Roy E. France, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Without provocation, Roy France struck another man multiple times with a metal-tipped object, fracturing the man's ribs and collapsing his lung. At trial, France claimed self-defense but was precluded from introducing evidence of his victim's conviction for strangulation of an unrelated person four years earlier. The jury rejected France's self-defense claim and found him guilty of Level 5 felony battery. France appeals, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of his victim's prior conviction. He also challenges his six-year sentence as inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts

[2] Linda Moore owned the rural Wabash County property where the altercation between France and her adult son, Michael Williams, occurred. With Moore's permission, France had placed a camper on her property and was living there temporarily. Williams also lived on Moore's property, in a camper parked within a large barn.

[3] About six to nine months after France began living on the property, he moved his camper back to his mother's property, where he had been living previously. Upon discovering France's move, Williams was concerned that it may have been motivated by France's unexplained irritation over Williams's use of a small burn pit on the property. Williams called France and left a voice mail message indicating that France did not need to move from the property and that Williams had only burned items once.

[4] France responded by text message, asking Williams where he had obtained France's phone number and referring to Williams by an expletive phrase. Williams, believing France was engaging in friendly banter, responded with his own expletive phrase and told France that he obtained France's number from Moore. France blocked Williams from further phone contact.

[5] Within days, France returned to retrieve his remaining belongings from Moore's property. When Williams became aware that France was back on the property, he went outside and approached France near the barn. Williams's and France's versions of what happened next differed substantially.

[6] According to France's trial testimony, Williams told France to leave the property while Williams held a metal-tipped object in his hand in striking position. As Williams prepared to strike France, France grabbed Williams's arms, threw him to the ground, and hit him across the forehead with the object. France threw the object to the side and went to his truck to leave. But Williams got up, followed France to his truck, and kicked the driver's-side door shut before France could enter the vehicle. France smacked Williams in the head with his hand and pulled on his jacket, causing Williams to fall onto the ground again. France rated the force of the blows he delivered as 8 out of 10.

[7] Williams retrieved the metal-tipped object, called France by a derogatory term, and walked away with the object. About 10 minutes later, France drove his truck closer to the house and was there when police arrived.

[8] According to Williams's testimony, however, the altercation began after Williams yelled to France that he did not need to move off the property. In response, France pushed Williams to the ground. And when Williams stood up, France hit him in the chest with what Williams described as a “four-wheeler axle,” causing Williams to fall again. Williams remained on the ground struggling to breathe. France attempted to start his motorcycle, but when Williams snickered or made another noise, France punched him in the head once or twice with his fist while Williams remained on the ground. Williams lost consciousness for an unknown period. When he regained consciousness, he stood up, and France asked where Williams's dog was. Williams said he was going to look for him and gingerly walked back to Moore's home, where he collapsed on the floor due to his breathing difficulties.

[9] It is undisputed that after Moore summoned help, Williams was transported to a local hospital and later transferred to a regional trauma center. He was diagnosed with multiple fractured ribs, a collapsed lung, and other extensive lung injuries. The jacket that Williams was wearing was ripped in the elbow and in multiple places on the back.

[10] The State charged France with Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. During his two-day jury trial, France testified in his own defense, claiming that he acted in self-defense and that Williams was the initial aggressor. After the State rested, France sought to admit evidence of Williams's 2018 conviction for strangulation. The trial court excluded the evidence as too remote and irrelevant. In France's offer to prove, he stated that this evidence would show his reasonable belief that he needed to use force to thwart and defend himself against Williams's attack. The jury found France guilty of Level 5 felony battery, and the trial court sentenced him to six years imprisonment. France appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] France raises two issues on appeal. First, he claims the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of Williams's prior conviction for strangulation of another person. Second, he contends his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We find no evidentiary error and that France fails to demonstrate his sentence is inappropriate.

