IN RE: the Marriage of Brett Miller (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Brett Miller (“Mother”) and Andrew Fink (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) were married and had a child (“Child”) in 2020. Parents divorced in 2023, and their final settlement agreement (“the Agreement”) was approved by the trial court and made a part of its dissolution decree. Under the Agreement, Parents agreed to joint legal and physical custody and equal parenting time. In 2025, Mother notified Father that she would be relocating. Father filed an objection to Mother's relocation, a motion to modify custody and parenting time, and a verified information for contempt. Mother also filed a motion to modify custody and parenting time.

[2] After a hearing, the trial court awarded primary physical custody to Father, with Mother to receive parenting time in accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (“the Guidelines”), subject to certain modifications. The trial court also found Mother in contempt.

[3] Mother now appeals, arguing that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in modifying physical custody, (2) improperly restricted her parenting time, and (3) abused its discretion in finding her in contempt. We agree with Mother on issues (1) and (3), so we reverse and remand and need not address issue (2).

Facts and Procedural History

[4] Parents were married in June 2019, and Child was born in June 2020. During the marriage, Parents lived in Wabash. Father worked at Grissom Air Force Base near Peru, and Mother worked for the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) in Wabash. In January 2023, Mother petitioned to dissolve the marriage. Before the divorce was finalized, Mother moved into her parents’ home in Peru. Father remained in the marital residence in Wabash. In July, Parents entered into the Agreement, pursuant to which they agreed to joint legal and physical custody and equal parenting time. On July 17, the trial court approved the Agreement and incorporated it into its dissolution decree. After the divorce, Mother had another child and got engaged to another person.

[5] In August 2024, by agreement of the parties, Child was enrolled in preschool in Wabash City Schools for the 2024-2025 school year. Shortly after the school year started, the marital residence was sold, and Father moved into his parents’ home in Fort Wayne. When Father had parenting time, he dropped off Child at school on his way to work. Before and after Father's move, parenting time exchanges were made in Huntington.

[6] On January 13, 2025, Mother texted Father that she and her fiancé had “look[ed] at this house that was for sale[.]” Ex. Vol. 3 at 203.¹ Father asked Mother, “Where are you looking to move to[?]” Id. Mother replied, “Surrounding wabash cities. I figured you'd want to keep [Child] in wabash schools so I'm trying to stay equidistant from there[.]” Id. Father did not respond to this statement.

[7] On January 31, Mother sent Father the following screenshot:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

Id. at 23. Father replied, “I don't want [Child] going to school in Wabash. I have no intent to stay at Grissom any longer than I have to and will be relocating to Fort Wayne at the soonest opportunity[.]” Id. at 209.² Mother responded,

Okay well unfortunately we chose the school that is equidistant for both us as where we both essentially living at the start of the divorced. If you are wanting to put him a different school it would still need to be equidistant from that. Until something else is ordered by the court he can continue to attend Wabash School System.

Id. Mother added, “I'm fine with you living in Fort Wayne as long as [Child] continues going to Wabash Schools.” Id. Father responded,

It's clear that my situation is more flexible to accommodate everything [Child] needs. I take him to 95% of his appointments and am always available when you have work conflicts. Especially considering [Mother's stepfather and mother] going to Florida as well as [Mother's sister] leaving soon [for a job in Nevada].3 I'm able to cover down for [Child] because everything I deal with currently is located in a generally straight line. That wouldn't be the case if you move to Marion and I'm not about to go that far out of the way. I would like to have [Child] go to school in Fort Wayne. that would eliminate any need for daycare as my mom has already offered to pick him up and drop him off as needed if that were the case. It would be much easier on [Child]. It would relieve a large amount of stress from you as well given the demands of your job.

Id. The parties did not discuss the matter further on that date.

[8] On February 6, 2025, Mother texted Father,

Andrew, I feel like you felt I was being unfair and that is not what I was intending. From my perspective I just don't feel it would beneficial for [Child] to basically be isolated to one parent when we've had this 50/50 schedule. Please let me know why you feel enrolling him Fort Wayne would be beneficial and what that schedule would look like realistically for me and my time with him. I trust you as his parent and I do want to give [Child] stability but I feel like we can both give him that and Fort Wayne seems very unnecessary. I would love to sit down and listen to your reasoning and wants in regards to [Child]. As far as myself moving I will provide you that address in the next couple weeks as the move in date becomes closer.

