Deonte M. Young, Appellant/Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee/Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In July of 2023, a vehicle in which Deonte Young was a passenger was stopped after officers noticed a headlight was out, the windshield was broken, and Young was not wearing a seatbelt. Officers found fentanyl, marijuana, and .38 caliber ammunition on Young's person; fentanyl and a .38 caliber handgun in the vehicle near where Young had been sitting; and that Young had an active no-contact order with respect to the driver. The State ultimately charged Young with Level 3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, Class C misdemeanor refusal to identify self, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The State also alleged that Young was a habitual offender.

[2] The day Young's trial was scheduled to begin, at which he was representing himself, the trial court declared a mistrial and found Young in direct contempt of court because of his behavior during jury selection. At Young's second trial, the trial court denied Young's request to again represent himself. The jury found Young guilty as charged and to be a habitual offender, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration. As restated, Young contends that

I. the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt of court;

II. the trial court erred in denying his request for self or hybrid representation;

III. the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his tendered jury instruction on venue;

IV. the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a remote witness to testify via zoom;

V. the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for Level 3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and to prove venue in Johnson County;

VI. the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his statements to police at the scene; and

VII. his sentence is inappropriate.

Because we find none of Young's arguments to have merit, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] During the early morning hours of July 13, 2023, Young was a passenger in an orange Ford Escape that was westbound on County Line Road, which is on the border between Marion and Johnson counties. Greenwood Police Officers Elijah Allen and Mackenzie Redenbarger were in a marked police vehicle monitoring traffic when they noticed the Escape as it drove by, specifically that it had a headlight out; the windshield was largely shattered; and Young, in the front passenger seat, was not wearing his seatbelt.

[4] The officers executed a traffic stop as the Escape pulled into a gas station at the northeast corner of County Line Road and US 31. Jordan Martin was driving, and Chrisana Bright was seated in the back seat behind her. As it happened, an order for protection had been issued by the Allen Superior Court in April of 2023, which provided that Young was not to have any contact with Martin.

[5] Both officers detected the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle as they approached. As Officer Allen approached the passenger's side, Young threw a small marijuana cigarette out the window, which struck Officer Allen's police vest and fell to the ground. After Young was removed from the vehicle and handcuffed, he refused to identify himself. Young requested a supervisor, so Lieutenant Aaron Wehnert came to the scene.

[6] A search of the fanny pack Young was wearing revealed a baggie containing twenty-eight blue pills, a baggie containing marijuana, and ammunition for a .38 caliber handgun. After Officer Redenbarger advised Martin and Bright of their Miranda ¹ rights in Young's presence, Young said, without being asked any questions, “That was mine. That was on me. They ain't got nothin’ on ‘em.” State's Ex. 1A at 4:50–4:56. In the vehicle, officers discovered a loaded .38 caliber revolver in the front passenger door pocket next to where Young had been sitting, a baggie containing eighty-eight blue pills in the center console, a baggie containing nine blue pills in the cupholder, marijuana cigarettes, and THC vape pens. The 118 blue pills—all of which were small, round, blue, and marked with an “M” on one side and “30” on the other—weighed over twelve grams, and the three that were later tested were found to contain fentanyl. After the search uncovered more contraband, Young, speaking of Martin, volunteered that “[s]he didn't know none of that was in the car. [․] She didn't know none of that stuff was in the car.” State's Ex. 2 at 0:25–0:41.

[7] The State initially charged Young with Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, Class C misdemeanor refusal to identify self, Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. At Young's first jury trial on November 12, 2024, the trial court granted Young's request to represent himself. Young orally objected to the admission of his statements through State's Exhibit 1 (Officer Allen's bodycam video) based on an allegedly insufficient Miranda advisement. The trial court overruled the objection. During jury selection, Young refused to abide by the trial court's orders on procedure and decorum, and the trial court declared a mistrial and found Young in direct contempt of court. The trial court sentenced Young to 120 days in jail for contempt and reset his bond.

[8] At the following two pre-trial conferences, Young claimed to be outside the court's jurisdiction and that he was being held captive. At the January 23, 2025, pre-trial conference, the trial court granted Young's request to represent himself but warned him that violating the court's orders or being disruptive would lead to termination of that right. During the February 13, 2025, pre-trial conference, Young claimed to be under threat and held for ransom; the trial court repeated its warning that if Young continued to interrupt or revisit prior rulings, then he might lose his ability to represent himself. When Young continued, the trial court found that Young was intentionally obstructing the process, so it terminated Young's ability to represent himself and appointed counsel.

