COSGROVE v. NEWREZ LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] John P. Cosgrove, pro se, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to vacate default judgment.¹ Cosgrove raises three issues for our review,² which we restate as the following dispositive issue: whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 20, 2024, NewRez LLC, d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (“NewRez”), filed its complaint on a note and request to foreclose on a mortgage underlying the note against Cosgrove. According to the complaint, Cosgrove executed a note in the principal amount of $228,000 along with a mortgage on certain real property in Rensselaer. The mortgage was duly recorded, and NewRez came to be the holder of the note and the mortgage.

[3] Cosgrove defaulted on the note, and NewRez filed its complaint and request to foreclose on the mortgage in due course. NewRez hired a process server to serve the complaint and summons on Cosgrove personally, which the process server accomplished on November 27 by serving either Cosgrove or his partner at their Rensselaer property.

[4] Cosgrove did not answer or otherwise respond to the complaint and summons. Accordingly, on February 12, 2025, NewRez moved for default judgment, which the trial court granted on February 20.

[5] Cosgrove then began filing various documents in the trial court. In relevant part, on March 13 he filed a motion to vacate the default judgment in which he stated, without being more specific, that he had not been “properly served” with the complaint and summons. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 95.³ The trial court set a hearing date on Cosgrove's motion to vacate, but Cosgrove did not appear at the hearing. The court then denied Cosgrove's motion, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] On appeal, we first reiterate Indiana's long-standing recognition that pro se litigants are “held to the same standards as a trained attorney.” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). As our Supreme Court has made clear:

[pro se litigants are] “afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). Accordingly, a party proceeding pro se must “be prepared to accept the consequences of his or her action.” McCullough v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 820, 825 (Ind. 2017) (quotation omitted). While trial courts may facilitate a fair hearing for pro se litigants by explaining “legal concepts in everyday language” and informing litigants “what is expected of them,” they must enforce the law. Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.2 & cmt. 5.

Id. at 410-11.

[7] Although Cosgrove's motion to vacate the default judgment did not specifically identify a Trial Rule 60(B) basis underlying his request, we interpret his assertion that he was improperly served to be a request for relief under Rule 60(B)(6). As our Supreme Court has explained:

Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) is one way for a property owner to challenge the sale of their property as void because they did not receive adequate notice. See Diversified Invs., LLC v. U.S. Bank, NA, 838 N.E.2d 536, 544-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. A trial court determines whether the judgment is void or valid. See Menard, Inc. v. Lane, 68 N.E.3d 1106, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), modified on reh'g, 86 N.E.3d 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. If a trial court finds the judgment void, then the judgment cannot be enforced, but if the judgment is valid, then the Trial Rule 60(B) motion must be denied. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Wayne Post 64, Am. Legion Corp., 4 N.E.3d 1200, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied). A denial of a motion for relief from judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Ind. 2012). A trial court abuses its discretion when its denial is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts” and inferences supporting the judgment for relief. Id. (quoting McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. 1993)). “On a motion for relief from judgment, the burden is on the movant to demonstrate that relief is both necessary and just.” Darling v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 1199, 1202 (Ind. [Ct.] App. 2005) (quoting G.B. v. State, 715 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)), reh'g denied.

In re 2020 Madison Cnty. Tax Sale, 218 N.E.3d 1274, 1277 (Ind. 2023).

[8] Cosgrove alleged in his motion to vacate the default judgment that he had been improperly served with the complaint and summons. But he provided no evidence aside from his verified motion in support of that assertion, and he also provided no factual details in support of his assertion as to how service may have been improper as a matter of law. Further, although the court provided Cosgrove with the opportunity to make his case at a hearing before the court, Cosgrove failed to appear. NewRez, meanwhile, presented an affidavit of a process server stating that personal service had been effected on Cosgrove at Cosgrove's residence on November 27, nearly three full months before NewRez filed its request for the default judgment. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied Cosgrove's motion to set aside the default judgment.

[9] Cosgrove's other arguments did not clearly present a Trial Rule 60(B) basis to set aside a default judgment or a corresponding basis under which our Court would review the trial court's decision under Rule 60(B). His remaining arguments are also not supported by cogent reasoning. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). We do not consider them further.

[10] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of Cosgrove's motion to vacate the default judgment.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Joanna Cosgrove was also a named plaintiff, and the trial court also entered default judgment against her. She did not join Cosgrove's motion to set aside the default judgment and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Cosgrove's brief to our Court is not in conformity with Indiana Appellate Rule 46.

3.   The handwritten numbers at the bottom of the pages of the Appellant's Appendix do not correspond to the .pdf page numbers. We use the .pdf page numbers.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.