Id. at 211. Father replied, “We can sit down and discuss it further[.]” Id.

[9] On February 13, Mother texted Father her Marion address and stated,

I believe we will move in within 30 days give or take a few days with my fiancé. You are more than welcome to come by the house and everything. So let me know if you need anything else. Obviously we will still meet halfway in Huntington for drop off up as it's pretty equidistant. He will also still be attending wabash city schools and everything. Are you wanting to utilize the new daycare on your days for summer care and after school care?

Id. at 212. Father replied, “We were still discussing school for next year were we not[?]” Id. Mother responded, “You never got back to be about that but as of now he is enrolled and will continue to be enrolled at wabash schools. But feel free to let me know when you're available to talk about it!” Id. Father stated,

You never responded to my text about sitting down to have a further conversation. I also know you enrolled him before we even had the conversation on the phone because I checked with the school. I understand enrolling him to ensure he's set up for next year but it's highly dishonest to not tell me you had already done it[.]

Id. Mother stated, “I did tell you? I sent you the screenshot saying he was enrolled and sent that specially to let you know that was taken care of[.]” Id. Father replied, “I understood that as a notice of availability[.]” Id. Mother responded, “I mean it says pre enrollment on it and [Child] will be assigned to a class for the 2025-2026 school year and then we had a whole conversation about him going wabash[.]” Id. Father stated, “We had a whole conversation about him not going to Wabash[.]” Id. Mother stated, “No you had a conversation about wanting him not to go to wabash and I said he was going to wabash for now because that is where he was originally attending and agreed upon[.]” Id. Father replied, “We haven't agreed on anything for kindergarten[.]” Id. And Mother responded, “That is the school of origin that was agreed upon during our divorce and that's where he will stay until further ordered by the court.” Id.

[10] On February 28, Father filed an objection to Mother's relocation and motion to modify custody and parenting time orders, in which he asserted that he had “learned that Mother already enrolled [Child] in school without Father's authorization or consent.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 33. Father further asserted that there had been an unspecified “substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors under I.C. § 31-17-2-8[,]” which a court must consider in determining whether a custody modification is warranted, and that modification of the custody and parenting time orders is “in the best interests of the parties’ child.” Id. Father also filed a verified information for contempt, alleging that Mother had “knowingly and intentionally violated the provisions of the July 17, 2023 Orders concerning joint legal custody of the child under the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines” by enrolling Child in Wabash City Schools “without any communication, consultation, or discussion with Father.” Id. at 30.

[11] Mother also filed a motion to modify custody and parenting time.⁴ In addition, Mother filed a response to Father's pleadings, in which she correctly pointed out that her intended relocation to Marion would “not increase the distance between the parties’ residence by at least 20 miles, and the proposed relocation would allow [Child] to remain enrolled in his current school, so [she] had no obligation to file a notice of her intent to relocate under Indiana Code § 31-17-2.2-1(b)(2).” Id. at 40. Mother relocated to Marion in March and started working for a foster care entity in May.

[12] In July, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing, and the parties submitted proposed findings at the court's request. In August, the trial court issued an order that reads in pertinent part as follows:

I. MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY, PARENTING TIME, AND RELOCATION:

․.

9. The July 17, 2023 Orders stated the following:

4.1. Custody. The parties shall share joint legal and physical custody of the Minor Child.

4.2 Parenting Time. The parties shall share parenting time as they may agree, or if they are unable to agree, then pursuant to three-day-on, three-day-off schedule. The parties shall equally divide parenting time during holidays and school breaks, as they may reasonably agree. Both parties have agreed to determine the parenting schedule as needed based on their individual schedules.

․.

12. Prior to Father's filing, Mother and Father were exercising equal parenting time on a modified schedule of time, and there was evidence that Father was exercising more than equal parenting time in 2024 with the child.

