Shawn Eric Buskirk, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Shawn Eric Buskirk appeals his convictions for Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice and 13 counts of Level 6 felony invasion of privacy, arguing the evidence is insufficient. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm Buskirk's convictions. However, we remand to the trial court with instructions to correct errors in the sentencing documents.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 8, 2024, the State charged Buskirk with five counts, all related to his girlfriend, E.F.: Level 5 felony strangulation (elevated from a Level 6 felony due to a prior conviction), Level 6 felony domestic battery (elevated from a Class A misdemeanor due to a prior conviction), Level 6 felony domestic battery by bodily waste (elevated from a Class A misdemeanor due to a prior conviction), and two counts of Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. That same day, the State requested a no-contact order under Indiana Code section 35-33-8-3.2 that would require Buskirk “during the pendency of this cause” “to have no contact” with E.F. “in person, by telephone or letter, through an intermediary, or in any other way, directly or indirectly, except through an attorney of record.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 37. Section 35-33-8-3.2(a)(4) provides that a trial court can “require the defendant to refrain from any direct or indirect contact with an individual ․ including if the defendant has not been released from lawful detention.” (emphasis added). The State also requested a higher-than-normal bond. See id. at 39. The trial court issued a warrant for Buskirk's arrest, set bond at $100,000, and issued a no-contact order under Section 35-33-8-3.2. The body of the order provides that Buskirk cannot contact E.F. “in person, by telephone or letter, through an intermediary, or in any other way, directly or indirectly, except through an attorney of record, while released from custody pending trial.” Id. at 64 (emphasis added). But the title of the no-contact order is “No Contact Order While in Jail, Upon Release from Custody, On Bail or Personal Recognizance.” Id. (emphasis added, formatting altered).

[3] The next day, July 9, Buskirk was arrested on the warrant. At the initial hearing on July 11, the trial court told Buskirk that it had granted the State's request for a no-contact order and advised him of what the order prohibited:

So, while this matter is pending, you're to have no contact with [E.F.]. That include[s] no face-to-face contact, no phone calls, text messages, social media contact[,] no communicating through friends or family members. If you're found in violation of that[,] [the] State can file additional criminal charges ․

Tr. Vol. 2 p. 7 (emphasis added). The court asked Buskirk if he understood, and he said yes. The court then had him sign the no-contact order.

[4] Buskirk remained in custody during the pendency of this case. Between August and October 2024, Buskirk placed over 600 phone and video calls to E.F. from jail. Buskirk's video-call log shows that he contacted “Vernal Homan,” whom the State argued below was actually E.F. based on the videos showing E.F. as well as the fact that E.F.’s maiden name is Homan. See Exs. 10, 19, 21; Tr. Vol. 3 p. 104; Appellant's Br. p. 7 (acknowledging that the video calls show E.F.). In a phone conversation between Buskirk and E.F. on October 2, after E.F. said she didn't have a car to drive, Buskirk stated:

Well hopefully um when I get out of here and get back to work you can have the trailblazer to drive. Will buy me another truck. Might take about, might take about a month, but go back to work, save a little, little bit of money to put a down payment on one or just buy one cash and make the trailblazer for you to drive. Sound good?

Ex. 28 at 7:55-8:52. E.F. responded, “Yeah, sounds good to me, babe.” Id. at 8:55-8:57. Buskirk also said that if he made a video call, he didn't want E.F. to appear in it so that he didn't have “to pay for it later down the road.” Id. at 5:09-5:10.

[5] The next day, October 3, the State filed a motion to place Buskirk in “administrative deadlock without phone, tablet, or mail privileges.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 89. The State alleged that Buskirk had contacted E.F. over 600 times from jail. The trial court granted the State's motion and ordered that Buskirk could only communicate with his attorney.

[6] In January 2025, the State amended the charging information to add one count of Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice and 13 counts of Level 6 felony invasion of privacy (elevated from a Class A misdemeanor due to a prior conviction). Also that month, Buskirk moved to exclude E.F.’s testimony at trial because he had subpoenaed her for a deposition, but she failed to appear Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-1176 | March 4, 2026 Page 4 of 11 twice. See id. at 116; Tr. Vol. 2 p. 46. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to exclude.

[7] A jury trial was held in March 2025. At the conclusion of the State's case in chief, Buskirk moved for judgment on the evidence for all five domestic-violence-related counts given the lack of evidence on the elements (since E.F. didn't testify). The trial court granted the motion and dismissed those counts. The jury then found Buskirk guilty of attempted obstruction of justice and all 13 counts of invasion of privacy. The trial court sentenced Buskirk to 5 years for Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice and 18 months for each count of Level 6 felony invasion of privacy, to be served concurrently, for a total of 5 years.

[8] Buskirk now appeals.

Discussion

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] Buskirk contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice and his 13 convictions for Level 6 felony invasion of privacy. When reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). We will only consider the evidence supporting the conviction and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

A. Attempted Obstruction of Justice

[10] A person commits Level 6 felony obstruction of justice when he

(1) knowingly or intentionally induces, by threat, coercion, false statement, or offer of goods, services, or anything of value, a witness or informant in a legal proceeding or an administrative or criminal investigation to:

(A) withhold or unreasonably delay in producing any testimony, information, document, or thing that the witness or informant is legally required to produce[.]

Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The offense is a Level 5 felony if, during the investigation or pendency of a domestic-violence case, the person knowingly or intentionally “offers, gives, or promises any benefit to” “any witness to abstain from attending or giving testimony.” Id. at (b)(1). “A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for commission of the crime, the person engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” I.C. § 35-41-5-1(a).

