IBARGUREN v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Miguel Ibarguren appeals his sentence for murder. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Aristides Garcia worked for CRST, which moves freight, and Ibarguren, who was born in 1977, was Garcia's trainee. Based upon an investigation of GPS coordinates of Garcia's truck, the truck stopped on February 9, 2022, for almost an hour at a location where Garcia's remains would ultimately be found. Allen Hensley, a manager at CRST, learned that an accident occurred in which the truck struck a mailbox on February 14, 2022. Garcia and Ibarguren did not return phone calls from Hensley. Caleb Johnson, another manager at CRST, attempted to communicate with Garcia and Ibarguren by phone, text, and the Qualcomm system in the truck. Johnson received “some responses through the Qualcomm,” and directed the truck team on February 25, 2022, to travel to Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Transcript Volume II at 41-42.

[3] On February 25, 2022, the truck returned to Cedar Rapids with only Ibarguren who told Johnson and Connor Chistopherson, the manager of operations at CRST, that Garcia had “gotten off the truck out of a medical concern” in Pontiac, Illinois, and that Garcia “didn't want [CRST] to know that he had a medical concern, because he was afraid of getting shut down.” Id. at 44-45. Christopherson thought it was odd that Garcia would exit the truck in Pontiac because it was not a major hub of transportation. Ibarguren gave CRST a bag of items owned by Garcia including medications and glasses, which concerned Johnson because they were items that Garcia would have needed. Christopherson, Johnson, and others decided to call the Cedar Rapids Police to report a missing person.

[4] Cedar Rapids Police Investigator Matthew Denlinger learned that Garcia last used his debit card at a Wal-Mart in Ellenwood, Georgia, on February 7, 2022, and obtained video which showed Garcia and Ibarguren entering the Wal-Mart, purchasing items, and returning to the truck. The police also learned that Garcia's daughter had called “[a]bout 10 days prior to [CRST] calling [the police] on February 25th, [CRST] received an email from [Garcia's] daughter stating that she has not talked to her father in over 10 days, and that she [was] worried.” Id. at 88.

[5] On March 8, 2022, Garcia's body was discovered inside a blue sleeping bag along I-65 north of Lafayette. An autopsy revealed that Garcia suffered twenty-one sharp force wounds including stab wounds and incised wounds to his neck, chest, back, and left hand. He suffered perforation of his right carotid artery and external jugular vein. He also suffered bilateral rib fractures from a blunt force. The multiple sharp force injuries caused his death.

[6] On March 10, 2022, the Cedar Rapids Police examined the truck at CRST and discovered “evidence that someone had been bleeding in that truck.” Id. at 119. Police also discovered “streaking to possibly be a cleanup of that blood at some point” as well as a black trash bag, blue gloves, duct tape, a tarp, and soapy detergent. Id. at 159. The Indiana State Police searched the truck and also discovered a notebook with Ibarguren's name and address which had a map indicating the area where Garcia's body was located.

[7] On March 13, 2022, the State charged Ibarguren with murder. On January 31, 2024, Ibarguren filed a Motion for Hearing to Determine Competence to Stand Trial, and the trial court granted the motion. After a hearing on April 16, 2024, the court entered an order on April 22, 2024, finding Ibarguren competent to stand trial.¹ In October 2024, the court held a jury trial, and the jury found Ibarguen guilty as charged. The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) indicated that Ibarguren had never been diagnosed as having a mental illness or disorder and did not feel that he suffered from a mental illness or disorder. The PSI mentioned that the court had granted a Motion for Competency Evaluations on February 1, 2024, and that “Dr. Jill Salem, Ph.D., and Dr. Sean Samuels, Psy.D., were ordered to determine if [Ibarguren] understood the proceedings and was able to assist in the preparation of his defense.”² Appellant's Appendix Volume IV at 43.