13. Since the parties’ July 17, 2023 Agreement and corresponding Order, Mother and Father disagreed on where their minor child would attend school for Kindergarten for the 2025-2026 school year. Prior to the 2025-2026 school year, there was inconsistency with the evidence on childcare and/or preschool for the child presented by both parties. The Court notes the following:

13.1 The July 17, 2023 Order specifically stated Husband's Mother as the childcare provider ․ with continuing to pay her $100 per week.

13.2 In November, 2023, there was disagreement on switching days and a childcare change. On November 27, 2023, Mother stated to Father, “If we're not switching he's in daycare. I'm not gonna ask anymore.”

13.3 In December 2023, Mother stated to Father, “I think if you are wanting to talk more about taking him to Huntington everyday we should do it.”

13.4 In March, 2024, Mother and Father discussed preschool after missing the open registration and meet and greet. Mother asked the question of where he would attend the following year, Huntington?

13.5 On July 6, 2024, Mother texted Father, “Did you talk to your mom about home schooling [Child] if we can't get him potty trained?”

13.6 In July 2024, their child was removed from the waitlist and enrolled in preschool at LH Carpenter in Wabash City Schools.

13.7 In January 2025, Mother changed daycare to Wabash, IN at First Friends. Further, she sent 2025-2026 Preschool and Kindergarten Pre-Enrollment information to Father on January 31, 2025. Father responded, “I don't want him to continue going to school in Wabash. I have no intent to stay at Grissom [Air Force Base] any longer than I have to and will be relocating to Fort Wayne at the soonest opportunity.[”] Mother responded that he would continue to attend Wabash school system until something else is ordered by the Court.

14. On February 6, 2025, Mother and Father discussed the issue of the child's school attendance for the upcoming school year. Mother indicated at that time that she was “open to moving him to Huntington”.

15. On February 13, 2025, Mother notified Father in writing of Mother's relocation to [Marion]. She indicated that the parties will still meet halfway in Huntington for drop off and for their minor child to be attending Wabash City Schools.

16. At trial, Father desired for the child's school to be within Northwest Allen County Schools because of the programming, school district, and support for [Child] without the requirement of childcare that would be best for his growth and development. Mother testified that she was no longer amenable to Huntington because of her other child that would eventually attend Wabash City Schools and that the school and continuity of the schedule and parenting time would be convenient for her without consideration of what may be best for the parties’ mutual child. Mother represented that she “could not possibly make it work” in referencing an equal schedule if the child attended Northwest Allen County Schools. However, Father prioritized his time with the child to exercise that equal schedule and additional time prior to the trial with preschool and childcare being in Wabash County, as well as exchanges in Huntington, Indiana. Father's testimony and actions with the child were focused on the child's best interests as opposed to Mother's testimony and decision-making at time [sic] being focused on herself or convenience.

17. Since the [July] 17, 2023 Orders, Mother and Father participated and were active in the care and supervision of their child. During that time and up through Father's pleadings filed in 2025, Father had historically been more available during the week with his work schedule for the child and appointments for the child. In May, 2024, Mother missed an overnight parenting time on May 6, 2024 and then was unable to meet for the parenting exchange May 10, 2024. On June 3, 2024, Mother again missed parenting time because of work. On July 16, 2024, Mother missed an overnight parenting time due to work. Mother had been less available with being on call at all times, and she specifically changed jobs to reduce her workload and schedule after Father initiated pleadings in 2025. After Father filed with the court on February 28, 2025, Mother texted Father, “I wanted to let you know I will be transitioning jobs relatively soon as I have accepted a case management position with Debra Corn Foster Care. This will eliminate the late nights and on call schedule ․”

18. The child has relationships with both sides of [the] family. There was evidence presented by Mother and Father regarding these relationships, as well as family members of both parents regarding these relationships. Maternal grandparents are relocating out-of-State and will be less available for care and support for Mother and the minor child. Paternal grandparents reside with Father presently and are within the Northwest Allen County School district within Allen County, Indiana. Paternal grandmother has historically watched and provided significant care for the minor child for the parents since birth and attested to the ability to do so in the future for the best interests of the minor child.

