IN RE: L.A.O.M. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.N.M. (“Mother”) has demonstrated an inability to provide appropriate care for her children. Mother's parental rights to two children have previously been terminated. The instant case involves L.A.O.M. (“Child”), who was removed from Mother's care after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received two separate reports of neglect and unsafe and unsatisfactory home conditions. DCS alleged that Child is a child in need of services (“CHINS”) and, following a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS. Mother does not challenge the CHINS adjudication on appeal, only the juvenile court's order that she refrain from using and possessing illegal drugs and alcohol. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Mother and A.J.M. (“Father”) on September 6, 2021. Prior to Child's birth, Mother had previously been involved with DCS with regard to her other children K.M. and N.H. (collectively, “Siblings”). In the prior termination proceedings involving Siblings, Mother had attributed the fact that she had suffered from schizophrenia “to the fact that she was a recovering drug addict.” Matter of N.H., 2020 WL 3248942 *1 (Ind. Ct. App. June 16, 2020), trans. denied. “Mother also admitted using alcohol, marijuana, pills, and cocaine as well as experimenting with methamphetamine and heroin in the past.” Id. We affirmed the termination of Mother's parental rights to Siblings, noting that “[a]lthough Mother attended nearly all supervised parenting time sessions, Mother's parenting skills never improved” and that service providers had testified that Mother had been unable to provide Siblings with “proper care without continuous intervention[.]” Id. at *5.

[3] On January 23, 2025, DCS received a report alleging that Child was “a victim of neglect due to inadequate clothing or hygiene and physical abuse.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 14. When asked about the allegations, Mother stated that Child “has behavioral problems which she attributes to him having ADHD, to being the victim of sexual abuse by [Father] and knowing that he was the byproduct of rape by [Father].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 15. Mother denied physically abusing Child but indicated that she “has difficulty controlling [Child's] behavior” and that “nothing works.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mother reported that she had been “diagnosed with PST, a more intense version of PTSD and she also has general anxiety - severe, but no other diagnoses. She currently takes only Xanax.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 15. Mother admitted to having “a history of substance use” but denied current use. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 15. Mother alleged that she had been “raped by [Father] multiple times and he beat her before, during, and after she was pregnant. She said he killed [Child's] twin in utero and molested [Child] after he was born.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 15. DCS attempted, but was unable, to establish an informal adjustment.

[4] On May 23, 2025, DCS received a second report alleging that Child “is a victim of neglect due to neglect and physical abuse.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 15. DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Kirsten Akins made contact with Mother and “determined that [Mother] continues having difficulty providing for [Child's] needs.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 15. DCS learned of Mother's prior DCS involvement with Siblings. DCS also learned that Mother had previously been “diagnosed with Borderline Intellectual Functioning and Social Anxiety Disorder.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 15.

[5] On May 30, 2025, DCS petitioned to have Child found to be a CHINS. On July 21, 2025, DCS moved for a finding that, pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6(b)(4),¹ reasonable efforts to reunify Child with Mother were not required. During a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition, Father admitted that Child is a CHINS as to him. The juvenile court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS as to Mother, finding as follows:

DCS initially became involved with [Child] (3 years old) in January of 2025 due to conditions in Mother's home.․ DCS provided Family Preservation Services, case management for [Child], and therapy for Mother. Family Preservation services were addressing parenting education and checking safety of the home. Services were in place for approximately four (4) months, but Mother did not make progress in services and the conditions of Mother's home got worse. The home was cluttered with trash on the floor, medication on the floor within reach of the child, and lighters within reach of the child. Mother has a dog but will not let it go outside as she is afraid people will see it and take it away. Mother allows the dog to urinate and defecate in the home, and it is not cleaned up. There is a strong smell of urine in the home. Additionally, [Child] was observed to be dirty and wearing clothes that did not fit. Despite services, Mother became more aggressive with the child because of his behavior. There was also an additional report regarding bruises on the child. Mother informed DCS that she had mental health issues of anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder when she was [Child's] age, but she outgrew it. Mother also said [Child] was diagnosed with severe anxiety, autism, bipolar disorder but that he would outgrow it as well. [Child] has never been diagnosed with autism. Mother's behavior was erratic, and she screamed at providers and the child.

In May of 2025, there was a report that [Child] had been sexually abused by Father.․ Mother insists that [Child] can tell people that he was molested when he was one (l) day old. Mother was observed to call [Child] inappropriate names, such as “rape baby,” in his presence. Mother says she loves [Child] dearly “no matter what he is,” which is a child of rape.

