Lee Guzman and David Owens, Appellants-Petitioners v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Lee Guzman and David Owens were jointly tried and each convicted of murdering Ronald Cannon in a drive-by shooting. After those convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, Guzman and Owens sought post-conviction relief. They argued that each of their trial counsel was ineffective, that the State suppressed a police report, and that new evidence was discovered warranting a new trial. The post-conviction court rejected these arguments, and Guzman and Owens (Petitioners) appeal. We affirm.

Facts

[2] Around 2 a.m. on Monday, May 16, 2005, employees of a Sunoco gas station in Indianapolis heard multiple gunshots outside their store. Seconds later, a white pickup truck rolled slowly into the gas station parking lot and stopped at the curb near the front door. Cannon emerged from the truck, bleeding, and fell to the ground. The gas station employees called police, who arrived at the scene less than a minute later.

[3] Officers discovered that Cannon had been shot twice: once in the left arm and once in the left side of his neck. He was pronounced dead at the scene. A spent bullet was found near Cannon's leg, and a bullet casing was discovered on a nearby street.

[4] The lead detective assigned to the case, Detective Christine Mannina, and her team canvassed the area of the crime scene and spoke to Cannon's family. Detective Mannina discovered that, on the night of the shooting, Cannon had been roller skating at a local rink and was on his way home when he was killed. Cannon regularly went roller skating on Sunday nights and drove home along the same route, often stopping at the Sunoco where he was ultimately shot. Detective Mannina contacted the rink's security officer to ask if anything occurred the night of the shooting, but no altercations were reported.

[5] In the ensuing weeks, Detective Mannina investigated several tips, including a road rage incident on a nearby highway and a potential dispute between Cannon and a man named Willie Scott ¹ at the skating rink. Police also looked into rumors that Cannon's name appeared on a hit list in the nearby Haughville neighborhood and that the unnamed sister of an unnamed Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) officer may have witnessed the shooting. None of these leads generated further information or a suspect, and Detective Mannina considered the case to have essentially run “cold.” PCR Exhs., p. 12.

[6] Two weeks after the shooting, Detective Mannina received another tip. She was contacted by Carmel police, who had been in touch with an alleged witness to Cannon's shooting, Brandon Rider. Detective Mannina met with Rider on May 31, 2005, and he provided a detailed statement about the shooting. According to Rider, the shooting occurred while he was driving two men around in the early morning hours of May 16. Those men, whom Rider knew only as “Lucky” and “Man,” opened fire at a white truck. Trial. Tr. Vol. II, p. 204 (contained in Pet.’s Exh. 6). Detective Mannina determined that Rider's account was consistent with the crime scene. And through photo arrays, Rider identified “Lucky” as Guzman and “Man” as Owens.

[7] When Detective Mannina dispatched a search for individuals matching Guzman's and Owen's descriptions, officers quickly found the two driving Rider's car. They were taken into custody and charged with murder.

Jury Trial and Direct Appeals

[8] Though Petitioners were tried in a single proceeding, they were represented by separate counsel. Mary Zahn represented Guzman, and Daniel Mohler represented Owens.

[9] At trial, Rider testified as the State's key eyewitness. Rider explained that, a few months before the shooting, he met Petitioners to buy drugs from them. At that time, Rider was addicted to heroin and frequently used crack cocaine and marijuana. He explained that sometimes, in lieu of paying for drugs, he would drive Petitioners around town. And in May of 2005, Rider hung out with Petitioners daily.

[10] Rider testified that on May 16, he had been driving his car with Guzman in the front passenger seat and Owens in the rear passenger seat. Around 2:30 a.m., the three were driving north on Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Drive (MLK). Rider then turned into a bank parking lot, drove through the lot, and exited on Eugene Street (Eugene). The intersection at issue is depicted in the map below. The road running at an angled north-south direction is MLK, the yellow thumbtack icon marks the Sunoco gas station, and the bank and its parking lot lies east of the Sunoco, just across MLK.

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

Trial Exh. “21-0156-4700 Aerial of Site copy” (contained in Pet.’s Exh. 7).

