IN RE: The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.L. (Minor Child); B.L. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] B.L. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental relationship with his nineteen-month-old daughter, S.L. (“S.L.”). Father argues that the trial court's order terminating his parental relationship with S.L. is clearly erroneous. Concluding that the trial court's order is not clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court's order terminating Father's parental relationship with S.L. is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[2] Mother and Father (collectively “Parents”) are the parents of S.L., who was born in January 2024. S.L. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth, and Parents admitted that they had used methamphetamine throughout Mother's pregnancy. One week later, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that S.L. was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). In addition, DCS removed S.L. from Parents and placed her in foster care with Father's sister (“paternal aunt”).

[3] In February 2024, Father admitted that S.L. was a CHINS. One month later, in March 2024, the trial court issued a dispositional order that required Father to: (1) abstain from the use of illegal controlled substances; (2) complete a parenting assessment and successfully complete all recommendations; (3) complete a substance abuse assessment and successfully complete all recommendations; (4) submit to random drug screens; and (5) attend supervised visits with S.L.

[4] Father tested positive for methamphetamine in March and April 2024. At some point, Father completed a substance abuse assessment at Centerstone (“Centerstone”), and the assessor recommended that Father participate in a substance abuse group and individual recovery coaching. Father “[i]nitially ․ showed up a couple of times, but then it became intermittent and then [he] stopped showing.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 65). Further, Father tested positive for methamphetamine in June and July 2024.

[5] Because Father continued to test positive for methamphetamine, the Centerstone recovery coach (“the recovery coach”) told Father that he would have to have four consecutive clean drug screens to return to Centerstone's program. When Father was unable to meet this requirement, the recovery coach recommended that Father participate in an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. Father did not want to participate in an inpatient program and decided that he would participate in counseling at another agency. Father was discharged from Centerstone in October 2024 and tested positive for methamphetamine in October, November, and December 2024.

[6] Also, in December 2024, Mother gave birth to Parents’ second child, who tested positive for methamphetamine at birth.² That same month, Father began participating in an intensive outpatient (“IOP”) substance abuse treatment program at Advantage Counseling (“Advantage”). However, after Father tested positive for methamphetamine in January and February 2025, the Advantage recovery coach recommended that Father participate in an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. However, Father still did not want to participate in an inpatient program.

[7] At the beginning of March 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental relationship with S.L. Father tested positive for methamphetamine four times in March 2025.

[8] In July 2025, Father entered an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. However, he left the program against medical advice five days later and tested positive for methamphetamine in July and August 2025.

[9] At the August 2025 termination hearing, the trial court heard the facts as set forth above. In addition, according to the DCS family case manager (“the FCM”), “the main issue with this entire case ha[d] been illegal drug use[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 44). Further, the FCM testified that the plan for S.L. was adoption by paternal aunt.

[10] In August 2025, the trial court issued a detailed order terminating Father's parental relationship with S.L. In this order, the trial court found, in relevant part, that DCS had met its burden of proving that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in S.L.’s removal or the reasons for her placement outside the home would not be remedied and that a continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to S.L.’s well-being.

[11] Father now appeals.

Decision

[12] Father argues that the trial court's order terminating his parental relationship with S.L. is clearly erroneous. We disagree.

[13] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of his child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. at 1188. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id.

[14] Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 provides, in relevant part, that DCS must allege in its termination petition as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

* * * * *

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.³ DCS must prove these alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013).

[15] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

[16] In addition, as a general rule, appellate courts grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters. Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “This deference recognizes a trial court's unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court[ ] only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Id.

[17] As a preliminary matter, we note that Father does not challenge the trial court's factual findings. As a result, he has waived any argument relating to whether these unchallenged factual findings are clearly erroneous. See Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (explaining that unchallenged trial court findings are accepted as true), trans. denied. We now turn to the substantive issue in this case.

[18] Father argues that the trial court's order terminating his parental relationship with S.L. is clearly erroneous. Specifically, he argues that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in S.L.’s removal or the reasons for her placement outside the home will not be remedied; and (2) a continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to S.L.’s well-being.

[19] However, we note that Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection d[.]” “Thus, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate Father's parental rights to [S.L.].” J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Therefore, we need only discuss whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in S.L.’s removal or the reasons for her placement outside the home will not be remedied. See id.

[20] In determining this statutory factor, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. Habitual conduct may include a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment. A.D.S. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[21] Further, the trial court may consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. Id. DCS “is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need only establish that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.” Id. (cleaned up).

[22] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that DCS removed S.L. from Father because of his methamphetamine use. During the nineteen-month pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Father tested positive for methamphetamine nearly every month. Further, he failed to successfully complete a substance abuse treatment program. Indeed, even after DCS had filed its petition to terminate Father's parental relationship with S.L., Father continued to test positive for methamphetamine and left an inpatient substance abuse treatment program against medical advice after only five days. This evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in S.L.’s removal or the reasons for her placement outside the home would not be remedied. The trial court's order terminating Father's parental relationship with S.L. is not clearly erroneous.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated S.L.’s mother's (“Mother”) parental relationship with S.L. However, Mother is not participating in this appeal.

2.   DCS removed that child from Parents, and the trial court subsequently adjudicated that child to be a CHINS.

3.   The General Assembly amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 effective March 11, 2024. Because DCS filed the termination petition in this case in March 2025, the amended version of the statute applies here. Additionally, we note that the General Assembly further amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 during the 2025 legislative session, and that amendment became effective July 1, 2025. The 2025 amendment does not apply to this case.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.