HOLSEY v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] William Deven Holsey pled guilty to Level 6 felony intimidation and agreed to pay restitution to a prior romantic partner after damaging her vehicle during an argument. The State presented evidence at a restitution hearing that the cost to fix the damage was $2192.28, which is the amount of restitution that the trial court ordered Holsey to pay. Holsey challenges the trial court's order, arguing that the vehicle was only worth $1731.00, which reflects the amount which he asserts that he should have been ordered to pay. Concluding that the trial court's order is supported by the record on appeal, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 7, 2025, Holsey arrived at the South Bend home of his former partner and mother of his two children, Shalonda Hobbs. Holsey was upset “about not being able to claim their children as dependents on his taxes” that year. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11. After unsuccessfully attempting to forcibly enter Hobbs's home, Holsey damaged Hobbs's vehicle. Holsey jumped on the vehicle's hood, damaged the windshield, and kicked the mirror off the vehicle.

[3] On March 8, 2025, the State charged Holsey with Level 4 felony burglary and Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. On June 26, 2025, Holsey entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to the added third count of Level 6 felony intimidation, and the State agreed to dismiss the original two counts. Holsey further agreed to pay restitution to Hobbs, and the parties agreed that sentencing would be left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court sentenced Holsey to “a sentence of 18 months, all of which [was] suspended on 12 months of reporting probation.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23.

[4] The trial court held a hearing to determine the amount of restitution due on September 12, 2025. At the hearing, Holsey testified that he believed Hobbs's vehicle to be worth $1731.00. Hobbs described the damage to her vehicle, reiterating that Holsey had damaged the vehicle's hood, windshield, and both side mirrors. Hobbs also provided an estimate obtained from a repair shop in Mishawaka, which detailed the damage to the vehicle's hood, windshield, and mirrors and estimated that the total to repair the damage was $2192.28. The trial court noted that Holsey had been ordered to pay $2192.28 in related protective-order proceedings and reiterated that Holsey was “only on the hook for” restitution once and did not have “to pay this thing twice.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 35, 36.

[5] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that

[i]n this case, there is clear evidence that the damage to Hobbs's vehicle was caused by Holsey, and that the actual cost of repair or replacement totalled [(sic)] $2,192.28. It is of no moment that Holsey calculates the Trade-In Value of the vehicle to be less, or that he offered $1,000 to the victim.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. The trial court ordered that “[b]ased on the evidence furnished to the Court, the Court orders restitution in the amount of $2,192.28[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28.

Discussion and Decision

[6] “The principal purpose of restitution is to vindicate the rights of society and to impress upon the defendant the magnitude of the loss the crime has caused.” Pearson v. State, 883 N.E.2d 770, 772 (Ind. 2008). “Restitution also serves to compensate the offender's victim.” Id. The trial court shall base its restitution order upon a consideration of the “property damages of the victim incurred as a result of the crime, based on the actual cost of repair (or replacement if repair is inappropriate)[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3(1). “An order of restitution is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion and will only be reversed upon a showing of abuse of discretion.” Archer v. State, 81 N.E.3d 212, 215 (Ind. 2017) (citing Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959, 962 (Ind. 2016)). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its ‘decision is clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before it’ or if it ‘misinterprets or misapplies the law.’ ” Gil v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Bennett v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).

[7] Holsey concedes that he agreed to pay restitution as part of his plea agreement. He contends on appeal, however, that the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion because it resulted in an “impermissible windfall” to Hobbs. Appellant's Br. p. 4. In support, Holsey points to his evidence suggesting that the total value of Hobbs's vehicle prior to his infliction of damage had only been $1731.00.

[8] “A restitution order must be supported by sufficient evidence of actual loss sustained by the victim or victims of a crime.” Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. “ ‘The amount of actual loss is a factual matter that can be determined only upon the presentation of evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Bennett, 862 N.E.2d at 1287). “We will affirm the trial court's order if sufficient evidence exists to support its decision.” Id. “Evidence supporting a restitution order is sufficient ‘if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.’ ” S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting T.C. v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied.

[9] The State presented an estimate indicating that the repairs to Hobbs's vehicle totaled $2192.28. The trial court credited this evidence in awarding that amount in restitution. While Holsey presented an estimate suggesting that Hobbs's vehicle had only been worth $1731.00, the trial court was not required to credit Holsey's evidence in this regard. See Hall v. State, 634 N.E.2d 837, 842–43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (providing that it is the function of the trier-of-fact to resolve conflicts and determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses and that the trier-of-fact is free to believe whomever it chooses). The trial court, acting as the trier-of-fact, credited the State's evidence in ordering Holsey to pay $2192.28 in restitution to Hobbs. Given that the trial court's order is supported by evidence in the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.¹

[10] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Holsey correctly notes that a restitution order “is not a means by which a victim may obtain better or more state of the art equipment.” Appellant's Br. p. 8 (quoting S.G., 956 N.E.2d at 684). That, however, is not what happened in this case, and the trial court's restitution order merely compensated Hobbs for the damage done to her vehicle by Holsey.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.