WHITE INVESTMENTS INC v. ESTATE OF RUSSELL (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] H.B. White Investments, Inc. (“Judgment Creditor”) appeals the trial court's order partially denying Judgment Creditor's objection to Martin J. Russell's (“Martin”) disclaimer of his interest under the will of his father, Charles M. Russell, Sr. (“Testator”). Judgment Creditor raises the following restated issues:

 I. Whether the trial court erred when it determined that Martin's acceptance of the use or benefit of a portion of his residual share of the Will only partially barred his ability to disclaim his interest in Testator's estate (“the Estate”)1; and

II. Whether Martin's disclaimer is barred by fraudulent transfer under Indiana Code section 32-17.5-8-5.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Testator executed a Last Will and Testament (“the Will”) on June 7, 2016, naming First Financial Bank of Terre Haute, Indiana, as his personal representative (“Personal Representative”). In relevant part, the Will devised and bequeathed to Martin “all the rest, residue and remainder of [the Estate].” Ex. Vol. III p. 6. In a 2010 criminal case (“the Criminal Case”), Martin was convicted of numerous thefts and was sentenced to an executed term of imprisonment in the Indiana Department of Corrections.² As part of his conviction, Martin was ordered to pay restitution to Judgment Creditor in the amount of $1,441,311.38, which was subsequently reduced to a judgment (“the Judgment”).

[4] Testator died on May 8, 2018, while Martin was still incarcerated. The residue of the Estate included, in pertinent part: a home and pole barn located in Rockville, Indiana (“the Property”), and a rental property (“the Rental Property”) located adjacent to the Property; a business named Bugsy's Pest Control (“the Business”), which Testator operated from the Property; various collectible items located in the basement of the Property (“the Household Goods and Furnishings”); and vehicles.³ The Business consisted of both tangible and intangible personal property and included a pick-up truck, sprayers, a pump tank, chemicals, business records, an answering machine, and a customer list.

[5] On August 16, 2018, the Estate was opened to probate the Will, and the next day, the trial court issued an order for the unsupervised administration of the Estate and appointed the Personal Representative.⁴ Two months later, in October 2018, Martin was released from prison and began operating the Business out of the Property. Martin operated the Business from Testator's home office on the Property and used a pole barn to store chemicals and work on equipment for the Business. From November 2018 to October 2019, Martin earned net income from the Business of approximately $1,000.00 a month.

[6] On May 8, 2019, Judgment Creditor filed a Verified Motion for Proceedings Supplemental in Martin's Criminal Case, seeking to attach Martin's “wages, assets, income, profits, or other non-exempt property which can be applied to the satisfaction of [the] Judgment.” Id. at 48–49. That same day, Judgment Creditor also filed its motion to intervene in the probate case, asserting an interest in Martin's residual share of the Estate. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 51–54. Later that month, the trial court granted Judgment Creditor's motion to intervene. See id. at 67.

[7] On September 13, 2019, Martin filed his Disclaimer of Intestate Share of Decedent's Estate (“the Disclaimer”),⁵ indicating his intent to disclaim his entire interest in the residue of the Estate and stating that he “has not accepted such property or any of its benefits[.]” Id. at 74–75. One month later, on October 14, 2019, Judgment Creditor filed an objection to the Disclaimer, arguing Martin was barred from disclaiming his interest in the Estate under Indiana Code section 32-17.5-8-2 because Martin had “already accepted some part of the interest that he now seeks to disclaim.” Id. at 82.

[8] On November 7, 2019, an evidentiary hearing was held on the Disclaimer and Judgment Creditor's objection. The trial court took the matter under advisement and, on November 20, 2019, issued its order determining that the Disclaimer was partially barred. In relevant part, it stated it:

[N]ow finds that [Martin] has already accepted at least some of the interests he seeks to disclaim. Therefore, the Court will sustain the objection to the [D]isclaimer. The Court finds that further discovery and evidentiary hearings should be held to determine exactly what assets are in the [E]state and what portion of those assets [Martin] has already accepted with a view toward putting a dollar value on that portion of the [E]state already accepted. The Court can find no authority for the proposition that acceptance of a portion of the [E]state results in a complete bar to disclaim the rest of the [E]state.

