Matthew Werner, Appellant-Respondent v. Marcie Werner, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Matthew Werner (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order that denied his petition to modify child support, found him to be in contempt, and ordered him to pay Marcie Werner's (“Mother”) attorney fees. Father argues that the trial court: (1) clearly erred when it denied his motion to modify child support; (2) abused its discretion when it found him to be in contempt; and (3) abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay Mother's attorney fees.

[2] Regarding the first issue, we note that the parties did not complete signed and verified child support worksheets as required by the Child Support Guidelines (“the CSG”). In addition, the trial court did not complete a child support worksheet and did not, as required by the CSG, calculate the parties’ weekly gross incomes. Without a weekly gross income calculation, the trial court's findings are simply not adequate to justify and explain its order. Under these circumstances, we are unable to determine whether the trial court's order is consistent with the CSG and whether the trial court's order denying Father's motion to modify is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions for the trial court to obtain signed child support worksheets from both parties. The worksheets must be consistent with the evidence introduced at the hearing, the witnesses’ testimony, and the guidance set forth below. After receiving the worksheets, the trial court is directed to recalculate Father's child support obligation accordingly.

[3] Regarding the second and third issues, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it found Father to be in contempt and when it ordered Father to pay Mother's attorney fees. Accordingly, we reverse those portions of the trial court's order.

[4] We reverse and remand with instructions.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it denied Father's motion to modify child support.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found Father to be in contempt.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to pay Mother's attorney fees.

Facts

[5] Father enlisted in the United States Navy in the late 1990's. Mother and Father (collectively “Parents”) were married in Indiana in 2001 and subsequently moved to Virginia. They are the parents of three children, M.W., who was born in 2005, Mc.W., who was born in 2011, and Ma.W., who was born in June 2016 (collectively “the children”).

[6] In July 2018, Parents became involved in a domestic violence incident (“the domestic violence incident”). Parents separated in December 2018, and in April 2019, Father began paying Mother $506.50 per week in child support.

[7] In June 2020, Parents entered into a separation agreement (“the agreement”). At that time, Father, who had been in the Navy for more than twenty years and who had been deployed overseas to combat zones more than twenty times, was a special warfare operator. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Parents agreed that Father would continue to pay Mother $506.50 per week in child support and that Father would provide medical, vision, and dental insurance for the children.

[8] Parents further agreed that Father was eligible to retire from the Navy and that Father's monthly military retired pay base was $5,632.01 at the paygrade of E-8. Further, according to the terms of the agreement, Father's obligation to pay Mother her share of his retired base pay was to commence upon Father's receipt of that pay.¹ In addition, pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Parents agreed that Father had pending criminal charges in the military justice system for an alleged aggravated assault that Father had committed against Mother during the domestic violence incident. Parents also agreed that if Father was convicted and sentenced, he could lose his military retirement benefits. In April 2021, a Virginia trial court incorporated the agreement into an order dissolving Parents’ marriage.

[9] At some point in 2021, following the dissolution of Parents’ marriage, the Navy court-martialed Father for the domestic violence incident. As a result of the court-martial, the Navy forced Father to retire earlier than he had planned and reduced his military retired base pay to an E-7 paygrade. Father retired from the Navy in April 2022.

[10] Although Father made regular child support payments in 2019, 2020, 2021, and early 2022, when Father retired from the Navy in April 2022, he experienced a delay of several months in receiving his retirement pay. From May 2022 through July 2022, Father paid Mother $1,013 per month in child support, which was one-half of the $2,026 monthly payment set forth in the agreement. From August 2022 through October 2022, Father did not make any child support payments.

[11] On November 17, 2022, Father filed a motion to modify child support in a Virginia trial court. Four days later, on November 21, 2022, Mother, who had apparently relocated to Indiana with the children shortly after the entry of the Virginia dissolution order, filed a petition in an Indiana trial court to register the agreement. In her petition, Mother affirmed under the penalties of perjury that Indiana was an appropriate and more convenient forum to address Father's petition to modify child support and his other motions, including a motion to modify custody and parenting time, his emergency petition for temporary custody and to restrict parenting time, his contempt petition, and his motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem. Mother also affirmed under penalties of perjury that there were no proceedings pending in any other jurisdiction with respect to custody or parenting time.

[12] Two days later, on November 23, 2022, the trial court issued an order granting Mother's petition to register the agreement and informing Father that he had twenty days after service of notice to request a hearing to contest the validity of the registration determination. Father did not request a hearing.

[13] Father did not make any child support payments in November or December 2022. In January 2023, Father paid Mother $50 in child support, and in February 2023, Father did not make any child support payments. In March and April 2023, Father paid Mother $2,000 per month in child support.

[14] In April 2023, Mother filed a contempt citation asking the trial court to order Father to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to pay his child support obligation. Specifically, Mother alleged that Father was more than $18,000 in arrears on his child support obligation. In addition, Mother's contempt citation provided that Mother had incurred attorney fees “relating to this action” and sought an award of reasonable attorney fees. (App. Vol. 2 at 33). Mother's contempt citation also informed the trial court that Mother's Virginia attorney had filed a motion to dismiss Father's pending motion to modify child support in Virginia, that the Virginia trial court had granted the motion, and that there were no issues pending in Virginia.

[15] In May 2023, Father paid Mother $1,000 in child support, and in June 2023, Father paid Mother $950 in child support. Father did not make any child support payments in July 2023.

[16] Also, in July 2023, Father filed a motion to modify child support in the Indiana trial court. Father's motion provided that Father's child support should be modified because there had been a substantial and continuing change in the parties’ incomes and circumstances rendering the current child support unreasonable. In August 2023, Father paid Mother $600 in child support payments, and from September 2023 through October 2024, Father paid Mother $800 per month in child support.

