BOYKIN v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Thristian Boykin appeals his conviction of murder, claiming error with the admission of certain evidence and the overall sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no reversible error and sufficient evidence, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 7, 2024, Byron Curry and Yvette King were walking down Hugh Street in Fort Wayne around 4:25 p.m. An individual wearing dark clothing and a mask suddenly approached them and fired twelve gunshots at Curry before running away. Curry died from his gunshot wounds.

[3] The police initially had no suspects in the case, but after the local media released still-frame photos from neighborhood security camera footage, they received an anonymous tip identifying Boykin. As their investigation continued, law enforcement connected Boykin to Mia Woods, who had been with Boykin at the time of the murder and had purchased two guns several days after the murder.

[4] Ultimately, the State charged Boykin with murder and a firearm enhancement. A jury convicted him as charged, and the court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of seventy years. Boykin now appeals his conviction of murder.

Issues

I. Whether the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence at trial.

II. Whether the State's evidence was sufficient to sustain Boykin's conviction of murder.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[5] A trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and thus we disturb its ruling only if it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 39 N.E.3d 705, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or it is a misinterpretation of the law. Id. Even if the court's ruling was an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse if the admission constituted harmless error. Id. An error is harmless if its probable impact on the jury, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties. Id.

A. Purchase of Guns

[6] Boykin first contends that the trial court erred by admitting Exhibits 42-45, the ATF-required Firearms Transaction Record from Woods’ purchase of guns. Specifically, he argues this record is not relevant because the purchase occurred eight days after Curry was killed.

[7] Boykin did not object when Detective Nicholas Lichtsinn, with the Fort Wayne Police Department, Woods, and the salesperson from the firearms store all testified that Woods purchased guns on March 15, 2024. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 12,¹ 54, 81-82. Moreover, defense counsel asked Woods about the firearms transaction on cross-examination. Id. at 59. Boykin only objected when the State sought to admit Exhibits 42-45. And even then, his objection was not to the authenticity of the document but rather to its relevance: “This is an uncharged party who's a witness who bought a firearm a week after a homicide. I just don't understand why we're even going down this road.” Id. at 83.

[8] Even if the trial court erred by admitting these exhibits, the admission was harmless error because they were cumulative of the testimony of Detective Lichtsinn, Woods, and the salesperson. Evidence that is cumulative of other unchallenged evidence generally amounts to harmless error because its admission does not affect a party's substantial rights. Richardson v. State, 189 N.E.3d 629, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

B. Anonymous Tip

[9] Next Boykin challenges the trial court's denial of his motion in limine concerning the evidence of an anonymous tip received by police. However, a motion in limine is only a preliminary ruling that does not result in reversible error. McBride v. State, 261 N.E.3d 274, 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). In order to preserve error for appellate review, litigants must comply with Evidence Rule 103. Id. at 279. Pertinent here is Rule 103(a)(1), which provides that a party may claim error with the admission of evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and the party timely objects or moves to strike on the record and states the specific ground.

[10] Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude the State's evidence of an anonymous tip received by police that identified Boykin as the individual in photos that had been released to the media. Counsel alleged the tip was inadmissible hearsay and that the photos were too “fuzzy” to allow identification, and the State argued it was not hearsay but was offered to show the course of the investigation by police. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 6-10. The court denied the motion in limine in part and granted it in part by allowing the State to offer very limited information that police received a potential lead without referencing any identification of Boykin in photos. Id. at 9.

[11] At trial, outside the presence of the jury, the State explained it would exhibit the photos released to the media and ask the detective if police received a name. Id. at 215. Defense counsel's objection at trial was not based on hearsay but instead was that the photos were “absolutely unidentifiable.” Id. at 216. The court clarified, “So – so you're saying there's no – there's no shown causation between the showing of the photos and his name coming up?” Id. Defense counsel responded, “None whatsoever.” Id.

[12] On appeal, Boykin argues that the evidence of the tip was inadmissible hearsay, but at trial his objection was based on “no causation.” “It is well established that a party may not object on one ground at trial and raise a different ground on appeal.” Ko v. State, 243 N.E.3d 1153, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. Doing so results in waiver of the issue on appeal. Id.

