IN RE: The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of Ki.H-C and Ke.H-C; (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] D.C. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental relationships with his three-year-old twin sons, Ki.H. (“Ki.H.”) and Ke.H. (“Ke.H.”) (collectively “the children”). Father argues that the trial court's order terminating his parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous. Concluding that the trial court's order is not clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court's order terminating Father's parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[2] Mother and Father (collectively “Parents”) are the parents of the children, who were born in February 2022. The day after the children were born, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that the children were victims of neglect. Specifically, the report alleged that there were concerns about Mother's mental health, her possible cognitive deficiencies, and her ability to care for the children. In March 2022, following an investigation, DCS filed a petition alleging that the children were children in need of services (“CHINS”), removed the children from Mother, and placed the children in foster care. The CHINS petition provided that the children's father was unknown. Mother admitted that the children were CHINS, and the trial court entered a dispositional order requiring Mother to participate in services.

[3] At the end of March 2022, DCS filed an amended CHINS petition alleging that Father was the children's father. Father admitted that the children were CHINS, and, in April 2022, the trial court issued a dispositional order that required Father to: (1) establish paternity of the children; (2) complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations; and (3) attend supervised visits with the children. Because Father lived in Minnesota, the DCS family case manager (“the FCM”) referred Father to virtual services.

[4] In July 2022, Father attended, in person, a court hearing in the CHINS case. During the hearing, Father “became very animated and kind of talked in circles[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 42). The trial court became concerned about Father's mental health and ordered Father to complete a psychological assessment. Thereafter, the FCM referred Father to a virtual psychological assessment.

[5] By August 2022, Father had begun the necessary steps to establish paternity. However, he had not completed the court-ordered parenting and psychological assessments.

[6] Two months later, in October 2022, Father attended, in person, another court hearing in the CHINS case. Following the hearing, the trial court ordered that Father, who had never visited the seven-month-old twins, could have a supervised visit with them. However, Father did not attend the visit and returned to Minnesota.

[7] Father established paternity of the children in March 2023. Shortly thereafter, Father moved to Indiana and stayed with Mother. The FCM referred Father to homebased services to assist him in finding housing and employment. While Father was in Indiana, he participated in supervised visits with the children at Mother's home. During the visits, Father demonstrated that he “really had a lack of knowledge of what he was doing with the children.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 21).

[8] That same month, Mother and Father became involved in a domestic violence incident. Specifically, during a verbal argument, Father “backhanded [Mother] in the face.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 23). Shortly thereafter, Father returned to Minnesota. Although the FCM again referred Father to virtual services, Father did not complete the court-ordered parenting and psychological assessments and only “[s]poradically” virtually participated in a Real Fatherhood Initiative (“RFI”) program, which included homebased case management services. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 26).

[9] In April 2024, Father returned to Indiana to visit the two-year-old children. However, because Father had not seen the children in more than one year, they were “very standoffish with him[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 33). Specifically, they “stayed very close to the provider, [and] when they would cry or anything, they went to the provider for comfort.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 33). Thereafter, Father returned to Minnesota. One month later, in May 2024, Ki.H. began having seizures and had to take daily medication to prevent them.

[10] In March 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental relationship with the children. That same month, Father came to Indiana one time to visit the children.

[11] One month later, in April 2025, Father attended an initial virtual session with an RFI advocate (“the advocate”). Because the advocate was aware that DCS had filed a termination petition, the advocate expected Father to be compliant with the program. However, following the initial session, Father did not respond to the advocate's cell phone calls or attend scheduled online appointments. Further, although the advocate asked Father to send her his most recent employment and housing information, Father failed to do so.

[12] In May 2025, Father drove to Indiana to attend a visit with the children. However, he arrived late to the visit and left the visit early because he had to drive back to Minnesota. When the advocate asked Father if he was able to create a bond with the children during such a short visit, Father responded that he was the children's father. According to the advocate, Father appeared to believe that “because he helped create [the children], that he should have them.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 97).

[13] The trial court heard the facts as set forth above at a June 2025 termination hearing. In addition, the FCM testified that the termination of Father's parental rights was in the children's best interests. Further, a DCS supervisor (“the supervisor”) testified that during the three-year pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Father had not successfully completed services. In addition, the supervisor testified that she was concerned that Father could not differentiate the identical twins and that Father did not believe that Ki.H. needed seizure medication. According to the supervisor, Father believed that Ki.H.’s seizures would stop if the child lived with him. The supervisor also testified that the children were “extremely attached” to their foster parents and did not have a bond with Father. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 70). Further, according to the supervisor, the termination of Father's parental relationships with the children was in the children's best interests and the plan for the children was foster parent adoption

[14] In July 2025, the trial court issued an order terminating Father's parental relationship with the children. That order provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Father was residing in the State of Minnesota. Services were offered to the father, but father did not participate in the services. In October 2022[,] father appeared for a CHINS hearing and father was authorized a visitation with the children. Father did not participate in the visit. Father completed DNA testing and was confirmed to be the father of the twins.