I. No Evidentiary Error

[12] France claims the evidence of Williams's strangulation conviction was admissible as part of his self-defense claim. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Barbee v. State, 269 N.E.3d 888, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Evidentiary rulings will be reversed when the decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. (quoting McCoy v. State, 193 N.E.3d 387, 390 (Ind. 2022)).

[13] “A valid claim of self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. 2003). Indiana's self-defense statute specifies that “[a] person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (2023). As used in the self-defense statute, “reasonably believes” requires both that the defendant subjectively believe that the force used was necessary to prevent serious bodily injury and that a reasonable person would have had this belief under the circumstances. Littler v. State, 871 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. 2007). A claim of self-defense succeeds only if the evidence shows that the defendant acted without fault, was in a place where the defendant had a right to be, and was in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm. Henson, 786 N.E.2d at 277.

[14] France argues that the evidence of Williams's strangulation conviction “was relevant to show [France's] reasonable belief that the force he used was necessary by showing Williams’[s] propensity to be violent.” Appellant's Br., p. 15. He claims the trial court's exclusion of this evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment ․ or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, ․ the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense’ ”) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).

[15] Evidence of a person's character or character trait—such as Williams's strangulation conviction—is generally inadmissible to prove that a person on a particular occasion acted in conformity with that character. Brand v. State, 766 N.E.2d 772, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); see Ind. Evidence Rule 404(a)(1) (“Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.”); Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”).

[16] But Evidence Rule 404(a)(2) contains special exceptions relating to crime victims. One such exception states: “subject to the limitations in Rule 412 [dealing with sex offense victims], a defendant may offer evidence of an alleged victim's pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it.” Evid. R. 404(a)(2)(B).

[17] But Evidence Rule 404(a)(2) “does not contemplate that character evidence will offer a glimpse into a defendant's mind at the time he acted in self-defense,” as the excluded evidence in France's case would have done. Brand, 766 N.E.2d at 779. As the Brand Court explained:

Introduction of specific acts to prove the defendant's state of mind would support the proposition that the defendant had a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary. In contrast, introduction of specific acts as victim character evidence, as permitted by Rule 404(a)(2), would support the proposition that the victim was using unlawful force. These are two separate and distinct propositions, and in fact constitute separate elements of self-defense. Moreover, because the general exclusionary rule of Evidence Rule 404(a) applies only when character evidence is used for the purpose of proving action in conformity with his character, it is apparent that when character evidence is utilized for some other purpose, such as to show defendant's state of mind, the rule is inapplicable. See Evid. R. 404(a).

Id.

[18] Rule 404(a) therefore is inapplicable here because France offered Williams's strangulation conviction as character evidence to show France's state of mind: that is, that France reasonably believed the force used was necessary to protect himself against Williams's attack. France therefore relies on the standard enunciated in Holder v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. 1991), which predates adoption of the Indiana Rules of Evidence in 1994 but remains valid in self-defense cases in which Rule 404(a) does not govern admission or exclusion. See, e.g., Brand, 766 N.E.2d at 780 (applying Holder to victim character evidence in self-defense case after determining Rule 404(a) did not apply).

[19] Holder, which involved a self-defense claim, ruled that “[e]vidence of the victim's character may be admitted ․ to show that the victim had a violent character giving the defendant reason to fear him.” 571 N.E.2d at 1254. This character evidence includes “evidence of [the victim's] specific bad acts.” Id. Such evidence must relate specifically to the victim, and the defendant “must first introduce appreciable evidence of the victim's aggression to substantiate the claim of self-defense before evidence is admissible to show the reasonableness of the defendant's fear of the victim.” Brand, 766 N.E.2d at 780.

[20] Such character evidence is admissible because “[t]he victim's reputation for violence is pertinent to a claim of self-defense.” Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “Thus, the victim's reputed character, propensity for violence, prior threats and acts, if known by the defendant, may be relevant to the issue of whether a defendant had fear of the victim prior to utilizing” force against the victim.” Id.

