IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J'S.P (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On June 26, 2020, J'S.P., J'M.P., and J'B.P. (collectively, “the Children”) were found to be children in need of services (“CHINS”) after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports that their parents had failed to provide them with a suitable, stable home. J.P. (“Father”), a registered sex offender, has shown no interest in establishing a relationship with the Children and has never participated in services. At some point, the Children were returned to their mother's care but were again found to be CHINS on January 2, 2024. On January 30, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to the Children. The record reveals that Father has demonstrated a pattern of refusing to either attend or participate in the termination proceedings, including the fact-finding hearing. Following the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights to the Children.¹ In challenging the juvenile court's order on appeal, Father contends that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over him, he did not receive adequate notice of the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court abused its discretion and violated his due-process rights by denying his request for a continuance of the fact-finding hearing, and the evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father has been “convicted of sexual battery of a person over 12 years old with a weapon” and is required to register as a sex offender. Tr. Vol. II p. 33. J'S.P. was born on December 27, 2012. J'M.P. was born on August 18, 2014. J'B.P. was born on May 17, 2017.

[3] On May 20, 2020, DCS petitioned to adjudicate the Children as CHINS due to Mother's failure to provide them with a suitable and stable home. DCS also alleged that Father had “not successfully demonstrated an ability and willingness to appropriately parent the [C]hildren” and appeared to be unwilling or able to ensure the Children's safety while in Mother's care. Ex. Vol. p. 39. On November 15, 2023, the juvenile court entered a default judgment adjudicating the Children to be CHINS as it related to Father, finding that service had been provided via publication. The juvenile court ordered “no services offered or ordered until [Father] appears in court or in the [DCS] Office to demonstrate a desire and ability to care for” the Children. Ex. Vol. p. 80.

[4] At some point, the Children were returned to Mother's care, but, on or around September 20, 2023, were again removed and placed with a maternal aunt after DCS received reports that the Children lacked a safe living environment and were the victims of neglect. With respect to Father, DCS again alleged that Father had “not successfully demonstrated an ability and willingness to appropriately parent the [C]hildren and/or ․ to ensure the [C]hildren's safety and well-being while in” Mother's care. Ex. Vol. p. 143. During the second CHINS proceedings, DCS unsuccessfully attempted to locate Father by leaving letters at “a couple of different addresses” that it had for Father and by checking to see if he was incarcerated. Tr. p. 17. DCS later asserted, however, that “both parents have been served” with notice of the second CHINS proceedings. Ex. Vol. p. 147.

[5] On January 2, 2024, the juvenile court again adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. The juvenile court entered a default judgment against Father after he failed to appear for a dispositional hearing on February 2, 2024. In its order, the juvenile court noted that Father had been served by publication and that DCS had “requested to proceed to disposition and order no services until such time that [Father] makes himself available to DCS.” Ex. Vol. p. 162. Despite DCS's diligent efforts to locate him, Father's whereabouts continued to be unknown throughout 2024 and into 2025.

[6] On January 30, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights. In February, DCS requested permission to serve Father with notice of the termination proceedings via publication after continued efforts to locate him had been unsuccessful. The juvenile court granted DCS's request and Father was served via publication pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 4. At DCS's request, a public defender was appointed to represent Father's interests.

[7] At the end of March, DCS located Father in the Marion County Adult Detention Center (“ADC”) and began making efforts to contact him. On March 31, 2025, the Clerk of the Marion County Courts certified that a copy of the termination summons and notice of the initial hearing had been sent to Father at the ADC. Father was notified that the juvenile court would conduct an initial hearing on April 22, 2025.

