IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of E.B. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] P.B. (“Father”) appeals the Vigo Circuit Court's termination of his parental rights over his minor child E.B. (“Child”). Father presents a single dispositive issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that the termination of his parental rights is in Child's best interests.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and M.B. (“Mother”)¹ have one child together, Child, who was born September 12, 2023. While she was pregnant with Child, Mother did not seek prenatal care, and she used methamphetamine. A test conducted on the umbilical cord after Child's birth was “positive for methamphetamine.” Tr. p. 48. Child was placed in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (“NICU”) after his birth.

[4] In the hospital, Mother “was acting erratically” and appeared to be “under the influence” of a substance. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 96. Accordingly, someone contacted the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) to report those concerns as well as concerns that “Mother did not have necessary supplies for the child” at home. Id. Father was living in Florida at the time of Child's birth but returned to Indiana a few days later. Father was not permitted to visit with Child in the NICU.

[5] On September 27, DCS removed Child from Mother's care, and, on September 28, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Father and Mother later admitted that Child was a CHINS, and the trial court adjudicated him as such. Following a dispositional hearing, the trial court ordered Father to, among other things, undergo a substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations; submit to drug screens; participate in a fatherhood engagement program; participate in visits with Child; and complete a parenting assessment and participate in any recommended program.

[6] Father continued to live in Florida, and DCS offered him virtual visits with Child twice per week. Father participated in those visits, started a fatherhood engagement program, and participated in virtual family team meetings with DCS. But, in January 2024, Father was arrested for “Trafficking in Fentanyl 4 grams or more,” among other offenses, and he was incarcerated in Florida until May 17. Ex. p. 26. During his incarceration, Father was unable to visit with Child.

[7] After his release, Father moved back to Indiana, and he began supervised in-person visits with Child. Father participated in two substance abuse rehabilitation programs, one for four weeks and a second program for three weeks. However, Father did not fully engage in court-ordered services. And Father “threatened [the family case manager] and other providers on different occasions through text messages and voicemails.” Tr. p. 32. In October 2024, Father was arrested on two counts of battery, and he was incarcerated in Putnam County. After his release, he spent another month in a substance abuse rehabilitation program, but he did not complete the program. Father subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of Level 6 felony battery and served a 730-day sentence with 240 days executed and 490 days suspended to probation.

[8] In January 2025, DCS filed petitions to terminate Father's and Mother's parental rights over Child. During an evidentiary hearing on those petitions, Madison Stuck, the family case manager, testified that Father had unsuccessfully completed a father engagement program because of threats Father had made to one provider and his noncompliance in another program. At the time of the hearing, Father's participation in father engagement was “on hold” because the provider could not reach Father. Id. at 23. Stuck testified that Father had not completed either a parenting assessment or a substance abuse evaluation. And Father did not provide Stuck with documentation that he had participated in any of the three rehabilitation programs he identified in his testimony.

[9] Father's participation in drug screens was grossly deficient. While he tested negative in March 2025, on the heels of his release from incarceration, Father otherwise tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine on every screen taken. Stuck testified that, while Father had engaged in virtual visits with Child when he lived in Florida, after he moved back to Indiana Father was “not compliant” with visits with Child. Id. at 30. Father did not regularly attend family meetings, and he did not attend a family meeting that was held one week prior to the final hearing. Finally, Stuck testified that Father had not verified either his residence or employment.

[10] Following the hearing, the trial court issued findings and conclusions in support of terminating Father's parental rights over Child. The trial court found in relevant part that Child had never lived with Father; that Father had not completed any ordered services; that Father had not visited with Child since April 2025; and that both Stuck and the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) believed that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. The court concluded that it is reasonably probable that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and led to the continued placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied; that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests; and that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care of Child, namely, adoption. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[12] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[13] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required, in relevant part, to prove that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3) (2024).

[14] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[15] Father's sole argument on appeal is that DCS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights over Child is in Child's best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id.

[16] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has held that recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[17] Father argues that his recent sobriety, his employment and housing, and his devotion to Child prove that termination of his parental rights is not in Child's best interests. But Father's argument is a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appeal.

[18] Two-and-a-half-year-old Child has lived in foster care since his birth. DCS presented evidence that Father has not demonstrated the ability to care for Child. Father has failed to complete any court-ordered services, he has not maintained sobriety for any meaningful period of time, and he has been incarcerated twice since Child was born. Child needs stability and permanency that Father is not able to provide. The DCS family case manager and CASA agreed that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment on this issue, and we affirm the court's termination of Father's parental rights over Child.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated Mother's parental rights over Child, but Mother does not participate in this appeal.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.