[8] On November 6, 2024, the court held a sentencing hearing. After statements from Garcia's children, Ibarguren stated:

I wanted to say this before, but it is very difficult for me to understand the process. I don't know how everything is, like, laid out or presented. But I would like to say that [Garcia] was in need of medications. Some of those medications were IVs. He was in need of those medications. Also, other medications for high blood pressure. The other medications that he was needing, he was not bringing them with him. He did not bring them. This made his behavior different, like he was not the same person. Also even his behavior changed towards me. Because he didn't have the medications with him when he was at work, maybe he forgot them, I don't know, I didn't understand what happened to him. His attitude changed a lot. He was aggressive. And he had a knife with him, too. That he would keep under the mattress. Yes.

I would like for you to consider – I want you to understand that I defended himself. Self-defense. And I know the son was speaking about his father that they were in the need of justice. But I want to ask the son why did he not ask his father that if he was in need of the medication, why didn't he say to his dad, hey, do you have the medication that you need? Because I know that his father would not deny that he was in need of the medication at his workplace.

I am not the type of person that goes around killing people. That is not the way it is. I understand that this should have never happened. I've also suffered because of this. So parents – not only parents should take care of their children, but children also should take care of their parents. I'm really sorry for your loss, sir. I understand that.

I'm before you here today as a killer, that's not – I don't accept it in that way. I'm not a killer. I defended myself. It was self-defense. Understand that.

Also [Garcia] was not sleeping much. I believe because of the same reason, because he did not have his medications.

Again, I would like to let you know that I also – I need fair, I need fair justice.

Transcript Volume IV at 89-90.

[9] During closing argument, the prosecutor asserted, “I think clearly what we heard in the defendant's allocution is a lack of remorse.” Id. at 90. He argued, “Your Honor, you heard a week's worth of testimony in which you heard Mr. Garcia was found with 21 stab wounds․ And that's not self-defense.” Id. at 91. The prosecutor requested a sentence of sixty-three years.

[10] During closing argument, Ibarguren's counsel argued that he heard Ibarguren express remorse. He also stated:

It's my recollection that the two psychiatrists or psychologist, one of which confirmed my concerns, and the other did not. Under the statute, the Court's given the right to make the determination. The Court made that determination. But the point of this argument is, that there is an issue of mental health that I think does exist.

I would also suggest that that is further supported by the course of a two-and-a-half year case that resolves itself in the way that it did with admissions at the end of today. I think those two statements indicate not only the evaluation by the counselors, revelations made today and their timing, also suggests that there are mental health issues available and they should be considered as mitigators.

Id. at 94-95. He also mentioned Ibarguen's lack of criminal history.

[11] The court stated in part:

I believe a reasonable sentence, when we do look at this, the mitigator, no prior criminal history is, in fact, one that I have to look at, and there is no prior criminal history that we are aware of. [Defense counsel] brought up the defendant's age, and that is something that the Court would also look at. The State brought up lack of remorse. And during the defendant's statement, it did not seem like there was true remorse. And given the 21 stab wounds on the deceased, on Mr. Garcia, it would appear that in my opinion, the aggravators are going to outweigh the mitigators.

Id. at 98.

[12] On November 15, 2024, the court entered a sentencing order which found the nature of the crime, “21 stab wounds,” and Ibarguren's lack of remorse as aggravating factors. Appellant's Appendix Volume IV at 56. The court found Ibarguren's lack of criminal history and age as mitigating factors. The court sentenced Ibarguren to sixty-three years.

Discussion

[13] Ibarguren argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering an aggravated sentence. He asserts that the court erred in failing to find that his mental health and expression of remorse were mitigating factors. He also contends the court found he had no prior criminal history which is a significant mitigating factor and that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors.

[14] We review the sentence for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons”; (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration”; or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-491. If the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491. The relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id.

