Danny McCarty, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Following a bench trial, Danny McCarty was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident and criminal mischief after he crashed his vehicle through a fence and into the front yard of a house. McCarty appeals and raises one issue: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his convictions.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the night of January 6, 2024, the weather was cold and snowy in Pulaski County. McCarty and his brother Charles drove in McCarty's vehicle to a nearby bar, where McCarty had several drinks.

[4] Later, at approximately 5:00 a.m., a snowplow driver was driving through a residential neighborhood when he observed McCarty's crashed vehicle in the front yard of John Simmermaker's house. The vehicle appeared to have been driven off the road and through a wrought iron fence and was only a few feet from the house. No one was in or around the vehicle.

[5] Clint Henry was staying at the house at the time, and he told law enforcement officers that he did not hear the accident that night and no one reported it to him. The officers searched the vehicle and discovered it was registered to McCarty. Inside the passenger cabin, the officers “detect[ed] the odor of a[n] alcoholic beverage.” Tr. Vol. II at 23. Leading from the driver's side of the vehicle to the road, the officers discovered a distinctive trail of footprints in the snow.

[6] Equipped with McCarty's address, the officers went to his home, and arrived at approximately 7:00 a.m.¹ There, the officers discovered another set of footprints leading from the road to the house. The footprints were the same size, shape, and tread pattern as the footprints left at the accident. The officers believed the footprints were left by someone who was intoxicated because they were not “in a straight line” and indicated the individual was “stumbling ․ towards the residence.” Tr. Vol. II at 36. In the driveway, the officers discovered “an impression of a vehicle that had been parked there,” id. at 25, but did not observe any tire tracks leading into or out of the driveway.

[7] The officers knocked on the door. McCarty answered. The officers observed that McCarty was not wearing shoes; his eyes were “red, watery”; his speech was “slurred”; and he smelled of alcohol “consistent with the smell [the officers] observed” in the vehicle earlier. Tr. Vol. II at 28. McCarty admitted he was the owner of the vehicle and was taken into custody. Before being taken out of his house, McCarty put on a pair of shoes. As he walked from his house to the officer's squad car, the officers observed that McCarty's footprints matched the footprints from the accident and those leading from the road in front of McCarty's house.

[8] The State charged McCarty with criminal mischief and leaving the scene of an accident, both as Class B misdemeanors. At the ensuing bench trial, the State argued that McCarty crashed the vehicle and got a ride home without reporting the accident. McCarty and Charles testified in McCarty's defense. McCarty admitted that he drank on the night of the accident but testified, “five or six beers ain't going to make me drunk. I am a big guy.” Tr. Vol. II at 76. McCarty denied driving the vehicle or leaving any footprints before his arrest.

[9] Instead, the brothers claimed they met a man at the bar on the night of the accident, and McCarty invited the man to spend the night on McCarty's couch. The man's name was Mike; they never learned his last name. Charles testified that he drove McCarty and Mike to McCarty's house at approximately midnight. Before Charles left at approximately 1:00 a.m., he announced, while Mike was nearby, that he was leaving McCarty's keys on a key ring near the front door. When Charles left, he thought McCarty and Mike were going to sleep. The brothers testified that they did not know when Mike left McCarty's house. They have not heard from him since that night.

[10] The trial court found McCarty guilty as charged. McCarty was ordered to serve 12 days in jail, with credit for time served, and 168 days suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support McCarty's Convictions

[11] McCarty argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his convictions for criminal mischief and leaving the scene of an accident as Class B misdemeanors. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[12] We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support McCarty's convictions. We address each conviction in turn.

a. Leaving the Scene of an Accident

[13] Beginning with McCarty's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident as a Class B misdemeanor, the State was required to prove McCarty absconded after the accident without taking reasonable steps to notify the property owner or law enforcement. Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1(a)(4), (b). McCarty admits the vehicle left at the accident belonged to him. McCarty's only argument is that the State failed to prove he was the one driving the vehicle during the accident.

[14] Several items of evidence, however, support the opposite inference. First, McCarty admitted that he went out drinking in the vehicle that night, and the vehicle had an odor of alcohol when the officers discovered it. Second, the footprints left at the scene of the accident matched those leading from the road to McCarty's house and those left by McCarty when he was taken to the police squad car.² The location of the footprints was consistent with the State's theory that McCarty was picked up after the accident and driven to his house. Third, there were no tire tracks in McCarty's driveway to suggest someone else took the vehicle from his house that night.

[15] Moreover, it appears the trial court disregarded the brothers’ testimony, and there was good reason to do so. McCarty suggested Mike could have taken the vehicle, but McCarty also testified he believed Mike was still in the house in the morning when the officers arrived. As for the footprints left by McCarty on the way to the squad car, McCarty testified the shoes he wore did not belong to him, but he never explained whose shoes they were or why he simply did not wear his own pair of shoes.

[16] McCarty argues that no one saw him driving the vehicle that night, that the officers did not measure or cast the footprints, and that the officers lacked formal training on comparing prints. It is well settled that a verdict can stand on circumstantial evidence alone. Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 689 (Ind. 2017) (citing Hampton v. State, 719 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind. 1999)). McCarty's argument was before the trial court, and we will not reweigh the evidence. Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (citing Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). Sufficient evidence supports an inference that McCarty drove the vehicle at the time of the accident and left without reporting it. The State thus presented sufficient evidence to support McCarty's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.

b. Criminal Mischief

[17] Turning to McCarty's conviction for criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor, the State was required to prove that McCarty “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damage[d] or deface[d]” Simmermaker's property without Simmermaker's “consent.” I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a). There is no contention McCarty acted knowingly or intentionally; the issue is whether he acted recklessly. A person acts recklessly “if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Id. § 35-41-2-2(c).

[18] McCarty argues the State failed to prove he drove recklessly because, given the snowy conditions that night, “the most plausible explanation was that the road was slick, and [McCarty] lost control of the vehicle.” Appellant's Br. at 11. McCarty, however, testified that he went to a bar that night and drank alcohol. When the officers arrived at McCarty's house, McCarty had an alcoholic odor consistent with the odor in the vehicle. And the officers testified they believed the footprints left in front of McCarty's house indicated McCarty was “stumbling” and “intoxicated.” Tr. Vol. II at 36.

[19] The trial court could reasonably conclude McCarty crashed the vehicle into the fence because he recklessly drove while intoxicated. McCarty's request that we blame the slick roads is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence. The State thus presented sufficient evidence to support McCarty's conviction for criminal mischief.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The time of the officers’ arrival is not clear from the record. The officers did not recall the time they arrived, and neither did McCarty, although he agreed with his counsel's suggestion of 7:00 a.m.

2.   Even McCarty's brother agreed the first two sets of footprints looked the same.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.