[13] Moreover, the record reveals that the evidence concerning the anonymous tip occurred in the midst of the detective's testimony about cellular phone records:

Q Yeah, so let's talk about those records, and then we'll look at this video. Did you, during the course of your investigation, receive the name – the defendant's name?

A We did, Thristian Boykin.

Q And were you able to locate some potential phone numbers for him?

A We were.

Tr. Vol. 2, p. 250. During a recess, defense counsel requested the court to admonish the jury “that the tip is not evidence[ ] but provided only for what the detective did with the information. But it's not to be considered as evidence.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 24. The State had no objection to this course of action, and the court admonished the jury as requested. See id. at 25.

[14] A timely and accurate admonishment is presumed to cure any error in the admission of evidence. McDaniel v. State, 272 N.E.3d 259, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). The admonishment given here was specifically requested by defense counsel. In addition, the reference to police receiving Boykin's name during their investigation was isolated, brief, and not connected to the photos. We presume the jury followed the court's admonishment, see id., and Boykin points to nothing in the record to suggest it did not. Therefore, waiver notwithstanding, error, if any, was neutralized and rendered harmless by the court's admonishment given at the request of defense counsel.

C. Jail Call

[15] The last piece of evidence that Boykin claims was erroneously admitted is the recording of a jail call between him and his mother. As he argued at trial, Boykin maintains on appeal that the call was inadmissible because it is not relevant and that, even if relevant, the call should have been excluded because it would confuse or mislead the jury.

[16] Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Ind. Evidence Rule 401. For its part, the State contends the call is relevant because Boykin discussed details of his case. Boykin does not address that portion of the call and instead asserts that the call is not relevant and is “a needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Appellant's Br. p. 28. Specifically, Boykin argues that it is an assumption by the State that his and his mother's mention of “old girl” refers to Woods and such was not necessary because evidence had already been presented regarding Boykin's and Woods’ association.

[17] Regardless of the references to “old girl” during the phone call, Boykin asked his mother about the evidence in his case. First, he asked if she had been watching the news. State's Ex. 266 at 1:49. His mother responded that a newspaper story a few days ago indicated the State had more footage showing the shooter in the same outfit. Id. at 2:03-2:13. Boykin responded, asking, “So ․ they had the same outfit on two days apart?” Id. at 2:30-2:32. Boykin's mother explained the additional footage was from an hour prior to the shooting. Id. at 2:33-2:43. Boykin responded, “That's bogus as hell.” Id. at 2:49-2:51.

[18] The standard set forth in Evidence Rule 401 is a liberal one, and the trial court's ruling on relevance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. 2011). Even if the evidence is only marginally relevant, the trial court has the discretion to permit its admission. Wilson v. State, 4 N.E.3d 670, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Moreover, recordings of telephone calls made from jail are generally admissible when the defendant discusses the crime for which he is incarcerated. King v. State, 985 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. As this was a jail call, and Boykin discussed his case with his mother in the call, the call is generally admissible and is relevant to his guilt.

[19] Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. See Ind. Evidence Rule 403. Trial courts are given wide latitude in weighing probative value against these dangers, and that decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021).

[20] Here, Boykin contends that the purpose of admitting the phone call was to “confuse and/or mislead the jury” that the call “contained some meaning beyond the words exchanged between mother and son[ ]”—presumably referring to the State's assertion that “old girl” refers to Woods. Appellant's Br. p. 28. However, the real issue is Boykin's discussion of the evidence in the case. Regardless, we find that neither the prejudicial nature of the call nor its potential to mislead the jury, if any, substantially outweighs its probative value. The call is only prejudicial in that it is probative of Boykin's commission of the offense and does not rise to the level of unfair prejudice. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the recording of Boykin's call to his mother from jail.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[21] Finally, Boykin argues that the State's evidence is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. Labarr v. State, 36 N.E.3d 501, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction after a jury verdict, “the appellate posture is markedly deferential to the outcome below ․” Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016).

[22] To convict Boykin of murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Boykin knowingly or intentionally killed Curry. See Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 19; Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (2018). Boykin challenges the State's identification evidence. In support of his argument, Boykin asserts that the State failed to produce an in-court identification of him as the shooter; King, the eyewitness to Curry's murder, did not testify; Woods testified that she did not see him with a gun; and there was no evidence that he and Curry knew each other.