19. Mother and Father have different parenting styles and have made different life and career choices since the July 17, 2023 Orders. Although the parties are joint legal custodians, Mother and Father are in disagreement on the school decision for the child and do not agree on the use of family versus third party childcare for the child.

20. Both parties presented evidence regarding the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the parents, siblings, and other persons significantly affecting the child's best interests. Mother testified on concerns with Father's actions concerning the child, but the evidence supported that Father did send Mother updates with photographs of the child and had received communication from Mother at times that she had difficulty caring for their child because of behavior.

21. Both parties presented evidence of the child's adjustment to the home, school, and community under custody and parenting plans proposed by both parties. The evidence supported that much of the home, school, and community involvement of the child with Father during his time during the week also includes continuity with the paternal grandmother's care for the child that had been occurring at the time of the July 17, 2023 Orders. Further, the Indiana Department of Education records supported objective data more favorable to Northwest Allen County Schools for Father's request on the educational decision compared to Wabash City Schools requested by Mother. For example, Student Attendance and 3rd Grade Literacy were substantially less at Wabash City Schools compared to Northwest Allen County Schools.

22. The Court has considered the best interest factors of the minor child with taking into consideration the presentation of the evidence and the information as stated. Under I.C. § 31-17-2-8, in determining the child's best interests, there is not a presumption favoring either parent. The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following: [the factors are recited in Issue 1 below].

․[5]

26. Here, Mother notified Father of her relocation in writing but did not file a Notice of Intent to Relocate with the Court. Father filed his objection within twenty (20) days of receiving the address from Mother. Whether or not the Notice was required for that move, Mother also did not file a formal Notice of Intent to Relocate from moving from Wabash, IN to Peru, IN from the July 17, 2023 Order, and Father did not file a formal Notice of Intent to Relocate from moving from Wabash, IN to Fort Wayne, IN. Due to the distance involved in the parties, as well as the parties’ respective positions, this Court has also considered the statutory factors above with the relocations and distances involved between the parties. Further, the Court considers that neither party remains residing within Wabash County, IN.

27. It is in the best interest of the parties’ child to modify the July 17, 2023 Orders with respect to custody and parenting time, and it is now Ordered that Mother and Father shall share joint legal custody of the minor child. Since Mother and Father cannot agree on school selection for the minor child, the Court now selects the Northwest Allen County School system for the 2025-2026 school year and all future years unless otherwise Ordered by the Court or otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing.․

28. Father shall have primary physical custody of the minor child. Mother shall have parenting time in accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines ․ with the following modifications:

28.1 Alternating weekends shall include Sunday overnights with Mother responsible for transporting the child to school on Monday morning.

28.2 The midweek visit shall be overnight if Mother can accommodate transporting the child to school the next morning.

28.3 Mother shall have extended parenting time over the summer by receiving 60% of the summer. Mother and Father should discuss and set the summer schedule prior to April 1st each year.

28.4 Mother shall have parenting time with the child over fall break each year.

․.

III. CONTEMPT:

32. Father established that since the July 17, 2023 Orders, Mother has been in direct contempt of the Court's Orders with the minor child, effectuating the provisions of joint legal custody for the minor child on issues of education, and following parenting time provisions for their child.

33. The Court finds that Mother has willfully failed to obey the requirements of the July 17, 2023 Court's Orders with the minor child, effectuating the provisions of joint legal custody for the minor child on issues of education, and following parenting time provisions for their child. Sanctions imposed against Mother at this time are deferred and suspended pending future, strict compliance with the Court's Orders and parenting time as stated with the child.

Appealed Order at 1-9 (citations to exhibits omitted). Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Issue 1: Custody Modification

[13] Mother first contends that the trial court erred in awarding Father primary physical custody of Child. “We review custody modifications only for an abuse of discretion.” McDaniel v. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d 282, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “There is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting significant latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Id. “Appellate courts ‘are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)). “Therefore, on appeal we will not ‘reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011)). “We will reverse the trial court's custody determination only if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Paternity of C.S., 964 N.E.2d 879, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied). “[I]t is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Id. (alteration in McDaniel) (quoting Kirk, 770 N.E.2d at 307).

