Elizabeth Martinez, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Todd Linderwell, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Elizabeth Martinez sued Todd Linderwell for damages in small claims court after Linderwell shot her two dogs—killing one and injuring the other—on his property. The trial court ruled in Linderwell's favor. Martinez raises several claims for appellate review, which we restate and consolidate as: Did the trial court clearly err when it denied her claim? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[2] On the evening of November 7, 2024, Martinez's partner, Jesse Falk, let two of their dogs, Douglas and Tilly, outside their home in Bluffton for what was supposed to be “a quick bathroom break.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 16. Falk directed the dogs to an enclosed pen next to the garage. No fence surrounded the property. After the canines finished their business, Falk entered the pen, grabbed Douglas by the collar—because he tended to wander—and attempted to return both dogs to the house. Falk lost his grip on the collar, and Douglas escaped. The three-and-a-half-year-old labrador raced towards a wooded area of the property. Tilly, a labrador mix, followed. Falk searched for Douglas and Tilly for some time, but his repeated attempts to recall the dogs were in vain.

[3] The same evening, around 9:40 at night, Linderwell stepped outside his house to dispose of trash. He was accompanied by his dog. Linderwell's property was within a mile of Martinez's home. As Linderwell and his dog were walking, Tilly approached, “[h]ead low to the ground, growling, teeth baring and coming at [Linderwell] and [his] dog.” Id. at 49. Linderwell threw the “stuff in [his] hands” into the air and headed back to his house. Id. Tilly backed off. But upon turning around, Linderwell realized Douglas “had [his] dog by the neck holding it to the ground.” Id. at 50. Linderwell began to yell at Douglas and Tilly, and the two walked away. Linderwell sought information about the dogs from his neighbors, but none knew them.

[4] The next morning, Linderwell took his dog outside before his children left for school. Linderwell again encountered Douglas and Tilly in his front yard; this time the two dogs were “spread out probably a hundred feet across and they [were] coming at [Linderwell and his dog] at a V and charging ․ and baring teeth again.” Id. Linderwell took his dog inside and retrieved his rifle. His wife “pulled [the children] into the kitchen behind the door[.]” Id. at 51. Now armed, Linderwell went outside and fired “two shots [at Douglas] and one shot [at Tilly] as [she] was running at [him].” Id. at 50. Both dogs dropped to the ground. Linderwell got his tractor “to clean everything up so [his] kids [didn't] have to witness.” Id. By the time he returned, Tilly had disappeared. Linderwell then witnessed Douglas “suffering bad[,]” so he “put [Douglas] down because it was moments from dying on its own.” Id. Upon closer inspection, Linderwell realized Douglas was wearing a tag with an address on it. He took the tag and searched for the address online, but his search came up empty. He placed Douglas in a bag and buried him on his property.

[5] Linderwell's daughter left the house distraught about the shooting and talked about the event in school. One of her teachers called Linderwell and suggested he find “somebody [for her] to talk to” about the incident. Id. at 52. The teacher also advised Linderwell of a social media post seeking information about missing dogs.² Linderwell read the post the day after his conversation with the teacher and subsequently called law enforcement.

[6] Meanwhile, Martinez and Falk continued to search for Douglas and Tilly. In addition to requesting help on social media, Martinez and Falk searched for the dogs in their neighborhood and beyond. Tilly made it back to the Martinez household the morning of November 8 with “a two inch hole in the side of her[.]” Id. at 28. Falk took Tilly to a veterinarian who patched her wound; Martinez later drove Tilly to an animal hospital where she underwent more extensive treatment. On November 9, acting on a tip received on Martinez's social media account, Falk resumed looking for Douglas. During his search, Falk encountered a law enforcement officer and told him about his efforts. The officer was aware of Linderwell's report and helped connect Falk with Linderwell. Law enforcement facilitated the return of Douglas’ body. By then, Linderwell was no longer in possession of Douglas’ dog tag.³

[7] On January 7, 2025, Martinez, pro se, filed the underlying action in small claims court, alleging Linderwell “shot and killed [her] chocolate labrador Douglas and severely wounded Tilly, [her] labrador mix.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 9. Her one-page “notice of claim” sought $5,000 in damages, court costs, and the return of Douglas’ dog tag. Id.

[8] On March 19, the court held a hearing in which Martinez, Falk, and Linderwell testified. At the hearing, Linderwell justified shooting the dogs largely because he believed his “health or safety” was in jeopardy. Tr. Vol. 2 at 63. The trial court determined Linderwell had “to make a split decision” when Douglas and Tilly charged at him and his dog the morning of the shooting. Id. at 68. The court was troubled by Martinez's inability to keep her dogs from leaving her unfenced property more than once before the incident at hand.⁴ The court concluded Martinez failed to take adequate measures to confine her dogs, and because of that Linderwell was in the difficult position of defending himself, his dog, and potentially his family from the threat of two seemingly untamed animals. See id. at 68. Accordingly, the trial court denied Martinez's claim and ruled in favor of Linderwell.

Standard of Review

[9] A judgment in a small claims action is “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). This Court will not set aside the factual findings or judgment entered in a bench trial unless clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A); Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1067 (Ind. 2006). In evaluating whether a judgment is clearly erroneous, we do not reweigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. City of Dunkirk Water & Sewage Dep't v. Hall, 657 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ind. 1995). We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. Id. Our “deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are ‘informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law.’ ” Id. (quoting S.C.R. 8(A)). We review questions of law de novo, like we do in appeals from a court of general jurisdiction. Trinity Homes, 848 N.E.2d at 1068.