[11] As Rider's car sat at the stop sign on the east side of Eugene, facing MLK, Rider noticed a white truck to the north, traveling southbound on MLK. Rider then heard Guzman exclaim: “There's that motherf***er that owes us money.” Trial Tr. Vol. II, p. 191. Just as Rider began to make a left turn to head southbound on MLK, he heard gunshots erupt from his car. Though he did not fully turn to look, he saw in his periphery both Petitioners leaning out of the windows—which had already been rolled down—and firing their handguns at the truck. Rider described the shots as traveling “[n]orthbound” and out of the “passenger” side of his car. Id. at 191, 193. When the gunfire ceased, Rider heard either Guzman or Owens remark: “That's what happens when you owe us money.” Id. at 195. Rider continued driving south down MLK and dropped off Petitioners at a nearby house. Fifteen or twenty minutes later, Rider drove back to the Sunoco to see what had happened to the truck and saw Cannon's body on the ground.

[12] During his testimony, Rider explained that he came forward with information about the shooting two weeks later because he was “feeling guilty” and wanted to “straighten [his] life out.” Id. at 201. He told an “[e]x-police officer friend” about the shooting and that friend put Rider in touch with police. Id. at 202.

[13] At the close of his direct testimony, the State moved to admit into evidence a plea agreement that Rider had entered into to resolve three unrelated pending charges for drug possession and conversion. Rider explained that these charges were filed months after he contacted police about the murder. The plea agreement stipulated that Rider's pending felonies would be downgraded to misdemeanors in exchange for his cooperation in the case against Petitioners. His sentence remained open, and his cooperation would be treated as a mitigating factor.

[14] On cross-examination, trial counsel attacked Rider's testimony from multiple angles. First, they pressed Rider about the details of his account, which shifted slightly. Rider explained that when he first saw the white truck, it was roughly in the middle of the block between 30th Street and Eugene, perhaps 150-200 feet away. He estimated that Cannon's truck was traveling “in the normal range” of speed—not slow but not speeding, perhaps 30-40 miles per hour. Trial Tr. Vol. III, p. 35. Rider explained that the bullets were fired at a “diagonal” and an “angled position, from south to north and east to west.” Id. at 33, 36.

[15] Trial counsel then highlighted the gaps in Rider's memory: he was unsure exactly how many shots were fired, and when questioned about the visibility at 2 a.m., he admitted it was dark out so he could not see very well. Rider could not distinguish the vehicle's driver or occupants—just that it was a white truck.

[16] Next, trial counsel attacked Rider's narrative based on his heavy drug use, arguing it affected his ability to perceive the events of the shooting. Rider admitted he had used heroin three or four times the day of the shooting. He also agreed that, around the time of the shooting, he regularly used cocaine and smoked marijuana, making it possible that he was also using those substances that night. Trial counsel called as a witness a medical expert that specialized in substance abuse and addiction. That expert testified that heroin use can result in the “dulling of the senses” and can “produce amnesia or memory problems.” Id. at 106-07.

[17] The State's other witnesses included Detective Mannina, who testified about her investigation, and a firearms expert, who determined that the two shots that hit Cannon were fired from different guns. A forensic pathologist testified that Cannon suffered two gunshots: one passed through his left arm and the second, fatal shot moved through his left arm and into his neck.

[18] At the close of trial, the jury found Guzman and Owens guilty of murder. They were sentenced to 60 years and 55 years, respectively, in the Indiana Department of Correction.

[19] Following their convictions, Petitioners separately appealed. Owens argued that Rider's testimony was unreliable and insufficient to support the conviction. Guzman argued that the jury's verdict could not stand because the physical evidence contradicted Rider's story. This Court affirmed the judgments in both appeals.² Guzman filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied. In both cases, transfer to our Supreme Court was also denied.

Post-Conviction Proceedings

[20] Owens initiated post-conviction proceedings in 2020, with Guzman following suit in 2022 by the same counsel. Petitioners both worked with Marion County's Conviction Integrity Unit (CIU) to conduct a full re-investigation of the case. In the nearly 20 years since Petitioners’ trial, IMPD's original investigative file had been lost, and trial counsel's files could not be located. Investigators discovered that Rider was deceased and his family did not want to get involved. No new information was gleaned from canvassing the neighborhood around the crime scene and reinterviewing the witnesses from the original investigation.