[9] At trial on March 3, 2025, Young was tried on charges of Level 3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, Class C misdemeanor refusal to identify self, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, plus a habitual offender allegation. Young objected to counsel's representation. Young renewed his objection to the admission of his statements in State's Exhibit 1, which objection was overruled. Just prior to Lab Analyst Hannah Ferner's remote testimony from Pennsylvania, Young objected “just for the record” to her remote testimony on the basis that he would not be able to “face her in person.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 211, 212. The trial court allowed Ferner's testimony over Zoom.

[10] At the conclusion of evidence, Young orally requested an instruction on venue, which the trial court refused in favor of a venue instruction that tracked the relevant statutory language. The jury found Young guilty as charged and that he was a habitual offender. At sentencing, the trial court vacated the direct contempt finding and awarded Young credit time for time served for contempt. The trial court sentenced Young to an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision

I. Contempt

[11] When the trial court declared a mistrial in Young's first jury trial, it found him in direct contempt of court for repeatedly disrupting the proceeding and acting in defiance and disrespect of the court. The trial court sentenced Young to 120 days in jail, revoked his bond, and reset his bond to $500,000.00 cash. Young challenges the trial court's finding that he was in direct contempt of court and the sanction imposed. The State argues that Young's appellate challenge to the propriety of the contempt finding and sanction is moot, and we agree.

[12] It is well-settled that an issue is deemed to be moot when the questions at issue are no longer a controversy and we are unable to provide effective relief to the defendant. Breedlove v. State, 20 N.E.3d 172, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. We will not reverse the trial court's decision in cases that will not result in a change in the status quo. Id. Here, the trial court vacated the contempt finding and gave Young full credit for the time served for contempt toward his sentence, meaning that reversing the trial court's contempt finding would change nothing. See Bell v. State, 1 N.E.3d 190, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding the contempt issue moot where the defendant had served his contempt sentence and been released because there was “no question” that an appellate decision on the claim would result in “ ‘no change in the status quo’ ”) (citation omitted). Young's challenge to the trial court's contempt finding is moot.

II. Self and Hybrid Representation

[13] Young contends that the trial court erred in terminating his self-representation and in denying him hybrid representation. A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to proceed without the assistance of counsel. Luke v. State, 214 N.E.3d 1013, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. This right, however, may be overridden if a defendant is not “ ‘able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.’ ” Love v. State, 113 N.E.3d 730, 738–39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173 (1984)), trans. denied. Whether the trial court violated a defendant's right to self-representation is a question of law that we review de novo, and we review and consider the entire record to make sure the defendant's right to self-representation has not been violated. Luke, 214 N.E.3d at 1015–16.

[14] As mentioned, at Young's first jury trial on November 12, 2024, the trial court granted Young's request to represent himself. During jury selection, however, Young repeatedly attempted to argue the facts of his case to the jury pool; repeatedly tried to revisit previous rulings by the trial court on requested continuances; repeatedly requested the trial court's “oath of bond[,]”and generally refused to abide by the trial court's orders on procedure and decorum. Tr. Vol. II pp. 137, 140.

[15] Young's argument seems to be that the behavior that led to the denial of his right to representation should be excused because he was attempting to obtain discovery materials. Young's counsel was appointed at his initial hearing in July of 2023, counsel was provided discovery, and the State provided Young with his own link to discovery in June of 2024. Young thereafter refused to meet with counsel to review discovery. After the first mistrial on November 12, 2024, Young did not renew any request for discovery until the February 13, 2025, pre-trial conference, when he informed the trial court that the State had to produce unspecified public “documents,” “written discovery,” and an “affidavit[.]” Tr. Vol. II pp. 246, 248. These documents were related to a petition for a “Writ of Quo Warranto” (which cites, inter alia, the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1836 between the United States of North America and the Moroccan Empire”) that Young had filed on January 29, 2025, in which he had requested various documents unrelated to trial. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 160. Moreover, Young admitted that he had received trial discovery “months ago, one month before we were supposed to proceed to trial” and admitted that he still had the disc with the discovery materials on it. Tr. Vol. II p. 248. Young's appellate claim that he was seeking to address a denial of discovery is unsupported by the record.