[17] In November 2024, the trial court held a two-day hearing on Mother's contempt citation and Father's motion to modify child support. Father testified that the $506.50 weekly child support payment amount set forth in the agreement had been based on his active military service income. According to Father, at that time, he had been earning $70,000 to $75,000 per year. Father further explained that when he had retired from the Navy in April 2022, he no longer had the ability to pay $2,000 per month in child support. Father specifically explained that his sole source of retirement income is his military retirement pay, which, at the time of the hearing, was $3,272 per month. Further, Father testified that Mother received $1,184.67 from his retirement pay every month, leaving him with a monthly gross income of $2,087. In support of his testimony, Father tendered to the trial court a copy of his most recent military retirement pay stub. According to Father, following his retirement, he had made “fairly consistent [child support] payments[;]” however, because he had not been able to pay the full amount, he had paid “[a]s much as [he] c[ould.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 12). Father acknowledged that he was in arrears in his child support payments and asked the trial court to order him to pay an additional weekly sum towards his arrearage. In addition, Father testified that he paid $31.07 per week for the children's medical, vision, and dental insurance.

[18] Father further testified that based on his monthly income, his yearly income was $25,044. Also, Father testified that based on this yearly income, his weekly income for child support purposes was $481.62. The trial court admitted into evidence an unsigned child support worksheet that listed Father's weekly income as $481.62. Further, the unsigned child support worksheet listed Mother's weekly income as $1,389.84. Based upon these weekly incomes set forth in Father's worksheet, his recommended child support obligation was $105 per week.

[19] In addition, Father testified that he had service related injuries that impacted his ability to work. Specifically, Father testified that he has multiple traumatic brain injuries. He also has spine and back issues, including vertebrae that have been injected with concrete, which prevent him from standing or sitting for long periods of time. At the time of the hearing, Father was attempting to obtain disability benefits. In addition, Father testified that he would like to pursue a career in public speaking. According to Father, he had obtained speaking engagements with groups, including law enforcement officers and first responders, to speak about leadership. Father further testified that he typically did not receive payments for the speaking engagements. Rather, he received reimbursement for his transportation, food, and lodging. Only one time did Father receive a $10,000 payment for a speaking engagement.

[20] When asked about the domestic violence incident that had led to the reduction of his military retirement pay, Father explained that he had been working on a highly sensitive operation overseas that had impacted him psychologically. Specifically, Father explained that he had been suffering from mental health issues that he had not fully understood.

[21] Father further testified that he lived with Dr. Kathy Greenburg (“Greenberg”) in Florida. Although Father and Greenberg were not married, they had participated in “a commitment ceremony[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 35). Father also testified that he and Greenberg lived in her condominium (“the condominium”), that he did not pay any rent or utilities, and that Greenberg supported him. According to Father, he did not have any ownership interest in any of Greenburg's assets and if he and Greenberg were to break up the following day, he would not be entitled to any financial benefits from her. Father also testified that he worked with contractors on one of Greenburg's properties that had been damaged in a hurricane. However, according to Father, Greenberg did not pay him for his services. In addition, Father helped with work around the condominium. Father is an authorized user on one or two of Greenburg's credit cards, and he also has his own credit card. Further, according to Father, he pays his $700 per month truck payment, and Greenburg helps him to pay for insurance for the truck. When asked about large deposits to his bank account, Father explained that the deposits included insurance payments for his items in two storage units that had been damaged by a hurricane as well as the $10,000 that he had received for the speaking engagement.

[22] During Mother's cross-examination of Father, Mother's counsel pointed out that Father's bank account showed that he had spent money on alcohol, DoorDash, and purchases at Target. Father explained that he “tr[ied] to pay when [he] c[ould].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 34). In addition, Mother's counsel asked Father about isolated large deposits to his bank account. Father agreed that those deposits were “not maybe normal[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 26). When Father asked Mother's counsel if she could “give [him] time to look at exactly the dates on what was actually going on[,]” Mother's counsel responded, “Nope[,] I'm ok, the judge has it so.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 27).

[23] Mother's counsel also asked Father if he lived in a 1.5 million dollar condominium in Florida. Father responded that he did not know how much Greenberg had paid for the condominium. When asked how much money Greenberg made and the sources of her income, Father responded that he had no idea and would just be guessing if he answered counsel's question.

[24] Following Father's testimony, Mother's counsel stated that she would like to take leave to depose Greenberg because, in counsel's opinion, Father “qualifie[d] for some sort of in[-]kind benefit” and “some sort of an amount need[ed] to be imputed to him[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 47). Mother's counsel further requested that the trial court either deny Father's motion or allow Greenberg “to come testify or depose her.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 47). Father's counsel responded that the case had been pending for over a year, since July 2023, that this was a final hearing, and that Mother's counsel could have deposed Greenberg at any time. The trial court agreed with Father's counsel that “the time ha[d] passed for discovery.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 48). In addition, the trial court told Mother's counsel that she could “certainly argue that any amount that [Father was] benefiting from as far as all of his non[-]payment of rent and utilities and lifestyle c[ould] certainly be imputed to him as income based upon his own testimony.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 48). According to the trial court, that argument was “still open to [Mother's counsel] without any particular figures as to how much the value of this condo [was.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 48).

[25] Also at the hearing, Mother testified that she was employed as an education program manager for the Navy SEAL Foundation. According to Mother, her gross pay for two weeks was $2,384.61. Mother also acknowledged that she received $1,184.67 per month from Father's retirement. In addition, Mother testified that the value of her home was approximately $350,000 and that she was behind on her mortgage payments.