[23] The evidence favorable to the verdict shows that King reported the shooter was a black male wearing dark clothing, slippers, and a mask. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 166, 234. One resident in the neighborhood heard multiple gunshots and then saw a black man running down the street wearing a dark colored sweatsuit and slippers, and another reported hearing the gunshots and seeing a man running down the street in a blue sweatsuit. Id. at 182-83, 197. Two other neighbors saw the man they believed to be the shooter get into a dark colored Kia. Id. at 237. Footage from several security cameras in the area at the time of the murder captured a tall individual in a dark blue sweatsuit, white socks, and slippers. Id. at 238. Security camera footage also showed a dark colored Kia, and officers were able to identify its license plate number. Id. at 241-42.

[24] Also from the security camera footage, the police prepared still-frame photos, which the local media released to the public. Id. at 248. The police subsequently received an anonymous tip identifying Boykin. Id. at 250. Once police received the tip, they obtained a cell phone number associated with Boykin. Id. Records for the cell phone showed it was at a gas station just prior to Curry's murder and then in the area of the murder at the time Curry was shot. Id. at 249; Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 3-4, 201. The police obtained footage from the security camera at the gas station, which showed that, less than one hour prior to the shooting, a dark colored Kia and a Mazda pulled into the parking lot. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 249. A male, dressed the same with white socks and slippers just like the male in the neighborhood security footage, exited the Mazda and got into the Kia while a female (later identified as Woods) exited the Kia and got into the Mazda. Id.; Tr. Vol. 3, p. 5. The vehicles then left together. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 249.

[25] Woods testified at trial that she had rented the Mazda vehicle and that she was with Boykin, who was driving the Kia. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 44-46. Boykin drove Woods in the Kia to Hugh Street to pick up her car that she had left parked there. Id. at 47. Woods further testified that Boykin, who was wearing a dark colored sweatsuit and either sneakers or slippers, got out of the Kia once they parked on Hugh Street, and when he returned, his mood “was off.” Id. at 50. Boykin drove away in the Kia and dropped Woods off at her employment. Id. at 52.

[26] Ten days after the shooting, Boykin and Woods were traveling together in separate cars when law enforcement initiated a traffic stop on both vehicles. Id. at 109, 113-115. Boykin was driving a rental truck and Woods was driving the Kia. Id. at 115. During a subsequent search of the Kia, officers found slippers in the trunk. Id. at 151-52. In the rental truck, officers found two face masks and a dark blue sweatshirt. Id. at 156, 158, 159. Subsequent testing of the sweatshirt and one of the face masks revealed a DNA profile that was a mixture of two individuals and that was at least one trillion times more likely to have originated from Boykin and an unknown individual than from two unknown individuals. Id. at 245, 246. In other words, the statistical analysis provided “very strong support” for the proposition that it was Boykin's DNA on these items. Id. Police also discovered Boykin in possession of two cell phones at the time of the stop, and further investigation revealed that both phones had been set up on March 12, 2024. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 9, 11.

[27] It is well established that circumstantial evidence alone may support a conviction. Harbert v. State, 51 N.E.3d 267, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. More particularly, “[t]he identity of the perpetrator of a crime is a question of fact, not law, and the weight given to identification evidence and any determination of whether it is satisfactory or trustworthy is a function of the trier of fact.” Watkins v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (Ind. 1990). Here, the jury heard the evidence and found it satisfactory to identify Boykin as the shooter. We agree. And for us to conclude otherwise would amount to a reweighing of the evidence and would invade the exclusive province of the jury. See Gantt v. State, 825 N.E.2d 874, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing jury's province to accept or reject evidence as it sees fit).

Conclusion

[28] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that error, if any, in the admission of evidence did not constitute reversible error and that the State's evidence was sufficient to sustain Boykin's conviction of murder.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although this part of the transcript is labeled “Cross Examination of Nicholas Lichtsinn,” an inspection of the record reveals it is actually part of the State's direct examination of Detective Lichtsinn.

Baker, Senior Judge.

DeBoer, J., and Scheele, J., concur.