LAPLANTE v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Mark William LaPlante was convicted of two counts of child molesting, one as a Level 1 felony and one as a Level 4 felony. The trial court sentenced LaPlante to an aggregate term of thirty-five years with five years suspended to probation. LaPlante presents two issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in instructing the jury?

2. Is LaPlante's sentence inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] For the first ten years of marriage, LaPlante and his now ex-wife, Dawn, resided in Alabama with Dawn's son, whom Dawn adopted prior to their marriage. After they were married, they adopted a girl. Eventually, Dawn and the children moved back to Franklin, Indiana, to be closer to family; LaPlante continued to maintain a residence in Alabama due to his employment there. The couple made the long-distance marriage work.

[4] The LaPlantes wanted children but had not been successful having children on their own. Then, in 2019, the LaPlantes became foster parents to siblings K.L. and P.L.,¹ who at the time were nine and ten years old respectively. LaPlante still lived and worked in Alabama but would arrange his schedule so he could spend as much time in Franklin with Dawn and the children as possible. When the pandemic struck in 2020, LaPlante was able to spend more time in Indiana because he was permitted to work from home. In April 2021, the LaPlantes adopted K.L. and P.L.

[5] On the night of February 13, 2022, LaPlante went into K.L.’s bedroom. She was wearing a long baggy shirt for pajamas, no underwear, and no socks. LaPlante asked her if she wanted to play a game and then he slapped her bottom with his hand. K.L. moved away, and got up and told him, “I'm gonna go tell Mom.” Transcript Vol. I at 240. LaPlante moved in front of the door and said, “Don't or else I'll get in trouble.” Id. He then hugged her, told her he loved her, and left the room.

[6] At school the following day, K.L., who had been diagnosed as cognitively delayed and learning disabled, functioning at a level several years younger than her age, spoke to a school counselor because she was confused about whether it was okay for LaPlante to touch her in certain ways. The counselor contacted DCS and DCS contacted Dawn. DCS asked Dawn to come alone and pick up K.L. and take her to the Child Advocacy Center. Dawn did not tell LaPlante about the phone call and said that she had to run an errand. When she got to the school, K.L. was “sobbing” and did not want Dawn to be mad at her. Id. at 196.

[7] During a forensic interview at the Child Advocacy Center, K.L. said that LaPlante started touching her before she was adopted and that he was still touching her after she turned twelve. K.L. disclosed that the touching usually occurred on the couch when she and LaPlante were watching anime with a blanket over them; he would use his hands to touch her, sometimes over her clothes and sometimes underneath. He used his hand and his fingers to rub her vagina. His fingers would go “[u]nderneath the flaps” multiple times.² Id. at 246. LaPlante would also “grope” her chest by grabbing and squeezing it. Id. K.L. explained that she did not understand what was going on and was afraid to tell anyone that LaPlante had touched her because she did not want to lose her mom and her family. She explained that she came up with a plan to try to make LaPlante stop touching her, namely, she would tell herself, “I can train him to stop touching me and [ ] just move his hand away and he'll stop.” Id. at 250.

[8] After the forensic interview, Dawn was informed about K.L.’s disclosure. Dawn then decided to take K.L. and P.L. to her parents’ house and went home to gather some things for K.L. and to pick up P.L. When Dawn arrived at the house, the first thing LaPlante asked her was, “Am I going to be arrested?” Id. at 199. LaPlante had already started packing things in his car, having told P.L. that there was an emergency at work and that he had to go to Alabama.

[9] After Dawn dropped the children at her parents’ house, she returned home. LaPlante was “a little frantic” and claimed that things did not happen the way K.L said they did. Id. at 202. Unprompted, LaPlante also stated to Dawn that “he didn't f*ck her.” Id.

