlikely given J.J.’s age and juvenile history.

[14] Indiana Code Section 31-37-18-6 requires placement in the least restrictive setting only “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child.” For several reasons, the trial court's decision to commit J.J. to the DOC was consistent with the statute and the broader policy favoring rehabilitation. First, as the trial court recognized, numerous less restrictive efforts had failed to alter J.J.’s behavior. Instead, he continued to reoffend and disrespect the rule of law and his fellow citizens. See M.Q.M. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 441, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (noting trial court has no obligation to revisit failed placement strategies). Second, because of J.J.’s substantial juvenile history, home detention was not a viable alternative, and residential placement was unlikely to be approved. Third, J.J. had responded well to therapy and other services while previously in the DOC but discontinued services after his release. This indicates the DOC could appropriately address J.J.’s mental health needs but that he was unlikely to seek or continue such services on his own. And last, although DOC commitment is intended to be a last resort, J.J. is nearly eighteen years old and this is essentially the last opportunity to aid him in directing his behavior in a positive direction. See A.C. v. State, 144 N.E.3d 810, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“The nature of the juvenile process is rehabilitation and aid to the juvenile to direct his behavior so that he will not later become a criminal.”) (quoting Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987)). The trial court was well within its discretion to determine the DOC represented the least restrictive means necessary, was in J.J.’s best interest, and reflected the community's safety needs.

Conclusion

[15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by committing J.J. to the DOC.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a) (2022).

2.   See also id. at 46 (order on factfinding/admission hearing continuing J.J.’s detention).

3.   In 2022, J.J. was adjudicated delinquent in four separate cases: one for theft, one for operating a motor vehicle without receiving a license, one for auto theft, and one for auto theft and criminal mischief. In 2023, he was adjudicated delinquent in three more cases for auto theft. And in 2024, he was adjudicated delinquent in one case for auto theft.

4.   J.J. had been denied by one program. Another said there was a wait for a bed, but it did not accept or deny him at that time. Lutane had not heard from four other programs.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.