FRAZIER v. CHILDRESS (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Michelle Frazier appeals the trial court's denial of her grandparent visitation petition, arguing the trial court's conclusion that she lacked standing was clearly erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Jeffrey Childress (Father) is the biological and legal father of E.C. (Child), born in October 2018. Frazier is the mother of Child's biological mother, Jayden Rice, who died in October 2019. Between October 2019 and at least October 2024, Frazier had frequent contact and developed a relationship with Child. However, Frazier did not have court-ordered grandparent visitation rights. On January 7, 2025, Father's wife, Taylor Childress (Mother), legally adopted Child without notice to Frazier. On January 28, Frazier filed a verified petition for grandparent visitation. On March 5, Father filed an objection to Frazier's petition, alleging Frazier did not have standing to pursue grandparent visitation because she was no longer Child's legal grandparent and she did not have established grandparent visitation rights before Child was adopted. Following a hearing, the court denied Frazier's petition for lack of standing under the Grandparent Visitation Act. Frazier now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[3] Frazier asserts the trial court's conclusion she lacked standing was clearly erroneous. We disagree.

[4] “Grandparents historically had no common-law right to visitation with their grandchildren.” Jocham v. Sutliff, 26 N.E.3d 82, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. The Grandparent Visitation Act (GVA) “does not protect an existing right, it confers a right upon a person who is statutorily entitled to ask for it.” Id. at 86. The GVA “which is the exclusive basis for a grandparent to seek visitation[,] ․ was enacted in derogation of the common law, [and] it must be strictly construed.” Id. at 85. “To seek visitation rights, a grandparent must have standing as prescribed by the GVA; otherwise, the petition must be dismissed as a matter of law.” Id. Because Frazier's issue raises a question regarding interpretation of the GVA, “we review de novo, giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation.” Id.

[5] Under the GVA, a child's “grandparent” may seek visitation rights if, among other things, “the child's parent is deceased[.]” Ind. Code. § 31-17-5-1(a) (1997). But a “grandparent” is defined as “(1) the adoptive parent of the child's parent; (2) the parent of the child's adoptive parent; and (3) the parent of the child's parent.” Ind. Code § 31-9-2-77 (1997). Frazier no longer met this definition of grandparent when she filed her petition after Child was adopted.

[6] Still, Frazier contends she “has visitation rights that survive the adoption of [Child] because she is biologically related to [Child] as her grandparent[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 17. Frazier correctly notes that “[v]isitation rights” provided for in Indiana Code sections 31-17-5-1 “survive the adoption of the child by ․ a stepparent[.]” Ind. Code § 31-17-5-9 (1997). However, we have previously held that the phrase “ ‘visitation rights’ is not a reference to the right to seek visitation but rather to the right of visitation already established.” Jocham, 26 N.E.3d at 87. Specifically, section 31-17-5-9’s reference to visitation rights that survive stepparent adoption means “the right to visit already given by a court[.]” Id. at 88. Here, Fraizer had not sought court-sanctioned visitation rights prior to Child's adoption, and no such rights had been granted to her by a court. She thus does not have legal visitation rights that survived Child's adoption.

[7] That notwithstanding, Frazier implies she would have timely petitioned for visitation had she received notice of Child's pending adoption, which she asserts she was entitled to receive. This argument fails to revive her petition because Frazier was not entitled to notice of the adoption. Under Indiana Code section 31-19-2.5-3(a)(3), notice must be given to “a grandparent described in IC 31-19-4.5-1(3) of a child sought to be adopted[.]” Indiana Code section 31-19-4.5-1(3) provides that the adoption statutes apply to a grandparent who:

(A) is the grandparent of a child sought to be adopted; and

(B) has:

(i) an existing right to petition for visitation under IC 31-17-5; and

(ii) a right to visitation that will not be terminated after the adoption under IC 31-17-5-9;

at a time prior to the date of the filing of the petition for adoption.

Before the adoption petition was filed, Frazier needed to meet all three of the above requirements. Because she did not have visitation rights granted by a court order, she did not have a “right to visitation that w[ould] not be terminated ․ under [I.C.] 31-17-5-9” and thus did not meet the requirement of Indiana Code section 31-19-4.5-1(3)(b)(ii).¹

[8] Frazier concludes that because she did not receive notice “there was no possibility” of timely filing a petition under the GVA. Appellant's Br. p. 19. But nothing in the adoption statutes trigger a grandparent's right to petition for grandparent visitation while eligible. Frazier was eligible to petition for visitation anytime between October 2019 and January 6, 2025 and, unfortunately, she did not do so. Although we are sympathetic to Frazier's desire that the trial court consider Child's best interests and her existing relationship with Child, the trial court could not do so under these circumstances. Because she did not have visitation rights conferred upon her pre-adoption, Frazier does not have standing to petition for visitation under the GVA. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[9] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Before the trial court, Frazier attempted to distinguish her case from Jocham, arguing that she was “strung along” by Father because they had an agreement regarding visitation and Father represented they would work out the details outside of court. Tr. Vol. II p. 6; cf. Jocham, 26 N.E.3d at 88 (“[T]his is not a situation where [the father] strung [the grandmother] along by giving her time with [the child] to placate her and then suddenly and without warning cut her off after the adoption.”). While Frazier may have been strung along, Jocham also noted that one way to “avoid cutting off a grandparent's opportunity to seek visitation rights by catching him or her unawares would be to amend the adoption statute to require notice of a petition for adoption be given to anyone who would be eligible under the GVA to seek grandparent visitation rights as of the time the petition is filed.” Id. at 88, n.2. Eleven years have since passed, and our review of the statute's post-Jocham amendment reveals that pre-adoption visitation rights must still be court-ordered to be entitled to notice. See ¶7 supra. Because Frazier is relegated to the same position as the grandparent in Jocham—that is, Frazier remains Child's grandmother biologically, and presumably “emotionally, and morally,” but not legally—her ability to pursue grandparent visitation has expired. Jocham, 26 N.E.3d at 87.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.