James Peavler, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] James Peavler kicked in the door of Thierry Killian's apartment and violently attacked him. Peavler was convicted of burglary resulting in serious bodily injury and battery resulting in serious bodily injury. Peavler appeals and raises one issue, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial court committed fundamental error because (1) the charging information did not allege a specific felony intended in the burglary charge and (2) the trial court did not provide a jury instruction tying the burglary to a specific felony.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In November 2024, Peavler and Killian lived in the same apartment complex in Anderson, Indiana, and they had a contentious relationship. During one incident, Killian and Peavler “got in a tussle” after Peavler shattered a bowl in Killian's apartment. Tr. Vol. I at 224.¹ Due to that “tussle,” id., Killian went to the emergency room. Killian never sought to have charges filed against Peavler.

[4] At approximately 2:00 a.m. on November 27, an intoxicated Peavler broke down the door of Daryll Hunter, who lived in a neighboring building, apparently mistaking Hunter's apartment for Killian's. Peavler knocked Hunter's television onto the floor and yelled, “I know you're in there, come out.” Tr. Vol. I at 195. Peavler then left Hunter's apartment, yelling, “come the F out” throughout the building. Id. at 204.

[5] Roughly one hour later, Killian was in his apartment getting ready to take a shower when Peavler “kicked in [the] door” and “beat [Killian] to a pulp.” Tr. Vol. I at 218. Peavler struck Killian repeatedly in the face, head, and body, leaving Killian unconscious. Peavler said he belonged to a “biker gang” and “was gonna kill [Killian].” Id. at 233. Peavler eventually “got tired” and “let [Killian] up,” and Killian walked downstairs to a friend's apartment, who contacted law enforcement. Id. at 228. Killian was transported to the hospital where he was diagnosed with multiple fractures and a subdural hematoma.

[6] The State ultimately charged Peavler with burglary resulting in serious bodily injury as a Level 2 felony ² (the “Burglary Count”) and battery resulting in serious bodily injury as a Level 5 felony ³ (the “Battery Count”). The State also alleged Peavler was a habitual offender. The charging information for the Burglary Count alleged, “On or about November 27, 2024, in Madison County, State of Indiana, [Peavler] did break and enter the building or structure of [Killian] with the intent to commit a felony therein said act resulting in serious bodily injury to [Killian].” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 70. The charging information for the Battery Count alleged, “On or about November 27, 2024, in Madison County, State of Indiana, [Peavler] did knowingly or intentionally touch [Killian] in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, resulting in serious bodily injury to [Killian].” Id.

[7] During the State's closing argument at Peavler's jury trial, the State highlighted the evidence of Peavler's intent to commit a felony in Killian's apartment.

When [Peavler's] saying he's gonna kill [Killian], that's evidence of [Peavler's] intent. How about further evidence of [Peavler's] intent? It doesn't require that [Peavler] actually went through with killing [Killian], for [Peavler] breaking and entering with the intent to commit a felony or theft. Maybe, when Peavler broke in, that's what he had in mind, that he was going to kill [Killian], and then he thought better of it as the beat down happened. Maybe Peavler wasn't actually going to kill [Killian] but was going to do what he ended up doing, which is just basically beating [Killian] senseless. As long as you believe that [Peavler] went in, with the intent to commit a felony in that apartment, he's guilty of burglary.

Tr. Vol. II at 184.

[8] The trial court instructed the jury that, to find Peavler guilty of the Burglary Count, the jury needed to find that Peavler “[k]nowingly or intentionally; [b]roke and entered; [t]he building or structure of [Killian]; [w]ith the intent to commit a felony in it; [w]hich resulted in serious bodily injury to [Killian].” Tr. Vol. II at 187. During jury deliberations, the jury submitted the following question: “Does intent have to happen at the time of breaking and entering or can intent occur after B[reaking] and E[ntering]?” Tr. Vol. II at 197. The trial court determined the question was answered by the court's previous instructions and declined to further instruct the jury.