[8] Father appeared at the initial hearing via video conferencing and was represented by counsel. Although Father appeared from the ADC, it was “unclear” if Father was able to hear the proceedings because Father did not respond or otherwise participate in the hearing. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 76. After Father left the hearing early, the juvenile court continued the hearing. Father's counsel indicated that she had been in contact with Father and that he “has indicated that he and his children may be eligible for membership in a Native American Tribe.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 77. Counsel further indicated that Father expected “to be released within the next month” and that she was in agreement with waiving the ninety-day statutory timeframe for conducting a fact-finding hearing. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 77. The juvenile court noted in its order from the hearing that “DCS informs the Court that ․ [Father has] been served” and the order did not contain any statement indicating that Father's counsel objected to or otherwise countered DCS's assertion. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 76. Although Father's counsel had indicated that Father had been set to be released from jail within a month of the hearing, on April 29, 2025, Father was convicted of various criminal offenses and was sentenced to a 545-day sentence.²

[9] At some point after DCS learned of Father's whereabouts, Father participated in mediation, at which he spoke with the Children's Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) Katelyn Cole. In speaking with GAL Cole, Father

generally described any efforts that he believes he made to have a relationship with his children, but would not continue the conversation at that time with [GAL Cole] about why he had been absent or his perception of the relationship that he has to his children. He wouldn't discuss it with me beyond describing a few attempts that ․ he's made.

Tr. Vol. II p. 42.

[10] Father appeared via video conferencing, and was represented by counsel at, the continued initial hearing on June 3, 2025. Father, however, “refuse[d] to provide his name or participate in the hearing.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 78. In its order following the hearing, the juvenile court noted that

DCS states that [Father] was served on 4/3/2025 in custody. DCS states that the [family case manager (“FCM”)] has attempted to set up virtual meetings with [Father] at the ADC, but he has declined. FCM [Sierra] Fegan is working to set-up an in-person meeting with [Father] to provide updates regarding the CHINS cases and obtain additional information from [Father], as his counsel has informed DCS that he is alleging he is eligible for tribal membership.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 78. The juvenile court's order contained no suggestion that either Father or his counsel had disputed DCS's statement that Father had been served with notice of the termination proceedings. The juvenile court found that Father “has been served and refused to participate in the continued initial hearing” and set the matter for a fact-finding hearing on July 1, 2025. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 78.

[11] FCM Fegan attempted to meet with Father in the ADC in June of 2025. Father, who had at this point already been notified of the termination proceedings, told FCM Fegan “to leave” despite FCM Fegan identifying herself and did not indicate that he wanted to engage in any services towards reunification with the Children. Tr. Vol. II p. 31. Father “didn't even really let [FCM Fegan] finish what [she] was trying to say and had cut [FCM Fegan] off and said that he didn't want [her] to return and walked away.” Tr. Vol. II p. 32.

[12] On June 23, 2025, Father moved to continue the termination hearing, citing his and the Children's potential eligibility as members of a recognized Native American tribe under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The juvenile court granted Father's motion and continued the fact-finding hearing to July 22, 2025. On both July 1, and July 10, 2025, DCS filed notices of the termination hearing, informing Father that the fact-finding hearing was scheduled for July 22, 2025, both of which contained indications that copies had been mailed to Father at the ADC.

[13] During the fact-finding hearing, FCM Fegan testified that she believed “it would potentially be traumatizing to the [C]hildren if they were removed” from their current placement with maternal aunt and placed with Father. Tr. Vol. II p. 33. FCM Fegan further testified that Father had refused to communicate with DCS, had no bond with the Children, and had not completed any services aimed at reunification. GAL Cole testified that Father “has not showed an interest in participating and engaging in conversations that do involve his children and does also involve his relationship to his children.” Tr. Vol. II p. 36. GAL Cole opined that Father's lack of engagement in the case “speaks to whether or not their safety is a priority for him.” Tr. Vol. II p. 36. Both FCM Fegan and GAL Cole opined that termination of Father's parental rights was in the best interests of the Children. On August 12, 2025, the juvenile court terminated Father's parental rights to the Children.

Discussion and Decision

[14] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the children. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

I. Jurisdiction

[15] “Personal jurisdiction refers to a court's power to impose judgment on a particular defendant.” Matter of K.P.G., 99 N.E.3d 677, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied.

Personal jurisdiction is a question of law. As with other questions of law, a determination of the existence of personal jurisdiction is entitled to de novo review by appellate courts. This court does not defer to the trial court's legal conclusion as to whether personal jurisdiction exists. However, personal jurisdiction turns on facts, and findings of fact by the trial court are reviewed for clear error. Clear error exists where the record does not offer facts or inferences to support the trial court's findings or conclusions of law.

In re J.H., 898 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.