[16] The record also refutes any suggestion that Young's behavior was merely reflecting “his inability to understand the proceedings or to self-representation without legal education,” as opposed to deliberate disruption of the court proceedings to avoid trial. Appellant's Br. p. 26. Young's refusal to comply with the trial court's orders and the judicial process caused the first mistrial, and this disruptive and non-compliant behavior continued during the following two pre-trial conferences. At the February 13, 2025, pre-trial conference, Young objected to the upcoming trial date, challenged the trial court's jurisdiction, claimed that the trial court was depriving him of his rights, refused to answer the trial court's questions, interrupted the trial court, and claimed that he was being held captive against his will. The trial court indicated that it was “absolutely certain that [Young was] an intelligent young man [who] fully underst[ood] what I'm saying,” found that Young was “obstructing the proceedings intentionally[,]” and revoked Young's self-representation because it had “no other alternative[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 249. Even at the second trial and while represented by counsel, Young was disruptive; the trial court noted that while he was “analytical and detailed[,]” it found his claimed lack of understanding to be “disingenuous at best.” Tr. Vol. III p. 29.

[17] The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom, to engage in serious and obstructionist misconduct, or to avoid compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 259 (Ind. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Consequently, while a defendant enjoys a right to self-represent, “it does not inevitably follow that such right precludes the appointment of counsel over the defendant's objection to protect the public interest in the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.” Id. at 260 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Suffice it to say that the record clearly supports the trial court's conclusion that this is one of those cases. Young abused the dignity of the courtroom, engaged in obstructionist misconduct to avoid trial, and refused to comply with procedural rules. The trial court did not err in denying Young the right to represent himself at his second trial.

[18] Young also contends that he was erroneously denied hybrid representation. The record, however, does not support Youngs's claim on appeal that he actually requested hybrid representation. Young requested at the final pre-trial conference on February 27, 2025, that counsel be dismissed, and he objected to counsel's representation at trial in March, with no mention of hybrid representation. While the trial court did indicate that it would not grant hybrid representation, that does not mean that it had been requested. In Jenkins v. State, 809 N.E.2d 361, 367–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, we concluded that because the defendant had not clearly asserted his desire to proceed with hybrid representation, no error had occurred. We draw the same conclusion here.

III. Jury Instruction

[19] Young contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to deliver his tendered jury instruction on venue. “The purpose of a jury instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001) (quotation and citation omitted). “Instruction of the jury is left to the sound judgment of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Schmidt v. State, 816 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. We consider whether the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the law, whether there was evidence sufficient to support the instruction, and whether the substance of the tendered instruction was covered by other instructions. Walden v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ind. 2008).

[20] At the conclusion of the evidence, Young orally requested the following instruction:

If you find from the evidence the offense charged in the information occurred outside of Johnson County, that the offenses were not part of the common plan, or intent to the offense, which originated in Johnson County and was not one part of a continuous course of action by the defendant, a separate independent set of facts occurring outside of Johnson County, then the State would have no jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant or the offenses charged, you must find the defendant not guilty.

Tr. Vol. III p. 242.

[21] The trial court refused the instruction and instead gave Final Instruction 17, which largely tracked the language of Indiana Code subsections 35-32-2-1(h) and -1(i) and provided as follows:

Under Indiana law criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed.

If an offense is committed at a place which is on or near a common boundary which is shared by two (2) or more counties and it cannot be readily determined where the offense was committed, then the trial may be in any county sharing the common boundary.

If an offense is committed on a public highway that runs on and along a common boundary shared by two (2) or more counties, the trial may be held in any county sharing the common boundary.

Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 23.