[9] The jury found Peavler guilty as charged, and Peavler admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Peavler to 45 years of incarceration. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error Regarding the Charging Information or the Jury Instructions

[10] Peavler argues that we should order a new trial because neither the charging information nor the trial court's instructions “defined the specific felony intended by Peavler when he entered Killian's home.”⁴ Appellant's Br. at 15. Peavler, however, did not challenge the charging information or object to the jury instructions prior to this appeal, so he must demonstrate that the alleged errors are fundamental. See Stwalley v. State, 534 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ind. 1989), abrogated in part on other grounds by Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992)

[11] “Fundamental error is an exception to the general rule that a party's failure to object at trial results in a waiver of the issue on appeal.” Strack v. State, 186 N.E.3d 99, 103 (Ind. 2022) (citing Kelly v. State, 122 N.E.3d 803, 805 (Ind. 2019)). The fundamental error doctrine is “very narrow and includes only errors so blatant that the trial judge should have acted independently to correct the situation.” Kelly, 122 N.E.3d at 805 (citing Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018)). “Fundamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been procedurally barred, not to provide a second bite at the apple for defense counsel who ignorantly, carelessly, or strategically fail to preserve an error.” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (collecting cases), abrogated in part on other grounds by Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068 (Ind. 2025).

[12] With this standard in mind, we begin with the charging information. When burglary is charged, “it is not sufficient merely to allege an intent to commit a felony without specifying the particular felony intended.” Reed v. State, 438 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Ind. 1982) (citing Bays v. State, 240 Ind. 37, 46, 159 N.E.2d 393, 397 (1959)). This is because the word “felony” is merely “a generic term employed to distinguish[ ] certain high crimes ․ from other offenses known as misdemeanors.” Bays, 159 N.E.2d at 397. Failure to specify the specific felony intended renders the charging information “insufficient.” Stwalley, 534 N.E.2d 229. Here, the State should have alleged that Peavler broke and entered Killian's residence with the intent to commit a specific felony, not merely a “felony,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 70, in general.

[13] The error, however, is not fundamental. Stwalley v. State, 534 N.E.2d 229, is instructive. In Stwalley, Stwalley broke and entered the 12-year-old victim's home and had forcible intercourse with her. Id. at 231. Stwalley was found guilty of burglary, child molesting, and rape, but the charging information did not specify the felony Stwalley intended in committing the burglary. Id. at 232. The Indiana Supreme Court found no fundamental error because the burglary count was “accompanied” by the child molesting and rape charges, id., which were specified as felonies, “arose from the same act of felonious intercourse,” and were “the only criminal conduct charged aside from the burglary,” id. at 233. Moreover, the evidence showed Stwalley broke and entered the home “with the intent to commit a rape.” Id.

[14] Here, as in Stwalley, the Burglary Count was accompanied by the Battery Count, the latter was specified as a felony, and it was the only other criminal conduct charged. Additionally, the evidence clearly showed Peavler broke and entered Killian's residence with the intent to commit a felony battery therein. Peavler kicked in Killian's door, “beat [him] to a pulp,” Tr. Vol. I at 218, and said he would kill him. Moreover, in the State's closing argument, the prosecutor highlighted the facts supporting the battery and argued that Peavler intended to “beat[ ] [Killian] senseless” when he broke and entered the residence. Tr. Vol. II at 184. On this record, it is clear that the Battery Count— charged as a felony—was the felony Peavler intended in committing the burglary.

[15] As for Peavler's argument that the trial court's instructions did not specify the felony intended in the burglary, Stwalley is again instructive. In Stwalley, the court held that “burglary instructions may sufficiently state the elements of burglary without defining the intended felony” because “the trial court has the discretion to determine whether to give an instruction including definitions.” 534 N.E.2d at 233 (citing Blackmon v. State, 455 N.E.2d 586, 589 (Ind. 1983)). The trial court here thus was not required to tie the burglary to any specific felony when instructing the jury. We discern no error in the trial court's instructions, much less fundamental error.

[16] Peavler argues that the jury's question during deliberations demonstrates the “jury was clearly grappling with the nature of Peavler's intent when he broke down Killian's door.” Appellant's Br. at 20. The jury's question, however, concerned only the timing of intent, not the offense intended or whether the offense was a felony.

[17] In sum, the failure to allege the specific felony intended in the Burglary Count does not rise to fundamental error, and the trial court's instructions were not erroneous. We affirm Peavler's convictions.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Appellate Rule 28 and Appendix A to the Appellate Rules require a court reporter to consecutively number the volumes of the Transcript, with the first volume containing only the Table of Contents. Ind. Appellate Rule 28(A), id. App. A(11)–(13), see also id. Form # App. R. 28-1. Here, the Table of Contents and the first transcript of the trial are both denoted “Volume I” of the transcript. We use “Tr. Vol. I” to refer to the first transcript of the trial and not the Table of Contents.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(3)(B).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (g)(1).

4.   Peavler groups the arguments regarding the charging information and the jury instructions together as a single issue, and we address them as such.

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.