Hamid R. Raffieed, Appellant-Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant v. Sheri Schenkel and Russell Schenkel d/b/a Traxside Bar & Grill, Appellees-Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Hamid Raffieed agreed to buy the Traxside Bar and Grill (“Traxside”) from Sheri and Russell Schenkel. After the sale, a dispute arose over certain aspects of the sale, and the parties entered into mediation. This resulted in a mediated settlement agreement (“the Mediated Agreement”), which provided that Raffieed would return ownership of Traxside to the Schenkels, transfer the liquor license to the Schenkels, and refrain from removing any trade fixtures from Traxside. Despite this, Raffieed removed several fixtures from Traxside and refused to assist with the transfer of the liquor license when issues arose. Accordingly, the Schenkels filed an emergency motion seeking to enforce the Mediated Agreement. The trial court granted the motion and found that the Schenkels incurred damages of $55,261.63; the trial court also awarded the Schenkels attorney fees in the amount of $8,954.69. Raffieed appeals and claims that the trial court erred by: (1) awarding damages associated with the closure of the bar due to the issues with the liquor license; (2) awarding damages based on the removal and replacement of the trade fixtures; and (3) awarding attorney fees. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Raffieed presents three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court clearly erred by awarding damages based on Raffieed's refusal to assist in the transfer of the liquor license.

II. Whether the trial court clearly erred by awarding damages based on Raffieed's removal of trade fixtures.

III. Whether the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees to the Schenkels.

Facts

[3] In 2023, Raffieed agreed to purchase Traxside from the Schenkels. In March of that year, Raffieed filed a complaint against the Schenkels claiming that they had breached the purchase agreement. The Schenkels filed an answer and a counterclaim alleging that Raffieed had breached the purchase agreement. The trial court ordered the parties to participate in mediation. The parties did so on November 28, 2023, and agreed to resolve all the issues between them. The mediator filed a report with the trial court the following day, indicating that the mediation was successful. The Mediated Agreement provided that Raffieed would transfer the liquor license back to the Schenkels on or before December 18, 2023, and counsel for both parties would work in good faith to facilitate this transfer. The Mediated Agreement further provided that Raffieed would deliver Traxside no later than December 18, 2023, with all “trade fixtures” still in place. Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 4. The Mediated Agreement also provided that the remedies available in an action to enforce the agreement included attorney fees.

[4] Raffieed delivered possession of Traxside to the Schenkels on December 18, 2023. Many of the trade fixtures, however, had been removed, which left Traxside “gutted” and non-operational.¹ Tr. Vol. II p. 152. Raffieed later testified that he took the items ² because he thought he had the right to do so. With regard to the liquor license, Raffieed signed the forms required to transfer the license to the Schenkels, but the Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission (“ATC”) rejected the documents because Raffieed listed an incorrect birthdate and because the corporate entity to which the Schenkels intended to transfer the license had been inadvertently dissolved. To correct their error, the Schenkels created a new limited liability company to accept the transfer of the license, and asked Raffieed to correct his mistake on the transfer form. Raffieed refused to do so unless the Schenkels signed a mutual and general release of claims. The Schenkels declined, and the ATC put the liquor license in escrow at Raffieed's request. This caused the Schenkels to shut down Traxside for six days until the liquor license was finally transferred to their LLC.

[5] On March 4, 2024, the Schenkels filed an emergency motion to enforce the Mediated Agreement. The trial court held a hearing on the motion the following day and entered an order requiring Raffieed to sign the documents necessary to transfer the license to the Schenkels. The trial court held a hearing on the issue of the fixtures and damages on November 18, 2024, and entered an order on December 31, 2024 awarding the Schenkels damages in the amount of $4,914 for loss of revenue due to the shutdown of the bar as a result of the issues with the liquor license; $28,049.05 for trade fixtures that had been replaced; $22,298.58 for trade fixtures that had yet to be replaced; and attorney fees in the amount of $8,954.69, for a total of $64,216.32. Raffieed now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[6] We explained in Turner v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 1257, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015):

Generally, Indiana strongly favors settlement agreements. Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. 2003). If a party agrees to settle a pending action, but then refuses to consummate the agreement, the opposing party may obtain a judgment enforcing the agreement. Id. “Settlement agreements are governed by the same general principles of contract law as any other agreement.” Id. “The construction of a contract is particularly well-suited for de novo appellate review, because it generally presents questions purely of law.” Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. AMCO Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2013).

[7] If a trial court enters findings and conclusions thereon in an action to enforce a settlement agreement, we first “determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Zukerman v. Montgomery, 945 N.E.2d 813, 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). On appeal, “we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. Rea v. Shroyer, 797 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We review questions of law de novo. Zuckerman, 945 N.E.2d at 818.