[26] Mother further testified that she had the address for the condominium because the children had visited Father there. According to Mother, she had “looked [the condominium] up” online. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 64). Mother's counsel asked Mother if she had been “able to determine how much [the condominium had] sold for[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 65). Father's counsel made a hearsay objection, which the trial court sustained. Mother's counsel asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the public record that “show[ed] that sale going through[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 65). The trial court responded that it was willing to take judicial notice of the fact that the condominium was in “a location that tend[ed] to have wealthier homes.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 66). Mother's counsel again asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the public record, which included the sale price of the condominium. According to Mother's counsel, the condominium was “a huge in[-]kind benefit that [Father was] receiving[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 66). When the trial court asked Mother's counsel if she wanted “to impute that as income to [Father][,]” Mother's counsel responded that there was “case law that shows that you can technically impute some amount for this mortgage[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 66, 67). The trial court responded that “discovery was not going to be re-opened based upon how long this case ha[d] been pending and the court ha[d] taken judicial notice of the general nature of property in that area, that w[ould] be the extent of the court's finding on that and the court w[ould] not allow the introduction of that piece of evidence.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 68).

[27] Also at the hearing, the trial court admitted into evidence Mother's arrearage calculation worksheet (“the worksheet”), which revealed, consistent with Father's testimony, that he had timely made full child support payments until his April 2022 retirement from the Navy. The worksheet further revealed, as set forth above, the child support payments that Father had made from April 2022 through October 2024. In sum, over the years, Father had paid $66,424 in child support and had an arrearage of $40,954.

[28] Mother's counsel asked Mother if she had incurred attorney fees “related to the contempt[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 73). Mother responded that she had, and Mother's counsel asked Mother if she was asking “that ․ [F]ather be obligated to pay those attorney fees[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 73). Mother responded that she was. Thereafter, the trial court admitted into evidence Mother's attorney's fee affidavit, which included eight pages of entries related to Mother's attorney's representation of Mother from March 2023 through December 2024.² The total for Mother's attorney fees was $8,569.38.

[29] During Father's counsel's cross-examination of Mother, Father's counsel asked her if her requested attorney fees were “primarily having to do with litigating and gathering evidence from attempting to prove in[-]kind benefits as it relate[d] to the child support modification[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 81). When Mother responded, “Sure[,]” Mother's counsel objected and argued that Mother did not necessarily understand her counsel's billing practices. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 81). Mother's counsel further acknowledged that some of the attorney fees “related to the modification.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 82). Father's counsel responded that “[t]he sanction for contempt is what the attorney fees would attach to.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 82). In addition, Father's counsel stated that it was his understanding that Mother was requesting attorney fees for the contempt citation and that “$6000 for a rule to show cause seems ․ high[.]”³ (Tr. Vol. 2 at 82). The trial court sustained Mother's counsel's objection.

[30] When Father's counsel asked Mother if she was asking that Father continue to pay $500 per week in child support, Mother responded, “Yes.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 82). Mother further testified that she was “not aware of what [Father]’s income [was] fully.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 83). She also agreed that she believed that Father was “hiding things” even though she had no evidence to support her belief. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 83).

[31] Also, during Mother's testimony, Mother's counsel told the trial court that she had “a few child support worksheets but that's if we're imputing the mortgage[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 73). Mother's counsel also told the trial court that she had a worksheet imputing Father's “other retirement[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 73). In addition, Mother's counsel asked the trial court if it “would ․ just like those in our findings[,]” and the trial court responded that “that would be perfect.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 73). Mother did not tender a child support worksheet to the trial court at the hearing.

[32] At the end of the hearing, Mother's counsel asked the trial court if it wanted a brief or if it “just want[ed] to see everything on paper[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 87). The trial court responded that since the case “involve[ed] some complex issues[,]” it was “appropriate to file a brief.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 87). In addition, the trial court specifically explained that it “just want[ed] some memo that suggest[ed]” each party's position and any case law that supported that position. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 88). The trial court further told the parties that they could “certainly include [their] proposed child support obligation worksheets in that.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 88).

[33] Following the hearing, each party submitted a memo that included the party's arguments and supporting case law. In Mother's memo, Mother argued that: (1) Father's motion to modify child support should be denied because he had been voluntarily underemployed for two years; (2) Father “should be imputed a higher income based on the in-kind benefits he receive[d] from [Greenberg;]” and (3) Father should be found in contempt and ordered to pay Mother's attorney fees. (App. Vol. 2 at 41). Mother did not attribute a gross weekly income to either herself or Father. Further, she did not specify a dollar amount that the trial court should attribute to Father for either his alleged voluntarily underemployment or the in-kind benefits that she argued that should be attributed to him. In addition, Mother did not attach a child support worksheet to her memo.

[34] In Father's memo, Father argued that: (1) “Mother failed to provide the [trial] Court with sufficient evidence of any potential income as is required to impute income[;]” (2) the trial court was “without sufficient evidence to calculate the value of any in[-]kind benefit, even if assigning that benefit was appropriate[;]” (3) the trial court should deny Mother's request to hold Father in contempt because he did not willfully fail to pay the full amount of his child support obligation; and (4) the trial court should deny Mother's request for attorney fees. (App. Vol. 2 at 58, 62). Like Mother, Father did not attribute a weekly gross income to either himself or Mother. Further, Father did not attach a child support worksheet to his memo.

[35] In January 2025, the trial court issued an order that provides, in relevant part, as follows:

At the time of the parties’ dissolution decree, both parents agreed that Father would retire at an E-8 pay grade. However, based upon his court-martial for aggravated assault on Mother, Father was forced to retire at a pay grade of E-7, resulting in a substantial loss of retirement income. Father's child support obligation should not be reduced based upon his misconduct.