[16] Father contends that the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to the Children is void because the record does not establish that the juvenile court had properly exercised personal jurisdiction over him. Specifically, Father asserts that that the juvenile court's finding that he had been served in the ADC on or about April 3, 2025, was “unsupported by competent evidence or documentation in the record.” Appellant's Br. p. 22. We disagree.

[17] Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(2) permits a party to raise lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense. A party can waive lack of personal jurisdiction and submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court if he responds or appears and does not contest the lack of jurisdiction. Trial Rule 12(B) provides a mechanism for raising defenses such as a lack of jurisdiction or insufficient service of process by requiring that the defenses or objections be asserted in the responsive pleading (where one is required) or by motion.

Matter of K.P.G., 99 N.E.3d at 680–81 (internal quotation omitted). Trial Rule 12(B) further provides that a claim that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the person is waived unless made within twenty days after service of the prior pleading. In Matter of K.P.G., we concluded that the mother could not contest the question of personal jurisdiction on appeal when she had “submitted herself to the trial court's jurisdiction by appearing in court and failing to contest personal jurisdiction at that time or within the time limitations found in Trial Rule 12(B).” 99 N.E.3d at 681.

[18] As a preliminary matter, we note that Father has not provided us a copy of the transcript of the relevant lower-court proceedings. Indiana Appellate Rule 9(F)(5) requires the appellant's Notice of Appeal to include “[a] designation of all portions of the Transcript necessary to present fairly and decide the issues on appeal.” Appellate Rule 9(F)(5) further provides that “[i]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding of fact or conclusion thereon is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the Notice of Appeal shall request a Transcript of all the evidence.” The record before us is deficient in that we cannot evaluate the testimony and evidence proffered by DCS outlining its efforts to serve Father. Father's failure to request that the transcript of this hearing be prepared results in waiver of this claim for appellate review. Matter of Guardianship of A.Y.H., 139 N.E.3d 1050, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In the interests of caution, however, we choose to address the question.

[19] As it relates to Father, the record indicates that Father was served via publication in early 2025. In addition, a TPR summons and notice of initial hearing was filed with the juvenile court and sent to Father at the ADC via certified mail on March 31, 2025. The summons notified Father of the termination proceedings and that the initial hearing was scheduled for April 22, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. The juvenile court conducted an initial hearing on April 22, 2025, as scheduled.

[20] While the record does not include a transcript of this hearing, the record includes the juvenile court's order that was issued following conclusion of the hearing. The juvenile court's order indicates that Father had been represented by counsel at this hearing and Father had appeared “via video conferencing” from the ADC but noted that “it is unclear if he is able to hear. The Court is unable to proceed with [Father's] advisement.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 76. The juvenile court's order further indicated that “DCS informs the Court that ․ [Father has] been served” and did not contain any statement indicating that Father's counsel objected to or countered DCS's assertion. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 76. After Father “left the meeting link[,]” the juvenile court asked Father's counsel if she had been in contact with Father, to which counsel responded that she has been in contact with Father and that Father “has indicated that he and his children may be eligible for membership in a Native American Tribe.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 77. Counsel indicated that Father expected “to be released within the next month” and that she was in agreement with waiving the ninety-day statutory timeframe for conducting a fact-finding hearing. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 77. Father's appearance, prior communication with counsel, and counsel's participation in the hearing support the juvenile court's finding that Father had been served with notice of the termination proceedings.

[21] Additionally, the juvenile court conducted a continued initial hearing on June 3, 2025. Again, while the record does not include a transcript of this hearing, the record includes the juvenile court's order that was issued following conclusion of the hearing. The order indicates that Father was represented by counsel at this hearing and appeared “via video conferencing” from the ADC but that Father “refuse[d] to provide his name or participate in the hearing.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 78. The juvenile court's order further indicated that

DCS states that [Father] was served on 4/3/2025 in custody. DCS states that the FCM has attempted to set up virtual meetings with [Father] at the ADC, but he has declined. FCM Fegan is working to set-up an in-person meeting with [Father] to provide updates regarding the CHINS cases and obtain additional information from [Father], as his counsel has informed DCS that he is alleging he is eligible for tribal membership.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 78. The juvenile court's order does not indicate that either Father or his counsel disputed DCS's statement that Father had been served with notice of the termination proceedings. The juvenile court found that Father “has been served and refused to participate in the continued initial hearing” and set the matter for a fact-finding hearing on July 1, 2025. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 78.

