LLC v. Rodney Brown, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Rodney Brown was unable to secure financing, Picasso Imports, LLC (“Picasso”) retained the deposit that Brown had paid to purchase a vehicle from Picasso. Brown brought suit against Picasso, seeking the return of his deposit, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Brown. Picasso argues that the trial court erred, but the designated evidence fails to demonstrate that an agreement allowed Picasso to retain Brown's deposit. The designated evidence, however, does establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding Brown's unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on that claim.

Issue

[2] Picasso raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Brown.

Facts

[3] On December 30, 2024, Brown visited Picasso's car dealership regarding a vehicle that Picasso had advertised on Facebook. Brown paid a $4,500 deposit on the vehicle and signed a document “that included credit authorization and payment estimate terms.”¹ Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 54. Brown, however, was unable to obtain the documentation that the lender was requesting, and Picasso refused to return Brown's $4,500 deposit. Picasso's office contained posted signs stating, “NO REFUNDS,” “ALL SALES ARE FINAL,” and “NO EXCHANGES.”² Id. at 53.

[4] In January 2025, Brown filed a small claims action against Picasso. When Picasso demanded a jury trial, the matter was transferred to Superior Court. In July 2025, Picasso filed a motion for summary judgment and designation of evidence, which included Brown's deposition and the affidavit of Hamza Chetoui, who is the owner of Picasso. Picasso argued, in part, that its policy of non-refundability was disclosed on the signs posted in the office. Brown filed a response and argued, in part, that he did not sign any document stating that the deposit was non-refundable.

[5] The trial court granted summary judgment to Brown and ordered Picasso to pay $4,500 plus interest and court costs to Brown. The trial court concluded that:

Even if the Plaintiff saw the signs, the Court finds that a reasonable person may not understand the intent of the signs. Considering all the signs together, it appears that “REFUNDS” only refer to “SALES,” not to credit applications. Also, the Defendant's reliance on Ind. Code 26-1-2-316 is clearly not analogous. Furthermore, the Plaintiff never signed any document informing him that he would forfeit his $4,500 payment. This Court rules that Defendant's posted signs by themselves are not sufficient to create an enforceable, binding agreement.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. Further, the trial court entered summary judgment for Brown on his unjust enrichment claim. Picasso now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Picasso challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Brown. “We review summary judgment decisions de novo, and Trial Rule 56(C) supplies the framework.” Cave Quarries, Inc. v. Warex LLC, 240 N.E.3d 681, 684 (Ind. 2024). “The moving party is entitled to summary judgment only if the evidence it designates in support of its motion ‘shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. at 684-85 (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). The purpose of summary judgment is to withdraw issues from the jury only when there are no genuine material factual issues for the jury to decide. Id. at 685. “Summary judgment is available when the nonmovant cannot prove its claim based on the undisputed evidence[.]” Id.

[7] The summary judgment movant has the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party which must then show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom ․ in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.

[8] “We limit our review to the materials designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res., 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018). Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we also reiterate that findings of fact and conclusions thereon entered by the trial court aid our review, but they do not bind us. In re Supervised Estate of Kent, 99 N.E.3d 634, 637 (Ind. 2018).

[9] Picasso argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Brown ³ because Brown failed to designate any evidence in response to Picasso's motion for summary judgment. Indiana Trial Rule 56(C), however, provides: “Summary judgment shall not be granted as of course because the opposing party fails to offer opposing affidavits or evidence, but the court shall make its determination from the evidentiary matter designated to the court.” Accordingly, Picasso was not automatically entitled to summary judgment because Brown failed to file a designation of evidence; Picasso still had the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[10] This case requires that we determine whether the parties had an agreement regarding the refundability of the deposit. “Interpretation and construction of contract provisions are questions of law.” B&R Oil Co., Inc. v. Stoler, 77 N.E.3d 823, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing John M. Abbott, LLC v. Lake City Bank, 14 N.E.3d 53, 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)), trans. denied. “As such, cases involving contract interpretation are particularly appropriate for summary judgment.” Id. “[B]ecause the interpretation of a contract presents a question of law, it is reviewed de novo by this court.” Id. (citing Jenkins v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 982 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied).

[11] “An offer, acceptance, consideration, and manifestation of mutual assent establish the existence of a contract.” Bennett v. Broderick, 858 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “There must be mutual assent or a meeting of the minds on all essential elements or terms in order to form a binding contract.” Jernas v. Gumz, 53 N.E.3d 434, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “In addition, to be valid and enforceable, a contract must be reasonably definite and certain.” Id.

[12] It is undisputed that there is no written contract here between Picasso and Brown signed by the parties that establishes the non-refundability of the deposit. Picasso relies solely upon the signs posted in its office, which stated: “NO REFUNDS,” “ALL SALES ARE FINAL,” and “NO EXCHANGES.”⁴ These signs, however, do not establish an agreement that Picasso was entitled to retain Brown's deposit in the event he was unable to obtain financing and complete the transaction. Taken together, the signs merely indicate that completed sales are final and no refunds or exchanges will be given. Picasso failed to demonstrate an enforceable contract between Picasso and Brown regarding the non-refundability of a deposit for a sale that was never completed.

[13] Next, Picasso argues that Brown was not entitled to summary judgment on his unjust enrichment claim. “Unjust enrichment operates when there is no governing contract.” DiMizio v. Romo, 756 N.E.2d 1018, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. An unjust enrichment claim “ ‘requires a party who has been unjustly enriched at another's expense to make restitution to the aggrieved party.’ ” Andrew Nemeth Props., LLC v. Panzica, 271 N.E.3d 1100, 1114 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 296 (Ind. 2012)). “To prevail, the plaintiff must show ‘that he rendered a benefit to the defendant at the defendant's express or implied request, that the plaintiff expected payment from the defendant, and that allowing the defendant to retain the benefit without restitution would be unjust.’ ” Id. (quoting Reed, 980 N.E.2d at 296).