[22] Simply put, the tendered instruction addressed jurisdiction, not venue, and there was no dispute that the State of Indiana has jurisdiction over this case. Consequently, Young's tendered instruction is not an accurate statement of the law on venue. In Cutter v. State, 725 N.E.2d 401, 409 n.3 (Ind. 2000), the Indiana Supreme Court questioned whether similar language was an accurate statement of the law on venue, noting that jurisdiction within the state is not the same thing as venue as to a particular county. See also Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133, 137 (Ind. 1994) (stating that venue and jurisdiction are not the same because venue statutes and rules do not confer jurisdiction but rather prescribe the location at which trial proceedings are to occur from among the courts empowered to exercise jurisdiction). We think that the Supreme Court's skepticism about the tendered “venue” instruction in Cutter was justified. The trial court properly refused Young's tendered instruction on jurisdiction and gave an instruction on venue that correctly stated the law.

IV. Remote Testimony

[23] Young contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the remote testimony of Ferner, who testified from Pennsylvania via Zoom. Young, however, has waived appellate review of Ferner's remote testimony for several reasons. First, although Young argues on appeal that he was denied his confrontation rights under both the Sixth Amendment and the Indiana Constitution, Young did not make that argument below. Rather, Young objected “for the record” based on being unable to “face her in person.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 211, 212. This objection is neither legally specific nor supported by any reference to authority, constitutional or otherwise. To preserve an error for appeal, a party must specifically identify the grounds for the objection at trial. Childers v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (Ind. 1999). The purpose of the requirement for a specific and timely objection is to alert the trial court so that it may avoid error or promptly minimize harm from an error that might otherwise require reversal and result in a miscarriage of justice and a waste of time and resources. Godby v. State, 736 N.E.2d 252, 255 (Ind. 2000). Young failed to specifically argue a legal analysis under either constitutional provision in any detailed way as to alert the trial court of the issue or to allow it to rule on the confrontation issue.

[24] Second, as to Young's appellate claim under Indiana Administrative Rule 14(C) that the trial court did not make specific findings of “good cause” for Ferber's remote testimony, he did not make any objection below on the reason for her remote testimony or the trial court's lack of specific findings. A party may not object on one ground at trial and raise a different ground on appeal. Benjamin v. State, 233 N.E.3d 506, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). We conclude that Young has waived any challenge he might have had to Ferner's remote testimony for appellate review.

V. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[25] Young contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to allow the jury to convict him of Level 3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and to find that venue exited in Johnson County. When reviewing sufficiency claims, we do not assess witness credibility or reweigh the evidence and consider only the probative evidence supporting the verdict and reasonable inferences therefrom. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). When confronted with conflicting evidence, we consider it in a light most favorable to the verdict and affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The State is required to prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence, even though it is not an element of an offense. Baugh v. State, 801 N.E.2d 629, 631 (Ind. 2004).

1. Level 3 Felony Possession of a Narcotic Drug

[26] Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6(a) provides that a “person who [․] knowingly or intentionally possesses [․] a narcotic drug (pure or adulterated) classified in schedule I or II, commits possession of [․] a narcotic drug, a Level 6 felony[.]” Fentanyl is a schedule II controlled substance, see Ind. Code § 35-48-2-6(c), and the offense is a Level 3 felony if the amount of the drug involved is at least ten but less than twenty-eight grams and an enhancing circumstance applies, such as possession of a firearm. Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-6(d)(2); 35-48-1.1-18(2).

[27] Young does not deny that the pills found were his but argues that the State failed to prove that he had possessed the required ten grams of contraband because it failed to test all of them for the presence of fentanyl. “The identity and quantity of a controlled substance, and the defendant's possession of or dealing in narcotics, may all be established through witness testimony and circumstantial evidence.” Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1024 (Ind. 2009). Moreover,

[t]o require that each and every fragment of a controlled substance be examined [․] would be impossible. It is sufficient and in compliance with accepted procedure that a representative sample of the controlled substance be scientifically tested and that the examining expert give his opinion as to the remainder of the homogeneous substance.

Hamdi v. State, 200 N.E.3d 956, 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Dixon v. State, 171 Ind. App. 472, 474, 357 N.E.2d 908, 910 (1976)).

[28] Three separate packages of pills were discovered: eight small, round, blue pills with “M” on one side and “30” on the other found in the cup holder; twenty-eight small, round, blue pills with “M” on one side and “30” on the other found in Young's fanny pack; and eighty-eight small, round, blue pills with “M” on one side and “30” on the other found in the center console. Ferner tested one pill from each package, all of which had tested positive for fentanyl. This evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that a representative sample from a homogeneous whole had been analyzed. See Woodford v. State, 752 N.E.2d 1278, 1283 (Ind. 2001) (finding sufficient evidence of dealing where two of nine rocks tested positive for cocaine, the chemist testified that all were “consistent in color, dryness, and wetness,” the total weight of the nine rocks equaled 3.21 grams, and the testing of a representative sample of two rocks of cocaine was sufficient).