The Indiana Child Support Guidelines also address in-kind benefits. Whether or not the value of in-kind benefits should be included in a parent's weekly gross income is fact sensitive and requires careful consideration of the evidence in each case. It may be inappropriate to include as gross income occasional gifts received. However, regular and continuing payments made by a family member, subsequent spouse, roommate, or live-in friend that reduce the parent's costs for housing, utilities or groceries, may be included as gross income. The marriage of a parent to a spouse with sufficient affluence to obviate the necessity for the parent to work may give rise to a situation where either potential income or the value of in-kind benefits or both should be considered in arriving at gross income. Child Support Guideline 3(A) cmt. 2(d).

Although Father and his girlfriend a[re] not legally married, they enjoyed a “commitment ceremony” and live as husband and wife. His girlfriend pays all of the bills including the mortgage, utilities and groceries. Father enjoys living in an upscale condo in North Palm Beach, Florida. He has access [to] spending for his wants and needs with two of his girlfriend's credit cards. The Court considers these in-kind benefits as substantial and worthy of consideration as gross income.

․ The Court commends Father for his lengthy service to his country, including his multiple deployments. Despite his claim of disability, Father has embarked on a career of public speaking. He contends that he only receives travel expenses for these engagements. There is clearly the potential for income. On at least one occasion, he received income of $10,000.00 in addition to his travel expenses. Father's decision to engage in public speaking for merely travel expenses is a choice that he has made. Indiana Child Support Guideline 3(A)(3) provides that where a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed the court shall calculate support based upon a determination of potential income. Potential income is to be determined upon the basis of the obligor's work history, occupational qualifications, prevailing job opportunities, and earning levels in the community. In Re Paternity of Buehler, 576 N.E.2d 1354 at 1356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). Although his work as a Navy SEAL is highly specialized, his most recent endeavors at public speaking, which utilize the knowledge and skills of that career, is a job opportunity with earning capacity. Father has exhibited that potential income is available.

The Court, having carefully considered the circumstances of this case, including the documentary evidence and testimony, finds that despite Father's career change, his retirement was anticipated in the divorce decree. The reduction in retirement pay was due to his own intentional misconduct. Father has substantial in-kind income and the potential of future income in addition to his retirement pay. Father has not met the burden of proving that statutory grounds exist for modification of the support order. Specifically, he has not shown a substantial and continuing change in circumstance which make the existing order unreasonable. The Court does find that Father has willfully failed to pay the child support order and is in contempt.

․ Mother's Contempt Citation is granted․ [Father] is further ordered to pay Mother's attorney fees in the amount of $8569.38 within 90 days.

(App. Vol. 2 at 67-69). The trial court did not attach a child support worksheet to its order.

[36] Father now appeals.

Decision

[37] At the outset, we note that Mother did not file an appellee's brief. When an appellee does not submit a brief, we do not undertake the burden of developing arguments for that party. Easterday v. Everhart, 201 N.E.3d 264, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Instead, we apply a less strict standard of review and may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error. Id. Prima facie error is “error at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (cleaned up). “Still, we are obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We now turn to the issues in this case.

[38] Father argues that the trial court: (1) clearly erred when it denied his motion to modify child support; (2) abused its discretion when it found him to be in contempt; and (3) abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay Mother's attorney fees. We address each of his contentions in turn.

1. Child Support

[39] Father first argues that the trial court clearly erred when it denied his motion to modify child support. “We place a strong emphasis on trial court discretion in determining child support obligations and regularly acknowledge the principle that child support modifications will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.” Marshall v. Marshall, 92 N.E.3d 1112, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (cleaned up). That is, reversal is proper only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 738 (Ind. 2015).

We recognize of course that trial courts must exercise judgment, particularly as to credibility of witnesses, and we defer to that judgment because the trial court views the evidence firsthand and we review a cold documentary record. Thus, to the extent credibility or inferences are to be drawn, we give the trial court's conclusions substantial weight. But to the extent a ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence, it is reversible, and the trial court has no discretion to reach the wrong result.

MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ind. 2005).

[40] Indiana Code § 31-16-8-1 governs the modification of child support orders and provides, in relevant part, that “modification may be made only: (1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable[.]” I.C. § 31-16-8-1(b)(1). The party seeking the modification bears the burden of establishing that the statutory requirements have been met. Hedrick v. Gilbert, 17 N.E.3d 321, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[41] Child support calculations are made utilizing the income shares model set forth in the Indiana Child Support Guidelines. Salser v. Salser, 75 N.E.3d 553, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The Guidelines apportion the cost of supporting children between the parents according to their means, on the premise that children should receive the same portion of parental income after a dissolution that they would have received if the family had remained intact. Id. at 558-59. Specifically, “[t]he Indiana Child Support Guidelines require a trial court to determine the proper level of child support by calculating each parent's weekly gross income.” Glass v. Oeder, 716 N.E.2d 413, 416 (Ind. 1999). See also DeGrado v. DeGrado, 243 N.E.3d 381, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (explaining that “[t]he calculation of the weekly gross income of both parents is the ‘starting point’ when determining a parent's child support obligation”). Indiana Child Support Guideline 3A(1) defines weekly gross income “as actual weekly gross income of the parent if employed to full capacity, potential income if unemployed or underemployed, and the value of in-kind benefits received by the parent.” Child Supp. G. 3(A)(1).

[42] Further, “[s]ince 1989, the Indiana Child Support Guidelines have required, in all cases in which the court is requested to order support, that both parents complete and sign, under penalty of perjury, a child support worksheet to be filed with the court verifying the parents’ incomes.” Payton v. Payton, 847 N.E.2d 251, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also Child Supp. G. 3(B)(1). Here, during the hearing, the trial court admitted into evidence Father's unsigned and unverified child support worksheet. Mother did not file one.

