HARDY v. E.B., Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Taylor Hardy, pro se, appeals a protection order entered in favor of E.B., presenting the following issues:

1. Was there sufficient evidence of harassment to support issuing a protection order against him?

2. Does Indiana Code Section 35-47-2-1.5—which prohibits a person restrained by an order of protection from knowingly or intentionally carrying a handgun—violate Hardy's constitutional rights to bear arms and to due process of law?

[2] We hold there is sufficient evidence to support the protective order. But as to Hardy's constitutional claims, he fails to develop cogent argument supported by relevant legal authority, so these claims are waived. Accordingly, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] E.B. is co-owner of the Neon Cactus bar located in West Lafayette. In 2022 or 2023, Hardy worked for E.B. for about six months as the general manager. The employment relationship ended badly over a dispute about DJ music selection, and Hardy subsequently filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a discrimination lawsuit against the Neon Cactus in federal court. Hardy took a job as the general manager of a different nightclub in town called 308 on State. During the pendency of the lawsuit, Hardy was subject to a no trespass order banning him from the Neon Cactus. After two or so years of litigation, the parties settled the lawsuit. As part of the settlement, E.B. agreed to release the no trespass order so it would not interfere with Hardy's employment prospects. But Hardy was still not welcome at the Neon Cactus.

[4] On March 12, 2025, E.B. filed a pro se petition for a protection order alleging Hardy committed stalking and repeated acts of harassment against him. In the petition, E.B. described three incidents of alleged harassment spanning about eighteen months: on November 21, 2023, Hardy called E.B. in the middle of the night and threatened E.B.’s staff; on March 18, 2024, Hardy burned a Neon Cactus t-shirt on the 308 on State dance floor; and on March 9, 2025, Hardy threatened E.B. and Neon Cactus co-owner, Angela Brown (“Angela”), outside the bar and refused to leave the area when asked, causing police to respond and remove Hardy from the premises (“the March 9 incident”). See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 7. In support of his petition, E.B. attached a copy of the police report from the March 9 incident. Among other relief, E.B. checked the box requesting the trial court prohibit Hardy from using or possessing a firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon.

[5] The trial court held a hearing on April 4, 2025, at which E.B. appeared pro se and Hardy was represented by counsel. E.B. testified that during the pendency of the lawsuit, Hardy called his phone three times at “[a]ll hours of the night.” Tr. Vol. at 13. One of those times, Hardy called E.B. in the middle of the night while E.B. was at home with his family. E.B. heard Hardy “screaming in the phone” that he “was going to get [E.B.’s] staff.” Id. at 8. E.B. also described seeing a video recording of 308 on State patrons—not Hardy—burning a Neon Cactus shirt while screaming “ ‘F’ the Neon Cactus, ‘F’ [E.B.].” Id. at 10. According to E.B., Hardy also made “very malicious posts” on a Facebook page disparaging E.B.’s business and stating E.B. was racist. Id.

[6] After the lawsuit settled, E.B. thought things “mellowed out quite a bit.” Id. E.B. testified that sometime thereafter, he took the Neon Cactus staff out to a local bar. Upon seeing Hardy inside, the group left and went to a second bar about one and one-half miles away. Shortly after they arrived there, Hardy walked in. When the group left around 3:00 a.m., E.B. saw Hardy sitting in his car outside, which he interpreted as Hardy “waiting on all of us to leave.” Id. at 11.

[7] E.B. also described the March 9 incident. When Hardy came to the Neon Cactus that night, a staff member who believed Hardy was banned told Hardy to leave several times before calling the owners. E.B. and Angela came down to speak with Hardy and told him he was not welcome at the Neon Cactus. Hardy moved outside to the strip mall parking lot in front of the bar, “screaming at the top of his lungs that [E.B.] raped a 17-year-old girl[.]” Id. Staff continued to ask Hardy to leave, but he did not. Eventually police were called to the scene, got Hardy to leave the parking lot, and issued Hardy a no trespass warning.

[8] As to the impact of these events, E.B. testified: “I'm tired of looking over my shoulder worrying if [Hardy is] going to be there, if he's going to hurt my wife, my kids, my family, my staff ․ This has been two years of my life that I wish had never happened. I'm extremely fed up with it. I'm tired of it. And I'm just ready to move on with my life.” Id. at 12. At the end of the hearing, he stated: “The only other testimony I have is that I just want it to stop. I just want to move on with my life. I just want my kids to be safe. I want my wife to be safe. I want my family to be safe. And this protection order will make that happen.” Id. at 50.