[21] For that reason, “a defendant is entitled to support his claim of self-defense by introducing evidence of matters that would make his fear of the victim reasonable.” Id. Actual danger is not required; instead, a good faith belief is sufficient. Id. However, this victim character evidence is still subject to the relevancy standard of Evidence Rule 401. James v. State, 96 N.E.3d 615, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Evid. R. 401.

[22] France claims the evidence of Williams's strangulation conviction was relevant to France's self-defense claim. France seemingly alleged in his offer to prove that the evidence would show that he knew of Williams's conviction, that he consequently feared Williams, and that, as a result, he reasonably believed he needed to use force preemptively to protect himself against Williams's imminent attack. But France further suggests that the jury would have acquitted him if he had been allowed to present evidence of Williams's conviction. In doing so, France exaggerates the potential import of the excluded evidence.

[23] France testified that Williams and he had lived in close proximity on the same property for at least six months and that no problems occurred between them until Williams contacted him by phone. Even then, France simply blocked Williams from further phone contact. None of Williams's text messages were threatening. In fact, Williams basically told France in the text messages that France's move from the property was unnecessary, suggesting a lack of any continuing conflict between the two of them.

[24] France never expressed any other sort of fear of Williams other than that allegedly arising from Williams's strangulation conviction. In addition, Williams's conviction arose from an alleged crime involving a third party whom the prosecutor identified as possibly Williams's ex-girlfriend. France, who was 6’1” and 230 pounds, never explained why he believed Williams's conviction in the offense with an alleged girlfriend left him fearful of Williams, who was about 5’8” and weighed substantially less than France. Williams told police and also later testified at his trial that he knew how to handle himself and that this “wasn't [his] first rodeo.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 246-47.

[25] These collective circumstances present a far less compelling claim for admission of the victim character evidence than those in James, which affirmed the trial court's exclusion of victim character evidence. 96 N.E.3d at 618-19. The excluded evidence in James arose from direct threats by the victim to the defendant to kill or hurt the defendant and his family members about two years before the defendant killed the victim. Id. at 617.

[26] In finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the victim character evidence because the excluded evidence was too remote to be relevant, the James Court concluded:

Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court's decision was not clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or the circumstances before the trial court. The record indicates that [the victim's] previous threat was allegedly made during a contentious time for the parties and that the parties had since resolved their issues. Moreover, in the time since the threat had allegedly been made, the parties[’] relationship had improved to the point that the parties were able to interact in a cordial manner on a somewhat frequent basis. Nothing in the record or the proffered evidence would support the reasonable inference that James felt threatened by [the victim] during the intervening two years since the threat was allegedly made.

Id. at 619.

[27] The evidence here is even less relevant, as it was more remote and less directly threatening than that in James. Williams's conviction arose more than four years before France hit him with the object. Although Williams's conviction arose from a violent crime, the evidence of the conviction—unlike the evidence of the threats in James—did not involve direct peril to France. And as in James, the record shows no significant conflict between Williams and France immediately prior to the battery.

[28] France's reliance on Littler is equally unavailing. In Littler, our Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence showing the defendant feared the victim (his twin brother) was going to stab him. 871 N.E.2d at 278. Our Supreme Court concluded that this evidence “confirming [the victim's] numerous prior stabbings, his mental condition, and his history of violent behavior would be very probative and relevant to the jury's evaluation of the objective reasonableness of [the defendant's] belief that he needed to use force against [the victim] and would also lend substantial credibility to [the defendant's] assertions.” Id. at 279.

[29] The excluded evidence in this case would not have served the same purpose. Evidence of Williams's conviction might have established Williams as capable of violence. But it did not explain why, as France alleged, Williams would launch an unprovoked attack on France for being on the property shortly after Williams sent France a text message suggesting that he could have remained on the property.