[14] Where, as here, neither party filed a written request for findings from the trial court, but instead the trial court directed the parties to prepare proposed findings, we treat the trial court's findings as sua sponte findings of fact. Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Sua sponte findings control only the issues they cover, and a general judgment standard will control as to the issues upon which there are no findings. Id. at 1089-90. “A general judgment entered with findings will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997). “When a trial court has made findings of fact, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions thereon.” Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d at 1090. The trial court's findings and conclusions will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. In re Creation of South-West Lake Maxinkuckee Conservancy Dist., 875 N.E.2d 222, 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “To determine that a finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, an appellate court's review must leave it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d at 1090.

[15] We accessed Parents’ proposed findings using the Odyssey case management system. The trial court's findings are a substantially verbatim adoption of Father's proposed findings. Adopting a party's proposed findings is not prohibited, but it diminishes our confidence that “the findings reflect the considered judgment of the trial court.” Beckman v. Beckman, 271 N.E.3d 1135, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 709 (Ind. 2001)).

[16] Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-21 provides in pertinent part that a court may not modify a child custody order unless the modification is in the child's best interests and there is a substantial change in one or more of the factors listed in Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-8. That statute provides in pertinent part,

The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parent or parents;

(B) the child's sibling; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.

(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:

(A) home;

(B) school; and

(C) community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.

(9) A designation in a power of attorney of:

(A) the child's parent; or

(B) a person found to be a de facto custodian of the child.

I.C. § 31-17-2-8. We have described this list of factors as “nonexhaustive.” Julie C. v. Andrew C. (In re Marriage of Julie C.), 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[17] Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he party seeking to modify custody bears the burden of demonstrating the existing custody should be altered.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). “Indeed, this ‘more stringent standard’ is required to support a change in custody, as opposed to an initial custody determination[ ] where there is no presumption for either parent because ‘permanence and stability are considered best for the welfare and happiness of the child.’ ” Id. (quoting Lamb v. Wenning, 600 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Ind. 1992)). “[A] change in circumstances ‘must be judged in the context of the whole environment, and the effect on the child is what renders a change substantial or inconsequential.’ ” Id. at 127 (quoting Jarrell v. Jarrell, 5 N.E.3d 1186, 1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied).

[18] Mother points out that, in its order, the trial court made no specific finding that any substantial change in circumstances had occurred sufficient to justify modification of the parties’ agreed-upon joint physical custody arrangement. Father argues that paragraphs 17 through 22 and 26 and 27 of the trial court's order support such a finding. We disagree.

[19] Paragraph 17 states that Mother had missed parenting time on a few occasions because of her on-call schedule with DCS, but that “she specifically changed jobs to reduce her workload and schedule[.]” Appealed Order at 4.⁶ If anything, Mother's change of employment counsels against a modification of physical custody.

[20] The only change mentioned in paragraph 18 is the impending relocation of the maternal grandparents, who “will be less available for care and support for Mother” and Child. Appealed Order at 5. But there is no indication that this reduced availability constitutes a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to justify a custody modification.⁷

[21] Paragraph 19 states only that Parents “have different parenting styles and have made different life and career choices” since their divorce and that they disagree about which school Child should attend and “the use of family versus third party childcare[.]” Id. There is no evidence that the parties’ “different parenting styles” constitute a change in circumstances, let alone a substantial one. As for their “different life and career choices,” Mother has gotten remarried, given birth to a child, and transitioned to a job with a much more flexible schedule. Father has remained employed at Grissom Air Force Base and moved to Fort Wayne when Child was in preschool in Wabash.⁸ Mother moved to Marion, which is closer to Father's current residence than was her previous residence in Peru. Father admitted that after Mother's relocation, the parenting time schedule and exchange location “remained the same[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 110. He also admitted that Mother “would lose significant time” with Child during the school year if he was enrolled in Northwest Allen County Schools. Id. at 112.⁹ In sum, Parents’ life and career changes did not negatively affect Child's best interests in any way and allowed them to maintain their equal parenting time schedule. Parents’ disagreement regarding Child's education and after-school care might support the appointment of a parenting coordinator, but not the modification of physical custody. See generally Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines § V (“Parenting Coordination”).¹⁰

[22] Paragraph 20 says nothing about any substantial changes of any kind.¹¹

[23] The same is true for paragraph 21, which neglects to mention that Child did so well in his Wabash preschool that Parents were encouraged to enroll him in a “dual-language immersion program” that is “typically for the higher-ability children” from kindergarten through eighth grade. Tr. Vol. 2 at 98, 99. Father presented no evidence that a similar program is available in Northwest Allen County Schools.¹²

[24] Paragraph 22 is essentially a boilerplate recitation of Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-8.