[9] Hardy testified on his own behalf and denied he made calls to E.B. Isaiah Darring—Hardy's friend and a former Neon Cactus DJ who had also left on “bad terms”—testified he, Hardy, and others were playing card games and drinking on the night of November 21 when someone “dare[d]” Hardy to call his former boss. Id. at 48, 46. According to Darring, Hardy did not want to, so Darring took Hardy's phone and called E.B. as “a joke.” Id. at 46. Regarding the Facebook posts, Hardy told the trial court he only posted the allegations he made in the federal lawsuit. Hardy explained that as the manager of 308 on State, he did not participate in burning the Neon Cactus shirt but responded to put out the fire. Hardy stated it was coincidental that he was at two bars on the same night as E.B. and the Neon Cactus staff. And as to the night of March 9, Hardy testified he went to the Neon Cactus to get tax forms from Angela and believed he had a right to be in the strip mall parking lot, even after being asked to leave the bar. He was concerned about a protection order being entered against him because it could affect his right to carry a firearm, which he needed for his current job with the Indianapolis Airport Authority Police Department.

[10] At the end of the hearing, the trial court found Hardy engaged in repeated acts of impermissible contact—specifically the late-night phone calls and the March 9 incident—and such contact would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and caused E.B. to feel distressed. Accordingly, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence Hardy harassed E.B. In its written order, the trial court enjoined Hardy from committing acts of harassment against E.B., his wife, and his children; prohibited Hardy from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with E.B.; and ordered Hardy to stay away from E.B.’s residence, place of employment, and the Neon Cactus. The trial court declined to prohibit Hardy from using or possessing a firearm, ammunition, or a deadly weapon under the protective order statute,¹ and on the cover sheet, the trial court checked the box indicating Hardy was not Brady disqualified.²

[11] Hardy, pro se, moved to correct error, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the order. The trial court denied the motion.

Sufficient evidence supports the protection order.

[12] We first note E.B. has not filed an appellate brief. When an appellee has not filed a brief, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee's behalf.” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). “[W]e will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.” Id. Prima facie error is error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (citation omitted). If an appellant is unable to meet this burden, we will affirm.

[13] Our two-tiered standard of reviewing a protection order is well established: first we consider whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and if so, we next determine whether those findings support the judgment. S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 497 (Ind. 2023). “In making these determinations, we neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses, and we consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's decision.” Id. We adopt this approach because “our trial courts are far better than appellate courts ‘at weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility.’ ” Id. at 498 (quoting Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind. 2017)). “And this is particularly true in protective order cases, where our trial judges see and hear the parties interact as they relay details about intensely personal, traumatic events.” Id.

[14] Under the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act (“CPOA”), Indiana Code Chapter 34-26-5, a person who “is or has been subjected to harassment” may petition for a protection order against a person who has committed repeated acts of harassment against the petitioner. I.C. § 34-26-5-2(b) (2021).³ Harassment means “conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact: (1) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; and (2) that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” I.C. § 34-6-2-51.5(a) (2019).⁴ Impermissible contact includes (but is not limited to) following or pursuing the victim, communicating with the victim, and posting on social media, if the post is directed to the victim or refers to the victim, directly or indirectly. I.C. § 35-45-10-3(a) (2022).⁵ In this context, “repeated” means “more than once.” See Falls v. State, 131 N.E.3d 1288, 1290 (Ind. 2019).

[15] A petitioner must establish harassment occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. See I.C. § 34-26-5-9(h); see also S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 498 (“[O]ur trial courts need only determine whether the petitioner has made the requisite showings by a preponderance of the evidence.”). To obtain a protection order, the petitioner must show the respondent poses a present and credible threat. S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 219–20 (Ind. 2020). A credible threat is “plausible or believable.” Id. at 220. Trial courts must consider the evidence and determine whether the respondent's actions—viewed objectively at the time the petitioner seeks relief—provide grounds for relief. See S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 499. A trial court's finding that harassment has occurred is sufficient to establish the respondent represents a credible threat to the petitioner's safety. See I.C. § 34-26-5-9(h) (“A finding that ․ harassment has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this section means that a respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of a petitioner or a member of a petitioner's household.”).