[Child] was removed from Mother ․ due to conditions of the home and Mother's mental health. Although she was participating in services, she was not actively learning or using skills provided.

****

Court finds coercive intervention is needed to provide [Child] with a safe and stable home and to provide services to the family.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 19–20. The juvenile court noted that the termination of Mother's parental rights to Siblings had been based, at least in part, on similar deficiencies regarding her “home conditions, parenting, and untreated mental health.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 20. Despite being offered services in both Siblings’ case and Child's case, Mother “did not make progress due to untreated mental health and lack of understanding” and her “parenting skills never improved.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 20. The juvenile court further noted that although Siblings had been adopted after the termination of Mother's parental rights to Siblings was upheld by this court (and transfer denied by the Indiana Supreme Court), Mother testified that she “believes that the head of DCS is involved and wants to reopen her case, reverse the termination, and put the children back in her home.”² Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 20.

[6] In a pre-dispositional report filed by FCM Ashley Hall, DCS recommended that the juvenile court's dispositional order should prohibit Mother from using illegal drugs and alcohol. The report indicated that Father had described Mother as “bat sh[*]t crazy” and had denied “raping Mother, stating they had been in a relationship over two (2) years before she got pregnant.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 6. Father had also denied Mother's allegation that, the day after Child's birth, Father had “beat[en] and raped her and also molested [Child] right after [Child's] birth” and that “IU Hospital covered up the incident when it was reported.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Father emphatically denied having ever raped, sexually assaulted, or molested either Mother or Child, claiming that Mother's allegations are “absolutely not true.” Tr. Vol. II p. 53. The pre-dispositional report also indicated that

On 8/11/2025, FCM Hall received a text from [Mother] that alleged she got molested on 7/31/2025 in court by [Father] and that her lawyer saw it. [Another DCS official] received an email from [Mother's] attorney stating that [Mother] made the same allegations against [Father], and that CASA and CASA attorney pushed [Mother] into [Father]. FCM Hall did not observe any of this before, during or after the court hearing.

Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 13.

[7] During the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court indicated that Mother's visitation with Child was “dependent on Mother continuing to take drug screens though, so DCS does need to make a drug screen referral. So Mother, you'll need to call in to Cordant, um, daily and take, um, all the requested drug screens in order to have those visits. Do you understand that?” Tr. Vol. II pp. 159–60. Mother, through counsel, responded “[t]hat's fine.” Tr. Vol. II p. 160. The juvenile court ordered that the drug screens be paid for by DCS because “[i]t's part of the child's safety.” Tr. Vol. II p. 160.

[8] On August 20, 2025, the juvenile court issued its dispositional order, in which it ordered that Mother

9. Not consume or possess, nor allow anyone else in your home to consume or possess, any legend drug or controlled substance without a prescription.

10. Inform DCS of any medication prescribed to you and take all medications exactly as prescribed.

11. Not consume or possess alcohol.

12. Submit to random drug screens upon request of DCS, [court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”)]/CASA Program, or the Court.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26. The juvenile court also reiterated its prior ruling during the dispositional hearing, stating that

[Mother's] fully supervised parenting time may commence upon a urine drug screen being collected from [Mother] with a negative result for methamphetamine and/or fentanyl. Parenting time may occur thereafter and may continue so long as she submits to all requested drug screens and refrains from using or testing positive for methamphetamine and/or fentanyl. Parenting time shall be immediately suspended in the event [Mother] again tests positive for methamphetamine and/or fentanyl on any subsequent drug screen at which time DCS shall submit a Status Report notifying the Court of such suspension. In such event, parenting time shall not resume until further order of the Court.․ Parenting time shall be immediately cancelled in the event [Mother] appears to be under the influence of any substance.

DCS is ordered to pay for drug screens for [Mother].

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29.

Discussion and Decision

[9] The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not to punish parents. A CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but rather is a determination that a child is in need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without intervention of the court. A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child․ The acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention.

Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (internal brackets and quotations omitted, ellipses in original). We note that Mother does not challenge the CHINS adjudication itself and has, therefore, waived any challenge to Child's status as a CHINS. See generally In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (providing that an issue is waived when a parent “does not specifically challenge the trial court's findings or conclusions.”), trans. denied.

[10] Mother contends only that the juvenile court abused its discretion with regard to some of the conditions included in its dispositional order. “[W]e review a trial court's order of services and conditions in a CHINS case for abuse of discretion.” In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's action is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Although the juvenile court has broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate, the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was revealed by the evidence. Indeed, forcing unnecessary requirements upon parents whose children have been adjudicated as CHINS could set them up for failure with the end result being not only a failure to achieve the goal of reunification, but potentially, the termination of parental rights.