[22] Also, on June 23, 2025, Father, by counsel, moved to continue the fact-finding hearing, claiming that Father had informed counsel of “his and the Children's potential eligibility to be enrolled in a federally recognized Indian Tribe.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 103. The juvenile court granted Father's motion, and the fact-finding hearing was rescheduled for July 22, 2025.

[23] The juvenile court's orders, including the order granting Father's request for a continuance, demonstrate that Father had submitted himself to the juvenile court's jurisdiction by appearing in court. The record further indicates that Father had failed to contest personal jurisdiction at that time or within the time limitations found in Trial Rule 12(B). As such, similar to our conclusion in Matter of K.P.G., we conclude that Father cannot contest the issue of personal jurisdiction on appeal. 99 N.E.3d at 681.

II. Adequate Notice of Fact-finding Hearing

[24] Father also contends that DCS failed to provide him with the statutorily-required notice of the fact-finding hearing. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-6.5 requires that DCS provide a parent with notice of a fact-finding hearing “[a]t least ten (10) days before a hearing on a petition[.]”

Compliance with the statutory procedure of the juvenile code is mandatory to effect termination of parental rights. Although statutory notice is a procedural precedent that must be performed prior to commencing an action, it is not an element of plaintiff's claim. Failure to comply with statutory notice is thus a defense that must be asserted.

In re H.K., 971 N.E.2d 100, 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). “Once the defense of lack of notice is placed in issue, DCS bears the burden of proving compliance with the notice statute.” In re M.P., 115 N.E.3d 498, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[25] “This Court has held that Indiana Code § 31-35-2-6.5 does not require compliance with Indiana Trial Rule 4, which governs service of process and incorporates a jurisdictional component.” In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. “Rather, in order to comply with the notice statute, one need only meet the requirements of Indiana Trial Rule 5, which governs service of subsequent papers and pleadings in the action.” Id. Indiana Trial Rule 5 authorizes service by U.S. mail, and service upon the party “must be made by delivering or mailing a copy of the papers to the last known address[.]” Ind. Trial Rule 5(B) (emphasis added). “Service is deemed complete upon mailing.” Ind. Trial Rule 5(B)(2).

[26] Father did not raise the lack-of-notice issue before the juvenile court. As such, he has waived his claim that DCS failed to provide him with adequate notice. See In re H.K., 971 N.E.2d at 103 (“Failure to comply with statutory notice is thus a defense that must be asserted.”). Regardless, we note that the record demonstrates that DCS complied with the statute and provided Father, at his last known address, with timely notice of the fact-finding hearing.

[27] On July 1, 2025, DCS filed a notice of the termination hearing and mailed a copy of the notice to both Father's counsel and Father at his last known address at the ADC. DCS filed a second notice of the termination hearing on July 10, 2025, and again mailed copies of the notice to both Father, again at his last known address at the ADC, and Father's counsel. Again, “[s]ervice is deemed complete upon mailing.” Ind. Trial Rule 5(B)(2). Both of these notices were filed more than ten days before the July 22, 2025 fact-finding hearing. Thus, the record establishes that DCS complied with the statutory requirements set forth in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-6.5.

III. Denial of Request for Continuance

[28] Father next contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion and denied him due process by denying his counsel's oral motion to continue the fact-finding hearing after Father did not appear.

A. Abuse of Discretion

[29] Generally speaking, a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to continue is subject to abuse of discretion review. An abuse of discretion may be found in the denial of a motion for a continuance when the moving party has shown good cause for granting the motion; however, no abuse of discretion will be found when the moving party has not demonstrated that he or she was prejudiced by the denial.

Matter of C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “The party seeking a continuance must show that he or she is free from fault.” In re B.H., 44 N.E.3d 745, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[30] The juvenile court conducted the fact-finding hearing on July 22, 2025. Father was represented by counsel at the hearing but did not appear in person. With regard to Father's absence, the juvenile court stated the following:

The court will note for the record that [Father] was given, there was a transport order in place. [Father] was given the opportunity to be transported over here and the sheriffs have informed us that he refused. The court will also note that [Father] has a pattern of doing this. He has either left the hearing or refused to participate in every hearing previously. So, we're going to go ahead and continue with the fact finding today.

