IN RE: the INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF B.S. and E.H. (Minor Children) and C.H. (Mother) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of C.H. (“Mother”) to her minor children, E.H. and B.S. (collectively, “Children”).¹ Mother appeals the termination order, raising one issue: Did the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] E.H. was born in January 2021 and B.S. in March 2023. In July 2023, Mother and J.S. were living together with Children.² DCS received a report alleging Mother was abusing drugs, she and J.S. had engaged in domestic violence, and Mother may have dropped E.H. A DCS family case manager (“FCM”) met with Mother and J.S. but DCS took no immediate action. Sometime after the meeting, Mother and Children went to a shelter that provides services to victims of domestic violence.

[3] On August 7, the FCM met with J.S., who expressed concern about Mother's mental health and the safety of Children in her care. The same day, the FCM also met with Mother at the shelter. Children were with her, and the FCM saw a bruise on B.S.’s cheek. Mother was “visibly emotional, upset, frantic in a way, [and] pacing.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 83. Mother showed the FCM a video on her cellphone of a “verbal argument that was very heated” between her and J.S. Id. at 85. They were in a car, Mother was driving, children ³ were crying in the background, and J.S. “forcibly and repeatedly punched the glove compartment[.]” Id. DCS removed Children “due to evidence that we had at the time of domestic violence occurring between [J.S.] and [Mother] in front of her children and then in addition to that, the overall mental health of [Mother] at the time.” Id. at 86. In addition, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine on an instant drug screen that day.

[4] Because of the bruise, DCS was concerned about physical abuse of Children and took them to a hospital to be assessed. B.S. had a healing fracture to her left tibia of the kind that happens “when there is a forceful load on one or both ends of the bone[.]” Id. at 12. The bruise to the soft part of B.S.’s cheek was “very unusual for accidental injury.” Id. The doctor who examined her stated the injuries “were not well explained by any accidental history given [or] by a medical condition. And they were not appropriate for [B.S.’s] developmental age for her to have caused herself.” Id. at 13. The doctor said the injuries were “characteristic of ․ child abuse” and noted “[w]hen a child is in an environment where there is any type of violence including domestic violence, they are at an increased risk of being victims of violence themselves.” Id.

[5] DCS filed a petition alleging Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”) on August 9. Mother admitted Children were CHINS and they were adjudicated as such on August 25. The trial court entered a dispositional decree for Mother on September 28. Children were initially placed in relative care with their maternal aunt, but were later placed with their maternal great-grandmother, with whom they have resided ever since.

[6] At a permanency hearing on February 6, 2025, the trial court found that Mother was not fully participating in services. A concurrent permanency plan of adoption was added to the existing plan.

[7] DCS petitioned for termination of Mother's parental rights on February 17. DCS alleged there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in Children's best interests. The statutory circumstances DCS alleged warranted termination included: (1) there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside the parent's home will not be remedied, and (2) there is a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Children's well-being, safety, physical health, or life. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3), (4) (2024).⁴

[8] A factfinding hearing was held on May 12. The FCM summarized the state of the CHINS case:

[W]e're involved due to domestic violence, due to ․ mom bein under the influence and due to physical abuse. And so we put the services in place to just kinda deal with the source of the problem and figure out what is it that you know is stressin them out or what's hinderin them for keepin these kids safe. And so with these two parents they were recommended to do services․ But they never graduated from any [domestic violence] classes․ I'm still seein DV activity throughout the case․ [T]hey're not consistent with their well-being so they're not consistent with employment. They're not consistent with housing. I'm not even getting consistent ․ negative drug screens [from Mother]. And so with that I still have concerns with havin [Children] being placed back in their parents’ care.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 129–30.

[9] When asked if the reasons Children were placed outside the home were likely to be remedied, the FCM replied:

I don't think so ․ [b]ecause we're here two years later and we're still in the beginning of the case. We have not made any progression whatsoever. We're still at supervised visits. We are still at blamin one another for our actions. Not taking accountability. We're not takin our services serious. We're not takin our therapy serious. We're not bein honest to our therapist about the reason of [DCS] involvement. And just our action in front of the girls still—I still have concerns with that.

Id. at 130.

[10] The FCM explained Children had been with their great-grandmother for the past twelve months and the permanency plan was for her to adopt Children. The FCM said great-grandmother was willing to adopt Children and this was “[a]bsolutely” a satisfactory plan. Id. at 131. And the FCM said termination and adoption was in Children's best interests because if they were to go back to Mother, “I don't know what that stability look[s] like. I don't know what that consistency look[s] like. I don't know what that safety look[s] like for them. But with [great-grandmother] I do see that. And these girls do deserve permanency.” Id. at 132. The court appointed special advocate also testified termination and adoption was in Children's best interests: “If we look at all the information from the parents from housing, employment, the services, ․ the drug issues ․ those are not ․ what we want for the children to be around.” Id. at 172.