[25] Moving on to paragraph 26, it too says nothing about any substantial changes of any kind.¹³ To the extent it suggests that Mother was required to file a notice of relocation with the trial court when she moved from Peru to Marion, this suggestion is incorrect as a matter of law. See I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(b)(2). In fact, Mother's move actually brought her fifteen miles closer to Father's residence in Fort Wayne. Tr. Vol. 2 at 154; Ex. Vol. 3 at 21.

[26] Finally, paragraph 27 is simply a conclusory statement regarding Child's best interests. We agree with Mother that Father “requested a modification simply because he didn't like the present circumstances, not because the circumstances had changed so substantially.” Appellant's Br. at 15. We also agree with Mother that the trial court's modification of physical custody resulted in a de facto modification of legal custody. See I.C. § 31-9-2-67 (stating that “the persons awarded joint custody will share authority and responsibility for the major decisions concerning the child's upbringing, including the child's education, health care, and religious training”). When modifying legal custody, in addition to considering Indiana Code Sections 31-17-2-8 and -21, a trial court must consider Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-15. Miller v. Carpenter, 965 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Marriage of Julie C., 924 N.E.2d at 1259-60).¹⁴ There is no indication that the trial court did so here.

[27] By all accounts, at the time of the fact-finding hearing, Child was a happy, well-adjusted five-year-old boy who enjoyed positive relationships with both parents and both sides of his extended family. He did well in preschool, liked his teachers, made friends with his classmates, and participated in Little League. Child had become accustomed to the parenting time schedule, which offered stability conducive to his best interests. Indeed, Parents agreed that Child “has a pretty strong aversion to change[.]” Ex. Vol. 3 at 17. Given the absence of any substantial change of circumstances, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying physical custody. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate joint physical custody. As far as Child's schooling is concerned, we direct the trial court to appoint a parenting coordinator to resolve the parties’ dispute on this issue. If no resolution is forthcoming by the end of the current school year, then either one or both parties may request a modification of legal custody.

Issue 2: Parenting Time

[28] Because we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying physical custody, we need not address Mother's argument that the court improperly restricted her parenting time.

Issue 3: Contempt

[29] As stated above, the trial court found that Father had established that Mother was “in direct contempt” of its orders “effectuating the provisions of joint legal custody” and parenting time. Appealed Order at 8. This finding is incorrect as a matter of law. “Direct contempt involves ‘acts which are committed in the presence of the court or in such close proximity to it so as to disrupt its proceedings while in session[,]’ ” whereas “ ‘[i]ndirect contempt involves those acts committed outside the presence of the court which nevertheless tend to interrupt, obstruct, embarrass or prevent the due administration of justice.’ ” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re A.S., 9 N.E.3d 129, 132 (Ind. 2014), and Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016)). Father presented no evidence that Mother committed disruptive acts in or near the trial court's presence; consequently, she could not be found in direct contempt.

[30] And, as Mother points out, the trial court “failed to articulate” a basis for finding her in what would properly be characterized as indirect contempt. Appellant's Br. at 24. “In order to be held in contempt for failure to follow [a] court's order, a party must have willfully disobeyed the court order.” City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 170 (Ind. 2005). “The determination of whether a party is in contempt of court is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 171. “We will reverse a trial court's finding of contempt only if there is no evidence or inference therefrom to support the finding.” Id.

[31] We can only presume that the trial court found Mother in contempt of the decree's barebones custody provision based on her enrollment of Child in kindergarten in Wabash City Schools without first obtaining Father's consent. But given that Child had attended preschool in that district and Father had not previously expressed any objection to him remaining in that district, we can only conclude that Mother was being proactive at best and presumptuous—not contemptuous—at worst.