[30] In addition, France offered differing accounts of the offense—a fact that minimizes the impact the evidence of Williams's conviction would have had on France's self-defense claim. First, France told police that he knew nothing about the assault. Then, after an officer suggested his story made no sense and asked him whether he acted in self-defense, France, after a long pause, told police that Williams attacked him without provocation. France never mentioned to police at the scene any fear of Williams based on Williams's strangulation conviction.

[31] France also told police that he hit Williams twice—once in the head and once on the back. At trial, France testified that he hit Williams twice in the head and nowhere else. Yet Williams's testimony and his medical records admitted at trial showed that Williams had suffered significant trauma to the trunk of his body including broken ribs, a collapsed lung, and bruising on his back. The facts in this case therefore are substantially different from those in Littler, which involved a claim of self-defense by a defendant who feared being stabbed by a family member with mental illness and a history of stabbings. Littler's determination that this character evidence was relevant and admissible does not further France's claim that Williams's conviction was relevant and admissible, too. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of Williams's conviction.

II. France's Sentence Is Not Inappropriate

[32] France claims his six-year sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). That Rule permits an appellate court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” App. R. 7(B).

[33] In reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, our principal role is to attempt to “leaven the outliers” and “not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence.” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013)). We therefore give “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision and revise the trial court's judgment only when it is “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). France bears the burden of persuading this Court that his sentence is inappropriate. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1092 (Ind. 2025).

[34] When assessing the appropriateness of a sentence, we first consider the statutory range established for that class of offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6. The trial court sentenced France to six years imprisonment.

A. The Nature of the Offense

[35] France argues that the maximum sentence was inappropriate because Williams “induced or facilitated” the offense through intoxication and text messages. Appellant's Br., p.-20. But France's claim that Williams “induced or facilitated” the offense is inconsistent with the evidence that led to the jury's rejection of France's self-defense claim and ultimate guilty verdict.

[36] France also contends Williams's injuries were insufficient to support a maximum sentence, although he concedes his offense was “moderately egregious.” Id. at 18. France vastly understates the brutality of the attack. He struck Williams with a metal-tipped object identified as an axle, causing three fractured ribs, a collapsed lung and other lung injuries, and head lacerations requiring stitches. Williams lost consciousness during the attack. He required emergency transport to a local hospital and then transfer to a larger hospital due to the severity of his injuries. Williams continues to suffer chronic headaches, eye problems, and breathing complications. Given the extent of the injuries France inflicted on Williams, he has failed to show that the nature of his offense warrants sentencing relief.

B. France's Character

[37] France's character also does not compel relief. After the attack, France did not call for help or render aid to Williams. Instead, he initially lied to police, feigning ignorance about Williams's injuries. Then, after admitting his involvement in the confrontation, France offered varying accounts of the attack.

[38] Moreover, France's criminal history demonstrates a troubling pattern of violent behavior. France has seven prior misdemeanor convictions, including three for battery. See Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.”). In connection with these prior offenses, France also twice violated the terms of his probation. This criminal history reflects his unwillingness to reform and, particularly, his propensity for violence.

[39] France's argument that his “moderate” criminal history does not support the maximum sentence is unpersuasive. Appellant's Br., p. 19. A defendant who commits the same crime four times has demonstrated that lesser sentences do not deter him. Each prior battery conviction was an opportunity for France to change his behavior. He did not.

[40] France also argues that his character justified less than the maximum sentence because he, at 47 years old and having earned a GED, is capable of rehabilitation. Although a GED is commendable, it does not offset France's extensive criminal history, which dates back to 1999. Moreover, France's theoretical capacity for rehabilitation is undermined by his repeated failures to reform, given that he had three prior battery convictions.

[41] In the end, France has failed to meet his burden of showing his sentence is inappropriate. The nature of his offense—a brutal, unprovoked attack causing severe and permanent injuries—and his character—a repeat violent offender with three prior convictions for the same offense—fully support the trial court's decision to impose the maximum sentence.

Conclusion

[42] As the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Williams's strangulation conviction, and because France's sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B), we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.