[15] The determination of mitigating circumstances is within the discretion of the trial court. Rogers v. State, 878 N.E.2d 269, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The court is not obligated to accept the defendant's argument as to what constitutes a mitigating factor, and the court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as does a defendant. Id. An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. If the court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, it is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist. Id.

[16] A trial court's determination of a defendant's remorse is similar to a determination of credibility. Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 534-535 (Ind. 2002). Without evidence of some impermissible consideration by the court, we accept its determination of credibility. Id. The trial court is in the best position to judge the sincerity of a defendant's remorseful statements. Stout v. State, 834 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[17] The record reveals that Ibarguren asserted at the sentencing hearing that Garcia was in need of medications, his behavior changed, and he was aggressive. He also stated that he merely defended himself and that he had also suffered. As mentioned by the prosecutor, Garcia suffered twenty-one sharp force wounds. Garcia was found inside a blue sleeping bag along I-65 weeks after his disappearance. We cannot say that Ibarguren demonstrated that his remorse is a significant mitigating circumstance or that the trial court abused its discretion.

[18] With respect to Ibarguren's mental health, “mental illness at the time of the crime may be considered a significant mitigating factor.” Castor v. State, 754 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ind. 2001). The Indiana Supreme Court has held that there is a need for “a high level of discernment when assessing a claim that mental illness warrants mitigating weight.” Covington v. State, 842 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ind. 2006). The following considerations are relevant when the trial court determines the significance of a defendant's mental illness for sentencing: (1) the extent of the defendant's inability to control his or her behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of the crime. Weeks v. State, 697 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ind. 1998). A trial court is not required to consider allegations of mental illness as a mitigator. James v. State, 643 N.E.2d 321, 323 (Ind. 1994).

[19] Under the title “Mental Health,” the PSI reveals that Ibarguren “has never been diagnosed as having a mental illness or disorder, is not presently in therapy for the same, has never participated in mental health treatment and has never been hospitalized due to a psychiatric problem.” Appellant's Appendix Volume IV at 43. It states that Ibarguren “does not feel as if he suffer[s] from a mental illness or disorder” and he “has never attempted suicide.” Id. It observed that “[i]n the past six (6) months he has experienced mental health symptoms or conditions such as difficulty sleeping and difficulty concentrating.” Id. The PSI also states that Ibarguren “has never been a victim of any type of abuse,” “denies suffering from any traumatic events,” “has no thoughts of homicide or ideas of harming another person,” and “is not being prescribed [ ] any mental health medications at this time.” Id.

[20] The record does not reveal evidence regarding the overall limitations on Ibarguren due to mental health issues or the extent of any nexus between mental health issues and the commission of the crime. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to recognize Ibarguren's mental health as a mitigator. See Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 931 (Ind. 1999) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the defendant's mental illness was not a mitigating factor), reh'g denied; Hamilton v. State, 233 N.E.3d 461, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“There is no evidence in the record that Hamilton's anxiety, racing thoughts, or insomnia impaired his ability to control his behavior, limited his functioning, or was in any way linked to the offense.”), trans. denied; Lewis v. State, 116 N.E.3d 1144, 1155-1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“The extent to which Lewis would have been unable to control his behavior due to the [Bipolar II] disorder is similarly unclear, and his behavior before, during, and after the murders suggests that he was in control of his faculties. The weight attributable to this mitigator, if any, would have been extremely low under the circumstances.”), trans. denied. In light of the record, we cannot say that Ibarguren demonstrated that his mental health is a significant mitigating circumstance or that the trial court abused its discretion.

[21] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ibarguren's sentence.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not contain a copy of the January 31, 2024 Motion for Hearing to Determine Competence to Stand Trial, the trial court's February 1, 2024 order granting the motion, the court's April 22, 2024 order finding Ibarguren competent to stand trial, or a transcript of the April 16, 2024 competency hearing. In his notice of appeal, Ibarguren did not request a transcript of this hearing.

2.   The record does not include any competency evaluation.

Brown, Judge.

Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.