Tr. Vol. II p. 4. Acknowledging the juvenile court's statement, Father's counsel requested a continuance, stating “[s]orry Judge, just so the record's clear, I would be moving for a continuance due to my client not being present fully expecting you to deny it for the reasons previously stated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 4. The juvenile court denied the motion, stating “the court will deny that due to the reasons previously stated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 5.

[31] Father claims, without citing any relevant authority for support, that because evidence was heard in his absence, the juvenile court's order should be considered a default judgment. Given that Father had appeared, both personally and by counsel at prior hearings; had participated, via counsel, at prior hearings; and was represented by counsel, who fully participated, at the fact-finding hearing, we reject Father's invitation to characterize the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights as a default judgment.

[32] Father, for the first time on appeal, challenges the juvenile court's statement that a transport order had been in place but that he had refused to be transported to the juvenile court for the fact-finding hearing. Father, however, does not explain or develop this challenge. He merely suggests that the fact-finding hearing was insufficient. In support, Father relies on Thompson v. Clark County Division of Family and Children, 791 N.E.2d 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Father's reliance on Thompson, however, is inapposite because in Thompson, the juvenile court had conducted an expedited, abbreviated hearing, without any witness testimony, that had consisted only of “the attorneys for the DFC and Thompson giving summaries of the anticipated testimony and introducing exhibits into evidence without sponsoring witnesses or foundations.” Id. at 796.

[33] In this case, the juvenile court conducted a full evidentiary hearing, at which Father's counsel was given the opportunity to call witnesses, cross-examine DCS's witnesses, and present arguments on Father's behalf. In arguing that the juvenile court acted within its discretion, the State asserts that Father cannot demonstrate that he was free from fault or that he would be prejudiced by the denial of his motion. We agree with the State on both assertions. The record before us on appeal indicates that Father had been given the opportunity to appear before the juvenile court for the fact-finding hearing but had refused. The record further indicates that Father's interests were protected and represented by counsel, who fully participated in the fact-finding hearing, by objecting to the admission of certain evidence, cross-examining witnesses, and providing a closing argument. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's motion to continue the fact-finding hearing.

B. Due Process

[34] The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Due Course of Law Clause of the Indiana Constitution prohibit state action that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without a fair proceeding. Parental rights constitute an important interest warranting deference and protection, and a termination of that interest is a unique kind of deprivation. However, children have an interest in terminating parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships. When the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 916–17 (Ind. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The process due in a termination of parental rights proceeding turns on the balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. The balancing of these factors recognizes that although due process is not dependent on the underlying facts of the particular case, it is nevertheless flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Finally, we must keep in mind the general principle that if the State imparts a due process right, then it must give that right. A parent in a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship is statutorily entitled to (1) cross-examine witnesses, (2) obtain witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory process, and (3) introduce evidence on behalf of the parent.

Id. at 917 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[35] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-6.5(e) provides that the subject of a hearing to terminate one's parental rights shall be given the opportunity to be heard at the hearing. We have concluded, however, “this statutory provision does not create a constitutional right for [a parent] to be physically present at the termination hearing.” C.T. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 896 N.E.2d 571, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. We have further concluded that representation by counsel at a hearing can be sufficient to satisfy this statutory requirement. Id.; Matter of C.C., 170 N.E.3d at 677–78.

[36] The record demonstrates that Father had been given notice of the hearing and the opportunity to be present but had refused. His interests, however, had been represented by counsel who objected to the admission of certain evidence, cross-examined witnesses, and gave a closing argument. His counsel had also been afforded the opportunity to introduce other evidence and call witnesses. Father had demonstrated an unwillingness to participate in any hearing relating to the termination of his parental rights, despite being given notice of said hearings.