Id. at 84.

[9] In November 2020, Martin and Judgment Creditor entered into an Agreed Entry in the Criminal Case, which provided that, in partial satisfaction of the Judgment, Martin would deliver to Judgment Creditor the title to the vehicles that were jointly titled in his name and Testator's name. In addition, Martin agreed that the outstanding balance on the Judgment was $2,864,343.06, as of September 24, 2020. Ex. Vol. III pp. 55–56. In January 2021, the Personal Representative filed an amended inventory that valued the Estate, in relevant part, as follows: the real estate (the Property and the Rental Property less a mortgage on Property) to be $236,000.00 and the Household Goods and Furnishings to be $260,000.00.⁶ See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 85–86.

[10] In May 2022, the trial court held further evidentiary hearings pursuant to its November 2019 order and again took the matter under advisement. The trial court permitted each party to submit post-trial briefs, and after reviewing the testimony and post-trial briefs, issued an order that concluded that “Martin's disclaimer is effective as to all assets other than what the parties have characterized as the business assets of the pest control business, the primary asset of which is the truck.” Id. at 110. The trial court then denied Judgment Creditor's objection to the Disclaimer with respect to all Estate property that was “not part of the pest control business.” Id.

[11] Judgment Creditor thereafter pursued a discretionary interlocutory appeal, which this court did not accept. Further proceedings were held, and a final judgment was entered on April 1, 2025. Judgment Creditor now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Judgment Creditor challenges the trial court's Order on the Disclaimer, arguing Martin should be barred from disclaiming his interest in any Estate property. To resolve this appeal, we must engage in statutory interpretation and questions of statutory interpretation are subject to a de novo standard of review. O'Connell v. Clay, 267 N.E.3d 994, 999 (Ind. 2025). “[O]ur primary goal is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent.” Perry Cnty. v. Huck, 263 N.E.3d 138, 141 (Ind. 2025) (citing Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012)). “The best evidence of that intent is the language of the statute itself, and we strive to give the words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning.” State v. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ind. 2008) (citing Hendrix v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2001)). “A statute should be examined as a whole, avoiding excessive reliance upon a strict literal meaning or the selective reading of individual words.” Id. (citing Sales v. State, 723 N.E.2d 416, 420 (Ind. 2000)). “Our first task when interpreting a statute is to give its words their plain meaning and consider the structure of the statute as a whole.” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep't, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016) (citing West v. Off. of Ind. Sec'y of State, 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 2016)). Our Supreme Court has previously explained that it “presumes that the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals.” Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 793 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2010)).

I. Effectiveness of the Disclaimer

[13] Indiana Code article 32-17.5 governs the disclaimer of interests in property. Under this article, “disclaimer” means “a refusal to accept an interest in or power over property.” Ind. Code § 32-17.5-2-4. In general, a person “may disclaim, in whole or part, any interest in or power over property[.] I.C. § 32-17.5-3-1 (emphasis added). Indiana Code section 32-17.5-3-4 expressly provides for a partial disclaimer. It states that “[a] partial disclaimer may be expressed as: (1) a fraction; (2) a percentage; (3) a monetary amount; (4) a term of years; (5) a limitation of a power; or (6) any other interest or estate in the property.” Id. (emphasis added).

[14] For a disclaimer to be a valid, it must “(1) be in a writing or other record; (2) state that it is a disclaimer; (3) describe the interest or power disclaimed; (4) be signed by the person making the disclaimer; and (5) be delivered or filed in the manner provided in IC 32-17.5-7.” I.C. § 32-17.5-3-3(b). However, in relevant part, a “disclaimer of an interest in property is barred” if, before the disclaimer becomes effective, “[t]he disclaimant accepts the interest sought to be disclaimed.” I.C. § 32-17.5-8-2(1) (“the Disclaimer Bar Statute”).

