JUVINALL v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Johnathan Juvinall (“Juvinall”) was convicted after a jury trial of obstruction of justice ¹ as a Level 5 felony and admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Juvinall to 2,100 days for his obstruction of justice conviction enhanced by 1,642 days for his habitual offender adjudication. Juvinall appeals and raises two issues for our review:

I.  Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Level 5 felony obstruction of justice; and

II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 7, 2024, R.J. was married to Juvinall, and on that date, the two went to the Oak Grove Motel in Warren County, Indiana together. Juvinall drove them to the motel in his mother's car. They spent the night in the motel and slept until approximately 1:00 p.m. the following day, May 8, 2024. When they woke up, Juvinall battered and strangled R.J. R.J. called 911 to report the crimes. Juvinall left the motel before police arrived and drove west toward Danville, Illinois. On May 15, 2024, the State charged Juvinall with Level 5 felony strangulation, Level 5 felony domestic battery, and Level 6 felony domestic battery stemming from the May 8, 2024 incident. R.J. and Juvinall were divorced shortly thereafter.

[4] On June 17, 2024, Juvinall filed a Notice of Alibi Defense, alleging that he was not in Warren County, Indiana, at the time the offenses occurred and was, instead, in Paris, Illinois, at the house of Amanda Harper (“Harper”) during this time period. R.J. was familiar with Harper as she was the person with whom Juvinall was having an affair while he was married to R.J. Juvinall was ultimately convicted of Level 5 felony strangulation and Level 5 felony domestic battery in the domestic violence case and found to be a habitual offender.

[5] At the time of the domestic violence crimes, R.J. had been paying for cell phone services for both her own and Juvinall's cell phones. Shortly after the crimes, R.J. sent Juvinall a text message alerting him that she was going to shut off his phone number. Juvinall communicated with R.J. and told her that, right after the incident at the motel, he drove by but decided not to stop because the police were there.

[6] Warren County Sheriff's Department Deputy Lucas Miller (“Deputy Miller”) was one of the officers who responded to the dispatch regarding the domestic abuse at the motel, and he investigated Juvinall's alibi defense. During his initial investigation, Deputy Miller first met with R.J. and found her injuries and appearance to be consistent with the crimes she reported. He learned from her that Juvinall left after the crimes, driving in the direction of Illinois, and that R.J. was paying for Juvinall's cell phone. Deputy Miller searched Facebook records, spoke with other witnesses who confirmed Juvinall was at the motel, and, using the phone number that R.J. stated belonged to Juvinall, obtained a search warrant for Juvinall's cell phone data.

[7] Deputy Miller received the cell phone records from Juvinall's cell phone carrier. The cell phone data contained the history of the locations of Juvinall's phone and revealed that Juvinall's cell phone was not located in Illinois at the time of the crimes. Instead, the cell phone was located near the Oak Grove Motel where the crimes occurred. The cell phone data indicated that Juvinall's cell phone did not leave Indiana until about 2:59 p.m., which was almost two hours after the domestic violence occurred, and did not arrive in Paris, Illinois, until 4:45 p.m. From this information, Deputy Miller concluded that it was impossible for Juvinall's cell phone to have been in Paris, Illinois, at the time the domestic violence took place.

[8] In preparing for Juvinall's trial in the domestic violence case, the State took Harper's deposition. In her deposition, when questioned by the State, Harper stated that Juvinall was with her in Illinois and not at the Oak Grove Motel at the time that he battered and strangled R.J. Prior to the deposition, Juvinall wrote a letter to Harper in which he instructed her on what to say about where they were on May 8, 2024, and what they were doing. Ex. Vol. 3 pp. 73–76. In this letter to Harper, Juvinall set out in detail what they purportedly did on May 8 and reminded her that “the supposed incident occurred at 2:48 p.m. to 2:52 p.m. so the times we were at [the places mentioned in the letter] have to take up the elapsed time of the supposed incident[.]” Id. at 73.

[9] On November 6, 2024, the State charged Juvinall with Level 5 felony obstruction of justice. The State also filed its Notice of Intent to Seek Habitual Offender Status. On June 17, 2025, a jury trial was held, and the jury found Juvinall guilty of the obstruction of justice charge. Juvinall admitted to the habitual offender enhancement.

[10] On July 1, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the time of sentencing, Juvinall's presentence investigation report reflected that his contact with the criminal justice system began when he was a juvenile and included three juvenile adjudications, four misdemeanor convictions, and six felony convictions. Juvinall had at least three probation violations and had previously spent time in the Department of Correction (“DOC”), on court supervision, on conditional discharge, and on probation.

[11] The trial court found as aggravating factors that Juvinall had a “history of criminal or delinquent behavior” and that he “recently violated conditions of probation, parole, [or] pardon.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 148. As mitigating factors, the trial court found that Juvinall admitted to and accepted responsibility for the habitual offender enhancement with no agreement in place between himself and the State and that he had family support who had been there for his trial. Finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced Juvinall to 2,100 days for his obstruction of justice conviction enhanced by 1,642 days on the habitual offender adjudication, resulting in an aggregate executed sentence of 3,742 days in the DOC. The trial court ordered that the 1,642 days for the habitual offender enhancement run concurrent with the habitual offender enhancement in the domestic violence case but ordered that the 2,100 days run consecutive to the sentence from that case and that the entire sentence in this matter run consecutive to a third cause number. Juvinall now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficient Evidence

[12] Juvinall argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Level 5 felony obstruction of justice. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016), cert. denied. Instead, we consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. “We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence.” Id. Further, “[w]e will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[13] To convict Juvinall of Level 5 felony obstruction of justice, the State was required to prove that he:

knowingly or intentionally induce[d] by coercion or false statement, a witness in a legal proceeding or criminal investigation to give a false or materially misleading statement and in so doing, during the investigation or pendency of a domestic violence or child abuse case, did knowingly or intentionally intimidate, unlawfully influence, or unlawfully persuade said witness to give a false or materially misleading statement at a deposition ․

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27; Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(1)(D), (b). Juvinall concedes some of these elements and only challenges the sufficiency of evidence that he (1) induced Harper by coercion or false statement to give a false or materially misleading statement and (2) knowingly or intentionally intimidated, unlawfully influenced, or unlawfully persuaded Harper to give a false or materially misleading statement at her deposition. He asserts that, in her deposition testimony, Harper stated that she did not even read the entire letter and that the letter did not influence her testimony. Juvinall therefore contends that the State failed to prove that the letter he wrote to Harper caused her to give false testimony at her deposition or had any effect on her deposition testimony.

[14] The evidence most favorable to the verdict established that R.J. was battered and strangled by Juvinall on the afternoon of May 8, 2024, in Warren County, Indiana. Cell phone data evidence was presented that Juvinall was not in Paris, Illinois, with Harper, during the pertinent time period as his alibi notice claimed. Specifically, the cell phone data revealed that Juvinall's cell phone was not located in Illinois at the time of the crimes and, instead, was located near the Oak Grove Motel where the crimes occurred and did not leave Indiana until about 2:59 p.m., which was almost two hours after the domestic violence occurred, not arriving in Paris, Illinois, until 4:45 p.m. Further, Juvinall communicated with R.J. and told her he was near the motel right after the domestic violence occurred. The evidence therefore established that Juvinall was not in Illinois with Harper during the time frame that the domestic violence crimes occurred.

[15] The State also presented the letter that Juvinall sent to Harper before she testified in a deposition, instructing her on what to say about where they were on May 8, 2024, and what they were doing. Ex. Vol. 3 pp. 73–76. The letter set out a detailed timeline of what they allegedly did on May 8, and in the letter, Juvinall reminded Harper that “the supposed incident occurred at 2:48 p.m. to 2:52 p.m. so the times we were at [the places mentioned in the letter] have to take up the elapsed time of the supposed incident[.]” Id. at 73. In the letter, Juvinall also stated, “[I] know that's a hell of alot [sic] to remember.” Id. at 75. He then emphasized the importance of Harper telling him what she was going to tell the prosecutor, stating “well, [I]'m gonna [sic] leave you with all that to decide exactly what you are going to tell the prosecutor. But [yo]u need to let me know exactly what you tell her[;] that way [I] can have the same exact thing to say in court[.]” Id. Subsequently, when testifying at her deposition, Harper stated that Juvinall was with her in Illinois and not at the Oak Grove Motel at the time that the crimes against R.J. were committed. Given the evidence that Juvinall was not actually in Illinois at the time in question and that Harper's deposition testimony aligned with Juvinall's instructions in the letter, the jury could reasonably infer that Juvinall (1) induced Harper by coercion or false statement to give a false or materially misleading statement and (2) unlawfully influenced or persuaded her to give a false or materially misleading statement in her deposition. All of his contrary arguments are requests for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Gibson, 51 N.E.3d at 210. Sufficient evidence was presented to support Juvinall's conviction for obstruction of justice.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[16] Juvinall contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020). “That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019).

[17] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) focuses on “the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We generally defer to the trial court's sentencing decision, and our goal is to determine whether the defendant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of Appellate Rule 7(B) are separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “Reviewing courts ‘must consider’ both factors, but the defendant need not ‘necessarily prove’ that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 219).

[18] Juvinall was convicted of Level 5 felony obstruction of justice and was adjudicated to be a habitual offender. A person who commits a Level 5 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one and six years, with the advisory sentence being three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). A person found to be a habitual offender can be sentenced to an additional fixed term between three years and six years when the person is convicted of a Level 5 or Level 6 felony. I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i)(2). Here, the trial court sentenced Juvinall to 2,100 days, which is approximately 5.75 years, for his Level 5 felony obstruction of justice conviction, enhanced by 1,642 days, which is approximately 5.5 years, for his habitual offender adjudication, totaling 3,742 days or approximately 10.25 years executed.

[19] When reviewing the nature of the offense, this court considers “the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense.” Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). In arguing that his sentence is inappropriate, Juvinall contends that his crime was non-violent, not egregious, “essentially” victimless, and did not cause damage to any person or property. Appellant's Br. p. 17. As to the nature of Juvinall's offense, the evidence demonstrated that, in an effort to avoid punishment for battering and strangling R.J., he wrote a letter to Harper to influence her testimony at her deposition and to get her to make false statements regarding his whereabouts at the time of the crimes against R.J. Contrary to his assertions that his crime was victimless and not egregious, Juvinall's crime constituted an affront to the criminal justice system and an effort to have Harper commit perjury and lie on his behalf. His offense also represented an attempt to avoid culpability for his crimes against R.J. and to deny her justice, thus making her a victim as well. Additionally, Juvinall was on probation in Illinois at the time he committed both the underlying battery and strangulation offenses and the obstruction of justice offense. Further, Juvinall admitted to being a habitual offender. Juvinall has not demonstrated compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offense in a positive light, accompanied by restraint, regard, or lack of brutality. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[20] When we look to a defendant's character, we engage in “a broad analysis of the defendant's ‘qualities, life, and conduct.’ ” Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Crabtree v. State, 152 N.E.3d 687, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied). As to Juvinall's character, he acknowledges he has a “moderate” criminal history but points to evidence that he obtained his GED, has a dependent child, and has various medical issues in an effort to argue that his sentence is inappropriate.

[21] The evidence at sentencing revealed that Juvinall has an extensive criminal history consisting of four misdemeanor convictions and six felony convictions, and numerous probation violations that led to extensions of probation and revocations. Juvinall's contact with the criminal justice system began with three juvenile adjudications and continued throughout his adult life with criminal convictions in three different states, including the crimes of driving while suspended, burglary, unlawful possession of marijuana in an amount over fifty pounds, and domestic battery. Although Juvinall has previously spent time on court supervision, on conditional discharge, on probation, and in the DOC, he has not been dissuaded from committing additional criminal offenses. As stated above, he was also on probation at the time of the instant offense. His criminal history and failure to curb his criminal actions despite prior opportunities to avoid incarceration and prior punishments reflect poorly on Juvinall's character. His present offense also reflects poorly on his character as it demonstrates dishonesty and an attempt to subvert the criminal justice system. Juvinall has not demonstrated compelling evidence, such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character, portraying his character in a positive light such that his sentence should be revised. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. We, therefore, conclude that Juvinall has not shown that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.

Conclusion

[22] We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Juvinall's conviction for Level 5 felony obstruction of justice. Additionally, his sentence is not inappropriate.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(1)(D), (b).

Foley, Judge.

May, J. and Altice, J., concur.