[37] Father may not manipulate the system by refusing to attend the fact-finding hearing and then claiming a denial of due process on appeal. See generally, Jackson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ind. 2007) (providing that the defendant may not manipulate the system by failing to appear for trial, only to later argue that he was denied due process if trial continued in his absence). Father also “may not take advantage of an error that he commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of his own neglect or misconduct.” See C.T., 896 N.E.2d at 588 (“The doctrine of invited error, grounded in estoppel, provides that a party may not take advantage of an error that he commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of his own neglect or misconduct.”). Based on the record before us, we cannot say that Father was denied due process.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[38] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[39] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[40] Father contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of his parental rights to the Children. In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3).³ As is relevant to this case, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite [DCS's] reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

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(12) That the parent is required to register as a sex or violent offender under IC 11-8-8.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d). Father does not argue on appeal that DCS failed to prove that it has a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the Children, with that plan being adoption. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination of his parental rights to the Children, Father argues that DCS failed to prove both Indiana Code sections 31-35-2-4(c)(1) and (c)(3).

A. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1)

[41] In this case, DCS alleged that termination of Father's parental rights was warranted under subsections (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), and (d)(12). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d)[.]” (Emphasis added). Thus, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate Father's parental rights to the Children. See generally In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d at 854 (addressing the prior version of the statute and explaining that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had used the word “or” and had therefore been written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court had only been required to find that one prong of subsection (B) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence).

[42] Father only challenges the juvenile court's conclusion that termination of his parental rights was warranted under subsections (d)(3) and (d)(4). He makes no arguments relating to the juvenile court's conclusion that termination of his parental rights was warranted under subsections (d)(2) or (d)(12). With respect to subsections (d)(2) and (d)(12), the juvenile court found as follows:

31. Children Removed For At Least Fifteen (15) of the Most Recent Twenty-Two (22) Months and Father Unable to Remedy Reasons for Removal. IC 31-35-2-4(d)(2).

a. The Children were removed from Mother's and Father's care as a result of being alleged to a CHINS and have been under the supervision of the local office of DCS since removal, for a period of over twenty-two (22) months at the time of trial. The Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the Children have been removed from Mother and Father and have been under the supervision of a local office of DCS for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months.

b. The Court find that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that despite DCS's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the Children with Father, Father has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the Children being placed outside of Father's home.

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34. Father Required to Register as a Sex Offender. IC 31-35-2-4(d)(12).

a. The Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that Father is required to register as sex offender under IC 11-8-8.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 140–41, 145. The juvenile court's findings with regard to subsections (d)(2) and (d)(12) stand as proven. Matter of De.B., 144 N.E.3d 763, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Any unchallenged findings stand as proven.”). As mentioned, either one of these findings is sufficient to satisfy Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1).

B. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

[43] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child].” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[44] With regard to the Children's best interests, the juvenile court found as follows:

e. Permanency is in the Children's best interests.

f. Father has not demonstrated the ability or willingness to appropriately parent the Children. He has not visited the Children, nor has he made efforts to engage in Court or with DCS.

g. The FCM and GAL believe that the termination of the parent-child relationship between Father and the Children, and the adoption of the Children by their pre-adoptive relative care Placement is in their best interests. All of the Children's needs are met by Placement and they are bonded and well cared for.

h. The Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of the parent-child relationship between Father and the Children is in the best interests of the Children. IC 31-35-2-4(c).

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 147. In arguing that the evidence is insufficient to prove that termination of his parental rights is in the best interests of the Children, Father does not challenge any of the juvenile court's findings, which we accept as correct. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as correct).

[45] The record establishes that FCM Fegan testified that after locating Father, she met with him but “as soon as [she] identified [her]self as the DCS FCM, he did not want to be there, and he told [her] that he did not want [her] to return and then walked away.” Tr. Vol. II p. 18. FCM Fegan's other attempts to meet with Father were rejected. Father did not express a willingness “to engage at all” with the Children. Tr. Vol. II p. 31. FCM Fegan testified that as of the date of the fact-finding hearing, Father was incarcerated, was facing additional charges, and it was unknown when he might be released from incarceration. FCM Fegan opined that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Children's best interests, stating that “the children don't have a relationship with dad” and it was unknown “when the last time that they've even saw their dad and that, I think just placing them with dad would do them more harm at this time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 21. On cross-examination, FCM Fegan further stated that Children “have no bond to father, and they never mentioned him. There they've been through a lot with this case. And I think, and then well on top of that, with [Father] being on the sex offender list, that does pose a threat to the children.” Tr. Vol. II p. 28. FCM Fegan opined that it “would potentially be traumatizing” to the Children to be removed from their pre-adoptive placement and placed with Father. Tr. Vol. II p. 33.