Matter of R.G., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[11] Mother claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering her to refrain from possessing or consuming illegal drugs or alcohol as part of the dispositional order because there was no evidence presented during the fact-finding hearing that indicated that she was currently abusing drugs or alcohol. In support, Mother cites to In re A.C., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), in which a panel of this court concluded that the juvenile court had abused its discretion in ordering the mother in that case to submit to a drug and alcohol assessment, random drug testing, and substance-abuse treatment where the record was devoid of “any allegation or even an indication that Mother has a substance abuse problem.” Mother also cites to In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d at 752, in which we concluded that the juvenile court had abused its discretion in ordering the mother in that case to ensure that the child was fed, clothed, supervised, and attending school when the evidence in the record supported “the contention that [child was] fed, attend[ed] appointments, and [was] hitting development milestones.”³ Both A.C. and B.W. are easily distinguished.

[12] In this case, Mother has a long-documented history with DCS and had previously admitted that she “was a recovering drug addict” who had used “alcohol, marijuana, pills, and cocaine as well as experimenting with methamphetamine and heroin in the past.” Matter of N.H., 2020 WL 3248942 at *1. While Mother claimed to have not been abusing illegal drugs or alcohol at the time of the fact-finding hearing, given Mother's admitted past issues with substance abuse, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the juvenile court to consider the risk of illegal drug use and alcohol by Mother or those residing with her to be a factor that would relate to Child's safety in Mother's home. Moreover, Mother had admitted to having administered crushed up Clonidine pills and having “put it in [Child's] juice” because Child “has sleep insomnia” and “tubes in his ears.” Tr. Vol. II p. 83. However, nothing in the record demonstrates that Child ever had a valid prescription for Clonidine.⁴ The evidence further indicates that Mother had left “medication” on the floor within Child's reach, supporting concern for whether the unknown medication had been prescribed to Mother or whether she was taking it as prescribed. Tr. Vol. II p. 19. Finally, Mother engaged in erratic behavior both prior to and during the fact-finding hearing and, given Mother's past indication that she had blamed her alleged schizophrenia on her drug use, see Matter of N.H., 2020 WL 3248942 at *1, it is reasonable that the juvenile court would be concerned that Mother's erratic behavior could be attributed to or caused by drug or alcohol abuse. Given the evidence before the juvenile court, we cannot say that the challenged conditions reflect unrelated boilerplate language but rather are supported by concerns in the record. The juvenile court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in including the challenged conditions in its dispositional order.⁵

[13] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6(b)(4) provides[r]easonable efforts to reunify a child with the child's parent, guardian, or custodian or preserve a child's family as described in section 5.5 of this chapter are not required if the court finds any of the following:****(4) The parental rights of a parent with respect to a biological or adoptive sibling of the child have been involuntarily terminated by a court under:(A) IC 31-35-2 (involuntary termination involving a delinquent child or a child in need of services)[.]

2.   Mother stated during the fact-finding hearing that she believes that the termination of her parental rights to Siblings may still be reversed because Chief Justice Rush allegedly “got COVID-19” after the Indiana Supreme Court had denied transfer on the prior case. Tr. Vol. II p. 68. She also alleged that as of the date of the fact-finding hearing, Siblings “are with Melissa.․ Melissa is corporate of DCS down in Indy.” Tr. Vol. II p. 68.

3.   To the extent that Mother cites to In re V.H., 967 N.E.2d 1066, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), in support, we note that V.H. is inapposite to the instant matter because this court had merely discouraged juvenile courts from using boilerplate conditions and restrictions after it reversed the CHINS adjudication and consequently the dispositional order.

4.   Clonidineis in a group of medicines called alpha-agonists. By regulating brain activity, it has a calming effect in children with attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). It can also be used for other conditions, such as tics, aggression, migraines, high blood pressure, pain in the hands and feet, sleep problems or other conditions.https://www.childrensmn.org/educationmaterials/childrensmn/article/15657/clonidine-catapres/ (last visited February 18, 2026).

5.   To the extent that Mother claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering her to participate in drug screens prior to visiting with Child, we note that not only did Mother fail to challenge this condition during the dispositional hearing, but Mother also consented to this requirement, stating “[t]hat's fine” when the juvenile court imposed the condition. Tr. Vol. II p. 160. Mother, therefore, accepted the condition for her visitation with Child and cannot argue on appeal that the juvenile court abused its discretion in imposing this condition on her visitation with Child. See A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 175 N.E.3d 318, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“A party may not take advantage of an error that she invites.”).

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.