Edmarius Malik Oats, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After pleading guilty to four counts of Level 3 felony aggravated battery, Edmarius Malik Oats was sentenced to thirty-eight years in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). He now appeals his sentence, arguing the trial court erred in identifying certain aggravating factors and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 23, 2023, officers with the Columbus Police Department received a report of a drive-by shooting at Lincoln Park. Officer Brian Voyles arrived first and found four people, including two juveniles, shot near the park's basketball court. Officer Voyles noticed there was a “large crowd” around the victims, as it was around 7:45 p.m. and the park, which included a football field, basketball courts, and baseball diamonds, was “quite full” of people. Tr. Vol. II pp. 37, 39.

[3] Witness Abe Fuller identified Oats as the shooter and told law enforcement that Oats and Gavin Hardin, one of the shooting victims, had a “beef ․ over a girl” and planned to “physical[ly] fight” that evening. Id. at 56. Shortly before the shooting, Hardin called Oats and told him he was at the park and Oats told Hardin he would “show up[.]” Id.

[4] The State charged Oats with Level 1 felony attempted murder and four counts of Level 3 felony aggravated battery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Oats later pled guilty to the Level 3 felonies and the State dismissed the Level 1 felony. The plea agreement also provided that Oats’ executed sentence would not exceed forty years. A sentencing hearing was held in August 2025.

[5] At sentencing, several civilian witnesses to the shooting testified. Michelle Chandler, who was at the baseball diamond with her son, testified she now feels she must always “pay attention” for her child's safety. Id. at 43. Rachel Shelton, also at the park with her son that evening, testified she had been playing kickball in that park for ten years but after the shooting her team “qui[t]” and her family no longer goes to the park. Id. at 49. Josiah Shelton testified he witnessed the shooting and now feels “uneasy to go places” and no longer goes to the park. Id. at 52.

[6] The trial court identified the following aggravating factors: (1) Oats’ history of delinquent behavior, including adjudications for battery, escape, and resisting law enforcement; (2) Oats’ multiple jail rule violations while incarcerated on this offense; (3) “the harm, injury, loss or damage suffered” by the victims “was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense[;]” (4) Oats knowingly committed a crime of violence in front of a person under the age of eighteen who was not a victim of the offense; (5) the “facts and circumstances” of the case; (6) the offense was premeditated; (7) the offense occurred at a public park and thus had a “community impact[;]” and (8) Oats displayed a “calculated disregard” for the safety of others in the community. Id. at 74. The court also found three mitigating circumstances: (1) Oats was eighteen when he committed the offense; (2) he pled guilty; and (3) he suffered from certain mental-health conditions. Finding the “aggravators significantly outweigh any mitigators[,]” the court sentenced Oats to nine-and-a-half years for each offense, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate of thirty-eight years in the DOC. Id. at 75. Oats now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Aggravating Factors

[7] Oats first argues the trial court erred by considering three improper aggravating factors: (1) the offense was premeditated; (2) the offense had a community impact; and (3) Oats showed a calculated disregard for the safety of the community.

[8] “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. A court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all[,]” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-91. “A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to enhance a sentence.” Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[9] Oats asserts there is no evidence to support the court's determination the offense was premeditated. We disagree. The evidence shows Oats had a “beef” with Hardin and the two planned to physically fight. Tr. Vol. II p. 56. Oats learned Hardin was at the park and later arrived there with a gun and fired multiple shots. Thus, the record indicates that Oats’ actions of driving to the park with a gun and shooting were not the result of a split-second decision, but rather showed planning and premeditation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the same to be an aggravator.

[10] Oats challenges the court's finding that the shooting impacted the community. The impact on others may qualify as an aggravator where the defendant's actions “had an impact on other persons of a destructive nature that is not normally associated with the commission of the offense in question and this impact must be foreseeable to the defendant.” Comer v. State, 839 N.E.2d 721, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Here, Oats committed a drive-by shooting at a crowded public park. At least three citizens testified as to the negative effect this shooting had on them as witnesses and how it made them fearful or unable to return to the park. This impact on others is of a destructive nature not ordinarily associated with aggravated battery, and it is entirely foreseeable that committing a mass shooting in a public space would produce such an impact. The court did not abuse its discretion in identifying this aggravating factor. See Gober v. State, 163 N.E.3d 347, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (court did not abuse its discretion in identifying impact on the community as an aggravator where defendant left her young children alone in an apartment and the children started a fire which displaced many residents), trans. denied.

[11] Oats also argues the court abused its discretion in finding he acted with a calculated disregard for the safety of others. But again, the evidence shows Oats fired multiple shots in a crowded public park. Notably, although he was targeting Hardin, he injured three others as well. In light of these circumstances, we conclude the trial court properly identified Oats’ disregard of others as an aggravating factor.

[12] Moreover, even if the court did abuse its discretion in finding any of these three challenged aggravators, the court still properly identified five other aggravating factors. As such, we are confident the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had not found the challenged aggravators. See Edrington v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1093, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[13] Oats next argues his thirty-eight-year sentence in the DOC is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an appellate court to revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We give “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision and attempt only to “leaven the outliers” rather than achieve the “perceived ‘correct’ result” in every case. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1225 (Ind. 2008)).

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is a rare avenue for appellate relief that is reserved for exceptional cases. Even with Rule 7(B), sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference. Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character). Absent such a sufficiently compelling evidentiary basis, we will not override the decision of ․ the trial court.

Sorenson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 717, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted), trans. denied.

[14] As an initial matter, we note Oats’ sentence is far from the maximum he could have received. For each of Oats’ Level 3 felonies, he faced between three and sixteen years, with an advisory sentence of nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b) (2014). He thus faced a maximum of sixty-four years in the DOC. The trial court sentenced him to a near-advisory nine-and-a-half years on each count, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of thirty-eight years in the DOC.

[15] As to the nature of his offense, Oats concedes “there is no disputing the seriousness of the offense[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 12. We agree. Oats fired shots into a crowded park and injured four people, two of them juveniles. By pure chance, no one was killed. Nonetheless, Oats argues consecutive sentences are inappropriate given the offense “was committed in a matter of seconds[.]” Id. We first note the trial court was well within its discretion to give consecutive sentences here, as this was a crime of violence with four victims. See Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a)(8) (2020) (defining aggravated battery as a crime of violence).¹ Furthermore, the record indicates that, far from being a split-second decision, Oats planned to commit this shooting after arguing with one of the victims. The premeditation and seriousness of the offense here warrant the sentence imposed.

[16] As to Oats’ character, he emphasizes his age and that he accepted responsibility by pleading guilty. But the trial court clearly considered these mitigators, acknowledging both at the hearing. This is also reflected in Oats’ sentence, which is half as high as it could be. Further, we note Oats had a history of delinquent behavior and several jail rule violations while incarcerated in this matter, both of which reflect poorly on his character. Given this, we cannot say his sentence is inappropriate.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2 was amended effective July 1, 2025.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.