[14] Picasso argues that it incurred administrative costs that defeat Brown's unjust enrichment claim, entitling Picasso to the entire deposit. Picasso designated evidence that it “incurred administrative and labor costs in processing Mr. Brown's financing, including [e.g., staff time, third-party credit report fees, and removal of the vehicle from active sale].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 54. The trial court found that Picasso “did not document any of those expenses and did not assign any monetary value to those expenses. Nevertheless, it is hard to fathom that those alleged expenses amounted to any amount at all close to $4,500.” Id. at 9.

[15] This designated evidence fails to establish that Picasso was entitled to summary judgment on Brown's claim. Although Picasso's affidavit is perfunctory and self-serving, the affidavit establishes a genuine issue of material fact regarding Brown's unjust enrichment claim. As such, neither Picasso nor Brown was entitled to summary judgment on this claim. See, e.g., Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 2014) (holding that a self-serving and perfunctory affidavit was “sufficient, though minimally so, to raise a factual issue to be resolved at trial, and thus to defeat the State's summary-judgment motion”). Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for further proceedings regarding the unjust enrichment claim.

Conclusion

[16] Picasso failed to establish an agreement between the parties entitling Picasso to retain the deposit. We conclude, however, that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Brown on his unjust enrichment claim because genuine issues of material fact exist. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

[17] Reversed and remanded.

[18] I concur in part and dissent in part. I fully concur with the majority's conclusion that Picasso failed to demonstrate an enforceable contract between Picasso and Brown regarding the non-refundability of the deposit. However, I disagree with the majority's holding that Brown was not entitled to summary judgment on his claim for unjust enrichment.

[19] In order for Brown to prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, he was required to show that “a measurable benefit has been conferred on the defendant under such circumstances that the defendant's retention of the benefit without payment would be unjust.” Zoeller v. E. Chicago Second Century, Inc., 904 N.E.2d 213, 220 (Ind. 2009). In support of its motion for summary judgment, Picasso designated as evidence portions of Brown's deposition and an affidavit of Hamza Chetoui, the owner of Picasso. In that affidavit, Chetoui stated that, following receipt of the deposit, the staff “ran Mr. Brown's credit and began processing the necessary paperwork[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 54. Chetoui further stated that the vehicle was removed from the floor and that Picasso “incurred administrative and labor costs” in preparing Brown's financing. Id.

[20] The majority concludes that that affidavit is nonetheless sufficient to defeat summary judgment in Brown's favor. I disagree. There is nothing in that affidavit, or indeed any of the designated material, to suggest that those costs cited in the affidavit were incurred in anything other than the normal course of business. Further, we agree with the trial court that Picasso “did not document any of those expenses and did not assign any monetary value to those expenses” in order to justify keeping Brown's $4,500. Id. at 9.

[21] Rather, the designated evidence shows that Brown conferred a benefit upon Picasso when he paid the $4,500 down payment. And there is no evidence that Brown received a benefit in exchange for that downpayment.⁵ The fact that Picasso incurred routine administrative expenses in its usual course of business as a car dealership does not equate to a benefit on Brown.

[22] Further, Merriam-Webster defines the word “down payment” as “a part of the full price paid at the time of purchase or delivery with the balance to be paid later.” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/down%20payment [https://perma.cc/HVT6-SFSX]. Thus, a down payment is paid by the buyer with the expectation that the buyer would receive the goods and pay the remainder of the balance owed. Here, had Brown been able to complete the purchase of the car, there is no doubt that he would have received a benefit for his down payment. But, where, as here, the purchase was not completed, Brown did not receive any benefit from his down payment. Despite the lack of benefit to Brown, Picasso received substantial benefits—it received $4,500 for a car that remained in its inventory and was able to be sold to another buyer plus the potential interest Picasso earned while holding Brown's money. And Picasso has not designated any evidence to demonstrate that it is entitled to retain the down payment, even if to cover administrative costs, when Brown received no corresponding benefit from that payment.

[23] It was Picasso's burden, as summary judgment movant, to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was entitled to keep Brown's money. I do not agree that Picasso met that burden. On the contrary, I agree with the trial court that the designated evidence demonstrates a lack of genuine issues of material fact and that Brown is entitled to summary judgment on his unjust enrichment claim. As such, I would affirm the trial court's order in its entirety.

[24] I concur in part and dissent in part.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This document is not included in the summary judgment materials. Although Picasso repeatedly cites to this document as a basis for retaining the deposit, there is no indication in the record that the document authorized the retention of the deposit.

2.   The designated evidence does not demonstrate the size or location of the signs.

3.   Although Brown did not file a cross motion for summary judgment, Indiana Trial Rule 56(B) provides: “When any party has moved for summary judgment, the court may grant summary judgment for any other party upon the issues raised by the motion although no motion for summary judgment is filed by such party.”

4.   Picasso's citation to Indiana Code Section 24-5-0.5-3 is unpersuasive. This statute concerns deceptive acts by a supplier in a consumer transaction. Picasso fails to explain how this statute allows Picasso to retain Brown's deposit.

5.   We reject Picasso's assertion that it was a “benefit” for Brown to have his credit run. To the contrary, Brown testified in his deposition that “all the hits [Picasso] put on [his] credit actually decreased [his] credit score.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 47.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Kenworthy, J., concurs. Bailey, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.