[16] Upon a showing of harassment by a preponderance of the evidence, “the court shall grant relief necessary to bring about a cessation of ․ the threat of violence.” Id. Among other relief, a trial court may enjoin a respondent from “harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with a petitioner.” I.C. § 34-26-5-9(c)(2), (d). A trial court may also order a respondent to stay away from the petitioner's residence, school, or place of employment. I.C. § 34-26-5-9(c)(5), (d). And so long as the protection order was issued after notice to the respondent and a hearing, a trial court may prohibit a respondent from using or possessing a firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon for the duration of the protection order. I.C. § 34-26-5-9 (d)(4), (h).

[17] The evidence favorable to the judgment is as follows: After his employment at the Neon Cactus ended and during the pendency of the lawsuit, Hardy made three overnight phone calls communicating “harassing” messages to E.B., including one in which he screamed and threatened to “get” E.B.’s staff. Tr. Vol. 2 at 8. After the lawsuit settled, Hardy came to the Neon Cactus, where he confronted E.B., yelled, argued, and refused to leave after being repeatedly asked to do so. E.B. explained he was “tired of looking over my shoulder worrying if [Hardy is] going to be there, if he's going to hurt my wife, my kids, my family, my staff.” Id. at 12. The trial court observed “it's clear ․ the actions caused [E.B.] to suffer emotional distress.” Id. at 51–52. Based on this evidence, the trial court found Hardy “represents a credible threat to the safety of [E.B.] or a member of [E.B.’s] household” and “repeated acts of harassment [have] occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of” a protection order. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 17. The record supports these findings and conclusions, and we therefore discern no error in the issuance of the order.

[18] Still, Hardy raises numerous arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the order. First, Hardy contends the trial court erred by admitting and relying on inadmissible hearsay statements, including those a police officer made during the March 9 incident, and which appear in the related police report. At the hearing, E.B. testified to what police officers said at the time and he claimed audio and video recordings of those events existed. But Hardy did not object to E.B.’s testimony about these statements.⁶ “The failure to make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence at trial, so as to provide the trial court an opportunity to make a final ruling on the matter in the context in which the evidence is introduced, results in waiver of the error on appeal.” Helman v. Barnett's Bail Bonds, Inc., 175 N.E.3d 826, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citation omitted). Hardy has waived any argument concerning the trial court's alleged reliance on hearsay statements.⁷

[19] Second, Hardy argues there were “significant inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of [E.B] and his witnesses.” Appellant's Br. at 5. Hardy contends this testimony was “incredibly dubious” and therefore the judgment should be reversed. Id. at 13. He urges us to adopt the version of events to which he and Darring testified, particularly as to the November 21 phone call. This is a request to reweigh the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, which we cannot do. S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 497.

[20] Next, Hardy argues there was insufficient evidence to establish the Neon Cactus had a contractual interest in the strip mall parking lot outside the bar, and therefore E.B. failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence Hardy had no right to be outside the bar's entrance on the night of March 9. He argues his “mere presence” was not enough to establish impermissible contact. Appellant's Br. at 10. The precise lease terms are immaterial. Impermissible contact includes (but is not limited to) “communicating with the victim,” I.C. § 35-45-10-3(a), and rises to harassment when it is repeated or continuing, would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress, and actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress, I.C. § 34-6-2-51.5(a). The evidence favorable to the decision shows that Hardy was unwelcome at the Neon Cactus, and after Hardy came to the bar and was asked to leave, he shouted personal accusations at E.B. in the presence of customers, argued with E.B., and did not stop until police responded. This evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding Hardy had impermissible contact with E.B. on March 9.