[29] As for the handgun, possession can be either actual or constructive. Washington v. State, 902 N.E.2d 280, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over an item. Massey v. State, 816 N.E.2d 979, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). A defendant's possession is constructive when he possesses: 1) the capability to maintain dominion and control over a piece of contraband; and 2) the intent to maintain dominion and control over a piece of contraband. Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh'g, 685 N.E.2d 698 (1997).

[30] To fulfill the capability element of constructive possession, the State must demonstrate that a defendant “was able to reduce the [contraband] to his personal possession.” Griffin v. State, 945 N.E.2d 781, 783–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The evidence showed that the .38 caliber revolver was discovered in the front passenger door pocket, and Young had been seated in the front passenger's seat immediately next to it moments before. This is sufficient to establish capability.

[31] To establish that Young had the intent to maintain dominion and control, the State had to prove that he had knowledge of the presence of contraband on the premises in which they were found. Id. Where, as here, a defendant's access to contraband is not exclusive, the jury may infer his intent to possess through the presence of additional circumstances pointing to his knowledge of the nature of the contraband and its presence. Lampkins, 682 N.E.2d at 1275; Richardson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Factors of intent may include, but are not limited to:

(1) a defendant's incriminating statements; (2) a defendant's attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) the item's proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of contraband within the defendant's plain view; and (6) the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns.

Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174–75 (Ind. 2011); see also Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ind. 1992).

[32] Young's knowledge of the presence of the handgun was shown through several of the factors listed above. Young was in the vehicle in which the handgun was found, and it was found in plain view right next to where he had been sitting. Moreover, police found .38 caliber ammunition in Young's fanny pack. This is sufficient evidence to allow an inference that Young had constructively possessed the handgun.

2. Class B Misdemeanor Marijuana Possession

[33] Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-11(a)(1) provides that a person who “knowingly or intentionally possesses (pure or adulterated) marijuana” commits possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. Young does not deny that he possessed the material identified as marijuana, arguing only that the State did not prove that it was, in fact, marijuana.

“[T]he identity of a drug can be proven by circumstantial evidence.” Clifton v. State, 499 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Ind.1986). [․] The opinion of someone sufficiently experienced with the drug may establish its identity, as may other circumstantial evidence. Id. Although chemical analysis is one way, and perhaps the best way, to establish the identity of a compound, persons experienced in the area may be able to identify cigarette smoke, marijuana, and even toluene. This is true even if every citizen may not be up to that task.

Vasquez v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1214, 1216–17 (Ind. 2001).

[34] Here, Officer Allen testified that he had detected the odor of burnt marijuana as he approached the vehicle, which he knew through his training and experience to be marijuana. Officer Allen also identified the object Young threw out the window as a marijuana cigarette. Officer Redenbarger's testimony echoed Officer Allen's regarding the odor. Both officers also believed that the green, leafy substance found in Young's fanny pack was marijuana, and Officer Redenbarger specifically testified that his training had allowed him to identify it. This evidence supports the jury's conclusion that the substance found in Young's fanny pack was marijuana.

3. Class A Misdemeanor Invasion of Privacy

[35] Indiana Code Section 35-46-1-15.1(a)(11) provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally violates “an order issued under IC 35-33-8-3.2” commits invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor. The invasion of privacy statute does not explicitly require actual service of a no-contact order for a conviction.

[36] Young was ordered on April 24, 2023, in open court to have no contact with Martin in Cause Number 02D04-2304-F6-488. Young refused to sign the order, but he was served with it by an officer. The no-contact order was admitted at trial as State's Exhibit 2. The evidence is undisputed that Young was discovered in a vehicle with Martin on July 13, 2023, less than three months after the no-contact order was issued. Young argues that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his invasion-of-privacy conviction because he never signed the no-contact order and no copy of the order was entered into evidence. First, there is precedent that knowledge of the no-contact order is enough to sustain a conviction for violating it, and Young does not claim that he was unaware of the order's existence. See Hendricks v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1050, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence of violation of a protective order when an officer told the defendant on the telephone about the order and defendant later violated it). Moreover, a copy of the no-contact order was, in fact, admitted as State's Exhibit 2. In the end, Young identifies no authority for the proposition that either of the circumstances he identifies would preclude a conviction for invasion of privacy, and we are aware of none. The State produced sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find Young guilty of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.