[21] However, the reinvestigation did produce a few new pieces of information. A private investigator learned that, when Rider approached his ex-police friend about the shooting, he also asked that friend for money. And at the time of the original trial, Rider was on probation and had a pending burglary charge not covered by the plea agreement that called for his testimony against Petitioners. These pieces of Rider's criminal history were not known to either party at the time of trial.

[22] The reinvestigation also revealed that Cannon's brother—who was known to the parties at the time of trial—was actually his fraternal twin and sometimes borrowed Cannon's truck. The CIU also looked into Willie Scott and found that he was involved with a criminal gang in Haughville. When Scott was arrested on drug charges five months after Cannon's murder, he possessed a .40-caliber handgun, which was the same caliber as the guns used in the murder. However, a ballistics comparison between Scott's gun and the shell casing from the crime scene was inconclusive.

[23] Finally, the CIU found a confidential police report created by Detective Mannina, which was recovered from a defunct department database. Neither prosecutors nor trial counsel had seen this report. Used to track her overtime hours, this report (Overtime Report) included notes about Detective Mannina's investigation. Though much of this information mirrored Detective Mannina's investigatory notes—which had been appropriately turned over to trial counsel—the Overtime Report contained some additional, previously undisclosed information about the investigation.

[24] When the reinvestigation was complete, Petitioners proceeded with their identical petitions for post-conviction relief, alleging four bases for relief:

1. Trial counsel's failure to procure experts to challenge the feasibility of Rider's account constituted ineffective assistance of counsel;

2. Trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate alternate suspects also constituted ineffective assistance of counsel;

3. The State improperly suppressed the confidential police report; and

4. Newly discovered evidence of Rider's pending charges at the time of his testimony warranted a new trial.

[25] In its response, the State acknowledged that the Overtime Report was previously withheld, should have been turned over, and contained information that went to the issues at trial. The State also acknowledged that Rider was not questioned at trial about his status on probation or his pending charges outside the plea agreement. The State “[had] no position regarding whether the Post-Conviction Relief Petition should be granted or denied.” App. Vol. II, p. 218.

[26] The post-conviction court conducted a hearing on the petitions in early 2025. There, Petitioners called a forensic engineering expert, William Dickinson, to testify about his analysis of the shooting. Dickinson focused primarily on determining the trajectories of the bullets based on the damage to Cannon's truck, his gunshot wounds, and Rider's testimony about the relative positioning of the vehicles. Dickinson estimated that the bullet trajectories possible under Rider's account of the shooting did not match up with the trajectories that were possible based on the physical evidence. Therefore, Dickinson opined that the shooting could not have happened in the manner which Rider described. Dickinson also challenged other aspects of Rider's narrative, including the short timeframe for all the listed events to occur and the practical difficulty of making a shot from one moving car into another.

[27] Petitioners then called an expert in lighting and optics, Jessica Ellis. She explained that, based on her reconstruction of the lighting conditions at the time of the shooting, the occupants of Rider's car could not have identified the occupants of Cannon's car. Ellis also opined that, based on Rider's description of the cars’ positions, it was likely that the glare of Cannon's headlights obstructed the vision of Rider and Petitioners for some period of time.

[28] Petitioners also offered into evidence a 2024 deposition of Detective Mannina, which was taken as part of the post-conviction proceedings. In that deposition, she reiterated that her investigation into alternate suspects was fruitless. When pressed about the logistics of Rider's story, she admitted she had not conducted a simulation of Rider's account of the shooting. The Overtime Report was also admitted, as well as a version of it marked with highlights agreed upon by the parties indicating previously undisclosed information.

[29] Finally, Guzman's trial counsel, Amy Zahn, testified. Owens's counsel, Daniel Mohler, could not be located. Zahn could not recall her investigation into other leads and was unable to locate her original file on the case. She remembered at some point filing a petition with the court for funds to pay for an expert. She did not consult a visibility expert, though she recalled consulting the State's firearms expert, deposing Detective Mannina, and discussing the distance and time figures presented by Rider's account.

[30] The State presented no evidence. The post-conviction court denied the petitions for relief, and Petitioners jointly appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[31] Because post-conviction actions are civil proceedings, Petitioners bear the burden of proving their claims by a preponderance of the evidence. See Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5) (2020).³ Where, as here, the petitioners appeal the denial of post-conviction relief, they “must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision.” Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000)).

