L.T. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Kids’ Voice of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] When A.M. (Child) was 12 years old, she was removed from the care of her mother, L.T. (Mother), due partly to neglect and concerns over Mother's mental health and stability. After Child was found to be a child in need of services (CHINS), the CHINS court ordered Mother to complete a variety of services aimed at reuniting her with Child. Mother failed to complete those services. More than two years later, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights, leading to this appeal by Mother. She claims the termination petition contained defective findings of facts and conclusions of law. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[2] During a two-month period beginning in February 2022, DCS received five reports about Child. By late April 2022, Mother was living in a hotel, and Child was living with Mother's mother (Maternal Grandmother) and stepfather. Around that time, Mother went to Maternal Grandmother's home and argued with Maternal Grandmother over Child's truancy. At the time, Child had already accumulated 37 unexcused absences for that school year. Mother eventually attempted to leave with Child, but Maternal Grandmother intervened. Mother then struck Maternal Grandmother.

[3] Police and DCS were summoned to Maternal Grandmother's home, and Mother was arrested. DCS soon petitioned to find Child to be a CHINS, alleging educational neglect and other neglect based on Mother's instability (including her lack of housing), her violent behavior in front of Child, and concerns about Mother's mental health. The CHINS court placed Child with Maternal Grandmother, with whom Child has lived ever since.

[4] After a fact-finding hearing, the CHINS court granted DCS's petition and adjudged Child to be a CHINS. The court specifically found that:

• Mother had not had independent housing for months prior to the CHINS filing.

• Child had not been to school for weeks before her removal because the school would not allow her to attend without required vaccines that Mother had failed to obtain for Child.

• Mother refused to agree to a tutor for Child or fully acknowledge Child's absences from school.

• Mother failed to recognize the negative impact of Child's exposure to Mother's repeated altercations with Maternal Grandmother and another family member.

[5] The CHINS court later entered a dispositional order, concluding:

The court considers Mother's history of living in hotels and with friends and relatives for sporadic and brief periods of time and her lac[k] of consistent employment, the fact that she has engaged in physical violence in front of the minor children, her unwillingness to ensure [Child's] attendance in school, appar[e]nt inability to understand the effect of her behaviors on [Child] and her combative demeanor and unreasonableness. The Court finds a rational basis to order Mother to participate in [homebased] case management, a psychological evaluation, and a parenting assessment.

Exhs., p. 64.

[6] In December 2023, Mother completed a psychological evaluation that resulted in recommendations that she engage in mental health treatment, homebased case management, and possible medication management. Mother stated that she would not participate in medication management and that she did not believe she had any mental health diagnoses, which was contrary to the understanding of the permanency family case manager.¹ In January 2024, the CHINS court granted Mother's request that she again be referred to the services that the CHINS dispositional order required her to complete.

[7] Two months later, DCS staff and service providers began working with Mother on goals, including housing, employment, and transportation. At that time, Mother was unemployed, did not have stable housing, and relied on a bus pass for transportation. Mother missed sessions with the various DCS staff and providers, claiming variously that she forgot, fell asleep, or did not want to attend. The homebased case manager observed Mother cycle between periods of stability and periods of visible decline, including depressed mood, disheveled appearance, and disengagement. Mother eventually reported finding employment and housing, but she never provided confirmation of her employment or the apartment address to DCS or service providers.

[8] DCS also referred Mother to providers for therapy and visitation. Mother initially exercised eight or nine hours of visitation three days per week with Child, with all visits supervised by a therapist working with Child and Mother. The therapist had “no safety concerns” during Mother's visits and observed a bond between Mother and Child. Tr. Vol. II, p. 13. But Mother eventually reduced her visits to three hours on two days per week. As Mother was entitled to visitation of up to twelve hours per session and exercised far less, the therapist never recommended unsupervised visitation. Mother's visits decreased over time, and the referral was ultimately closed when Mother stopped scheduling visits.

[9] In June 2024, the trial court changed Child's permanency plan to adoption at a review hearing that Mother did not attend. A month later, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights as to Child. Mother thereafter stopped communicating with DCS and last visited Child about three months before the termination hearing in June 2025. Mother did not appear at the termination hearing, although her counsel did. As of the date of the termination hearing, Mother had not completed the services ordered by the trial court. Mother had not provided evidence of any mental health treatment outside DCS referrals.