Father moved in with mother in Indiana in early 2023. Father began visiting the children along with mother. Father was overwhelmed with caring for the twins. Homebased services were put in place to assist father with employment, housing, and parenting education.

Mother and father had a domestic violence incident and father stopped visiting the children on March 21, 2023. Father moved back to the State of Minnesota. Father was given virtual services, but father was not compliant. Father was sporadic at best with his compliance with the case plan. Father has only visited the children a hand full of times and does not have any significant bond with the children. All efforts to engage father in the case plan and all efforts have failed.

(App. Vol. 2 at 55).

[15] Father now appeals.

Decision

[16] Father argues that the trial court's order terminating his parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous. We disagree.

[17] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of his children when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. at 1188. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own children should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the children, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id.

[18] INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4 provides, in relevant part, that DCS must allege in its termination petition as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

IND. CODE § 31-35-2-4.² DCS must prove these alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013).

[19] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

[20] In addition, as a general rule, appellate courts grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters. Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “This deference recognizes a trial court's unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court[ ] only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Id.

[21] As a preliminary matter, we note that Father does not challenge the trial court's factual findings. As a result, he has waived any argument relating to whether these unchallenged factual findings are clearly erroneous. See Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (explaining that unchallenged trial court findings are accepted as true), trans. denied. We now turn to the substantive issue in this case.

[22] Father argues that the trial court's order terminating his parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous. Specifically, he first argues that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the children's removal or the reasons for their placement outside the home will not be remedied; and (2) a continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the children's well-being.

[23] However, we note that INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection d[.]” “Thus, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate Father's parental rights to [the children].” J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Therefore, we need only discuss whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the children's removal or the reasons for their placement outside the home will not be remedied. See id.

[24] In determining this statutory factor, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. Further, the trial court may consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. A.D.S. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. DCS “is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need only establish that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.” Id. (cleaned up).

[25] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that when DCS filed the CHINS petition and removed the children from Mother, Father had not yet been identified. After Father had been identified, DCS filed an amended CHINS petition and included Father in the CHINS proceedings. Further, the trial court ordered Father to participate in services, including a parenting assessment, a psychological assessment, and supervised visits with the children. However, during the three-year pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Father did not complete either the parenting assessment or the psychological assessment. Further, Father rarely visited the children. Specifically, in March 2023, Father attended a few supervised visits with the children in Mother's home. In 2024, Father visited the children one time, and in 2025, after DCS had filed the termination petition, Father visited the children a few more times. This Court has previously explained that a parent's failure to exercise the right to visit his children demonstrates a “lack of commitment to complete the actions necessary to preserve [the] parent-child relationship[.]” In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

[26] We further note that after DCS had filed the termination petition, Father had the opportunity to participate in an RFI program. However, following the initial session, Father did not respond to the advocate's cell phone calls or attend scheduled online appointments. Further, although the advocate asked Father to send her his most recent employment and housing information, Father failed to do so. The totality of this evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the children's removal or the reasons for their placement outside the home would not be remedied.

[27] Father also argues that the trial court's order terminating his parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous because DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the terminations were in the children's best interests. In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the children's best interests, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the children involved. Id. In addition, a child's need for permanency is a central consideration in determining that child's best interests. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009), reh'g denied. Further, the recommendation of the family case manager, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59.

[28] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that at the time of the termination hearing, three-year-old Ki.H. and Ke.H. did not have a bond with Father. Also, both the FCM and the supervisor testified that termination was in the children's best interests. In addition, the trial court concluded that DCS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the children's removal would not be remedied, and we have found that the evidence supported that conclusion. The totality of this evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the termination of Father's parent-child relationship with the children was in their best interests.

[29] Lastly, Father argues that the trial court's order terminating his parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous because DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the children. This Court has previously explained that the plan for the care and treatment of a child need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated. In re T.S., 267 N.E.3d 6, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Here, the supervisor testified that the plan for the children's care and treatment was foster parent adoption. This is a satisfactory plan. See id. This evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the children. Accordingly, the trial court's order terminating Father's parental relationships with the children is not clearly erroneous.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated the children's mother's (“Mother”) parental relationships with the children. This Court affirmed those terminations under a separate cause number.

2.   The General Assembly amended INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4 effective March 11, 2024. Because DCS filed the termination petition in this case in March 2025, the amended version of the statute applies here. Additionally, we note that the General Assembly further amended INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4 during the 2025 legislative session, and that amendment became effective July 1, 2025. The 2025 amendment does not apply to this case.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.