[43] We further note that the trial court did not complete a child support worksheet and did not, as required by the CSG, calculate weekly gross incomes for the parties. Without a weekly gross income calculation, the trial court's findings are simply not adequate to justify and explain its order. Under these circumstances, we are unable to determine whether the trial court's order is consistent with the CSG. See Payton, 847 N.E.2d at 254 (holding that review of the trial court's modification order was precluded in such circumstances). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's modification order and remand with instructions for the trial court to obtain signed child support worksheets from both parties. See id.; see also Pryor v. Bostwick, 818 N.E.2d 6, 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (remanding the case to the trial court with instructions for the trial court to obtain child support worksheets signed by both parties pursuant to Indiana Child Support Guideline 3(B)(1) and to recalculate Father's child support obligation accordingly); Dye v. Young, 655 N.E.2d 549, 551 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (remanding the case to the trial court where we were unable to determine whether the trial court had complied with the child support guidelines because the trial court had neither made findings concerning the income that it had attributed to each party nor completed its own child support worksheet). The worksheets must be consistent with the evidence introduced at the hearing, the witnesses’ testimony, and the guidance set forth below. After receiving the worksheets, the trial court is directed to recalculate Father's child support obligation accordingly. See Payton, 847 N.E.2d at 254; Pryor, 818 N.E.2d at 12.

[44] Because they will arise on remand, we address Father's specific arguments that the trial court clearly erred “by imputing an undefined income to Father and applying an unknown amount of in-kind benefits to Father's income.” (Father's Br. 9).

[45] Regarding Father's first argument, we note that although the trial court found that Father had exhibited that potential income for public speaking was available, the trial court did not impute a specific potential income to Father. The CSG permit imputation of income to discourage parents from avoiding significant child support obligations by becoming unemployed or taking a lower paying job. Sandlin v. Sandlin, 972 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). However, “the Guidelines do not require or encourage parents to make career decisions based strictly upon the size of potential paychecks, nor do the Guidelines require that parents work to their full economic potential.” Id. Further, the Guidelines caution that “attributing potential income that results in an unrealistic child support obligation may cause the accumulation of an excessive arrearage, and be contrary to the best interests of the child(ren).” Child Supp. G. 3(A)(3), cmt. 2(c).

[46] Child Support Guideline 3(A)(3) provides that “[i]f a court finds a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed without just cause, child support shall be calculated based on a determination of potential income.” “A determination of potential income shall be made by determining employment potential and probable earnings level based on the obligor's employment and earnings history, occupational qualifications, educational attainment, literacy, age, health, criminal record or other employment barriers, prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in the community.” Child Supp. G. 3(A)(3) (emphasis added).

[47] Here, our review of the record reveals that although Mother had the burden to present evidence on her claim that income should be imputed to Father, see Walters v. Walters, 186 N.E.3d 1186, 1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (explaining that the parent arguing for the imputation of income to another parent bears the burden of persuasion), Mother did not do so. Because Mother presented no evidence addressing any of the factors for determining potential income, on remand, the trial court has no basis to impute potential income to Father.

[48] Regarding Father's second argument, we note that although the trial court found that Greenberg's payment of the mortgage, utilities, and groceries constituted in-kind benefits worthy of consideration as gross income, the trial court did not impute a specific in-kind dollar amount to Father. The CSG contemplate imputed income as a component of weekly gross income. Thomas v. Orlando, 834 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Specifically, the commentary to the CSG provides, in relevant part, as follows:

․ [R]egular and continuing payments made by a family member, subsequent spouse, roommate or live-in friend that reduce the parent's costs for housing, utilities, or groceries, may be included as gross income. If there were specific living expenses being paid by a parent which are now being regularly and continually paid by that parent's current spouse or a third party, the value of those assumed expenses may be considered to be in-kind benefits and included as part of the parent's weekly gross income.

Child. Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(d). Further, whether “the value of in-kind benefits should be included in a parent's weekly gross income is fact-sensitive and requires careful consideration of the evidence in each case.” Id.

[49] Here, our review of the record reveals that although Mother had the burden to present evidence regarding the value of Father's living expenses, if any, that were paid for by Greenberg for the purpose of establishing imputed income, see In re Paternity of C.B., 112 N.E.3d 746, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that the parent arguing for the imputation of income to another parent bears the burden of persuasion), trans. denied, Mother did not do so. We specifically note that following Father's testimony, Mother told the trial court that she would like to take leave to depose Greenberg to determine an amount of in-kind benefits to impute to Father. However, the trial court declined to re-open discovery. Thereafter, during Mother's testimony, Mother's counsel asked the trial court to take judicial notice of a public record that included the price that Greenberg had paid for the condominium. However, the trial court declined to take judicial notice of the public record but stated that it would take judicial notice that the condominium was located in an area that tended to have wealthier homes. Because there is simply no evidence in the record regarding the value of Father's living expenses that were paid for by Greenberg, Mother has failed to meet her burden. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court has no basis to impute in-kind income to Father.

2. Contempt

[50] Father further argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found him to be in contempt for failing to pay the full amount of his child support obligation. He specifically contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's contempt finding. We agree.

[51] “Whether a party is in contempt of court is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and its decision will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion.” J.M. v. D.A., 935 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh'g denied. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or is contrary to law. Id. When reviewing a determination on contempt matters, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm unless, after a review of the entire record, we have a firm and definite belief that the trial court has made a mistake. Id.

[52] Contempt is not an available remedy in every case where there is a child support delinquency. Geesy v. Geesy, 959 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “To be held in contempt, it must be found that the support delinquency resulted from a willful failure to comply with a support order and that the delinquent parent has the ability to pay.” Id. (citing Pettit v. Pettit, 626 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind. 1993)).