[10] On October 12, 2022, the State charged LaPlante with two counts of child molesting, one as a Level 1 felony and one as a Level 4 felony. A two-day jury trial commenced on January 22, 2025. K.L., who was fifteen at the time of trial, testified as set out above. The jury found LaPlante guilty as charged. On March 7, 2025, the trial court sentenced LaPlante to thirty-five years with five years suspended for the Level 1 felony and a concurrent term of eight years with two years suspended for the Level 4 felony. LaPlante now appeals, arguing that the jury was improperly instructed and that his sentence is inappropriate. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

1. Jury Instruction

[11] A trial court's decision on how to instruct a jury is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 636 (Ind. 2010). When evaluating the jury instructions on appeal, we look to whether the tendered instructions correctly state the law, whether there is evidence in the record to support giving the instruction, and whether the substance of the proffered instruction is covered by other instructions. Id. We will reverse a conviction only if the appellant demonstrates that the instruction error prejudices his or her substantial rights. Id.

[12] As pertinent here, the crime of child molesting is defined as follows:

A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, knowingly or intentionally performs or submits to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) commits child molesting.

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a).³ “Other sexual conduct” is defined as “an act involving ․ the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by an object.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5. The term “object” is not defined by statute, but our case law has established that a finger is an object for purposes of the child molesting statute. See Seal v. State, 105 N.E.3d 201, 209-10 (Ind. Ct App. 2018), trans. denied; Simmons v. State, 746 N.E.2d 81, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

[13] The State filed a proposed final instruction that defined a finger as an object.⁴ LaPlante objected to this proposed instruction, stating, “I don't know that that's a misstatement of the law, but I think the cases that it's citing are sufficiency cases.” Transcript Vol. I at 223. He further argued, “I don't plan on arguing that a finger is not an object” so the instruction is “not necessary.” Id. at 224. The trial court rejected the State's proposed instruction but indicated it was a correct statement of the law and a proper argument to be made in closing.

[14] At a later point in the trial, the State objected to the trial court's proposed final instructions because they did not include the State's proposed final instruction to “clarify” for the jury that a finger is an object. Transcript Vol. II at 32. The State again requested that its proposed instruction be given “to avoid any confusion.” Id. The trial court again rejected the State's proposed instruction.

[15] At the conclusion of the evidence but before final instructions, the jury sent a question to the court asking “if a hand/finger is considered an object.” Id. at 36. The court responded, advising the jury that the question would be addressed by the parties during closing arguments. The State then renewed its request that its proposed final instruction be given. LaPlante added nothing to his previous objection but reiterated that he was not going to make an argument that a finger is not an object. This time, the trial court agreed with the State and found that it was appropriate to give the State's proposed instruction regarding “what classifies as an object.” Id. at 37. The court instructed the jury in Final Instruction 10, as follows: “Indiana law holds that a finger is an object for purposes of other sexual conduct.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 32.

[16] On appeal, LaPlante challenges Final Instruction 10 on several bases. Specifically, he argues that the instruction (1) is not a correct statement of the law, (2) lessened the State's burden of proof, and (3) invaded the province of the jury to determine the facts.

[17] To preserve an error for appeal, a party must specifically identify the grounds for the objection at trial. Childers v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (Ind.1999). See also Ind. Crim. Rule 8(B) (“No error with respect to the giving of instructions shall be available ․ except on the specific objections made․”); Ind. Trial Rule 51(C) (“No party may claim as error the giving of an instruction unless he objects thereto ․ stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.”). The purpose of the requirement for a specific and timely objection is to alert the trial court so that it may avoid error or promptly minimize harm from an error that might otherwise require reversal and result in a miscarriage of justice and a waste of time and resources. See Godby v. State, 736 N.E.2d 252, 255 (Ind. 2000).

[18] LaPlante's initial objection to the instruction at trial asserted that the instruction was taken from a sufficiency case. Indeed, our Supreme court has cautioned that “[t]he mere fact that certain language or expression [is] used in the opinions of this Court to reach its final conclusion does not make it proper language for instructions to a jury.” See Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. 2003). LaPlante also argued that the instruction was not necessary as he was not going to argue that a finger was not an object. The trial court sustained LaPlante's objection, noting that it was a correct statement of the law. While the trial court reversed course and gave Final Instruction 10 after the jury's question, LaPlante has not established that the substance of the instruction was not a correct statement of the law.