4. Venue

[37] Young claims that the State failed to establish venue in Johnson County. Young had a constitutional and statutory right to be tried in the county where the offense was committed. See Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 13; Ind. Code § 35-32-2-1(a). As mentioned, the State is required to prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence. Peacock v. State, 126 N.E.3d 892, 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Baugh, 801 N.E.2d at 631). We neither reweigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility but look to the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the requisite venue. Eberle v. State, 942 N.E.2d 848, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. “[T]he State meets its burden of establishing venue if the facts and circumstances permit the trier of fact to infer that the crime occurred in the given county.” Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Eckstein v. State, 839 N.E.2d 232, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

[38] Indiana Code section 35-32-2-1(a) provides that “[c]riminal actions shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed, except as otherwise provided by law.” Moreover,

[i]f an offense is committed on a public highway (as defined in IC 9-25-2-4) that runs on and along a common boundary shared by two (2) or more counties, the trial may be held in any county sharing the common boundary.

Ind. Code § 35-32-2-1(i).

[39] The State produced sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that venue was in Johnson County. As we have already concluded, there was sufficient evidence to establish that Young possessed the handgun and fentanyl pills in the vehicle as it proceeded westbound on County Line Road, a public highway that runs along a common boundary between Johnson and Marion Counties. See Ind. Code § 9-25-2-4 (defining “public highway” as “a street [․] in Indiana [․] that is used by the public or open to use by the public”). Consequently, “the trial may be held in any county sharing the common boundary.” Ind. Code § 35-32-2-1(i).

[40] Young's focus on when and where the officers discovered the contraband is misplaced. The question of venue under the circumstances of this case turns on where the defendant “committed” the offense, not where the offense was discovered. Ind. Code § 35-32-2-1. There is no evidence to even suggest that Young did not possess the handgun and fentanyl pills on County Line Road but somehow did when stopped a short time later in Marion County. Young's argument is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Eberle, 942 N.E.2d at 855.

VI. Admission of Body Camera Video

[41] Young contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Officer Allen's body camera video of his encounter with Young on the basis that he had not been sufficiently informed of his rights before stating that the drugs and handgun found in the vehicle were his. We afford trial courts broad discretion in ruling on the admission of evidence and review the trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Richardson v. State, 189 N.E.3d 629, 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Miranda warnings are based upon the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and were designed to protect an individual from being compelled to testify against himself. State v. Keller, 845 N.E.2d 154, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).²

[42] We need not address the merits of Young's Miranda argument, because even if the body camera video was admitted in error, any error could only be considered harmless. Statements obtained in violation of Miranda are subject to harmless-error analysis. Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). When determining whether an error is harmless, our review is de novo, and the error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Here, ample evidence established Young's possession of the handgun and contraband, even without considering his incriminating statements.

[43] As discussed, Young does not argue that the fentanyl pills or marijuana were not his, only that the State failed to establish that all of the pills contained fentanyl and that the substance he possessed was, in fact, marijuana, arguments we have already rejected. As for the handgun, we have already concluded that the State produced sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find that Young had constructively possessed it. Young was in the vehicle in which the handgun was soon thereafter found, and it was found in plain view right next to where he had been sitting. Young's fanny pack on his body contained ammunition for the kind of handgun found in the vehicle. Because other evidence amply established Young's possession of the handgun and other contraband, any error that may have occurred in the admission of his statements of possession can only be considered harmless.

VII. Appropriateness of Sentence

[44] Young contends that his aggregate twenty-five-year sentence is inappropriately harsh. We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). “Although appellate review of sentences must give due consideration to the trial court's sentence because of the special expertise of the trial bench in making sentencing decisions, Appellate Rule 7(B) is an authorization to revise sentences when certain broad conditions are satisfied.” Shouse v. State, 849 N.E.2d 650, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. “[W]hether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). In addition to the “ ‘due consideration’ ” we are required to give to the trial court's sentencing decision, “we understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions.” Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)).