[53] In the Pettit case, the evidence revealed that Father had fallen into arrears in his child support payments after losing his employment. Although the trial court determined that Father was in contempt for nonpayment of child support, our Indiana Supreme Court reversed that finding in light of Father's uncontroverted testimony that he was unemployed and could not find work. Id. at 448. Father had also applied for a loan to pay his support arrearage.

[54] Similarly, in Marks v Tolliver, 839 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), the evidence revealed that Father was unable to work because of degenerative disc disease and acute arthritis. In addition, Father had no assets or income and lived rent-free in a trailer provided by his stepfather. Father had met Indiana's Medicaid disability criteria and had applied for Social Security disability benefits. Although the Social Security Administration had denied his application, Father had initiated an appeal of that denial. Further, the State, which had filed the information for rule to show cause against Father, presented no evidence contravening Father's characterization of his medical or financial circumstances. Although the trial court found Father to be in contempt, on appeal, we concluded that “there was no evidence that Father had the ability to pay child support and that his failure to do so was willful. Consequently, the trial court lacked the authority to use its contempt power.” Id. at 707. See also J.M., 935 N.E.2d at 1235 (explaining that where the trial court did not make a finding about Father's ability to pay child support and the record did not support such a finding, the trial court abused its discretion in finding Father in contempt); Geesy, 959 N.E.2d at 259 (reversing the trial court's finding of contempt where the State presented no evidence to establish that Father's failure to pay child support was willful or that he was even able to pay). We further note that Indiana Child Support Guideline 2 specifically states that “[i]n no case shall child support ․ exceed fifty percent (50%) of the obligor's weekly adjusted income.”⁴

[55] Here, our review of the record reveals that beginning in 2019, when Father was still employed by the Navy, he paid $506.50 per week in child support. Further, from 2019 until 2022, Father timely made all child support payments. However, when Father retired from the Navy in April 2022, his income was reduced to $481.62 per week in retirement pay, which is less than his weekly child support obligation and more than 100% of his adjusted weekly gross income. In addition, Father pays $31.06 per week for his children's medical, dental, and vision insurance. Further evidence reveals that Father suffers from multiple traumatic brain injuries. He also has spine and back issues, including vertebrae that have been injected with concrete, which prevent him from standing or sitting for long periods of time, and he has applied for disability benefits. Mother presented no evidence contravening Father's characterization of his personal financial or medical circumstances. We further note that Father did not deny the existence of an arrearage or otherwise indicate a refusal to pay child support. Based on these facts and circumstances, we find that there was no evidence that Father had the ability to pay the full amount of child support or that his failure to do so was willful. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's contempt finding. See Marks, 839 N.E.2d at 707.

3. Attorney Fees

[56] Father also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay Mother's attorney fees. Again, we agree.

[57] The determination of the payment of attorney fees in a proceeding to modify child support is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon an abuse of that discretion. Sutton v. Sutton, 773 N.E.2d 289, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). In assessing attorney fees, the trial court may consider such factors as the resources of the parties, the relative earning ability of the parties, and other factors that bear on the reasonableness of the award. Id. In addition, the trial court may consider any misconduct on the part of one of the parties that directly results in the other party incurring additional fees. Id.

[58] Here, our review of the record reveals that Mother only requested attorney fees for the contempt citation, which we have reversed. Further, other than the trial court's finding of contempt, both the record and the trial court's order are silent as to what factors, if any, supported an award of attorney fees to Mother. Given our reversal of the trial court's contempt finding, Mother's greater earning ability, and the meritorious nature of Father's arguments at the trial court level and on appeal, we reverse the trial court's decision to award attorney fees to Mother. See id. at 298 (reversing the trial court's award of attorney fees to wife in light of the parties’ near parity in resources and earning abilities, this Court's reversal of the trial court's contempt finding, and the meritorious nature of husband's arguments at the trial court level and on appeal).

[59] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

[1] I respectfully disagree with my colleagues in the majority that the trial court erred in denying Father's petition to modify child support and finding Father in contempt for failure to pay his existing support obligation in full. The court's findings—none of which Father specifically challenges on appeal—support its decisions on those issues. See Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“[I]f the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment, we will affirm.”), trans. denied. And since the court was well within its discretion to hold Father in contempt, it did not err in ordering him to pay the attorney's fees Mother incurred in litigating her contempt citation. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 835 (Ind. 2016) (“[T]rial court[s have] inherent authority to award attorney's fees for civil contempt.” (quoting Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997))). That said, a court may only award reasonable attorney's fees, id., and I agree with Father that it was not reasonable under the circumstances to “award[ ] Mother the entirety of her attorney fees[,]” which included fees incurred by Mother that were not directly related to her contempt citation. Appellant's Brief at 19.

[2] I therefore respectfully dissent from the reversal of the trial court's denial of Father's modification petition and decision to find Father in contempt. I would, however, vote to remand the award of attorney's fees for recalculation based only on the fees incurred by Mother in pursuit of finding Father in contempt.

1. Child Support Modification

[3] As the party seeking to modify child support, Father “had the burden [ ] of establishing changed circumstances so substantial and continuous as to make” the existing support order unreasonable. MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind. 2005). And since he had the burden of proof below, he now “appeals from a negative judgment, which will be reversed only if there is no evidence to support the trial court's conclusion.” Adams v. Adams, 873 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Under this stringent standard of review, “we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, together with all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Smith v. Dermatology Assocs. of Fort Wayne, P.C., 977 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). And we will affirm unless “the evidence points unerringly to a conclusion different than that reached by the trial court.” Id.

