BROOKS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a guilty plea to resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”) endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor, Christian Brooks was sentenced to 730 days, with 610 days suspended to probation. Brooks violated the terms of his probation by failing to report for drug screens and failing to call in to a drug-screening hotline. The trial court revoked Brooks’ probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence on electronically monitored home detention with privileges to drive to and from his place of work. Brooks appeals and argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sanction for his violations.¹ We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Brooks raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Brooks to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence on home detention.

Facts

[3] On April 21, 2024, at approximately 2:00 a.m., law enforcement observed Brooks traveling 127 miles per hour in a 60-mile-per-hour zone. After a high-speed pursuit spanning approximately two and one-half miles, Brooks’ vehicle ultimately crashed into an eight-foot-deep ditch. Brooks showed signs of intoxication and registered a blood alcohol concentration of 0.125 on the certified breath test.

[4] On April 22, 2024, the State charged Brooks with Count I, resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony; Count II, OWI endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor; Count III, operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least .08 but less than .15, a Class C misdemeanor; Count IV, reckless driving, a Class C misdemeanor; and Count V, speeding, a Class C infraction. On January 30, 2025, Brooks pleaded guilty to resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor; Counts III-V were dismissed. The trial court sentenced Brooks to 730 days on the resisting law enforcement charge, with 120 days executed in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) and 610 days suspended to probation. On the OWI endangering a person charge, the trial court sentenced Brooks to 365 days, with 120 days executed in the DOC and 245 days suspended to probation. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

[5] As a condition of probation, Brooks was required to cooperate with and submit to drug and alcohol screens. Brooks was directed to call a drug screen hotline daily to determine whether he was required to submit to a drug screen on any given day. On some days, Brooks would be randomly assigned to take a screen.

[6] On July 29, 2025, the State filed a petition to revoke Brooks’ probation, alleging that Brooks violated the terms of his probation by failing to “cooperate with or submit to” drug and alcohol screens and failing to call into the hotline; specifically, Brooks failed to report for drug screens on July 11, 2025, and July 25, 2025, after calling into the hotline. App. Vol. II at 63-64. Brooks also failed to call in to the hotline on seven additional days in June and July of 2025.² Id. See also Tr. Vol. II p. 37.

[7] On August 4, 2025, the trial court held an initial hearing on the petition to revoke probation, at which Brooks appeared pro se. Brooks stated: “[s]ome of the dates I can say that I did forget to call in” and “[b]ut some I cannot confirm or deny.” Tr. Vol. II p. 39. The trial court asked Brooks, “[do you] admit that you did violate probation?” Brooks responded, “[y]es.” Id. at 42.

[8] On August 13, 2025, the trial court granted the petition to revoke probation and ordered Brooks to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence—“five hundred fifty-two (552) days, less credit time of two (2) days”—“on electronically monitored home detention” administered through West Central Regional Community Corrections. App. Vol. II at 66. The terms of Brooks’ home detention permitted him to drive to and from work. The trial court granted Brooks a specialized driving permit with an ignition interlock device. The trial court also ordered Brooks to submit to drug screens weekly. The court explained that its order reflected its consideration that Brooks “walked in here without an attorney on the first day and admitted” the violations. Tr. Vol. II p. 55. The home detention placement would allow Brooks to continue providing for his family. Brooks now appeals and argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Brooks to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence on home detention.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Brooks admitted to his violations of the probation conditions and appeals only the sanctions imposed by the trial court as a result of his probation violations. We review a trial court's sanction for probation violations under the abuse of discretion standard. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the trial court misinterprets the law. Id.

[10] When a probation violation is alleged, the trial court engages in two functions. Id. “First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred.” Id. “Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation.” Id. Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h) governs such sanctions and provides:

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the [probationary] period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[11] “ ‘Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation.’ ” Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied), trans. denied. “While it is correct that probation may be revoked on evidence of violation of a single condition, the selection of an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant's probation violation, which will require a determination of whether the defendant committed a new criminal offense.” Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618.

[12] Here, Brooks admitted at the hearings and in his appellate brief that he violated the terms of his probation. Tr. Vol. p. 42; Appellant's Br. p. 14. Brooks nevertheless argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering “excessive” sanctions because his admissions were made pro se “without the benefit [of] a negotiated resolution between himself and the State” and because the trial court failed to consider his remorse, clean testing, and employment. Appellant's Br. p. 15. We disagree.

[13] Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h) authorizes the trial court, upon finding that a defendant has violated a term of probation, to impose “one or more” sanctions, including ordering execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at sentencing. The trial court did not order Brooks to serve the balance of his sentence in the DOC, but instead ordered placement on home detention with privileges to work and drive so that he could meet family responsibilities.

[14] This sanction is not excessive. Brooks was on probation for OWI endangering a person. “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). The essence of Brooks’ probation was to remain alcohol and drug free. His lack of compliance with the drug screens and call-ins undermined the ability to monitor his compliance with probation. Thus, the trial court was well within its discretion to order Brooks to serve his sentence on home detention.

Conclusion

[15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Brooks’ probation and ordering him to serve his suspended sentence on home detention. Accordingly, we affirm.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Brooks also includes facts and arguments concerning his subsequent violation of the conditions of home detention. But Brooks filed his notice of appeal on August 29, 2025, and the trial court entered its later order revoking Brooks’ home detention on October 2, 2025. That latter matter is not included in this notice of appeal and, therefore, is not considered in this opinion.

2.   None of the latter seven dates required a drug screen. At the time the petition was filed, Brooks had served fifty-eight days of probation, with a balance of 552 days remaining. App. Vol. II at 63.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.