Christopher B. Williams, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Christopher B. Williams appeals the thirteen-year aggregate sentence that was imposed following his convictions for child molesting, a Level 4 felony, and dissemination of matter harmful to a minor, a Level 6 felony. Williams contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him and that the sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Williams and Shannan Baker married in 2015. Thereafter, the two lived in Brown County with Baker's two minor children from a prior relationship. Baker's daughter, M.L.—the victim—was born in 2014.

[4] Sometime in April 2022, M.L. told her elementary school principal that Williams “had touched her inappropriately.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 133, 137. The principal had M.L. call Baker to tell her what had occurred. M.L. recalled telling Baker that she did not previously report Williams's actions because he threatened to hurt her if she “ever told anyone.” Id. at 135. Although the school reported these allegations to the Department of Child Services, no additional action was taken. Law enforcement was also not contacted at the time.

[5] Sometime in 2023, M.L.’s father took her for a forensic interview regarding Williams's actions. During the interview, M.L. reported that she did “not feel safe” talking about Williams previously because he threatened her and “told her not to tell anyone.” Id. at 133. M.L. described Williams's multiple acts of molestation that occurred when she was four, five, and six years old and that “she did not know what any of it meant at the time.” Id.

[6] As for the first incident of molestation, M.L. recounted that Williams gave her a “horrible massage,” undressed them both, and fondled her vaginal, buttocks, and breast areas. M.L. stated that Williams had “pulled her into his room while her brother was in the bathroom, [and that he touched] her until her brother got out of the shower.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 18.

[7] On another occasion, M.L. recalled that Williams “had her face the wall and bend over” while Williams was naked. Id. at 135. Williams then touched her in a way that she described as “weird ․ [and] it did not feel like hands.” Id. The molestations “happened constantly” over a three-year period. Id. at 134-35. M.L. also recalled that Williams made videos of her during some of the incidents and he showed her videos of other naked people including one of him and Baker showering together.

[8] After M.L. provided her forensic statement, the police contacted Baker, and she denied that she had been aware of any molesting allegations against Williams. It was later revealed, however, that Baker had been notified in 2022 by an official from M.L.’s school of the molesting allegations.

[9] On March 21, 2024, the State charged Williams with child molesting, a Level 4 felony, and dissemination of matter harmful to a minor, a Level 6 felony. The charging information alleged that Williams committed the offenses “between January 2017 and January 2020.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 22. Williams was on bond for other unrelated sexual offenses during part of that period.

[10] Williams agreed to plead guilty to the charged offenses pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with the State that left sentencing to the trial court's discretion. At the guilty plea hearing on May 12, 2025, the State orally amended the charging information to allege that Williams committed the offenses “between January 2017 and May 27, 2017.” Transcript at 64-66, 68; Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 12, 108-09. Those dates excluded the time that Williams was on bond for the other sex offense. In light of that amendment, the parties agreed that the trial court would have discretion to order the sentences imposed on the current offenses to run concurrently with the sentence ordered in the unrelated case, and that Williams would be entitled to good time credit in both cases.

[11] At the sentencing hearing on July 25, 2025, Williams testified that he committed his sex crimes during a period of “a lot of drug use” and that he “wasn't a very good person at that time.” Transcript at 8. He described his efforts at rehabilitation, substance abuse treatment, and his intention to continue vocational training and counseling during his incarceration.

[12] In a victim impact statement that was read into the record, M.L. stated that she was a victim of “rape, molestation, [and] physical abuse” and that she was upset that no one believed her accusations against Williams. Exhibit 4. M.L. further stated that Williams “ruined [her] life and childhood” and that she still has flashbacks of the incidents. Id.

[13] The trial court thereafter identified the following aggravating factors: (1) Williams's lengthy history of delinquent and criminal behavior that included prior convictions for sexual offenses; (2) Williams's history of violating alternative sentences; (3) his violation of a position of trust; (4) M.L. was only four years old when the abuse started, she suffered significantly, and the offense was greater than that required by the elements of the charged offenses; and (5) the crime was one of violence that Williams knowingly committed in the presence of another child.

[14] The trial court then found that Williams's unstable childhood, his acceptance of responsibility for the crimes, his show of remorse, and his plan to continue participating in rehabilitation programs while incarcerated were mitigating circumstances.

[15] After considering the above, the trial court sentenced Williams to eleven years of incarceration for child molesting with two years suspended to probation, and to two years for dissemination of matter harmful to a minor. Those sentences were ordered to run consecutively with each other and consecutive to the sentence that he was currently serving on a prior conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor. Williams also received earned credit days and credit time for the period that he was incarcerated prior to sentencing.

[16] Williams now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Discretion

[17] Williams argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Specifically, Williams contends that the trial court improperly identified an aggravating circumstance and that it overlooked a mitigating factor that was supported by the record.

[18] “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. When a defendant's sentence falls within the range authorized by statute, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id.

[19] A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all[,]” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-91.

[20] In this case, Williams argues that the trial court improperly identified the elements of the child molesting offense as an aggravating circumstance. He maintains that M.L. did not suffer any “significant and greater” harm than the elements that were necessary to prove the offense. Appellant's Brief at 10.