[15] Judgment Creditor does not challenge the validity of the Disclaimer itself but rather argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of the Disclaimer Bar Statute. Specifically, Judgment Creditor argues that because Martin accepted a portion of the property bequeathed to him under the Will (the Business), he is barred from disclaiming his interest in the remainder of the property bequeathed to him in the Will. Judgment Creditor does not challenge the trial court's finding that Martin only accepted the Business property and neither party asserts that the relevant statutes are ambiguous. We, therefore, limit our review to the plain language of the statutes.

[16] The Disclaimer Bar Statute states that “[a] disclaimer of an interest in property is barred if ․ [t]he disclaimant accepts the interest sought to be disclaimed.” I.C. § 32-17.5-8-2 (emphases added). Put simply, it is not the bequest that is barred from being disclaimed, but Martin's interest in the specific property that he had already accepted. In this instance, that is the Business. Under Judgment Creditor's interpretation of the statute, the bar would extend to property that the disclaimant had not accepted and would be inconsistent with a disclaimant's ability to partially disclaim an interest in property. The trial court did not err when it concluded that Martin's disclaimer was effective as to all of the property that he had not accepted or used for his benefit, meaning all assets except the Business.

[17] Judgment Creditor further challenges the Disclaimer as a matter of equity. In the Disclaimer, Martin stated that he “has not accepted such property or any of its benefits[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 74–75. Judgment Creditor argues that this statement “was false when made[,]” and therefore as a matter of equity, the Disclaimer should be disregarded or set aside. Appellant's Br. p. 29. We note that “our courts generally will not exercise equitable powers when an adequate remedy at law exists.” Porter v. Bankers Tr. Co. of Cal., 773 N.E.2d 901, 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing State ex rel. Hahn v. Howard Cir. Ct., 571 N.E.2d 540, 541 (Ind.1991)). “But where substantial justice can be accomplished by following the law, and the parties’ actions are clearly governed by rules of law, equity follows the law.” Id. (citing Metro. Sch. Dist. of Sw. Parke v. Vaught, 233 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Ind. 1968)). Because Martin and Judgment Creditor's actions are properly governed by the Disclaimer Bar Statute, we cannot say that an injustice will result from following the law under the circumstances. Application of the Disclaimer Bar Statute to only the Business results in no injustice and does not require us to fashion an equitable remedy.

II. Fraudulent Transfer

[18] Judgment Creditor next contends that the Disclaimer should be “barred on the basis of Indiana's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.” Appellants Br. p. 29; I.C. § 32-18-2-14. Judgment Creditor highlights Indiana Code section 32-17.5-8-5 as support, which states that “[a] disclaimer is barred or limited if the disclaimer is barred or limited by Indiana law other than this article.” However, Judgment Creditor failed to raise this argument to the trial court, and therefore, it has been waived on appeal. Mitchell v. Stevenson, 677 N.E.2d 551, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (stating “[w]hen an issue is not raised before the trial court, it is waived for review.”), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[19] We cannot say the trial court erred in permitting Martin to disclaim his interest in or power over property he did not accept, and we cannot say the trial court erred in declining to exercise its equitable power under the circumstances. Moreover, because the issue of fraudulent transfer was not raised below, it has been waived on appeal.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the opinion we use “Will” and “Estate” interchangeably, referring to Martin's interest under the Will or his interest in the Estate.

2.   Martin pleaded guilty under Cause number 83C01-1001-FC-1. See Ex. Vol. III pp. 22–24.

3.   There were several vehicles owned jointly between Testator and Martin that were transferred to Martin as non-probate assets.

4.   A new case number, 61C01-1905-ES-12, was assigned when the trial court later ordered the supervised administration of the Estate. See Ex. Vol. III pp. 63–64.

5.   Despite the Disclaimer's reference to Martin's “intestate” share of the Estate, all parties and the trial court considered the Disclaimer to be asserted against Martin's testate share of the Estate.

6.   It is unclear from the record if the assets of the Business are included in the appraisal as Household Goods and Furnishings.

Foley, Judge.

May, J. and Altice, J., concur.