[10] At the hearing, the FCM testified that Mother's untreated mental health issues impaired Mother's stability and ability to safely parent Child. The FCM and the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) recommended termination of Mother's parental rights, with a plan for adoption of Child by Maternal Grandmother and her husband.

[11] The court granted DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights in findings of fact and conclusions of law that specified in part:

6. Conditions Resulting in Removal or Reasons for Placement Outside the Home (IC 31-35-2-4(d)(3)).

a. The Child was originally removed and has continued to be removed from the Parent's care as a result of Mother's untreated mental health, violence, instability and neglect ․

b. As of the termination hearing, [Mother was] not maintaining contact with DCS regarding the Child and ․ had not completed Court ordered DCS services to achieve reunification. Mother stopped visiting the child in March 2025[.]

c. Due to [Mother's] failure to maintain contact with DCS and her providers, engage in services provided by DCS, engage in non-referred DCS services, or demonstrate that she has housing and employment and is treating her mental health, the Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal and for continued placement outside [Mother's] home will not be remedied. IC 31-35-2-4(d)(3) ․

7. Threat to the Child's Well-Being (IC 31-35-2-4(d)(4))[.]

a. ․ The Child needs permanency and stability which [Mother cannot] provide. [Mother] has failed to engage in services to achieve reunification and failed to visit the Child since March 2025 ․ [and] has demonstrated that [she lacks] safe and appropriate housing or sufficient income to care for the Child and meet her needs.

b. [Mother has] not shown initiative in completing services ․ [ ]or shown any progress in becoming better able to provide the stability and safety the Child needs and deserves. [Her] lack of engagement with the DCS, [her] lack of parenting time and visitation with the Child, [her[ unwillingness to participate in services, the length of the CHINS case, and the Child's need for stability and permanency demonstrate that continuation of the parent-child relationship with [Mother] is a threat to the Child's emotional, mental, and physical well-being. Continuation of the parent-child relationship will expose the Child to perpetual instability with [Mother], which is a threat to her well-being.

c. The Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship between [Mother] and the Child poses a threat to her well-being. IC 31-35-2-4(d)(4) ․

8. That the Parent Failed to Comply with the Child's Dispositional Decree I.C.31-35-2-4(d)(7)[.]

a. Mother ․ [has] failed to comply with the Dispositional Decree entered on or about December 19, 2022 for a period of at least 12 months following both the Child's removal and the Child's Adjudication.

b. DCS made reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family and DCS made numerous referrals for all services ordered at the Disposition, but [Mother did not] cooperate[ ] with and/or successfully complete[ ] the services.

c. It is unlikely that [Mother] will substantially comply with the Dispositional Decree, which was entered 2 1/212 years ago.

d. DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that [Mother has] failed to comply with the Child's Dispositional Decree.

9. Termination in the Child's Best Interests (IC 31-35-2-4(c)(3))[.]

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b. ․ The Child needs permanency and stability, which [Mother has not] provided and [is] not able or willing to provide․

c. Termination will permit the Child to achieve permanency through adoption by Maternal Grandmother.

d. [T]here is clear and convincing evidence that the conditions which led to the original and continued removal of the Child from the care of the parents are not reasonably probable to be remedied. Coupled with the recommendation from the FCM and GAL [for termination], there is sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that termination is in the Child's best interests. The Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Child's best interests. IC 31-35-2-4(c)(3).

App. Vol. II, pp. 163-64. Mother appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Mother challenges three factual findings by the trial court, claiming they are unsupported by the record. She further contends the remaining evidence was insufficient to justify termination of her parental rights. We conclude the challenged findings are supported by the record and that the findings support the trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights.

[13] When seeking to terminate parental rights, DCS must prove the statutory requirements for termination by “clear and convincing evidence.” Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. When reviewing an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment without reweighing the evidence or judging witness credibility. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We review whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). “Findings are clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support them.” In re T.S., 906 N.E.2d 801, 804 (Ind. 2009).

I. The Record Supports the Challenged Findings

[14] The three factual findings that Mother challenges are Finding 12 (relating to Mother's refusal to permit entry/in-home visitation) and Findings 14 and 27 (relating to Mother's alleged untreated/undertreated mental health difficulties).