[11] The trial court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights.⁵ With respect to the DCS plan for Children's care and treatment, the trial court found:

94. The children have been in the care of their maternal great-grandmother ․ since April 15, 2024․

95. Both Mother and [J.S.] agreed to the children's placement with [great-grandmother].

96. There is a bond between [great-grandmother] and the children, all of their needs are met, and they have a great deal of extended family support.

97. [Great-grandmother] is willing to adopt the children and is able to meet their needs. [Great-grandmother] is able to keep healthy boundaries with the children and their parents and there was nothing identified that would make adoption difficult.

Id. at 38–39.

[12] As for the allegations in the termination petition, the court concluded:

31. There is a reasonable probability, based upon the past pattern of conduct of Mother ․, both prior to and during the CHINS and TPR cases, that the reasons for removal and the reasons for placement outside of parents’ home are likely to continue․

32. The continuation of the parent-child relationship between Mother and the children ․ demonstrated by the evidence at [the] TPR hearing, poses a threat to the children's healthy emotional and physical development.

* * *

39. Termination of Mother's ․ parental rights is in the children's best interest.

40. DCS has a suitable plan for the children's future care, that being adoption.

Id. at 43–44.

Standard of Review

[13] Parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). That said, “this right is not absolute.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[14] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must prove there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child and termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3) (2024). DCS must also allege and prove the existence of one or more statutory circumstances warranting termination. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d)(1)–(12).

[15] If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and “shall enter findings of fact” supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c) (2012); see also I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997) (burden of proof). As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts[.]” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses for ourselves but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment. Id. at 642. We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and second, whether those findings support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We will set aside the trial court's findings of fact and judgment only if they are clearly erroneous. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

The trial court's satisfactory plan determination is not clearly erroneous.

[16] Mother claims the trial court erred in determining DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children.⁶ Specifically, Mother argues great-grandmother did not testify she was willing to adopt Children and there was no evidence Children “were otherwise ‘adoptable’ should the plan that [great-grandmother] adopt the children fall though.” Appellant's Br. at 8. But such evidence is not necessary.

[17] The plan for the care and treatment of a child need not be detailed to be satisfactory. Rather, the plan must simply offer a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the children.” Id. That is, “there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.” Id. “Part of the reason for this is that it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to determine whether an adoptive placement is appropriate.” Id.

[18] Mother does not challenge any of the trial court's findings, and we accept the unchallenged findings as true. Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Here, the trial court found DCS’ plan for Children was adoption, “there was nothing identified that would make adoption difficult,” and great-grandmother is willing to adopt Children. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 39. Adoption is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of a child following termination. See In re C.D., 141 N.E.3d 845, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. The trial court's determination that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children is supported by the findings.

Conclusion

[19] The trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to Children is not clearly erroneous.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated the rights of J.A. (father of E.H.) and J.S. (father of B.S.). J.A. did not appear at the termination factfinding hearing and does not participate in this appeal.It does not appear J.S. filed his own notice of appeal, but Mother filed a notice of appeal on September 15, 2025. Five days before an appellant's brief was due in this cause, J.S.’s counsel filed an appearance and requested a thirty-day extension of time to file his brief. The extension was denied, and J.S. did not timely file his own brief or join in Mother's brief. J.S. also did not move to file a belated brief. Instead, J.S. submitted a pleading styled as a Reply Brief after the Appellee's Brief was filed. The pleading was not accepted for filing. Because J.S. failed to timely file an opening brief, his appeal is subject to summary dismissal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 45(D). Even if we were to order the Reply Brief to be filed, the brief lacks cogent argument, has scant citation to the record or legal authority, and is largely a request to reweigh the evidence. Further, the path J.S. has chosen for presenting his argument to the Court has deprived the Appellee of an opportunity to respond. For these reasons, the reply brief itself also subjects J.S.’s appeal to waiver. See App. R. 46(A)(8).

2.   Mother and J.S. were not married, and it appears J.S. had not established paternity of B.S.

3.   The video did not show the children, and Mother did not identify them. The FCM testified “[t]here's no indication that it would have been any other children other than” E.H. or B.S. Id. at 88.

4.   DCS also alleged Children have been removed from the parent and under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months and despite DCS's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2).

5.   The trial court's order quotes a previous version of Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 39. That version was amended effective March 11, 2024, and DCS petitioned for termination under the 2024 statute. Based on the allegations in the petition, however, the elements DCS was required to prove are the same under both versions of the statute. Although the trial court cited an older version of the termination statute, it made relevant findings on the elements alleged by DCS.

6.   Mother does not challenge the proof supporting the other elements and our review of the record and the findings supports the trial court's conclusions on those points.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.