[21] The trial court may not enhance a sentence based solely on the material elements of the offense. See Higginson v. State, 209 N.E.3d 15, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). It may, however, “properly consider the particularized circumstances of the material elements of the crime to be an aggravating factor.” Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[22] In this case, Williams was convicted of child molesting, a Level 4 felony, pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b), which provides that “[a] person who, with a child under fourteen ․ years of age, performs or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child molesting, a Level 4 felony.”

[23] Williams began molesting M.L. when she was only four years old. M.L. described in her forensic statement Williams's constant multiple acts of fondling that occurred over a three-year period. Although Williams contends that the harm caused by his crime “are those contemplated by the [child molest] statute,” the statute does not account for M.L.’s extremely young age or the repeated and diverse acts that Williams committed. Appellant's Brief at 16. M.L. expressed in her statement that she was severely harmed by Williams's acts of “rape, molestation, [and] physical abuse.” Exhibit 4. M.L. further stated that Williams “ruined [her] life and childhood” and that she still has flashbacks of the incidents. Id. In short, it was proper for the trial court to identify the “nature and circumstances” of the offense as an aggravating factor. See, e.g., Sullivan v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the use of the child victim's age as an aggravating circumstance was justified because although the victim's age—which was eight at the time of the offense—was an element of child molesting, the fact that the victim was significantly less than fourteen made the crime more heinous).

[24] Williams next claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not identify his guilty plea as a mitigating factor. When a defendant alleges that the trial court failed to identify a mitigating circumstance, he is required to establish that the mitigator is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. The finding of mitigating factors is not mandatory and rests within the discretion of the trial court. O'Neill v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1243, 1244 (Ind. 1999). Moreover, the trial court is “not required to explain why it does not identify a defendant's proffered factors to be mitigating.” Smith v. State, 929 N.E.2d 255, 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

[25] A defendant who pleads guilty is entitled to have “some” mitigating weight given to the plea. Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ind. 2005). But a guilty plea “is not inherently considered a significant mitigating circumstance.” Primmer v. State, 857 N.E.2d 11, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added), trans. denied. Rather, the significance of a guilty plea as a mitigator varies from case to case. Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221. A guilty plea may not be significantly mitigating when it does not demonstrate the defendant's acceptance of responsibility, or when the defendant receives a substantial benefit in return for the plea. Id.

[26] Contrary to Williams's contention, the trial court did identify Williams's decision to plead guilty as a mitigating factor, noting that Williams “has accepted responsibility and is remorseful.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 143. The record also shows that the State amended the charging information at the guilty plea hearing to provide the trial court with discretion to order Williams to serve his sentence in the instant case concurrently with that imposed in the unrelated sexual misconduct case. The parties further agreed that Williams was entitled to credit time in light of the amendment. Hence, Williams received a substantial benefit from the plea agreement as a result of the narrower dates regarding Williams's alleged commission of the offenses set forth in the amended information. For these reasons, we cannot say that the trial court overlooked a substantial mitigating circumstance when it sentenced Williams.

[27] In sum, Williams has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[28] Williams argues that his sentence was inappropriate when considering the nature of the offense and his character. The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) enables this court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023). It is the defendant's burden on appeal to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025).

[29] In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, “and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122.

[30] When evaluating the nature of an offense, we “look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense.” Borroel v. State, 241 N.E.3d 8, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. Given that sentencing “is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference, a trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093. In determining whether Williams carried his burden of establishing that his sentence is inappropriate, we consider “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the typical offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[31] We begin with the advisory sentence as “the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Anglemeyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494. Here, Williams pled guilty to Level 4 felony child molesting and Level 6 felony dissemination of matter harmful to a minor. The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is two to twelve years with an advisory sentence of six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is six months to two and one-half years with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7. Williams received consecutive sentences of eleven years with two years suspended to probation on the child molest charge and two years on the dissemination charge.

[32] M.L. reported that Williams touched her “constantly” over a three-year period. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 134-36. He fondled her vaginal, buttocks, and breast areas and touched her “from behind” with something that M.L. said “did not feel like hands.” Id. Williams also filmed M.L., showed her videos of other naked people including her mother, and threatened to hurt M.L. if she told anyone about his actions. Williams also committed at least one of the offenses while M.L.’s brother was in the next room. Williams has failed to demonstrate that the circumstances of his offenses require a lesser sentence.

[33] Turning to Williams's character, our analysis “involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 990-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. In other words, an offender's character is “what is learned about his life and conduct.” Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[34] The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence varies based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character. Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[35] Williams has a significant criminal history including five juvenile adjudications for battery, one for criminal trespass, and several placement violations. As an adult, Williams has amassed felony convictions for battery resulting in serious bodily injury, sexual misconduct with a minor, and two acts of perjury. Williams also has misdemeanor convictions for false informing, criminal trespass, and battery. His probation was revoked on two occasions, and his community corrections sentences were revoked three times. It was further established that Williams has significant drug abuse issues and previous gang affiliations. Williams has failed to produce compelling evidence that his sentence warrants revision when considering his character.

[36] In sum, Williams has failed to carry his burden of establishing that his sentence is inappropriate when considering the nature of the offense and his character.

[37] Judgment affirmed.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.