RODRIGUEZ v. VILLALOBOS (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2021, Enrique and Ellen Villalobos (“the Villaloboses”), filed a complaint against their neighbors, Joseph and Jaclyn Rodriguez (“the Rodriguezes”), alleging that the Rodriguezes had installed a fence on their property and requesting that the trial court enter an order requiring the Rodriguezes to relocate the fence. Several years of litigation ensued. By 2023, the Rodriguezes had filed an Amended Counterclaim for quiet title of the Villaloboses’ property on their side of the fence and for injunctive relief and damages in relation to an accessory structure on the Villaloboses’ property.¹ The accessory structure is now the main subject of dispute on appeal.

[2] In their partial motion for summary judgment, the Rodriguezes requested that the trial court order the removal of the accessory structure, claiming that its construction had violated the declarations and covenants of their shared subdivision and the Porter County Unified Development Ordinance. In their cross-motion, the Villaloboses moved for the trial court to, inter alia, enter summary judgment based on their equitable affirmative defenses, which the trial court did. Because we find one of the affirmative defenses, laches, dispositive to the issues before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The Rodriguezes and Villaloboses are neighbors in the Wind Whistle Subdivision in Porter County, subject to the subdivision's Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions (“Declaration”), which provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Section 20. Storage Buildings & Placement. The design and location of the storage building must be submitted to the developer for written approval before construction begins. The building's exterior siding will be the same material as the exterior siding of the main dwelling, and the building will have a brick fascia. No metal buildings, pole barns, or pre-fabricated units will be allowed on said Lots.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 95.

[4] In 2013, the Villaloboses installed an accessory structure on the west side of their property. A driveway leading to the structure was installed later, although the parties dispute whether it was installed within weeks or a year after the installation of the accessory structure. The Villaloboses, through their builder, applied for and received a building permit for the accessory structure.

[5] The structure was “green tag[ged]” by an inspector according to Enrique Villalobos. Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 188. After the accessory structure was completed, the Villaloboses poured a concrete driveway to the structure. The Villaloboses contend that the driveway was installed “about a year after” the installation of the accessory structure, Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 193, while the Rodriguezes contend the driveway was installed “within weeks.” Appellants’ App. Vol. IV p. 33. The Villaloboses also installed a hydraulic lift in the accessory structure.

[6] On December 28, 2021, the Villaloboses filed a complaint against the Rodriguezes, alleging that the Rodriguezes had installed a fence on their property and requesting that the trial court enter an order requiring the Rodriguezes to relocate the fence. On August 24, 2023, the Villaloboses filed an amended complaint, alleging that the Rodriguezes had trespassed onto their property, “[o]n multiple occasions, and on a continuing basis as a result of [․] their unauthorized fence,” violated the declaration of covenants and restrictions of the Wind Whistle Subdivision, defamed Enrique Villalobos, and invaded the Villaloboses’ privacy. Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 62.

[7] On December 5, 2023, the Rodriguezes filed an Amended Counterclaim for quiet title of the Villaloboses’ property on the Rodriguezes’ side of their fence and for injunctive relief and damages in relation to the Villaloboses’ “automobile repair services on their property,” and the Villaloboses’ accessory structure. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76. On February 5, 2024, the Villaloboses asserted affirmative defenses in their reply to the Rodriguezes’ amended counterclaim. The affirmative defenses included that “[s]ome or all of the relief sought by the Rodriguezes is or may be barred by the doctrines of estoppel and/or waiver and/or by the Rodriguezes’ unclean hands,” which included the Rodriguezes “past and present failure to conform” to the Declaration by their use of a prefabricated storage shed. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 108. They also asserted that “[s]ome or all of the relief sought by the Rodriguezes is or may be barred by the doctrine of laches and/or by the Rodriguezes’ implicit consent [․] for approximately [a] decade after the Villaloboses’ accessory building was constructed[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 109.

[8] On August 30, 2024, the Rodriguezes filed a motion for partial summary judgment, specifically that “in Count III of the Amended Counterclaim, the Rodriguezes allege that the Villaloboses’ accessory building is a pole barn and exceeds the height limitations specified in the Porter County Unified Development Ordinance.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 126. The Rodriguezes requested that the trial court “determine the pole barn violates the Declaration and the Porter County Unified Development Ordinance and order its removal.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 127. In the memorandum in support of their motion, the Rodriguezes designated certain exhibits, the Declaration, the Porter County Unified Development Ordinance, an expert report, the Villaloboses’ answers to requests for admission, Enrique's deposition, and Menard's drawings.

[9] On September 29, 2024, the Villaloboses filed their cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to their equitable affirmative defenses, response brief, and brief in support of cross-motion for partial summary judgment. In their cross-motion, the Villaloboses moved for the trial court to “enter a summary judgment in their favor vis-à-vis Count III of the Rodriguezes’ Counterclaim (captioned ‘Enjoin Building Violation’) based upon the Villaloboses’ equitable affirmative defenses of laches and/or estoppel and/or waiver and/or unclean hands.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 166. The Villaloboses argued that the designated evidence presented a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Villaloboses’ accessory structure failed to comply with the applicable law and covenants.

[10] The Villaloboses also argued that the “evidentiary record clearly and conclusively establishes that equitable affirmative defenses that the Villaloboses expressly pleaded make the extraordinary injunctive relief they request unavailable.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 173. The Villaloboses argued that because the Rodriguezes “voiced no complaints for approximately a decade” about the accessory structure, and “allowed the Villaloboses to incur the significant construction costs” for the structure and the driveway to the structure, “laches should bar them from equitable relief.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 175. The Villaloboses next argued that the Rodriguezes’ enforcement of the Declaration should be barred under the doctrine of unclean hands.