The trial court did not clearly err in denying Martinez's claim.

[10] In the court below, Martinez averred Linderwell “severely wounded Tilly,” “killed Douglas,” and kept Douglas’ dog tag. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 9. She sought recovery for medical expenses for Tilly plus costs “incurred for Douglas[’] training while he was alive” and to “adopt and train another chocolate labrador.” Id. at 12. Linderwell argued he was justified in shooting Douglas and Tilly to protect himself.

Necessity

[11] A defense of necessity admits the facts of the offense but contends the acts were justified. See Stubbers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citation omitted), trans. denied. To establish a necessity defense, the following requirements must be present: (1) the defendant acted as a result of an emergency and to prevent a significant harm; (2) there was no adequate alternative to doing so; (3) the harm caused is not disproportionate to the harm avoided; (4) the defendant had a good-faith belief the act was necessary to prevent greater harm; (5) such belief was objectively reasonable under all the circumstances; and (6) the defendant did not substantially contribute to the creation of the emergency. See Harnandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376–77 (Ind. 2015); cf. Toops v. State, 643 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing the “applicability of the common law necessity defense in a criminal context”).

[12] In this case, Linderwell testified he shot Douglas and Tilly because he feared for his safety. On the night before the shooting, Linderwell encountered the two dogs on his property, and both aggressively charged at him growling and with teeth bared. Douglas attacked Linderwell's dog, forcing it to the ground by the neck. Hoping to avoid a repeat of this first encounter, as Douglas and Tilly charged at Linderwell and his dog a second time, Linderwell retrieved his rifle. His family stayed behind in the kitchen. Linderwell fired two shots at Douglas and one shot at Tilly, successfully stopping the threat of harm. He shot Douglas again because it was “gravely suffering” and “moments from dying on its own.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 50. The trial court determined Linderwell faced a dire situation and acted out of concern for “the safety of himself as well as his family and other property[.]” Id. at 68. At no point during the emergency did Linderwell provoke or entice Douglas and Tilly to enter his property. Linderwell's actions were justified under the defense of necessity.

[13] Martinez argues otherwise. She suggests any threat Linderwell faced ended when he went inside to retrieve his rifle. Martinez further alleges Linderwell failed to exercise reasonable alternatives, such as calling police or animal control. She maintains Linderwell's response was “malicious and not in good faith ․ [nor] reasonable in this situation.” Appellant's Br. at 18. But following the presentation of testimony, the trial court found Douglas and Tilly posed a threat to Linderwell's safety. After hearing Linderwell twice encountered two runaway and aggressive animals, the court concluded the incident was not one in which Linderwell simply “wait[ed] to ․ shoot at [Martinez's] dogs.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 68. The trial court credited Linderwell's version of events, and we cannot reweigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. See Hall, 657 N.E.2d at 116.

[14] Martinez next posits Linderwell was not justified in shooting her dogs absent a statutory provision permitting his actions. Appellant's Br. at 17 (citing Ind. Code § 15-20-2-2, which states, a person “who observes a dog in the act of killing or injuring livestock may kill the dog if the person has the consent of the person in possession of the real estate on which the dog is found”). Martinez avers this case does not involve protection of livestock, so Linderwell was not justified in shooting her dogs. Yet Martinez does not point to authority supporting the proposition that Linderwell could not have acted to protect himself in an emergency situation without also protecting livestock. Indeed, when pressed during oral argument, counsel for Martinez conceded that, under certain circumstances, a person may be justified in shooting aggressive dogs on his property. See Oral Arg. at 9:30–9:45, [https://perma.cc/X85Z-V6PV] (Martinez's attorney accepting there can be justification when faced with imminent threat).

[15] We acknowledge the special bond dog owners have with their pets. Our holding is not an endorsement of shooting another's dog without justification. But we are ultimately mindful of our deferential standard of review and of the trial court's role as factfinder. Having considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, and recognizing the trial court found the requirements of necessity were met, we hold the trial court did not clearly err when it denied Martinez's claim and ruled in favor of Linderwell.⁵

Conclusion

[16] The trial court did not clearly err.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Martinez created the post. She sought the public's assistance in finding her lost dogs.

3.   After recovering Douglas’ body, Martinez contacted law enforcement with the goal of bringing criminal charges against Linderwell. She also posted Linderwell's information on social media, including his name and address, as a “[p]ublic safety advisory.” Id. at 19.

4.   Falk described owning a dog as “kind of a new experience” and testified he built the dog pen after neighbors asked he prevent another pet, Lucy, from roaming unrestrained. Id. at 28; see also id. at 36 (Falk depicting his efforts to prevent Lucy and “Doug” from leaving his property as a “learning experience”). Without specifying which canine, Martinez and Falk testified their dogs ran away from their property on several occasions before the shooting involving Linderwell. See id. at 15 (Martinez acknowledging previous social media posts, one in 2022, and a second in May 2024, when she asked for assistance to recover her dogs); at 35 (Falk stating “[t]hey have gotten off”). The trial court “counted three times” before November 2024 when Douglas “got loose.” Id. at 68.

5.   Because we decide the case under the doctrine of necessity, we decline to address alternate theories raised by the parties. In addition, Linderwell requests appellate attorney fees. Such fees are discretionary and appropriate when the appeal is “permeated with meritless, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay.” Duncan v. Yocum, 179 N.E.3d 988, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Based on the record before us, we do not believe Linderwell has made the showing necessary to award him appellate attorney fees. See id. (noting this Court exercises caution when awarding attorney fees because of the potential chilling effect on the right to appeal).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Felix, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.