[21] Hardy also argues there was insufficient evidence E.B. was placed in fear or suffered emotional distress. Only the latter is required for a protection order issued for harassment. See id. Hardy selectively quotes E.B.’s testimony—such as E.B.’s statement, “I just want it to stop,” Tr. Vol. 2 at 50—and argues a petitioner's feelings of general discomfort and mere preference that respondent's conduct stops are insufficient to support a finding E.B. suffered emotional distress. See Appellant's Br. at 12–13.⁸ But here, E.B. testified to feeling as though he was “looking over [his] shoulder worrying if [Hardy is] going to be there” and to being concerned for the safety of his family and friends. Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. Although E.B. did not testify to a specific feeling, we believe this testimony expresses emotional distress. And the trial court specifically found based on this testimony that “it's clear ․ the actions caused [E.B.] emotional distress.” Id. at 51–52. Given the deference we show to trial courts in making credibility determinations, we hold E.B.’s testimony coupled with the trial court's specific finding is sufficient to establish E.B. suffered emotional distress.

[22] Finally, Hardy argues the trial court's findings were insufficient under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). “Protective orders are in the nature of injunctions,” and therefore in granting a protective order, the trial court must sua sponte make special findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Hanauer v. Hanauer, 981 N.E.2d 147, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Although we prefer written findings of fact and conclusions thereon, the “plain language of Indiana Trial Rule 52(A) does not require that the findings and conclusions be in writing.” In re Paternity of S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d 879, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “The purpose of Rule 52(A) is to provide the parties and the reviewing court with the theory upon which the trial judge decided the case in order that the right of review for error may be effectively preserved.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “Oral findings and conclusions can achieve this purpose so long as they are thoroughly detailed in the record.” Id.

[23] In its written order, the trial court found Hardy “represents a credible threat to the safety of” E.B. and “repeated acts of harassment [have] occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of this Order.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 17. Such findings are sufficient to support the issuance of a protective order. See Hanauer, 981 N.E.2d at 149–50 (holding substantially similar findings supported the protective order). In addition, the trial court entered oral findings on the record, explaining specifically what conduct it found constituted harassment (and what did not). See Tr. Vol. 2 at 51–53. These findings were adequate to effectuate our review.

[24] Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the trial court's order, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the trial court's issuance of a protective order in favor of E.B.

Hardy has waived any constitutional claims for failure to develop an argument supported by relevant legal authority.

[25] Hardy next challenges the constitutionality of a State-imposed handgun restriction triggered by the entry of the protective order.

[26] It is unlawful for a person restrained by an order of protection under the CPOA to knowingly or intentionally carry a handgun. I.C. § 35-47-2-1.5(b)(5) (2022). A violation of the unlawful carrying of a handgun statute is a Class A misdemeanor or, if certain conditions are met, a Level 5 felony. I.C. § 35-47-2-1.5(e). Hardy correctly asserts that by operation of State statute, he is prohibited from carrying a handgun.

[27] Hardy contends the statute—as applied to him—violates his right to bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 32 of the Indiana Constitution. He also argues the statute is “unconstitutionally vague and violates due process.” Appellant's Br. at 16 (capitalization omitted). In support of his arguments, Hardy cites several United States Supreme Court cases for general tenets of constitutional law. See id. at 15–16 (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)). But other than reciting the most general legal principles, Hardy fails to develop his arguments or direct us to current legal authority to aid or expedite our review of his specific claims.

[28] A party's arguments on appeal must be supported by cogent reasoning and citations to legal authority. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). As a pro se litigant, Hardy is “ ‘held to the same standards as a trained attorney’ and ‘afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)). “[A]dequate and cogent briefing is required for [the adversarial] process to live up to its potential.” Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657. “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, nor will we address arguments that are too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). In the absence of cogent argument supported by current legal authority, we decline to analyze Hardy's bald assertions that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated by the entry of the protection order.

[29] Hardy's claims of constitutional violations are waived. See id. (imposing waiver for insufficiently explained claims and lack of citation to legal authority).

Conclusion

[30] Sufficient evidence supports the protection order, and Hardy's constitutional claims are waived.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In pronouncing its findings at the hearing, the trial court stated: “The Court cannot prohibit Mr. Hardy from using or possessing a firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon. That's specific to family and household members, or former family and household members.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 53. But such relief may be ordered—after notice and a hearing—under any circumstance that qualifies for a protection order, including harassment. See I.C. § 34-26-5-9(d)(4), (h) (2024).

2.   Brady disqualification refers to the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. Enacted in 1993, Brady restricts certain persons from possessing firearms, including those subject to a court order that “restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2024).