I. The trial court properly awarded damages for the closure of the bar.

[8] Raffieed first claims that the trial court erred by granting damages to the Schenkels based on their act of closing Traxside due to the issues with the liquor license. Raffieed's argument on this matter is minimal and contains no citation to authority or to the record.³ As we have repeatedly explained, Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that the argument section of a brief “contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning.” Also, “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on ․” App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). We will not consider a claim on appeal when there is no cogent argument supported by authority and there are no references to the record as required by the rules. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Although we prefer to decide cases on their merits, arguments are waived where an appellant's noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors. Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 983). Given the deficiencies in Raffieed's argument on this issue, we consider it waived. See id.

[9] But even if we considered the merits, Raffieed would not prevail. Raffieed claims that the application to transfer the liquor license was “fraught with errors by both parties.” Appellant's Br. p. 18. This may be true, but once the ATC pointed out these errors, Raffieed refused to correct the incorrect birthdate. When asked to correct his mistake, Raffieed instead asked the Schenkels to sign a release of all claims, which they refused to do. Raffieed unilaterally had the ATC place the license in escrow instead of facilitating its transfer to the Schenkels.

[10] The trial court could reasonably conclude that, by refusing to cooperate with the Schenkels to correct the error in the form required to transfer the liquor license—and instead holding it over their heads in an attempt to get the Schenkels to release their claims—Raffieed breached his obligation under the Mediated Agreement to transfer the license to the Schenkels. Raffieed's argument to the contrary is little more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

[11] Raffieed also claims that the trial court erred by awarding damages as a result of the Schenkels’ decision to close Traxside for six days due to the lack of a liquor license. We disagree. A party injured by a breach of contract may generally receive consequential damages. Indianapolis City Mkt. Corp. v. MAV, Inc., 915 N.E.2d 1013, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Johnson v. Scandia Assocs., 717 N.E.2d 24, 31 (Ind. 1999)). Such consequential damages may be awarded when the non-breaching party's loss “flows naturally and probably from the breach and was contemplated by the parties when the contract was made.” Id. “A factfinder may not award damages on the mere basis of conjecture and speculation.” Id. But consequential damages may include lost profits so long as the evidence is sufficient to “allow the trier of fact to estimate the amount with a reasonable degree of certainty and exactness.” Id. Lost profits need not be proved with mathematical certainty. Id. Lost profits are not uncertain where there is testimony that, while not sufficient to put the amount beyond doubt, is sufficient to enable the factfinder to make a fair and reasonable finding as to the proper damages. Id. at 1024-25.

[12] Raffieed argues, as he did below, that the Schenkels could have continued to run Traxside as a restaurant and sell food and non-alcoholic drinks.⁴ But, as found by the trial court, Traxside's main business is a bar, and operating without the liquor license was not feasible. Indeed, the bar could have lost even more money had it not shut down entirely.

[13] Ms. Schenkel testified that, based on a conservative estimate of the bar's historic daily profits, Traxside lost $819 in profit per day for the six days it was closed as a result of the liquor license issue. Thus, the trial court's calculation of damages in the amount of $4,914 was within the evidence. See Indianapolis City Mkt., 915 N.E.2d at 1024-25 (affirming trial court's award of consequential damages based on lost profits after restaurant was closed due to landlord's breach of lease). Raffieed's argument on this issue is little more than a request that we consider his testimony and other evidence that does not favor the trial court's judgment, which, as noted above, we cannot do.

II. The trial court did not err by awarding damages for Raffieed's removal of trade fixtures.

[14] Raffieed also claims that the trial court erred by awarding the Schenkels damages based on his removal of several fixtures from Traxside. Raffieed complains that the trial court did not limit its damages to the items listed during the original sale of the bar. But this is merely another request that we reweigh the evidence. The trial court's judgment was supported by the Schenkels’ testimony and their exhibits, which show that Raffieed removed numerous fixtures from the premises, contrary to the terms of the Mediated Agreement. The removal of these fixtures left the bar “gutted.” Tr. Vol. II p. 152.

[15] To the extent that Raffieed argues that the items he removed were not trade fixtures, we disagree. “Generally speaking, an article loses its status as simple unrelated personalty and becomes a ‘fixture’ when it becomes so integrated into the efficient use of a particular parcel of real estate that it is logically considered more part of the real estate than not.” 14 IND. LAW ENCYC. Fixtures § 1 (2026 Update) (footnote omitted). “When personal property is attached to land or a building and is regarded as an irremovable part of the real property the personal property is considered a fixture.” Id. (footnote omitted).

[16] Generally, personal property becomes a fixture, if the following is proven:

(1) either actual or constructive annexation of the article to the real property; (2) adaptation of the article to the use of the real property in general or to the part of the real property to which the article is connected; and (3) an intent by the annexing party to make the article a permanent accession to the real property.

[17] Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 633, 641 (Ind. 2012). The intent of the annexing party is the “chief test,” and “the first two requirements often serve as evidence of that intent.” Id. Thus, “whether a chattel has become a fixture ‘is a mixed question of law and fact and depends on the particular circumstances of each case.’ ” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Green v. Gibson Cir. Ct., 206 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ind. 1965)).