[46] GAL Cole opined that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Children's best interests, stating that

my main concern is it is unclear when [Father] last saw his children or last spoke to them even prior to this case being open. I would say that's my number one concern is that absence appears to be predominant. The other concern I have is he has not appeared at any of the court hearings where reunification was sole plan and sole focus of this case. He's currently incarcerated and the release date is undetermined. So that is a concern considering time. And I would say just now that we've located [Father], the concern is the lack of willingness to engage in conversations to discuss the wellbeing of his children or to discuss reunification for that matter.

Tr. Vol. II p. 41. GAL Cole further opined that it was concerning that Father “has not showed an interest in participating and engaging in conversations that do involve his children and does also involve his relationship to his children.” Tr. Vol. II p. 36. GAL Cole outlined Father's unwillingness to discuss “why he had been absent” or his lack of a relationship with his children. Tr. Vol. II p. 42. GAL Cole also testified that she believed that the Children needed permanency and that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Children's best interests because it would enable them to experience permanency. GAL Cole stated, with regard to the Children's pre-adoptive placement with maternal aunt, that

I just think that the children have stability, they have clear direction, they are safe, they are together and they're with family. And I think that with the lack of engagement, the lack of cooperation, and also just the lack of relationship with [Father] at this time, I think delaying TPR and delaying permanency is not in these children's best interest.

Tr. Vol. II p. 44. GAL Cole opined that Father's lack of engagement had delayed “permanency for [the C]hildren” and that continued delay “would cause emotional distress to the [C]hildren.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 42, 45.

[47] FCM Fegan's and GAL Cole's testimony supports the juvenile court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights is in the Children's best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests). GAL Cole's testimony also supports the juvenile court's determination that the Children needed permanency. “A child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Additionally, Father has not demonstrated that he is willing to work towards reunification with the Children, who, apart from a short period when the Children had been returned to Mother, have been removed from his and Mother's care since 2020. Father's unwillingness to discuss the Children's needs with FCM Fegan and GAL Cole, combined with the Children's need for permanency, supports the juvenile court's determination that termination of Father's parental rights is in the Children's best interests.

[48] Father cites a number of cases, which he claims support his assertion that his parental rights should not have been terminated. In each of these cases, however, the incarcerated parent had a strong bond and relationship with their child, and they had taken positive steps while being incarcerated to better themselves. See K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 648–49 (Ind. 2015) (noting that father had made substantial efforts towards bettering his life and was bonded to children); In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191, 194–95 (Ind. 2009) (finding that parents had fully cooperated with services and had maintained a relationship with child); In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1263–64 (Ind. 2009) (noting that mother had made a good faith effort to complete available services while incarcerated and had maintained a consistent, positive relationship to child); H.G. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 959 N.E.2d 272, 292–93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that father had made efforts to improve himself and secure an early release and had made an effort to rekindle his relationship with child), trans. denied. Here, Father had no bond with Children and had made no effort to work towards reunification or even see the Children. Father has shown no initiative to either better himself or have a relationship with Children. His circumstances are not similar to those of any of the parents in K.E., G.Y., J.M., or H.G.

[49] In challenging the juvenile court's determination that termination of his parental rights was in the Children's best interests, Father argues that “the Court should not speculate or make assumptions regarding Father, even if the Children are currently placed in [(sic)] with an excellent caregiver[;]” “[e]ven if Father has a history with law enforcement, he is still the Children's father, and is merely asking for additional time during which his Children will remain safe in the care of the maternal aunt[;]” and “Father simply seeks additional time to secure the mere opportunity to reunify with his Children.” Appellant's Br. pp. 36, 37. Father's arguments effectively amount to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.⁴ See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[50] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   C.B. (“Mother”) consented to the Children's adoption and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Father was facing additional criminal charges.

3.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again effective July 1, 2025. DCS filed its petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child on January 30, 2025. Although Father cites to a prior version of the statute in his appellate brief, we apply the version of the statute in effect at the time DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights.

4.   We are unpersuaded by Father's unsupported assertion that termination proceedings were premature because he had not participated in the underlying CHINS proceedings.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.