3.   E.B. also alleged he was a victim of stalking, but because the trial court did not find Hardy committed acts of stalking, we focus our review on the evidence to support harassment.

4.   Harassment does not include “statutorily or constitutionally protected activity, such as lawful picketing pursuant to labor disputes or lawful employer-related activities pursuant to labor disputes.” I.C. § 34-6-2-51.5(b). As of July 1, 2025, this definition now appears in Indiana Code Section 34-6-2.1-80 (2025).

5.   Although the civil code does not define “impermissible contact,” this Court has applied to civil protection cases the term's definition from the criminal statutes. See, e.g., J.T. v. A.H., 255 N.E.3d 512, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025); Fox v. Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

6.   The only hearsay statement to which Hardy objected was E.B.’s claim that an officer at the West Lafayette Police Department advised him to petition for a protective order. The trial court sustained the objection, saying, “It is hearsay, and the Court won't take it into account.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 49.

7.   Hardy also alleges the trial court erred by relying on unadmitted or unauthenticated materials, including “police reports, social media posts, and other documents that were attached to the petition but not admitted into evidence or subjected to adversarial testing” and such reliance “violates due process and requires reversal.” Appellant's Br. at 17. At the hearing, neither party offered video footage, audio recordings, the March 9 police report, or other documentary evidence for the trial court's consideration. True, E.B. and his witnesses referenced or testified about the contents of these items. But again, Hardy did not object to such testimony. In any case, Hardy fails to cite any authority to support his cursory due process argument, and accordingly it is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (providing each contention “must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on”).

8.   In this portion of the brief, Hardy cites several cases in support of his argument. We have reviewed the cited case law and find numerous inconsistencies between Hardy's brief and the contents of these decisions, which simply do not contain the quoted language or stand for the propositions for which they are cited. For example, Hardy's brief contains the following paragraph:“Actual, case-specific evidence of fear or emotional distress caused by the respondent is required; generalized statements of a desire for peace or safety are not enough.” S.H. v. D.W., 19S-PO-118 (Ind. Jan. 31, 2020) (reversing protection order where petitioner failed to present specific evidence of emotional distress or fear); Tisdial v. Young, 925 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (same).Appellant's Br. at 13.The correct citation to the first case is S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214 (Ind. 2020), but more importantly, we have reviewed that opinion (and dissent) and do not find the direct quote Hardy attributes to it. Then in the parenthetical, Hardy indicates the S.H. Court reversed the issuance of a protection order because the petitioner “failed to present specific evidence of emotional distress or fear.” Appellant's Br. at 13. In S.H., a petitioner asked for a two-year extension of an existing order of protection. At the hearing, the petitioner did testify about her fear of the respondent. See S.H., 139 N.E.3d at 221 (explaining the petitioner “said she continues to fear for her life because of [respondent's] past violent acts and has an ongoing fear that he will harm her again” and stating “we do not question the sincerity of [petitioner's] multiple expressions of fear”). However, the S.H. Court reversed the extension for a second two-year term because the evidence did not show respondent represented a “present, credible threat to the petitioner's safety.” Id.The second case, Tisdal v. Young, 925 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), appears at that citation, but again does not stand for the cited proposition. There, a panel of this Court held there was insufficient evidence of stalking to support the issuance of a protective order where two women who walked in a park regularly got into an argument on two separate occasions, and there was no evidence the respondent “came looking for” the petitioner. Id. at 786. Again, the petitioner testified to her fear or emotional distress, as the opinion notes she “testified that as a result of the fights, she was afraid of” the respondent and “stopped frequenting the Park for approximately two months.” Id.A party's arguments must be supported by cogent reasoning and citations to legal authority. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). The purpose of Rule 46 “is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (citation omitted). Mischaracterization of cases does not aid or expedite our review and, in egregious cases, may so substantially impede our review that we cannot address an issue on the merits. See Wilcox v. Gingrinch, No. 25A-PL-1157, 2026 WL 249093, at *7 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2026) (holding all issues were waived where the appellants’ “lack of cogent argument – built ․ on fabricated and grossly mischaracterized legal authority – impede[d] our ability to provide meaningful appellate review”). Although our review of this issue is not substantially impeded by Hardy's misquote and mischaracterizations, we caution Hardy to carefully review cited case law before submitting future filings to this Court.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.