[18] A subset of fixtures, termed “trade fixtures” are “personal property put on the premises by a tenant which can be removed without substantial or permanent damage to the premises and [are] capable of being set up or used in business elsewhere.” Milestone Contractors, L.P. v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 739 N.E.2d 174, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Dinsmore v. Lake Elec. Co., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 1282, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)); see also 14 IND. LAW ENCYC., Fixtures § 13 (2026 Update).

[19] Here, the Schenkels offered into evidence, as Exhibit D, a list of the trade fixtures that were removed or destroyed by Raffieed and had been replaced. They also presented Exhibit E, which was a listing of the items that had not yet been replaced and the cost associated with replacing those items. The Schenkels presented testimony explaining why each item listed was a trade fixture and the cost associated with replacing that fixture. The trial court concluded that the items listed by the Schenkels, which they testified had been removed from the bar contrary to the terms of the Mediated Agreement, were trade fixtures, including: an ice machine, refrigerators, an ATM machine, a smoke removal system, a pizza oven, a griddle, a fryer, a cash register, four fifty-inch televisions and wall mounts, four stage monitor speakers, four microphone stands, the indoor and outdoor camera systems, seven tables, twenty-eight bar stools, an LED sign, and a safe. Many of these items—the wall-mounted televisions, the refrigeration units, cooking appliances, were physically attached to the real property. The remaining items, such as the LED sign, bar stools, audio equipment, and lighting, were integral to the operation of the bar and were adapted to the use of the property as a bar.

[20] Thus, the purpose, placement, and long-established use of these items demonstrate that they were trade fixtures. When these items were removed, the bar was non-operational. The trial court accepted the Schenkels’ evidence as true, and we are in no position on appeal to second-guess its factual determination.⁵ We cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that these items were trade fixtures that, pursuant to the clear terms of the Mediated Agreement, were to be returned to the Schenkels along with possession of the bar.

III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees.

[21] Lastly, Raffieed claims that the trial court erred by granting the Schenkels attorney fees. Raffieed's argument on this issue is again sparse. He argues simply: “Finally, as to the attorney's fees awarded to [the Schenkels]’s counsel, there is no statutory or contract basis for them.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. We, therefore, consider this issue waived for failure to make a cogent argument. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a); Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 364. Waiver notwithstanding, Raffieed is legally and factually incorrect.

[22] Paragraph 6 of the Mediated Agreement clearly and unambiguously provides:

Pursuant to Rule 2.7 of the Indiana Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution, should a dispute arise regarding settlement of this matter, it is contemplated this agreement is in compliance with Rule 2.7(E)(2) and may be filed by either of the parties as a Joint Stipulation indicating the matter has been settled according to the above terms and conditions of this agreement. Each party agrees that they are subjecting themselves to the remedies provided by Rule 2.7(E)(3) which may include sanctions or other appropriate remedies, including the entry of judgment on this agreement and/or attorney fees.

Appellee's App. Vol. II pp. 3-4 (emphasis added). Thus, the parties agreed to a possible award of attorney fees should a dispute arise from the Mediated Agreement.

Conclusion

[23] Raffieed's claims regarding the liquor license and attorney fees are waived for failure to make a cogent argument. Waiver notwithstanding, his claims fail. And Raffieed's argument regarding trade fixtures is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence. For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Among the fixtures that were missing were: an ice machine, two refrigerators, an ATM machine, a smoke removal system, a pizza oven, a griddle, a fryer, a cash register and credit card reader, four fifty-inch televisions and wall mounts, four stage monitor speakers, four microphone stands, the indoor and outdoor camera systems, seven tables and twenty-eight bar stools, an LED sign, and a safe.

2.   Raffieed admitted to taking three of the televisions, the pizza oven, an on-demand hot water system, and the cash register.

3.   His entire argument on this matter consists of the following paragraph:Additionally, the transfer of the liquor license back to Sheri was fraught with errors by both parties. The placing of it in escrow by [Raffieed] simply meant Traxside could not sell liquor. It could stay open, sell food, etc. Sheri decided to shut it down. Once the license was successfully transferred to Sheri - six (6) days later the bar was back open. The damages (lost revenues) claimed were unreasonable in light of the events and governmental issues tied to it.Appellant's Br. p. 18.

4.   Raffieed also complains that the Schenkels failed to sign the hold-harmless agreement, but there is no indication in the record that the Schenkels were required to do so. To the contrary, the parties were required to abide by the terms of the Mediated Agreement.

5.   Raffieed cites Roebel v. Kossenyans, 629 N.E.2d 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), but provides no explanation of how that case applies to the facts of the present case. Regardless, in that case, the defendant removed an incandescent light fixture. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's determination that this light fixture was a trade fixture that the tenant had a right to remove upon termination of the lease. Id. at 243-44. Roebel is easily distinguishable in that here, the parties agreed in mediation that the trade fixtures would remain with the bar.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur