BARKER v. TRIPP (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Philip N. Barker and Angela Tripp entered into a Cohabitation Agreement providing that if their relationship ended, Tripp and her children would remain in the home. When the relationship ended, Barker did not move out. Tripp then sought and obtained a preliminary injunction ordering Barker to vacate the home and giving Tripp temporary possession of it. Barker now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Barker and Tripp, who each have children from prior relationships, started dating in 2018. At that time, they each owned a house. In 2023, Tripp and Barker decided that Tripp and her children would move into Barker's house and that Tripp would sell her house. That June, Barker and Tripp executed a Cohabitation Agreement, which provides that “[e]xpenses for routine household items and services, including groceries, utilities, rent, and cleaning supplies, shall be shared in proportion to each party's contribution to total household income.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 26. The Cohabitation Agreement also provides that Barker would add Tripp to the deed to his house:

The parties hereby agree to the following additional terms: Philip Barker agrees to put Angela Tripp on the deed as owner of **** Chazimal St, Plainfield, IN 46168. Angela Tripp agrees to pay Philip $65,000 for ownership. In the case that the relationship ends, Philip Barker agrees to move out and allow Angela Tripp to stay in the home so that her children have stability. Philip agrees to keep the mortgage in his name with the current mortgage terms. Angela Tripp would be fully responsible for the mortgage payments, property taxes, homeowners insurance, and utilities. Angela and her children would reside in the home as long as she continues paying until both children finish school. At that time, she would sell the home and split the equity with Philip Barker equally from the time she moved in until the time he moved out. Any equity gained while she lives in the home without Philip would go to Angela.

Id. at 27-28 (emphasis added). Tripp paid Barker $65,000. That same month, a quitclaim deed was recorded granting ownership in the house to Barker and Tripp as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Id. at 21.

[3] Barker and Tripp's relationship ended in March 2025, but Barker stayed in the house. In May, Tripp filed a complaint for specific performance, declaratory judgment, and breach of contract. She also filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to order Barker to move out of the house as required by the Cohabitation Agreement.

[4] A hearing on the preliminary injunction was held that month.¹ Barker and Tripp, who were both still living in the house, each testified that if they had to move out, they would have to rent. In addition, Tripp testified that she had paid her share of the household expenses, while Barker said she had not. Finally, Tripp testified that Barker was physically and verbally abusive, which Barker denied, and that her daughter was experiencing emotional trauma as a result. Following the hearing, the trial court made the following relevant findings: Barker “has continued to reside in the home and refuses to leave”; Barker and Tripp's relationship is “toxic” and involved “episodes of violence including verbal and physical”; Tripp's daughter “is experiencing emotional trauma because of the toxic nature of Tripp and Barker's relationship”; “there was evidence that the police have been called and a DCS report has been made”; and Barker's testimony “disputing any knowledge of Tripp's bruises and injuries was not credible.” Id. at 10. Based on these and other findings, the court concluded that Tripp had established the four requirements of a preliminary injunction:

(1) “Tripp has proven a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits related to the terms of the Agreement because the terms of her exclusive possession and occupancy are clear and ambiguous.”

(2) “Tripp has no adequate remedy at law without this preliminary injunction. Tripp has proven that without an injunction ordering Barker to vacate the home, that he will not honor the terms of the Agreement and voluntarily leave.”

(3) “Tripp has proven that without an injunction ordering Barker to vacate the home, that there will be irreparable harm. Specifically, without an order removing Barker from the Chazimal Street home, the ongoing toxic relationship will continue to cause Tripp and her minor child emotional harm.”

(4) “The public interest is not disserved by issuing this preliminary injunction because it promotes the enforcement of a clear and unambiguous contract and promotes a cessation to family violence.”

Id. at 11. Accordingly, the court awarded Tripp “temporary and exclusive occupancy and use of the home,” ordered that she was “solely responsible for the mortgage, property taxes, insurance and utilities,” and ordered Barker to “personally vacate the home ․ not later than 6:00 p.m. on May 23, 2025.” Id.

[5] This interlocutory appeal now ensues.²

Discussion and Decision

[6] Barker contends that the trial court erred in granting the preliminary injunction. “Appellate review of a preliminary injunction decision is limited and deferential.” Perry Cnty. v. Huck, 263 N.E.3d 138, 140 (Ind. 2025) (quotation omitted). “The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and thus we limit our review to whether there was an abuse of that discretion.” Id. at 141. In determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, we consider whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings support the judgment. Id. In doing so, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. Great Lakes Anesthesia, P.C. v. O'Bryan, 99 N.E.3d 260, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). We will reverse the trial court's judgment only when it is clearly erroneous, and a judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Perry Cnty., 263 N.E.3d at 141.

[7] In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) it has a reasonable likelihood of success at trial; (2) its remedies at law are inadequate and it is at risk of irreparable harm unless an injunction is issued; (3) its threatened injury outweighs the potential harm of granting the injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved. Id. The movant must prove each of the requirements to obtain a preliminary injunction, and if the movant fails to prove even one of these requirements, the trial court cannot grant an injunction. Holcomb v. T.L., 175 N.E.3d 1177, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[8] Barker's main argument is that Tripp didn't prove the first requirement of a preliminary injunction, that is, that she has a reasonable likelihood of success at trial. Barker doesn't dispute that the Cohabitation Agreement provides that if the relationship ends, he must move out. Instead, he claims that Tripp materially breached the Cohabitation Agreement first by not paying her share of the household expenses as required by the agreement, meaning that she cannot seek to enforce it. See A House Mechanics, Inc. v. Massey, 124 N.E.3d 1257, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“It is well established that [w]hen one party to a contract commits the first material breach of that contract, it cannot seek to enforce the provisions of the contract against the other party if that other party breaches the contract at a later date.” (quotation omitted)).

[9] To support his argument that Tripp committed the first material breach by not paying her share of the household expenses, Barker claims that Tripp “provided no receipts and no documentary evidence from her bank accounts to substantiate her claim.” Appellant's Reply Br. p. 5. Instead, he says, “[t]he only evidence Tripp offered was her testimony.” Id. But Tripp's testimony that she paid her share is enough. Barker's argument to the contrary is a request for us to reweigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, which we don't do. See Great Lakes Anesthesia, 99 N.E.3d at 268.

[10] Barker also argues that Tripp failed to prove the second and third requirements of a preliminary injunction, that is, that she is at risk of irreparable harm unless an injunction is issued and her threatened injury outweighs the potential harm of granting the injunction. Specifically, Barker claims that he disputed Tripp's testimony about emotional harm to her and her daughter. But the trial court didn't believe Barker, and we don't assess witness credibility on appeal. Barker also claims that because Tripp first materially breached the Cohabitation Agreement, she should have to find alternative housing, not him. We, however, rejected this premise above. And to the extent Barker asserts that it would be easier for Tripp to find alternative housing, they each testified that they would have to rent. This is therefore a request for us to reweigh the evidence. The trial court did not err in granting the preliminary injunction.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Barker moved for a change of judge. The judge said that after he ruled on Tripp's request for a preliminary injunction, the parties could proceed with selecting a new judge. After the preliminary injunction was issued, the parties agreed on a new judge.

2.   Barker filed his notice of appeal on June 20, 2025, but the case wasn't fully briefed until December 17, 2025.

Vaidik, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.