A. Finding 12

[15] Mother challenges the portion of Finding 12 that specifies: “[Mother] temporarily found employment and an apartment, but refused to permit anyone, including [the homebased case manager], other services providers, or DCS, in the home.” App. Vol. II, p. 156. But the homebased case manager testified she asked to visit Mother's home and that Mother refused because, according to Mother, the family members with whom she was staying did not want DCS staff or service providers in their home.

[16] The homebased case manager also testified that after Mother reported obtaining an apartment, Mother stated at a meeting with DCS staff that she did not wish to allow visits there and that she “wanted to keep everything outside in the community.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 32. Mother never provided the apartment address to DCS, in any case. In addition, the permanency family case manager testified that when she asked Mother if she could perform a home check, Mother “stated that she did not want me to come to her home.” Id. at 62.

[17] This testimony is evidence from which the trial court could reasonably infer that Mother refused in-home access and in-home visitation. Thus, Finding 12 is not clearly erroneous.

B. Findings 14 and 27

[18] Mother also challenges two related findings—Findings 14 and 27. Finding 14 specifies that “Mother has not addressed her mental health[,] and her untreated or under-treated mental health issues have negatively impacted Mother's personal stability as well as her ability to parent the Child and meet her needs.” App. Vol. II, p. 157. Finding 27 provides that “Mother's desired unlimited access to the Child compromises the Child's safety and stability due to Mother's untreated or undertreated mental health issues and the detrimental impact her mental health has on her residential and financial stability.” Id. at 159.

[19] Mother contends these findings are unsupported by the evidence because the evidence reflects no “credible accusation” that she had a mental illness. Appellant's Br., p. 12. She asserts that the court could not rely on the FCM's comment that she believed that Mother “was having some sort of depression ․ maybe even some bipolar stuff going on.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 33-34.

[20] But Findings 14 and 27 do not depend on a particular diagnostic label. Instead, they are reasonably based on evidence in the record showing:

• Mother had a history of substance abuse.

• Child was removed from Mother's care partly due to concerns over her mental health after she engaged in multiple violent confrontations (including toward her mother) that were witnessed by her children.

• Mother had been removed from two shelters and family members’ homes due to her behavior.

• The psychological evaluation that Mother underwent resulted in recommendations for individual mental health treatment and related services.

• Mother stated she would not cooperate in treatment, including submitting to possible medication management, and refused to believe she had any mental health issues.

• DCS's witnesses described Mother's instability, cycles of personal decline in which she appeared unkept and in a depressed mood, disengagement from people trying to assist her, and generally erratic behavior. Mother's unusual behaviors included her becoming “irate” and yelling at the court when it refused to close the CHINS case, despite her noncompliance with services. Exhs., p. 80.

• Mother's history during these proceedings of being unable to independently care for her own basic needs by procuring stable employment, housing, and transportation.

• The permanency family case manager testified that allowing Mother unlimited access to Child would expose Child to Mother's potential mental health issues and impact Child's stability if Mother refused to bring her back to Maternal Grandmother's home.

[21] The trial court could infer from this evidence that Mother had unaddressed mental health concerns that affected her ability to achieve the stability necessary for reunification and to parent Child. In particular, the psychological evaluation supported this inference because its recommendation for ongoing treatment would have been unnecessary if Mother lacked mental health issues or if she already was addressing those issues through ongoing treatment. Moreover, the evidence showed that Mother's mental health and her lack of stability would negatively impact Child if Mother had unlimited access to her. Because there are facts supporting Findings 14 and 27 by inference, it is not clearly erroneous. See In re T.S., 906 N.E.2d at 804.

II. Clear and Convincing Evidence Supports the Judgment

[22] For the judgment to stand, clear and convincing evidence must show that termination is in Child's best interests, that there is a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment, and that at least one of numerous statutory circumstances under Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) were true. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 (2024); Ind. Code 31-37-14-2. Here, DCS alleged the following statutory circumstances in its termination petition:

• Child has been removed from Mother and has been under DCS supervision for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months (beginning with the date Child was removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a CHINS) and despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify Child's family under Indiana Code § 31-34-21-5.5, Mother has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in Child's placement outside Mother's home. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2) (2024).

• There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the parents’ homes will not be remedied. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (2024).

• There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of Child. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(4) (2024).

App. Vol. II, p. 18.

[23] The trial court concluded that DCS proved all three of these circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. Mother contends none of the three circumstances were proven, but she otherwise does not contest the trial court's conclusions of law.

