Zachary Johnson, Appellant-Defendant v. MKPKDK LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Zachary Johnson rented property in Lebanon, Indiana through a lease agreement he entered with MKPKDK Realty, LLC (the LLC), a single member limited liability company owned by Manzil Kohli. When Zachary fell behind on rent payments, the LLC sued him in small claims court, seeking ejectment and damages. At both the possession hearing and damages hearing, Johnson asserted that the lease agreement was void and unenforceable because the LLC didn't have a broker license. The trial court disagreed with Johnson, concluding that because the LLC was an entity owned by Kohli and Kohli was the owner of the property, it did not need a broker license under the statute. The court therefore awarded the LLC possession of the property and ordered Johnson to pay $5,677 in damages and costs.

[2] Johnson filed a motion to set aside the judgment, asserting the same argument and two additional arguments pertaining to procedural errors. The court treated Johnson's motion as a motion to correct error and ultimately denied it. Johnson now appeals and asserts that the trial court misinterpreted a small claims rule, administrative rule, and a statute. Finding Johnson has waived his arguments on appeal for lack of cogency, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[3] In the summer of 2024, Johnson entered into a lease agreement with the LLC to rent a home in Lebanon. The property subject to the lease was not owned by the LLC—of which Kohli was the sole member—but was titled in Kohli's name alone. In March 2025, the LLC filed a complaint for ejectment and damages against Johnson for failure to pay rent.²

[4] At the possession hearing later that month, Johnson argued that the lease was unenforceable. In its order, the court noted that “[a]lthough the Lease may have been unenforceable due to a licensing issue, [Johnson] failed to carry [his] burden to prove that this gave [him] the right to occupy the [ ] Property indefinitely without having to pay to [the LLC] fair compensation for the privilege.” Prejudgment Order on Possession.³ The trial court awarded the LLC possession of the property and gave Johnson thirteen days to vacate the property. At the damages hearing in July, Johnson presented the same argument. He claimed the LLC “was prohibited from leasing the [ ] Property to [him] under Indiana law because [the LLC] did not own the property and/or was not licensed to manage it for the owner.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 14. The trial court ultimately rejected his argument, finding that the blended ownership arrangement between Kohli and the LLC brought the LLC into the licensing exemption and thus, it was not required to hold a broker license to rent the property. Id. at 16.

[5] The court entered judgment against Johnson and awarded the LLC $5,677 in damages and costs. Johnson filed a motion to set aside the judgement pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B), reiterating the argument above as well as asserting multiple procedural deficiencies. The court treated his motion to set aside as a motion to correct error and denied the motion. Johnson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Preliminarily, we note that Johnson proceeds in this matter pro se. “A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Pro se litigants are “held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys[,]” meaning they “are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Id. (quoting Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied). One such consequence may be waiving appellate review for their failure to present a cogent argument, which is precisely what we have here. Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984.

[7] Appellate Rule 46(A) governs the format and substance of an appellant's brief, and Johnson's violates many of its requirements. First, his “Statement of the Facts” section is devoid of any facts at all but rather contains only argument. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) (requiring the Statement of Facts section to “describe the facts relevant to the issues presented for review”); see also K.S. v. D.S., 64 N.E.3d 1209, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he statement of facts should be devoid of argument.”). Also, Johnson's facts section, and indeed his entire brief, lacks any citations to the record. App. R. 46(A)(6)(a) (“The facts shall be supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix[.]”).

[8] The absence of citations to the record is not surprising given Johnson's failure to provide a transcript or other record of the proceedings below in violation of Appellate Rules 9(F)(5) and 31(A). Rule 9(F)(5) requires the “designation of all portions of the [t]ranscript necessary to present fairly and decide the issues on appeal.” Rule 31(A) provides that, in the event a transcript is unavailable, a certified statement of the evidence may be submitted in its place to ensure there is an adequate record. See Maw v. Pringle, 263 N.E.3d 790, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (finding party waived arguments that relied on the evidence for his failure to provide a transcript or statement of the evidence under Rule 31(A)). Absent a transcript or other record of the proceedings below, we are essentially left to speculate as to what was discussed, argued, and presented by either party before the trial court. Campbell v. Criterion Grp., 605 N.E.2d 150, 160 (Ind. 1992) (noting that “failure to include a transcript works a waiver of any specifications of error which depend upon the evidence”) (internal citation omitted).

[9] Turning to Johnson's Argument section, he contends that the trial court's failure to adhere to Small Claims Rule 2(B), Administrative Rule 8(B)(3), and Indiana Code section 25-34.1-3-2 led to “an erroneous judgment.” Appellant's Brief at 6. However, Johnson offers no analysis of these rules—of their language or meaning—and he cites no case law to support his contentions. His Argument section consists only of statements of error followed by the particular rule or statute he claims was applied erroneously, recited in its entirety. See Appellant's Br. at 9-10 (“With the matter of Indiana Small Claims Rule 2(B) being violated is states [sic] verbatim ․”). As such, he has failed to present a cogent argument regarding any error in their application. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that appellants’ arguments be “supported by cogent reasoning” and “citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on”).

[10] Moreover, at no point does Johnson explain why these alleged errors constitute reversible error. App. R. 46(A)(8) (requiring appellants to present arguments as to “why the trial court ․ committed reversible error”) (emphasis added); App. R. 66(A) (“No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where” the error is harmless). It was Johnson's burden to provide cogent and supported arguments on appeal, and our role is not to “become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are ․ too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Spainhower v. Smart & Kessler, LLC, 176 N.E.3d 258, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984), reh'g denied, trans. denied.⁴ As such, we conclude Johnson has waived his arguments on appeal.

Conclusion

[11] Because Johnson has failed to abide by our appellate rules and present a cogent argument, his arguments are waived. Therefore, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Stacy Irvin was also listed as a defendant, but she was eventually dismissed and does not participate in this appeal.

3.   Accessed via Odyssey.

4.   Although Johnson generally provides more analysis in his reply brief, it is only in support of a new argument. “[I]t is well-settled that a party on appeal waives any argument presented for the first time in [his] reply brief.” Higgason v. State, 210 N.E.3d 868, 885 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.