[4] The evidence here does not unerringly point to the conclusion that Father met his burden of proof to show a substantial and continuing change in circumstances. When the parties agreed to the existing support order, Father earned between $70,000 and $75,000 a year from active-duty military service. At the same time, Father had felony criminal charges pending against him for aggravated assault against Mother. Father was convicted and forced to retire from the military at a lower rank. He now claims this constitutes a change in circumstances because his retirement income (which was significantly reduced by his demotion) is less than his active duty pay. The trial court was not persuaded—and for good reasons.

[5] To begin with, Father could have anticipated at the time he agreed to the existing support order that his criminal acts against Mother would likely require him to retire from the military with reduced retirement benefits. Father knew, after all, that he was facing court-martial proceedings. This Court has expressed that a “court need not modify support in accordance with the computation based on the guidelines if the change in circumstances was contemplated at the time of the existing child support order.” Hay v. Hay, 730 N.E.2d 787, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). And Father knew or should have known that after being forced to retire from the Navy, it would be incumbent upon him to seek gainful employment to supplement his reduced retirement income. See Meredith v. Meredith, 854 N.E.2d 942, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming finding of voluntary unemployment when father retired early and chose to not work despite being able to do so), granting reh'g.

[6] The trial court was under no obligation to give credence to Father's testimony that he could not work because some of his proclaimed injuries prevented him from standing or sitting for long periods of time. Indeed, Father introduced no medical evidence to corroborate his testimony, and the court expressly found that “[d]espite his claim of disability, Father has embarked on a career of public speaking.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 68. As Father testified, he travels the country to teach leadership seminars to law enforcement personnel but earns no profit other than a modest per diem. The court found, however, “[t]here [was] clearly the potential for income” since Father had been paid $10,000 for at least one speaking engagement. Id. And the fact that Father earned no real income from public speaking was merely “a choice that [Father] has made.” Id. It goes without saying that the court gave some weight to the fact that as Father roamed the country working for no pay, he often did so in lieu of exercising parenting time with his children. See id. at 67 (“Father sporadically engages in parenting time while traveling for speaking engagements.”).

[7] Father conceded that the only reason he has been able to work for no pay was because his girlfriend “foot[ed] the bill”:

[Mother's Counsel:] So you're stating that ․ you're barely able to make it on [your] retirement but you're choosing a career that comes with expenses and no income is that correct?

[Father:] As far as choosing directly I would not say that.

Q Is someone forcing you to be in these speaking engagements?

A No it's my choice to actually work on my accreditation and my certifications in getting my voice out there in helping these first responders and law enforcement experts.

Q So who is footing that bill? Is it [your girlfriend]?

A She is.

Transcript at 30-31. And despite Father's refusal to seek employment from which he can earn an income, the court found he enjoys a high standard of living bankrolled by his girlfriend:

[Father's] girlfriend pays all of the bills including the mortgage, utilities[,] and groceries. Father enjoys living in an upscale condo in North Palm Beach, Florida. He [can] spend[ ] for his wants and needs with two of his girlfriend's credit cards. The Court considers these in-kind benefits as substantial and worthy of consideration as gross income.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 68 (emphasis added).

[8] Despite these unchallenged findings, the majority reverses the trial court's conclusion that Father failed to prove the existing support order is unreasonable. It finds that we cannot adequately review the court's decision on appeal because the parties failed to submit verified child support worksheets. It further holds that there is “no basis to impute potential income to Father” nor to “impute in-kind income to Father.” Ante at ¶¶ 47, 49. These conclusions do not flow from a faithful application of the negative judgment standard of review, nor are they consistent with our general practice of “granting latitude and deference to the trial court in family law matters.” See Campbell v. Campbell, 250 N.E.3d 459, 470, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (declining to re-weigh evidence even when reviewing a custody determination for prima facie error).

[9] Starting with the lack of verified child support worksheets, the majority is correct insofar as it recognizes that

trial courts are required to make support orders in compliance with the guidelines and to spell out the reasons for any support orders which deviate from the guideline results. We cannot review a support order to determine if it complies with the guidelines unless the order reveals the basis for the amount awarded. Such revelation could be accomplished either by specific findings or by incorporation of a proper worksheet.

Carter v. Dayhuff, 829 N.E.2d 560, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Scott v. Scott, 668 N.E.2d 691, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). But this Court has long held that when a party fails to provide a verified child support worksheet or evidence from which the court can accurately calculate his income, he cannot complain on appeal that the trial court failed to modify support. See Beardsley v. Heazlitt, 654 N.E.2d 1178, 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming denial of a petition to modify child support where the petitioner “submitted neither a child support guidelines worksheet nor evidence upon which the trial court could have determined his income”).

[10] What's more, though the guidelines contemplate that the parties will submit child support worksheets, a court's failure to sua sponte require the parties to do so does not necessitate reversal. For example, in Hendrick v. Gilbert, this Court reasoned a party's “failure to produce a worksheet, his failure to object to [the other parent's] lack of a worksheet, and his tacit agreement to proceed without a verified worksheet constituted a waiver of his right to appeal on [that] basis.” 17 N.E.3d 321, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); see also Forbes v. Forbes, 610 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (“If no worksheet was presented to the trial court, the fault is [the complaining party's], not the trial court's.”). As the majority aptly notes, in his post-trial memorandum “Father did not attribute a weekly gross income to either himself or Mother” nor did he “attach a child support worksheet[.]” Ante at ¶ 34. So as the party with the burden of proof, Father's failure to provide the trial court with verified worksheets puts the blame squarely on him for any deficiencies in the court's findings regarding his income.