[32] Petitioners challenge the post-conviction court's rejection of their three alleged bases for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) suppression of evidence; and (3) newly discovered evidence. Finding that Petitioners have failed to carry their burden on appeal, we affirm.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

[33] “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to counsel and mandates ‘that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ ” Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1279 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate two things: (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 1280. Failure to demonstrate both prongs—deficient performance and prejudice—is fatal to an ineffective assistance claim. State v. Greene, 16 N.E.3d 416, 419 (Ind. 2014).

[34] “Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.” Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). Accordingly, counsel's performance is presumed effective, and a petitioner must offer strong and convincing evidence to overcome that presumption. Id. at 1241.

[35] Petitioners raise two bases for their ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims: (1) trial counsel's failure to retain experts to challenge the feasibility of Rider's account; and (2) trial counsel's failure to investigate alternate suspects. We address each in turn and find neither persuasive.

A. Failure to Retain Experts

[36] Petitioners first contend that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to retain experts in incident reconstruction, ballistics, and visibility. In support of their argument, they point to the testimony of forensic engineering expert Dickinson and lighting expert Ellis, which was offered at the post-conviction hearing. Petitioners argue that Dickinson's and Ellis's analyses proved Rider's account of the shooting was “impossible,” and, therefore, trial counsel's failure to present such evidence fell below the minimum standard of competence. Appellant's Br., p. 38. However, this claim fails at the prejudice prong of the analysis for two reasons.

[37] First, as the post-conviction court found, the core substance of these experts’ conclusions was already before the jury. Through argument and extensive cross-examination, trial counsel emphasized the apparent discrepancies between Rider's narrative and the physical evidence. For instance, counsel cross-examined Detective Mannina about whether the damage to the side mirror of Cannon's truck indicated that the fatal shot came from behind the vehicle, rather than from the front or side as Rider's account suggested. Counsel also questioned the forensic pathologist at length about the bullet trajectories, ultimately eliciting testimony that Cannon's wounds were inconsistent with head-on gunfire unless his body was turned. Finally, counsel questioned Rider about the precision needed to kill Cannon from a moving car, stating: “they must have been pretty good shots, huh?” Trial Tr. Vol. III, p. 36.

[38] With respect to visibility, Rider himself admitted that he could not see who was driving the approaching vehicle, only that it appeared to be a white truck. Ellis's visibility analysis—concluding that the occupants of the truck could not be identified—was consistent with Rider's own account. And counsel Zahn made this point directly to the jury: “you heard Brandon Rider say it was dark and that's why he couldn't see who was inside the cab of the truck. But yet these people are just going to start firing on someone when they don't really even know who it is?” Trial Tr. Vol. IV, p. 41.

[39] Both attorneys reiterated these points in closing arguments. Counsel Zahn argued: “If [Guzman] was hanging out the front seat like [Rider] says, all you have to do is look at the map and see that bullet would probably be in the front windshield, not the side, the front windshield. It doesn't make any sense. The physical evidence does not corroborate what Brandon Rider says happened.” Id. at 44. Counsel Mohler also offered argument on the timing. He asserted that, with Cannon's truck covering a short distance at 30 to 40 miles per hour, there was not enough time for Petitioners to recognize Cannon, pull their guns, aim, and fire. Mohler told the jury that “[Rider's] story is so preposterous that it has to be a lie.” Id. at 66.

[40] Thus, trial counsel covered each point raised by the experts who testified at the post-conviction hearing—bullet trajectories, lighting, precision, and timing. Though the proposed experts’ testimony would have provided a more technical presentation of these same themes, Petitioners have not demonstrated that such added technical gloss on these common-sense arguments would have created a “reasonable probability” of a different verdict. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

[41] Second, the proposed expert testimony is not as exonerating as Petitioners suggest. Their argument that the experts render “impossible” Rider's narrative rests on a false dichotomy: either the shooting happened exactly as Rider described it, in every spatial and temporal detail, or it did not happen at all. Appellant's Br., p. 38. Additionally, Dickinson's models used select variables from Rider's testimony—distances, positions, and speed—as fixed inputs, even though Rider's own account was far less precise. For example, Rider described the 150-to-200-foot figure as an estimate of when he first saw the truck, not a fixed distance at which the shooting began or he began driving. He once described the bullets as traveling “[n]orthbound,” but later characterized the direction as “south to north and east to west.” Trial Tr. Vol. II, p. 191; Trial Tr. Vol. III, p. 36.