[32] Also, we can only presume that the trial court found Mother in contempt of the decree's barebones parenting time provision based on the few occasions that she was unable to exercise parenting time due to her work demands with DCS, where she is no longer employed. We cannot say that Mother's fulfillment of her job duties constituted willful disobedience of the trial court's order. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Mother in contempt and reverse that portion of its order.

[33] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Except as indicated by brackets, we have reproduced the parties’ texts verbatim.

2.   Father's and his mother's testimony at the July 2025 fact-finding hearing suggest that Father had already relocated to Fort Wayne by this time. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 88 (Father's testimony: “I lived in Wabash for a very short time when [Child] started school because we still had the house when he was registered, and then the house sold shortly after the school year started.”); id. at 29 (paternal grandmother's testimony: Father moved in with her in “like, September-ish, October-ish” of 2024).

3.   At the July 2025 fact-finding hearing, Mother's sister testified that she would be returning to “the Indiana area” in November 2025, “hopefully just somewhere close to” Mother. Tr. Vol. 2 at 122.

4.   Additionally, Mother requested a modification of child support (set by the Agreement at zero for both parties), which the trial court denied. Mother does not appeal that ruling.

5.   In paragraph 23 of its order, the trial court excerpted a portion of Indiana Code Section 31-17-2.2-1(c), which allows a trial court to modify a custody order based on a parent's relocation, regardless of whether the relocating parent is exempt from the requirement of filing a notice of relocation by subsection (b) of the statute. Subsection (c) lists six factors that the court “shall take into account ․ in determining whether to modify a custody order[.]” The ensuing paragraphs of the order contain no substantive findings regarding those factors.

6.   Mother testified that her current work schedule is “very flexible,” that she does not “have demanding on-call anymore[,]” that she can work from home “as needed[,]” and that she can schedule her relatively light travel duties “around [her] parenting time obligations or other obligations[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 132.

7.   In fact, maternal grandmother testified that she picked up Child from daycare only “three or four times maybe” when Mother was unable to do so because of her on-call schedule with DCS, where she no longer works. Tr. Vol. 2 at 20.

8.   Father testified, “I have stability in my job, and I'm not going to attempt to find anything else until ․ events here have been concluded, and I know in what direction I need to proceed in.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 70.

9.   Moreover, paternal grandmother would be responsible for taking Child to and picking him up from school. Tr. Vol. 2 at 39.

10.   The trial court's order states that Parents “mediated pending filings in good faith and were not able to reach a resolution at mediation in advance of the” fact-finding hearing. Appealed Order at 1. We note that a parenting coordinator would have a broader role, which includes “assessing the family and the litigation history; educating the parties as to the impact their behavior has on the child; facilitating conflict management; and assisting the parties in the development of parenting plans and alternative resolutions to other disputes.” Parenting Time G. § V(D)(1).

11.   Paragraph 20 does say that Father “had received communication from Mother at times that she had difficulty caring for their child because of behavior.” Appealed Order at 5. Most parents could say the same thing about most children at one point or another in their development.

12.   Given Child's demonstrated academic aptitude and apparent lack of attendance issues, we fail to see the relevance of data regarding Northwest Allen County Schools’ third-grade literacy and student attendance. Mother notes that “Father never expressed that he was unhappy with the education [Child] was getting in Wabash County.” Appellant's Br. at 16.

13.   The trial court noted that “neither party remains residing within Wabash County, IN.” Appealed Order at 7. But this does not affect Child's eligibility for enrollment in Wabash City Schools. Tr. Vol. 2 at 158-59.

14.   Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-15 provides,In determining whether an award of joint legal custody under section 13 of this chapter would be in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider it a matter of primary, but not determinative, importance that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an award of joint legal custody. The court shall also consider:(1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded joint custody;(2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child's welfare;(3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age;(4) whether the child has established a close and beneficial relationship with both of the persons awarded joint custody;(5) whether the persons awarded joint custody:(A) live in close proximity to each other; and(B) plan to continue to do so; and(6) the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the home of each of the persons awarded joint custody.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.