Michael Percifield, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Michael Percifield was convicted of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Percifield now appeals, raising two issues for our review: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his pending charges in another case; and 2) whether his conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Percifield and A.P. met in 2020 and were later married. A.P. worked as an elementary school teacher in Martinsville. During the relationship, Percifield frequently asked A.P. to text him intimate pictures of herself, including when she was working. A.P. took intimate photographs of herself in her home or in the staff bathroom. A.P. last sent intimate pictures to Percifield in February 2024 and never permitted him to share these pictures with another person.

[3] In May 2024, the State charged Percifield with Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 3 felony rape, two counts of Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony criminal confinement, and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery in Cause No. 55D02-2405-F1-787 (“Cause No. 787”) for acts committed against A.P.¹ On May 31, the court in Cause No. 787 issued a no-contact order prohibiting Percifield from contacting A.P. in any way “directly or indirectly, except through an attorney of record, while released from custody pending trial. This includes, but is not limited to, acts of harassment, stalking, intimidation, threats, and physical force of any kind.” Ex. p. 21. Percifield was served with a copy of the no-contact order on June 3. The couple separated and later initiated divorce proceedings. After Percifield lost his construction tools in the separation, he repeatedly told his girlfriend Kasey Flanagan that “[h]e wanted to get [A.P.] fired.” Tr. Vol. II p. 163.

[4] On January 7, 2025, Percifield contacted police dispatch to report A.P. allegedly taking intimate pictures of herself on school property. Martinsville School Police Deputy Chief Douglas Rather called Percifield to investigate the report. During their conversation, Percifield threatened “to call the media” and seemed “upset with the prosecutor's office for taking his phone[.]” Id. at 123, 134. When Percifield refused to meet in person to complete a written statement, Deputy Chief Rather asked Percifield to email him a statement along with “any evidence that he wanted [Deputy Chief Rather] to look at pertaining to this call.” Id. at 123.

[5] Percifield detailed his allegations in an email to Deputy Chief Rather and attached five pictures.² The first picture is a “selfie” of A.P. clothed in her classroom. Id. at 146. The other four pictures are intimate images of A.P. Percifield claimed that “if [A.P.’s] phone is taken with a warrant and inspected the timestamp will show she is guilty of these accusations.” Ex. p. 6. Deputy Chief Rather met with the superintendent and A.P. to discuss Percifield's allegations. A.P. was not charged with a crime or terminated from her employment.

[6] On January 16, the State charged Percifield with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and Class A misdemeanor distribution of an intimate image. In February, Percifield filed a motion to dismiss, arguing he did not knowingly or intentionally violate the no-contact order and merely reported a potential crime to law enforcement. The court denied Percifield's motion to dismiss on March 1. Percifield later requested in a motion in limine that the court exclude any evidence of his pending charges in Cause No. 787 and redact the no-contact order. The court found Percifield's pending charges were “relevant as to motive and intent” and denied his request. Tr. Vol. II p. 26.

[7] Over Percifield's objection, the State referenced Percifield's pending charges in its opening statement and the court admitted the no-contact order without redactions. A.P. acknowledged she was the alleged victim in Cause No. 787. Flanagan testified that after his separation, Percifield was angry over the pending case and his lost property. She stated Percifield wanted “an eye for an eye” and wanted to use the intimate photos of A.P. “[f]or his F1 felony case” and to get her fired. Id. at 163, 167. After the presentation of evidence, the court instructed the jury that Percifield was presumed innocent of his pending charges in Cause No. 787 and that it was not to speculate as to those charges in any way.

[8] The jury found Percifield guilty as charged. The court did not enter a judgment of conviction for distribution of an intimate image due to double jeopardy concerns, and it sentenced Percifield to 330 days executed for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Percifield now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[9] Percifield argues the court erred in admitting evidence of his pending charges. “Our standard of reviewing claims of alleged evidentiary error is well settled: the decision to admit or exclude evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion.” McMillen v. State, 169 N.E.3d 437, 440-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). A trial court abuses its discretion in admitting evidence when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019). A trial court's evidentiary ruling is presumptively correct, and “a challenger bears the burden on appeal of persuading us that the trial court erred in its exercise of discretion.” Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[10] At the outset, we observe that the existence of a no-contact order is an element of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(5) (2023). Accordingly, the no-contact order was admissible as direct evidence of Percifield's guilt and was not barred by Rule 404(b). See Mise v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1079, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding evidence is not prohibited by Rule 404(b) where it is direct evidence of guilt), trans. denied.

[11] Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) provides “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” However, the evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(2). When the evidence is introduced for another purpose, the court

[f]irst ․ must determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act. Second, the court must determine that the proponent has sufficient proof that the person who allegedly committed the act did, in fact, commit the act. And third, the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403.

D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted).