[11] Nor should the trial court's judgment be reversed because it failed to “impute a specific potential income” or “a specific in-kind dollar amount to Father.” Ante at ¶ 45. To be sure, it was Mother's burden to persuade the court to impute income to Father, either because of his voluntary underemployment or the in-kind income from his girlfriend. Walters v. Walters, 186 N.E.3d 1186, 1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). It should be noted, however, that at least with respect to in-kind income, our Supreme Court has made clear that a party need not prove an exact dollar figure. Glass v. Oeder, 716 N.E.2d 413, 417 (Ind. 1999) (finding sufficient evidence to impute income when a father had a “rent-free living arrangement” even though there was “no evidence from either party of the actual value of [the] house or the cost of renting a similar home”).

[12] Had Mother asked the trial court to recalculate Father's child support obligation based on his imputed income, I might agree that Mother was required to present evidence to allow the court to calculate the specific value of the imputed income. But all Mother argued was that the court should reject Father's claim that his only source of income was his retirement pay, and the evidence presented was sufficient to convince the court to do so. By instructing the court that it should have instead believed Father's claim that he lives only on his meager retirement pay, the majority substitutes its judgment for the trial court's, which found the value of Father's expense-free living arrangement in a luxury high-rise condo was substantial (albeit without putting a specific dollar figure on it).

[13] I could perhaps join the majority in saying that it would have been best practice for the trial court to enter a specific finding on the income it imputed to Father. But the court's characterization of that income as substantial does not lead me to believe the evidence required the court to conclude differently than it did. Nor do I believe it's proper to instruct the court on remand that it “has no basis to impute” potential or in-kind income to Father. Ante at ¶¶ 47, 49 Such an instruction not only oversteps our bounds as an appellate court but puts a thumb on the scale in favor of Father on remand. The majority is correct that imputing income “is fact-sensitive and requires careful consideration of the evidence in each case.” Id. at ¶ 48 (quoting Child. Supp. G. 2(A), cmt. 2(d)). As an appellate court, we are not positioned to say there is no basis on the specific record before us to impute income to Father. See Carter v. Carter, 201 N.E.3d 230, 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“Appellate courts are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.” (quoting Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016))) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[14] For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court's determination that Father failed to prove a change in circumstances that made the existing support order unreasonable.

2. Contempt and Attorney's Fees

[15] Considering Father's voluntary decision to work for no pay, the trial court was well within its discretion to hold Father in contempt for failure to pay his child support obligation in full. As a previous panel of this Court aptly explained,

it is within the discretion of the trial court to hold an individual in contempt for willfully disobeying a court order. Farmer v. Farmer, 735 N.E.2d 285, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). We also acknowledge that contempt is available to assist in the enforcement of child support orders and judgments[.] ․ Without regard to economic resources, once a party is found in contempt, the trial court has “the inherent authority to compensate the aggrieved party for losses and damages resulting from another's contemptuous actions.” Adler v. Adler, 713 N.E.2d 348, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Such inherent authority includes the award of attorney's fees that were expended by a party in order to enforce a child support order and judgment. See Topolski v. Topolski, 742 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

Scoleri v. Scoleri, 766 N.E.2d 1211, 1221-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). And like the denial of Father's petition to modify support, a “finding that a parent is not excused from his or her failure to pay support is a negative judgment which will be reversed only if there is no evidence to support the trial court's conclusion.” J.M. v. D.A., 935 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Esteb v. Enright by State, 563 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)), reh'g denied.

[16] To hold Father in contempt, the trial court needed to find that Father (1) willfully failed to comply with the support order and (2) had the financial ability to comply. See id. Given the court's findings that Father was able to earn an income but nonetheless chose to pursue a “career” in public speaking for no pay, the court was well within its discretion to decline to excuse Father's noncompliance with the existing support order. In light of Father's unexcused noncompliance, and since contempt sanctions should be calculated “[w]ithout regard to economic resources,” Scoleri, 766 N.E.2d at 1221, I cannot join the majority in holding that “Mother's greater earning ability” and the supposed “meritorious nature of Father's arguments” support reversal of the contempt finding and award of attorney's fees. Ante at ¶ 58.

[17] That said, when a court awards fees after finding a party in contempt, that award should be limited to the “attorney's fees that were expended by a party in order to enforce a child support order and judgment.” Scoleri, 766 N.E.2d at 1222. Moreover, the fee award must be reasonable. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d at 835. Here, Mother's attorney's fee affidavit and the attached billing statements contained billing entries for matters that appear unrelated to the contempt citation, including entries for time expended by Mother's counsel in litigating Father's petition to modify child support. I therefore agree with Father that it was not reasonable for the court to “award[ ] Mother the entirety of her attorney fees,” Appellant's Br. at 19, and would remand with instructions for the trial court to recalculate the fee award based only on the attorney's fees Mother incurred directly related to Father's contempt.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The agreement provided as follows regarding Mother's share of Father's retired base pay:[Mother] shall be awarded a percentage of [Father]’s disposable retired pay (disposable retired pay is as defined in l0 U.S.C. 1048. et. seq.), to be computed by multiplying 50% times a fraction, the numerator of which is 205 months of marriage during [Father]’s credible military service, divided by [Father]’s total number of months of credible service on the date of divorce. The parties further agree that on the date of divorce, [Father]’s military retired pay base (High-3) was $5632.01 at the paygrade of E-8, and [Father] had 24 years and 5 months of credible service.(Ex. Vol. 1 at 123).

2.   We note that the hearing in this matter occurred in November 2024. Mother's attorney included four unbilled entries for work she apparently anticipated doing following the hearing in December 2024. These entries included four hours billed for working on a bench memo.

3.   As set forth above, Mother's total attorney fees were $8,569.38.

4.   According to Father's child support worksheet, both his weekly gross income and his weekly adjusted income are $481.62.

Pyle, Judge.

Altice, J., concurs. DeBoer, J., dissents with opinion.