Jeffrey L. Rayford, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] After being pulled over on suspicion of driving a stolen vehicle, Jeffrey Rayford led law enforcement officers on a high-speed reckless chase until he crashed and then fled on foot. Rayford was convicted of resisting law enforcement using a vehicle as a Level 6 felony and resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor. Rayford appeals and presents one issue, which we restate as follows: Whether Rayford's convictions violate Indiana's protection against substantive double jeopardy.

[2] We reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the evening of March 23, 2025, Indiana State Police Trooper Keith Martin and Sergeant Aaron Pfaff “received a license plate reader hit of a stolen vehicle” in the downtown Indianapolis area. Tr. Vol. II at 90. The officers located the vehicle, which was driven by Rayford, and conducted a “high-risk traffic stop.” Id. Rayford pulled over but did not obey the officers’ commands to “shut the vehicle off, toss the keys out, [and] exit the vehicle.” Id. at 92. Instead, Rayford took off and led the officers on a dangerous high-speed chase that lasted approximately three minutes. Rayford eventually crashed his vehicle in the area of Fall Creek Road and Paris Avenue.

[4] After the crash, Rayford exited the vehicle from the passenger side and “t[ook] off running on foot.” Tr. Vol. II at 95. Rayford ran up a hill and onto the interstate but was ultimately apprehended approximately 200 yards from the crash site.

[5] The State charged Rayford with resisting law enforcement using a vehicle as a Level 6 felony (“Resisting by Vehicle”); resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor (“Resisting by Foot”); and reckless driving as a Class C misdemeanor. In the State's closing argument, one time, the prosecutor contended Rayford committed separate offenses: “resisting law enforcement by car” and “resisting law enforcement by foot.” Tr. Vol. II at 163.

[6] The jury found Rayford guilty as charged. The trial court did not enter a conviction for reckless driving but entered convictions for both resisting law enforcement charges. The court then found that the sentences for both counts should be served concurrent to one another.

Discussion and Decision

Rayford's Convictions for Resisting by Vehicle and Resisting by Foot Violate Indiana's Protection Against Double Jeopardy

[7] Rayford argues his convictions for Resisting by Vehicle and Resisting by Foot are contrary to Indiana's protection against double jeopardy. We review such questions de novo. A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024) (citing Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 237 (Ind. 2020); Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020)).

[8] Indiana's protection against substantive double jeopardy prohibits “multiple convictions for the same offense in a single proceeding.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1066. To determine if a substantive double jeopardy violation has occurred, we apply a “three-part test based on statutory sources.” Id. First, we look to the statutory language of the offenses at issue; if that language “clearly permits multiple punishments,” then “there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy” and we end our analysis. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Second, we assess whether the charges are inherently included or factually included as charged. Id. at 1068. When “ ‘neither offense is an included offense of the other (either inherently or as charged) there is no violation of double jeopardy and the analysis ends’—full stop.” Id. at 1067 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248). Third, we “examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial.” Id. at 1071 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249).

[9] We begin with the statutes defining the offenses. A person commits resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor if, as relevant here, the person “flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer's siren or emergency lights, identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3). The offense is elevated to a Level 6 felony if the person “uses a vehicle to commit the offense.” Id. § 35-44.1-3-1(c)(1).

[10] Turning to Wadle’s first step, the parties agree that the resisting law enforcement statutes do not clearly permit multiple punishments. As for the second step, the parties also agree that the resisting law enforcement offenses are inherently included. This is so because resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor “is established by proof of the same material elements” as resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony, except the latter includes the additional element of the use of a vehicle. I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168(1) (defining “included offense”); compare I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), with I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(c)(1).¹ Because the offenses are inherently included, we presume a double jeopardy violation. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1069.

[11] The rubber meets the road in Wadle step three. In this step, the State bears the burden of rebutting the presumptive double jeopardy violation by demonstrating a “distinction between what would otherwise be two of the ‘same’ offenses.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071. We “probe the underlying facts—as presented in the charging instrument and adduced at trial—to determine whether a defendant's actions were ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’ ” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). Importantly, “there is no absolute rule regarding the exact amount of time necessary between acts to consider them separate,” but “temporal breaks and intervening acts enable the defendant to form a new criminal intent, rendering the acts separate and distinct.” Brabson v. State, 242 N.E.3d 519, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Gammage v. State, 277 So.3d 735, 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)), trans. not sought.

[12] “If the underlying facts reveal the two offenses are indeed ‘separate,’ ” there is no double jeopardy violation. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). If, however, the “facts show only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other,” the State may not obtain cumulative convictions. Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249).

[13] We conclude the State has not rebutted the presumptive double jeopardy violation. We find persuasive Lewis v. State, 43 N.E.3d 689, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015),² a case with nearly identical facts as those present here. In Lewis, the defendant fled from law enforcement officers in his vehicle and led them on a high-speed chase. Id. at 690. The defendant eventually abandoned the vehicle in a parking lot and fled on foot. Id. The defendant was convicted of resisting law enforcement and resisting law enforcement using a vehicle. Id. On appeal, this court held the defendant's convictions violated double jeopardy protections because the defendant's “actions of fleeing by vehicle and then on foot constitute[d] one continuous act of resisting law enforcement.” Id. at 691 (citing Arthur v. State, 824 N.E.2d 383, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied).

[14] Here, as in Lewis, Rayford's ambulatory flight was merely a continuation of his initial vehicular flight. The events all occurred in a short amount of time, were united by Rayford's singular purpose of evading apprehension, and formed merely stages of the same criminal transaction. Although the State argues Rayford made a separate “culpable” decision to flee on foot after the crash, Appellant's Br. at 9, the crash was simply a momentary impediment that compelled Rayford to shift gears and alter but not abandon his course.

[15] Rayford's convictions thus violate the protection against substantive double jeopardy. We therefore reverse “the conviction with the lesser penalty,” Eversole v. State, 251 N.E.3d 604, 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 256), trans. denied, which here is Rayford's conviction for Resisting by Foot. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the Resisting by Foot conviction and sentence.

[16] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because we determine the offenses are inherently included, we need not determine whether the offenses are also factually included. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248). However, the State also concedes that the ambiguity in the charging informations results in a determination that the two offenses are factually included.

2.   We note that Lewis was decided prior to the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Wadle and appears to have been decided primarily under federal double jeopardy jurisprudence. This, however, does not undermine our confidence in the holding.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.