[45] Young was convicted of Level 3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, Class C misdemeanor marijuana possession, Class C misdemeanor refusal to identify self, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and was found to be a habitual offender. Young was ordered to serve a sentence of two years for obstruction of justice, ninety days for marijuana possession, sixty days for refusal to identify self, 365 days for invasion of privacy, and twelve years for possession of a narcotic drug. All sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, and Young's sentence for possession of a narcotic drug was enhanced by thirteen years by virtue of his status as a habitual offender. The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is between three and sixteen years with an advisory sentence of nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b). The habitual-offender enhancement for a person convicted of a Level 3 felony is between eight and twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i). Taking into account only Young's conviction for Level 3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, his enhanced sentence could have been as long as thirty-six years of incarceration.

[46] In evaluating the nature of Young's offenses, we consider “the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense[s,]” Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied, and, in so doing, we find them to be moderately heinous. Young was found to be in possession of over 100 fentanyl pills and a handgun, acts that are much more consistent with drug dealing than with personal use. Young was also riding in a vehicle with a person he was prohibited from contacting in any manner. The nature of Young's offenses justifies his moderately-enhanced sentence.

[47] Young's character also justifies the length of his sentence. In evaluating a defendant's character, we consider “the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Wilson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 667, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021), and McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)). A defendant's criminal history is one relevant factor in analyzing his character, the significance of which varies based on the “gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.” Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Rutherford, 866 N.E.2d at 874). Young's criminal history is extensive for a twenty-nine-year-old. In addition to five juvenile adjudications, Young has prior convictions for Level 5 felony battery, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, Level 6 felony domestic battery, and Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug. Young's misdemeanor convictions include drug abuse and operating while intoxicated in Ohio and battery. Young had pending misdemeanor charges in Ohio for assault and obstructing an officer. Young has also violated the terms of probation on two prior occasions and acknowledges that he has spent a majority of his adult life incarcerated. This is likely why he was assessed at “very high” risk to reoffend. Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 57.

[48] Young has also failed to take responsibility for his actions. At sentencing, Young claimed that he did not know what laws he had violated, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him, he had been under the influence at the time, he had not put anyone in harm's way, and he had been under duress. Young claimed that for “most” of his crimes, he had been “always with somebody” and had gotten “wrapped up in the middle.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 78. During his colloquy with the trial court, Young generally minimized his criminal history and his actions.

[49] Young has not sought substance-abuse treatment, despite admitting that he began using drugs as a child and had been using methamphetamine and fentanyl daily at the time of the offenses. When released from the Allen County jail, he returned to using fentanyl and marijuana. Young could have, but did not, seek treatment during his many periods of incarceration. “[L]ongstanding drug or alcohol abuse without improvement despite opportunities for rehabilitation may support such a conclusion [of bad character].” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 6 (Ind. 2014); see also Mefford v. State, 983 N.E.2d 232, 237–38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that a long history of substance abuse did not reflect well on a forty-one-year-old defendant's character), trans. denied. As was the case in Mefford, Young's “history of criminal activity, multiple probation violations and revocations, and admitted illegal drug use reflect poorly on his character and indicate nothing but a disregard for the law.” 983 N.E.2d at 238.

[50] Young's attempt to place blame for his poor character on his family and childhood does nothing to show examples of his good character. See Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 725 (Ind. 2007) (noting that the Indiana Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence of a difficult childhood warrants little, if any, mitigating weight); Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 543 (Ind. 1996) (mitigating weight warranted by a difficult childhood is in the low range). The trial court found Young to be “intelligent,” “analytical[,] and detailed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 249; Vol. III p. 29. Yet, Young has shown an inability to use those characteristics in a positive way to benefit society. In the end, Young's purported mitigators do not rise to the level of “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” necessary to overcome the deference given to the trial court's sentencing decision. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). Young has failed to convince us that, in light of the nature of his offenses and his character, a reduction in his aggregate twenty-five-year sentence is warranted.

[51] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2.   Young mentions Article 1, Section 14, of the Indiana Constitution but does not develop a separate argument based on it.

Bradford, Judge.

May, J., and Altice, J., concur.