[12] Percifield argues the no-contact order should have been redacted to omit the specific nature of his charges. Here, the court admitted the no-contact order without redacting Percifield's pending charges after finding they were “relevant as to motive and intent.” Tr. Vol. II p. 26. “Evidence of a defendant's motive is always relevant in the proof of a crime.” Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1057 (Ind. 2011). Flanagan testified that Percifield was angry about Cause No. 787 and that he wanted to use A.P.’s intimate photos for that case and to get her fired. Percifield's pending charges in Cause No. 787 were thus a cause of or reason for Percifield's invasion of A.P.’s privacy. That is, Percifield's pending charges were relevant in demonstrating why he was hostile toward A.P., and “ ‘hostility is a paradigmatic motive for committing a crime.’ ” Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. 1997) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1107 (4th Cir. 1992)). To introduce prior-acts evidence to demonstrate intent, the State must first have “reliable assurance” that the defendant will contest the issue of intent. Fairbanks, 119 N.E.3d at 569 (quotation omitted). Percifield argued he merely attempted to report a potential crime—raising an issue of contrary intent—in his motion to dismiss. In doing so, Percifield gave reliable assurance that he would contest the issue of intent at trial. See id. (holding defendant gave the State reliable assurance by making statements before trial to law enforcement and news media).

[13] Next, “the court must determine that the proponent has sufficient proof that the person who allegedly committed the act did, in fact, commit the act.” D.R.C., 908 N.E.2d at 223. Here, because the existence of the pending charges is the “act” the State relied upon to show motive and intent, the State only needed to prove Percifield was the person charged with the pending offenses. The State did not need to prove Percifield committed the charged offenses themselves. The State met its burden here by eliciting testimony from A.P. acknowledging she was the alleged victim and detailing Percifield's pending charges in Cause No. 787. See Tr. Vol. II p. 140.

[14] Finally, we disagree with Percifield that any probative value gleaned from his pending charges was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. As we discussed above, Percifield's pending charges were highly probative of his motive and intent. And while the existence of pending charges is undoubtably prejudicial, the court reduced this impact by instructing the jury that Percifield was presumed to be innocent of the pending charges. See Weisheit v. State, 109 N.E.3d 978, 989 (Ind. 2018) (“It is presumed that jurors follow their instructions.”).

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[15] Second, Percifield argues the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Our standard of review is well settled:

For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact. On sufficiency challenges, we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021) (citations omitted).

[16] To convict Percifield of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, the State needed to show that Percifield “knowingly or intentionally violate[d] ․ a no contact order issued as a condition of pretrial release, including release on bail or personal recognizance, or pretrial diversion[.]” I.C. § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(5). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) (1977). “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Id. § 35-41-2-2(a).

[17] Percifield argues he did not knowingly or intentionally contact A.P. and was merely reporting a potential crime. “Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the jury must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1091 (Ind. 2025) (quotation omitted). A defendant's intent “normally cannot be established with mathematical precision” but may “be inferred from a defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195-96 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotations omitted).

[18] Here, the facts and inferences most favorable to the jury's verdict establish that Percifield was upset about losing his construction tools and his phone, wanted an “eye for an eye,” and planned to use A.P.’s intimate photos “[f]or his F1 felony case” and to get her fired. Tr. Vol. II pp. 163, 167. When Percifield spoke to police, he threatened “to call the media” and suggested that law enforcement take A.P.’s phone. Id. at 123. Based on the nature of Percifield's allegations and his suggestion that law enforcement seize A.P.’s phone, the jury could reasonably conclude that Percifield was aware of a high probability that law enforcement would contact A.P. and communicate his allegations to her. See Phipps, 90 N.E.3d at 1196 (holding sufficient evidence supported invasion of privacy conviction where the contents of defendant's email indicated she knew the message would be relayed to the protected party). Percifield argues he was simply reporting A.P.’s “misconduct” and did not intend to contact her. Appellant's Br. p. 10. But the jury rejected this argument, and it is within its discretion to do so. Phipps, 90 N.E.3d at 1197 (“Invasion-of-privacy cases are fact specific and such determinations are best made by the finder of fact rather than a reviewing court on appeal.”).³ Accordingly, we will not disturb the jury's verdict. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Smith's conviction of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.⁴ Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Chronological Case Summary for Cause No. 787 indicates the State later amended its charging information and, on October 10, 2025, Percifield was convicted of Level 1 felony attempted murder, two counts of Level 3 felony rape, Level 4 felony criminal confinement resulting in moderate bodily injury, and two counts of Level 6 felony intimidation.

2.   The attached images were pictures Percifield took of his computer screen, which each displayed an image through a Cellebrite extraction report of his cell phone.

3.   Percifield disputes whether his conduct constituted harassment or intimidation, as argued by the State at trial. However, the no-contact order prohibited Percifield from contacting A.P. in any way directly or indirectly which “includes, but is not limited to, acts of harassment, stalking, intimidation, threats, and physical force of any kind.” Ex. p. 21 (emphasis added). The State was only required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Percifield knowingly or intentionally violated the no-contact order by indirectly contacting A.P. As discussed above, we conclude the State met its burden. Accordingly, we need not address whether Percifield's conduct constituted one of the enumerated acts prohibited in the no-contact order.

4.   Percifield also challenges whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove he committed Class A misdemeanor distribution of an intimate image. However, the trial court did not enter a judgment of conviction on this count due to double jeopardy concerns. Because we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, we need not address this argument. See, e.g., Moone v. State, 250 N.E.3d 1101, 1109 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (declining to address challenge to sufficiency of evidence supporting guilty verdict where trial court did not enter judgment of conviction because sufficient evidence supported convicted offense), trans. denied.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.