[11] On February 27, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the filed motions. On April 14, 2025, the trial court entered its ruling on the summary judgment motions, denying the Rodriguezes’ motion for partial summary judgment on Count III of their amended counterclaim, denying the Villaloboses’ motion to strike improperly designated material as moot, granting the Villaloboses’ motion to strike paragraphs eleven and twelve of Joseph Rodriguez's Exhibit F affidavit, and granting the Villaloboses’ cross motion for partial summary judgment as to equitable defenses.

Discussion and Decision

[12] The Rodriguezes contend, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment regarding their request for an order of removal of the Villaloboses’ accessory structure, specifically arguing that “[l]aches does not provide a free pass for the pole barn that violates the Declaration and [Porter County Unified Development Ordinance], because Villaloboses cannot establish inexcusable delay, knowing acquiescence and prejudice.” Appellants’ Br. p. 20. The Villaloboses argue that they satisfied their burden under Indiana Trial Rule 56 to establish laches against the Rodriguezes on this issue. We agree with the Villaloboses.

[13] Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

Any doubt as to a fact, or an inference to be drawn, is resolved in favor of the non-moving party. The moving party bears the burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact; however, once this burden is sustained, the opponent may not rest on the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. We consider only the evidence designated to the trial court.

We affirm summary judgment on any legal basis supported by the designated evidence. The appellant bears the burden of persuading us the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. That the parties made cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard of review. We consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Marion Cnty. v. State, 888 N.E.2d 292, 296–97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[14] The trial court, in granting the Villaloboses’ cross-motion for summary judgment, determined, in part, that the Rodriguezes’ claim involving their request for an order of removal of the Villaloboses’ accessory structure was barred by laches.

Laches is an equitable defense that may be raised to stop a person from asserting a claim she would normally be entitled to assert. Laches is neglect for an unreasonable length of time, under circumstances permitting diligence, to do what in law should have been done. The general doctrine is well established and long recognized: Independently of any statute of limitation, courts of equity uniformly decline to assist a person who has slept upon his rights and shows no excuse for his laches in asserting them.

The doctrine of laches may bar a plaintiff's claim if a defendant establishes the following three elements of laches: (1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party. A mere lapse of time is not sufficient to establish laches; it is also necessary to show an unreasonable delay that causes prejudice or injury. Prejudice may be created if a party, with knowledge of the relevant facts, permits the passing of time to work a change of circumstances by the other party.

Angel v. Powelson, 977 N.E.2d 434, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quotations and citations omitted).

[15] The parties agree that the accessory structure was built in 2013. The Rodriguezes contend, however, that their nine-year-delay in asserting any claims regarding the accessory structure was excusable because “not until 2020 did the automobile repair activity reach significant levels.” Appellants’ Br. p. 17. We are at a loss to understand how the alleged increased automobile repair activities changed the Rodriguezes’ perception of the height or type of construction of the accessory structure that had been next door to them since 2013. We note that the Rodriguezes may even be correct that the accessory structure in the Villaloboses’ backyard is a “pole barn” in violation of Section 20 of the Declaration. However, even if the structure is a “pole barn” as contemplated in the Declaration, that fact would have remained the same since 2013, and the Rodriguezes concede that, other than the driveway installed, “[n]o other changes have been made to the Villaloboses’ pole barn structure over the intervening time period before the Rodriguezes made their complaint.” Appellants’ Br. p. 20. It seems that the Rodriguezes’ argument is, essentially, “we did not notice the pole barn until now.”

[16] The designated evidence provides that the Rodriguezes “had no idea of the size of the pole barn, including its height, before it was constructed. We had no information about it before it was erected.” Appellants’ App. Vol. IV p. 33. While the Rodriguezes seem to suggest that the Villaloboses misrepresented the building's height to Porter County in seeking the building-permit for the accessory structure, they make no suggestion whatsoever that they had relied on any such misrepresentations in the nine years that they had lived next-door to the “huge structure.” Appellants’ Br. p. 17. The Rodriguezes’ silence for nearly a decade with regard to this “huge structure” constitutes an implied acquiescence in their actions.

[17] Moreover, their delay in seeking to enforce the requested injunction establishes prejudice to the Villaloboses, who, at the very least, installed a driveway to the accessory structure within a short time after its completion. While the parties present differing accounts of when the driveway was constructed, there is no genuine dispute that it was constructed after the accessory structure was completed, and there is no genuine dispute that the driveway was constructed to serve the accessory structure, thus representing a change in circumstances that would result in prejudice to the Villaloboses if the Rodriguezes were to prevail on their partial motion for summary judgment. See Oakes v. Hattabaugh, 631 N.E.2d 949, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (vacating the trial court's injunction against the Oakes on the basis of laches because “Kent permitted the violations [of restrictive covenants] for at least two years without objection” and “[h]er delay in seeking to enforce the restrictive covenants was prejudicial to the Oakes who built and established their home and purchased additional land after their horses, barn, sign, and fence had already been present without complaint”), trans. denied.

[18] Based on the foregoing, we find that laches applies to this almost-decade-long delay. Because we conclude that the Villaloboses’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment demonstrated no genuine issue as to any material facts and entitlement to a judgment as a matter of law on laches as it related to Count III of the Rodriguezes’ amended counterclaim, we need not address the other issues before us.

[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While the Rodriguezes refer to the structure as a “pole barn,” Appellants’ Br. p. 11, the Villaloboses refer to the structure as an “outbuilding.” Appellees’ Br. p. 12. For the purposes of this memorandum decision, we refer to the structure as the Villaloboses’ “accessory structure.”

Bradford, Judge.

May, J., and Altice, J., concur.