[42] A jury is not required to accept every detail of a witness's testimony to credit its substance. See, e.g., Foulks v. State, 582 N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ind. 1991) (“The trier of fact is free to believe one part of a witness’ testimony and disbelieve another part.”). Here, the jury heard Rider's account and its slight variations. It heard extensive cross-examination of Rider and of other witnesses challenging the details of that account. Still, the jury found the core of Rider's testimony—that Petitioners fired at Cannon from Rider's car—to be credible. Petitioners have failed to show that “but for” counsel's alleged error of failing to retain such experts, “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1280.

B. Failure to Adequately Investigate Alternate Suspects

[43] Petitioners next contend that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to conduct an independent investigation into alternate suspects. An attorney “has a duty to make a reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable decision that the particular investigation is unnecessary.” Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 719-20 (Ind. 2007). “[W]e apply a great deal of deference to counsel's judgments” and “resist [from] judging an attorney's performance with the benefit of hindsight.” McKnight v. State, 1 N.E.3d 193, 200-01 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). This is because a defendant, “[w]ith the benefit of hindsight, ․ can always point to some rock left unturned to argue counsel should have investigated further.” Ritchie, 875 N.E.2d at 719.

[44] Here, Petitioners’ claim fails for multiple reasons. First, Petitioners criticize trial counsel for relying on Detective Mannina's investigation “despite knowing that [Detective] Mannina had not properly investigated other viable suspects.” Appellant's Br., p. 38. Petitioners do not cite the record for this proposition. They appear to argue that such inference can be made because trial counsel questioned Detective Mannina about her investigation. However, the fact that trial counsel deposed Detective Mannina before trial about her investigation and then cross-examined her at trial about it actually demonstrates that trial counsel pursued their obligations to independently investigate the case by assessing the investigation of police.

[45] Second, Petitioners largely fail to specify the leads they claim trial counsel should have investigated. They state that “viable suspects” existed, without explaining who they were and why they were “viable.” Id.⁴ Petitioners mention the lead about the unnamed sister of the unnamed IMPD officer who supposedly witnessed the shooting and claim trial counsel “did nothing to try to locate her.” Id. at 40. But the record shows that police had already attempted to find her to no avail, even after interviewing witnesses at the crime scene and canvassing the neighborhood.

[46] Though Petitioners compare their case to Warren v. State, 146 N.E.3d 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), we find it distinguishable. In Warren, the petitioner claimed his trial counsel failed to investigate his brother's girlfriend, whose truck and physical appearance could have matched the description of the murderer. Id. at 978-79. Trial counsel in Warren also failed to interview the defendant's brother, who would have explained that his girlfriend exhibited strange behavior following the murder—she repainted her car, suddenly possessed a large amount of cash, and left town. Id. at 978. This Court determined trial counsel's performance was deficient but ultimately found no prejudice due to substantial independent evidence of the petitioner's guilt. Here, the lead about the unnamed sister of the unnamed IMPD officer, who was not even claimed to be the suspect herself but merely someone who may have information, was far less concrete than the named and identified alternate suspect in Warren.

[47] Despite Petitioners’ aforementioned failure to name any other specific unpursued leads, we observe that the other tips that emerged in the investigation were also too vague to be productive or were found to be dead ends after review. For instance, Detective Mannina testified that she investigated the reported road rage incident but determined that the vehicles involved did not match Cannon's truck. And though Detective Mannina heard a rumor that there may have been a fight at the skating rink between Cannon and Willie Scott, she had asked the security officer working at the rink that night about any altercations and the officer reported none. We therefore cannot say that the extent of trial counsel's investigation was unreasonable.

[48] Finally, Petitioners fail to meet their burden on the prejudice prong as well. Because Petitioners offer no argument as to how any tip would have led to a viable alternate suspect, any attempt to show prejudice is purely speculation. See McKnight, 1 N.E.3d at 201 (explaining that prejudice prong of ineffective assistance claim “requires going beyond the trial record to show what investigation, if undertaken, would have produced.”).