[11] Buskirk argues that the State “failed to present sufficient evidence to support a determination that Buskirk induced [E.F.] to withhold her cooperation either through coercion or through a promise of some sort of goods or benefits.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. The State responds that it sufficiently proved that Buskirk attempted to induce E.F. not to cooperate with the prosecution by an offer of goods, services, or anything of value. That is, during the October 2 phone call, Buskirk offered E.F. “the use of his Trailblazer upon his release and promised he would save money” to buy himself a truck. Appellee's Br. pp. 14-15. At the end of the conversation, Buskirk asked if his offer “sounded good.” According to the State, this “reflect[ed] an effort to secure [E.F.’s] agreement to the proposed exchange. He was not making a casual remark about transportation. Rather, he was offering her something of value (the use of his truck) and seeking her confirmation that it was satisfactory.” Id. at 15. We agree with the State that, considering all the evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that Buskirk was testing whether his offer was enough to keep E.F. supportive and to discourage her cooperation with the prosecution. The evidence is sufficient to support Buskirk's conviction for attempted obstruction of justice.¹

B. Invasion of Privacy

[12] To convict Buskirk of Level 6 felony invasion of privacy as charged here, the State had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally violated an order issued under Section 35-33-8-3.2 and that he has a prior unrelated conviction for invasion of privacy. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 126-29; I.C. § 35-46-1- 15.1(a)(11). Buskirk doesn't dispute that he contacted E.F. more than 600 times from jail over the course of two months. Rather, he asserts that “the no-contact order issued by the trial court did not prohibit contact while [he] was incarcerated.” Appellant's Br. p. 8. Buskirk acknowledges that “While in Jail” appears in the title of the no-contact order, but he notes that “that language appears nowhere in the body” of the order and argues that the body of the order should control. Id. at 10.

[13] For its part, the State argues that although the body of the no-contact order provides that Buskirk could not contact E.F. “while released from custody pending trial,” the title of the order clearly shows that the court intended the restriction to apply regardless of Buskirk's location, “which is consistent with the purpose of no-contact orders.” Appellee's Br. p. 11. Moreover, the State highlights that the trial court told Buskirk at the initial hearing that he could not contact E.F. “while this matter is pending,” which is not dependent on his location. We agree with the State that the no-contact order, when read in its entirety and in light of the trial court's oral explanation at the initial hearing, prohibited Buskirk from contacting E.F. while the matter was pending, including while he was incarcerated. This is buttressed by Buskirk's statement that he didn't want E.F. to appear in video calls so he didn't have “to pay for it later down the road” and the fact that he used the name “Vernal Homan,” not E.F., for video calls to her.

[14] On December 30, 2025, after the briefing in this case was completed, a panel of this Court issued a memorandum decision in Cruz v. State, No. 25A-CR-1308, 2025 WL 3764745 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2025). There, the Marion Superior Court issued a no-contact order like the one here in that the body of the order provided that the defendant could not contact a witness “while released from custody pending trial,” but the title of the order included “While in Jail.” Id. at *4. Like Buskirk, the defendant contacted the witness while he was incarcerated. The defendant was convicted of invasion of privacy and appealed his conviction. This panel reversed, finding that the substance of the no-contact order, not its caption, controlled. See id. (citing Hunter v. State, 60 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding document titled “Recommendation of Plea” was a plea agreement)). We added:

The State further points to evidence that Cruz understood he was not permitted to contact [the witness] while in jail, even though the language of the no-contact order did not expressly prohibit it. The State, however, does not explain how such a misunderstanding could result in a violation of a condition that did not exist.

Id. at *5.

[15] We find Cruz distinguishable because it doesn't address or consider what the trial court told the defendant about the no-contact order at the initial hearing. Here, the trial court told Buskirk at the initial hearing that the no-contact order applied “while this matter is pending,” and Buskirk acknowledged that he understood. We find that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Buskirk knowingly or intentionally violated the no-contact order.² Accordingly, we affirm his 13 convictions for invasion of privacy.³

II. Corrections to Sentencing Order

[16] Finally, Buskirk argues that even if we affirm his convictions, we should remand the case to the trial court to fix errors in the Sentencing Order and Abstract of Judgment. See Appellant's Br. p. 5 n.1. As Buskirk points out, these documents show that he was convicted of Level 5 felony obstruction of justice instead of Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice. See Appellant's App. Vol. 3 pp. 126, 129. Buskirk also points out that these documents show that disposition of all counts was by guilty plea instead of jury trial. See id. at 126-27, 129. We therefore remand this case with instructions for the trial court to correct these documents.

[17] Affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his reply brief, Buskirk makes a one-sentence argument that in the event we find the evidence sufficient to prove Level 6 felony attempted obstruction of justice, the evidence is insufficient to prove the enhancement to a Level 5 felony because Buskirk's statement about the Trailblazer is not “a promise[ ] of a benefit” as contemplated by the enhancement. See Appellant's Reply Br. p. 7 n.1. For the reasons explained above, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support the enhancement.

2.   Buskirk directs our attention to cases where appellate courts have found that when the title of a charging information conflicts with the body of a charging information, the body controls. See, e.g., Funk v. State, 714 N.E.2d 746, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh'g denied, trans. denied. But the issue in this case is not whether there is a conflict between the title and body of the invasion-of-privacy charging informations, and so these cases don't control.

3.   We assume the trial court is relying on form orders for its no-contact orders. The use of forms is acceptable if the right form is used. In the future, we caution both the State and the trial court to make sure the language of the no-contact order is correct.

Vaidik, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.