ROSENBAUM v. THOMPSON (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Steven and Megan Rosenbaum, pro se, appeal the trial court's judgment for Gregory Thompson, Sr. on Thompson's complaint for eviction. The Rosenbaums raise thirteen issues for our review, but we address only the following dispositive issue: whether the Rosenbaums have met their burden of showing prima facie error. As they have not, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] As explained further below, the record on appeal is sparse. On June 22, 2023, Thompson filed his complaint for eviction against the Rosenbaums in the Hendricks County small claims court. The Rosenbaums moved to have the case transferred to the Hendricks Superior Court's plenary docket, which request the small claims court granted “for purpose[s] of damages,” if any. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 22.

[3] On the plenary docket, the Rosenbaums filed numerous motions and requests with the trial court, which the trial court eventually found to be “frivolous and non-meritorious.” Id. at 36. On June 17, 2025, the court held a bench trial on Thompson's complaint. The Rosenbaums did not appear at that hearing. The court then entered judgment for Thompson, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[4] The Rosenbaums appeal the trial court's judgment for Thompson. Indiana has long recognized that pro se litigants are “held to the same standards as a trained attorney.” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). As our Supreme Court has made clear:

[pro se litigants are] “afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). Accordingly, a party proceeding pro se must “be prepared to accept the consequences of his or her action.” McCullough v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 820, 825 (Ind. 2017) (quotation omitted). While trial courts may facilitate a fair hearing for pro se litigants by explaining “legal concepts in everyday language” and informing litigants “what is expected of them,” they must enforce the law. Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.2 & cmt. 5.

Id. at 410-11; see also Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 136-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting that pro se litigants “are required to follow [our] procedural rules”).

[5] We also recognize that Thompson has not filed a responsive brief. When the appellee fails to file a brief on appeal, we may reverse the trial court's decision if the appellants make a prima facie showing of reversible error. McGill v. McGill, 801 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In this context, prima facie error is defined as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Orlich v. Orlich, 859 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). This rule was established to make clear that it is not the burden of the court on appeal to rebut apparently valid arguments advanced for reversing the trial court's judgment. See McGill, 801 N.E.2d at 1251. That said, it is affirmatively the appellants’ burden to show prima facie error.

[6] The Rosenbaums allege the following trial court errors:

• Holding a bench trial instead of a jury trial in violation of their rights under the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution, and Indiana Small Claims Rule 4(C);

• Not ordering Thompson to provide a more definite statement of his damages prior to trial, in violation of Indiana Trial Rule 8;

• Error under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6);

• Error under Indiana Trial Rule 26;

• Error under Indiana Trial Rule 37; and

• Error in the trial court's award of legal fees to Thompson.1

[7] From what we can discern, the Rosenbaums first raised their objections under Trial Rules 8 and 26 in June 2025. See Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 28. The Rosenbaums present no argument supported by cogent reasoning to our Court that those objections, nearly two full years after Thompson had filed his complaint and on the eve of the trial, were timely presented to the trial court. Further, the Rosenbaums do not identify, nor have we discerned, where in the record they objected under Trial Rules 12 or 37. Accordingly, we will not consider those issues. See, e.g., GKC Ind. Theatres, Inc. v. Elk Retail Invs., LLC, 764 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“the trial court ․ cannot be found to have erred as to an issue or argument that it never had an opportunity to consider.”).

[8] Regarding the alleged denial of their jury-trial rights, although the Rosenbaums requested and received transfer to the plenary docket at least in part to have a jury assess any monetary damages, they also did not appear at the damages hearing, and the trial court proceeded from the bench. They cite no authority for their apparent proposition that they can avoid appearing at a damages hearing and then complain on appeal about the type of hearing the court held in their absence. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); Martin, 130 N.E.3d at 136-37.

[9] Finally, in their Notice of Appeal, the Rosenbaums expressly informed the trial court clerk that “[n]o transcript” of any hearings in the trial court, including the bench trial, were “requested in this appeal.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 2. Without a transcript of the proceedings before the trial court, we are unable to assess the merits of the Rosenbaums’ claim that the trial court erred in entering its judgment for Thompson. Thus, here too the Rosenbaums have not met their burden on appeal.

[10] For all of these reasons, we are unable to say that the Rosenbaums have met their burden on appeal to show prima facie error, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In their brief's statement of the issues, the Rosenbaums also allege that the trial court erred in not transmitting the exhibits to them in accordance with their Notice of Appeal and also in how it identified certain documents on the CCS. But the Rosenbaums’ Argument section of their brief contains no recitation or analysis of those purported errors. See Appellants’ Br. at 9-12. We therefore conclude that those purported errors are waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.