[49] For these reasons, we cannot say that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioners relief on their ineffective assistance of counsel claims.⁵

II. Suppression of Evidence

[50] Petitioners next claim the State suppressed the Overtime Report in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). “[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused ․ violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87.

[51] To prevail on a Brady claim, the petitioner must show that the evidence: (1) was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) is favorable to the defense because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; and (3) is material, meaning prejudice ensued from its suppression. State v. Parchman, 200 N.E.3d 499, 504 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

[52] The post-conviction court rejected Petitioners’ Brady claim, concluding the information contained in the Overtime Report was neither exculpatory nor material. It found that much of that information was already “known to trial counsel, explored during cross examination, and argued to the jury” and “what remains ․ does not tend to prove that [Petitioners] did not commit the offense or otherwise undermine confidence in the verdict.” App. Vol. III, p. 103.

[53] On appeal, Petitioners claim the post-conviction court failed to consider the two “most significant” pieces of information in the Overtime Report: details about Cannon's brother and the IMPD officer's sister. Appellant's Br., p. 40. As to the first, trial counsel already knew that Cannon had a brother, that the two were not well liked, and that the brother may have been on a hit list. The Overtime Report contained the additional information that the brother was Cannon's fraternal twin and often borrowed Cannon's truck. As to the IMPD officer's sister, the defense already knew that she was rumored to be a witness to the shooting and saw a car with Illinois plates at the scene. The Overtime Report provided the additional information that, according to the sister's account, the shooter fired from a car and then walked to Cannon's truck while continuing to shoot.

[54] Based on this information, Petitioners theorize that “a gang from Chicago may have been involved in the murder” and might have mistakenly targeted Cannon while searching for his twin brother. Id. at 41. However, much of the information underlying this alternate-perpetrator theory was already available to trial counsel and presented to the jury. Trial counsel knew that police had looked into the involvement of the Chicago-area gang called the Disciples, including a rumor that the gang was “not leaving until they get [Cannon's brother].” PCR Exhs., p. 83; Appellants’ Br., p. 15 (marking this information “provided”). Counsel also knew that the vehicle in the account of the IMPD officer's sister had Illinois plates. In fact, trial counsel cross-examined Detective Mannina at trial about the potential involvement of the Disciples gang. That Cannon's brother was a fraternal twin and sometimes drove Cannon's truck adds incremental detail to a theory the jury already heard and rejected. Therefore, Petitioners fail to establish that the previously undisclosed information undermines confidence in the verdict.

[55] Petitioners also allege that the account of the IMPD officer's sister (the shooter first fired from a vehicle and then walked to the truck to continue shooting) “perfectly matches the ballistics angles.” Appellants’ Br., p. 41. But without further details like location, distance, and angles—information that Petitioners acknowledge is critical in their argument discrediting Rider's account—a meaningful comparison cannot be made to the physical evidence at the scene. Moreover, the sister's account appears to conflict with other evidence presented at trial. For instance, the gas station attendant testified that, immediately after hearing gunshots, he looked out the front window and watched Cannon drive up to the station, stop his truck, and exit before collapsing. The attendant did not see anyone shooting at Cannon.

[56] Because the undisclosed information was either already presented to the jury or too vague to form a viable alternate theory, the new information contained in the Overtime Report would not reasonably “put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Parchman, 200 N.E.3d at 504 (citation omitted). Petitioners have therefore failed to show that the suppressed information was material. Accordingly, the post-conviction court did not err in denying Petitioners’ relief on this claim.

III. Newly Discovered Evidence

[57] Lastly, Petitioners argue that newly discovered evidence of Rider's additional criminal matters entitles them to a new trial. Specifically, the post-conviction reinvestigation revealed that, at the time of trial, Rider was on probation and had a pending Class B felony burglary charge.

[58] Petitioners contend this evidence would have demonstrated Rider's “motivation to falsely testify” and “strong incentive to lie.” Appellants’ Br., pp. 42, 46. But the jury was already presented with precisely that theory through far more direct evidence. Therefore, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that this new evidence would likely produce a different result at retrial. See Bunch v. State, 964 N.E.2d 274, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that “[n]ewly-discovered evidence mandates a new trial only when” nine criteria are demonstrated, including that the evidence “will probably produce a different result at retrial”).