A. Remedying of Conditions

[24] Mother argues that DCS failed to prove both that she failed to remedy the conditions leading to removal and that a reasonable probability exists that these conditions will not be remedied. In determining whether the conditions that resulted in the child's removal will not be remedied, we “engage in a two-step analysis.” K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). We first identify the conditions that led to removal. Id. Then we “determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this second step, “the trial court must judge a parent's fitness ‘as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (quoting Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind.2005)). The court must also balance “a parent's recent improvements against ‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’ ” Id. (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). The court “has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id.

[25] The conditions leading to Child's removal were: (1) Mother's educational neglect of Child; (2) Mother's mental health and general instability, including lack of independent housing; and (3) Mother's general neglect of Child, including Mother's exposure of Child to Mother's violent encounters. Child's truancy ended when Child was removed from Mother's care, and the record contains no indication that Mother's criminal proceeding for striking Maternal Grandmother was ongoing. But the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Mother did not remedy—and was unable to remedy—the remaining conditions that prompted Child's removal and continued placement with Maternal Grandmother.

[26] The evidence showed that during the three years between Child's removal and the termination judgment, Mother never had verified housing or employment, refused home access, inconsistently participated in services without completing any successfully, declined other services, and eventually stopped communicating with DCS and visiting Child months before the termination hearing. Mother essentially made no progress, despite the benefits of three years of State intervention.

[27] Mother favors continuing Child's placement with Maternal Grandmother but essentially without State supervision. If that came to fruition, Mother argues that the conditions leading to Child's removal and continued placement outside Mother's home would be remedied. But Mother essentially is asking for an arrangement to parent when and where she wants. Parenting is not a part-time proposition or discretionary endeavor. Moreover, given that Mother would still be Child's legal custodian, this arrangement would fail to protect Child from many of the problematic behaviors that led to Child's removal in the first place—namely, Mother's exposure of Child to violence, Child's truancy, Mother's erratic behavior, and Mother's lack of stable housing and employment. “A trial court need not wait until a child is [harmed] from a deficient lifestyle ․ before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

[28] The trial court did not err in concluding that clear and convincing evidence showed that Mother had not remedied the conditions leading to Child's removal and that there was a reasonable probability that Mother would not remedy those conditions.

B. Threat to Child's Well-being.

[29] Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being. She notes the lack of concerns for Child's safety during Mother's supervised visits and argues that an allegedly amorphous notion of permanency for Child cannot justify termination here. Appellant's Br., pp. 15-16.

[30] A trial court may consider habitual patterns of conduct in assessing parental threat, including the likelihood of future neglect or deprivation. In re G.F., 135 N.E.3d 654, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Here, the record includes evidence that Mother had a history of substance abuse and had displayed violent propensities and erratic behavior. She never progressed beyond supervised visitation and missed a number of scheduled visits before ultimately ceasing the visits months before the termination hearing. Mother also disengaged from services and stopped communicating with DCS staff. She never established stable housing or stable employment during the three years of DCS involvement and refused DCS's help in finding housing and jobs.

[31] Moreover, Mother did not comply with the CHINS dispositional order. She had failed to participate in the treatment recommendation that resulted from the psychological evaluation. DCS witnesses testified to ongoing concerns over Mother's mental health that were based in whole or part on their observations of her. The psychological evaluation resulted in recommendations for ongoing mental health treatment for Mother that she rejected and then essentially ignored. The permanency family case manager testified that continuation of the parent-child relationship would delay permanency and expose Child to instability and Mother's ongoing mental health issues.

[32] Against this evidentiary backdrop, the testimony about the lack of safety concerns during supervised visits is of little assistance to Mother's argument. Safety in supervised visits is quite different from finding Child to be safe to return to Mother's unsupervised care. The trial court's finding that continuation of the parent-child relationship threatened Child is not clearly erroneous, given Mother's habitual pattern of failing to prioritize Child's needs and to address Mother's own need for treatment, stable housing, and employment.

Conclusion

[33] Because the record supports the three challenged findings, and because the trial court's findings and reasonable inferences support its statutorily-based conclusions, we affirm the judgment terminating Mother's parental rights.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For reasons unclear from the record, the psychological evaluation was not admitted into evidence, and the person who conducted the evaluation did not testify. Although the record does not reveal Mother's specific mental health diagnosis resulting from the psychological evaluation or any other source, the recommendations for mental health treatment resulting from the psychological evaluation are evident in the record.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.