[19] Turning to LaPlante's arguments that Final Instruction 10 lessened the State's burden of proof and invaded the province of the jury to determine the facts because it informed the jury that, as a matter of law, a finger is an object for purposes of establishing “other sexual conduct,” we observe that LaPlante did not make these arguments to the trial court.

[20] Nevertheless, even if it was error to give Final Instruction 10, LaPlante has not demonstrated that the instruction prejudiced his substantial rights. See Hall v. State, 769 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)) (noting that a defendant is only entitled to reversal if he affirmatively demonstrates that the instructional error prejudiced his substantial rights). To be sure, K.L. testified that LaPlante used his hand and fingers to touch her “beneath the flaps,” which was her way of describing how he touched her vagina. Transcript Vol. I at 246. And, as LaPlante had told the trial court, he was not and did not argue that a finger/hand did not qualify as an object. His entire defense was to challenge K.L.’s credibility. LaPlante has not established that he is entitled to reversal.

2. Inappropriate Sentence

[21] LaPlante seeks our independent review of the appropriateness of his sentence under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B), which allows us to revise a sentence if “after due consideration of the trial court's decision” we find that “the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Id.; see also Hoak v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1209, 1209 (Ind. 2019) (“Even when a trial court imposes a sentence within its discretion, the Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of this sentencing decision.”).

[22] Our principal task in this regard is “ ‘to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ not to achieve a ‘correct’ result in every case.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1248 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). “And we generally defer to the sentence imposed unless a defendant presents ‘compelling evidence’ portraying the nature of the offense and their character in a positive light.” Id. (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). Thus, LaPlante bears the responsibility of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. See Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018).

[23] The sentencing range for a Level 1 felony is twenty to forty years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. As stated above, LaPlante received an aggregate thirty-five-year sentence of which five years were suspended to probation.

[24] LaPlante did not attempt to cast the nature of his offenses “in a positive light” as required to obtain revision of his sentence. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. In any event, the nature and particularized facts of the case demonstrate that the nature of his offenses does not warrant a lesser sentence. LaPlante adopted a vulnerable young girl who had not had a stable life due to being in and out of the foster care system. K.L. functioned several years younger than her age because of cognitive delays and a learning disability. LaPlante began sexually abusing her after she was placed in his home and the abuse continued after he adopted her. He ruined what K.L. had hoped would be a loving and safe home for her and P.L. His actions left K.L. believing that she could “train him” to stop touching her so she could preserve her new family. Transcript Vol. I at 250. The nature of the offense does not warrant revision.

[25] Turning to LaPlante's character, we acknowledge that he has no prior criminal history and had been gainfully employed. We also observe that LaPlante was previously accused of sexually abusing his other adopted daughter but that those charges were ultimately dismissed. Most telling of his character, however, is the depravity of the offense. He recognized K.L.’s vulnerability and violated the position of care and trust. Hart v. State, 829 N.E.2d 541, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“There is no greater position of trust than that of a parent to his own young child.”). LaPlante has not demonstrated that his character is deserving of a lesser sentence.

[26] In light of the nature of the offense and LaPlante's character, we cannot say that his aggregate thirty-five-year, partially suspended sentence is inappropriate.

[27] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   K.L. and P.L. are Dawn's son's half-siblings. The LaPlantes were first introduced to K.L. and P.L. as toddlers when Dawn's son was meeting with members of his biological family.

2.   The “flaps” were understood by the detective based on his training and experience in sex crimes investigation to be part of the female sex organ.

3.   The offense is a Level 1 felony if it is committed by a person at least twenty-one years of age. I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a)(1). LaPlante's Level 4 felony was based on fondling or touching of K.L. with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either K.L. or himself. See I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b).

4.   Although LaPlante did not include the State's proposed final instructions in his appendix, it is clear from the record that this is the substance of one of the challenged instructions.

Altice, Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.