[59] At trial, a plea agreement between Rider and the State was admitted into evidence and thoroughly explored before the jury. That agreement required Rider to cooperate with the State in Petitioners’ prosecution in exchange for a reduction of the charges and the recognition of his cooperation as a mitigating factor at sentencing. On cross-examination, Rider acknowledged that he hoped to minimize his incarceration when sentenced and recognized that his failure to cooperate would allow the State to withdraw the agreement.

[60] Therefore, Rider's potential biases and motivation to testify favorably for the State were made clear to the jury. That Rider had other unrelated criminal matters pending at the time of trial pales in comparison with the evidence of his agreement with the State, which outlined explicit benefits for his cooperation.

[61] Given this context, Petitioners’ comparison to Newman v. State, 334 N.E.2d 684 (Ind. 1975), is misplaced. In Newman, a key prosecution witness entered into a lenient plea agreement in exchange for his testimony, but that agreement was not disclosed to the defense. Our Supreme Court found trial counsel had no opportunity to attack the witness's credibility on this basis. Here, the opposite occurred: Rider's plea agreement was admitted into evidence, and trial counsel attacked Rider's credibility on those grounds.

[62] For the same reasons, the information that Rider asked his ex-police officer friend for money when Rider reported the shooting does not change the outcome. Again, Rider's personal incentives to cooperate were made clear through much more direct evidence: the plea agreement. The post-conviction court did not err in concluding that this new evidence was not “enough to make it probable that a different result would be produced at a new trial.” Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ind. 2006).

Conclusion

[63] Because trial counsel challenged the feasibility of Rider's account through cross-examination of multiple witnesses, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the failure to retain experts to make the same points constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioners’ arguments about further investigation of alternate suspects rest on vague and speculative leads, and they fail to show what a more thorough investigation would have uncovered.

[64] Finally, most of the information contained in the suppressed Overtime Report was already known to trial counsel and before the jury. Petitioners fail to show a reasonable probability that the outcome would be different had that information been disclosed. For similar reasons, Petitioners also fail to show that the newly discovered evidence of Rider's additional pending criminal charges impacts the verdict.

[65] In sum, Petitioners have failed to show that “the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 258). We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Throughout the record, this individual's name appears as both “Willie Scott” and “Willie Stott,” with the nickname “Meat” attributed to both. See, e.g., Trial Tr. Vol. III, p. 163; PCR Exhs., p. 25. As the post-conviction court used the last name “Scott,” we follow suit.

2.   Guzman v. State, Case No. 49A02-0609-CR-831 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2007) (mem.); Owens v. State, Case No. 49A05-0609-CR-538 (Ind. Ct. App. July 19, 2007) (mem.).

3.   Petitioners contend that because the post-conviction prosecutor took no position on their petitions, the State waived its right to defend the judgment on appeal; therefore, Petitioners claim they need only demonstrate prima facie error. We are unpersuaded. First, taking no position is not the same as conceding that the petition is meritorious. Petitioners still bore the burden of proving their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, and the post-conviction court had an independent obligation to evaluate the evidence. See P-C.R. 1(5)-(6).Second, the authority on which Petitioners rely is inapposite. In State v. Peters, 921 N.E.2d 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), the State, as appellant, waived an issue by failing to raise it at trial, whereas here, the State is the appellee defending a judgment in its favor. And the res judicata principles discussed in Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697 (Ind. 2013), are inapplicable here because there is no prior judgment that the State is seeking to relitigate; it is merely defending the denial of the petition on appeal.

4.   In the facts section of their Appellants’ Brief, Petitioners recount the many tips that emerged in the investigations. But without specification in the context of their ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument, we cannot determine which of these various tips Petitioners believe are viable. When a party fails to make a cogent argument, we will not develop one for them, and the argument is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); Lee v. State, 91 N.E.3d 978, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

5.   In their claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioners also argue that the post-conviction court improperly presumed that, because counsel Mohler did not testify at the post-conviction hearing, his testimony would not have supported Owens's claims. They contend that Mohler could not be located for the hearing despite diligent efforts, and thus, the court should have instead presumed Mohler's testimony would mirror counsel Zahn's. However, we need not resolve this dispute. As explained above, even considering Zahn's testimony as part of the record, Petitioners have not established ineffective assistance of counsel. Presuming Mohler would have testified consistently with Zahn therefore would not change the outcome of our analysis.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.