WILSON v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Robert P. Wilson appeals pro se the Marion Superior Court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Wilson presents five issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as two issues:

1. Whether he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.

2. Whether the post-conviction court abused its discretion when it denied certain discovery requests.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The facts underlying Wilson's convictions for murder and carrying a handgun without a license were stated by our Court in his direct appeal:

On the evening of February 26, 2006, Wilson, Eric Burdine, Jr. (Burdine), and William Berry (Berry) spent time together, socializing and drinking. They first gathered at the home of Lepoleon Trodder (Trodder), at 33rd Street and Denny in Indianapolis, Indiana, where they were joined by Eric Searcy (Searcy). At some point during this visit, while Wilson, Burdine, and Berry sat in Berry's car, Wilson lit a cigarette. Berry warned Wilson several times not to get any ashes on his jacket or he would break Wilson's jaw. While Burdine understood Berry's comment to be a joke, Burdine thought Wilson took it seriously.

Eventually, the group, including Trodder and Searcy, went to the home of Laquita Brown (Brown), located at 5251 East 27th Street. The group gathered in front of Brown's house and continued drinking. Around 10:00 p.m. that night, the men broke up and started departing. Burdine and Berry were standing shoulder to shoulder, facing towards the front of Berry's car. Wilson walked around the back of the vehicle. Suddenly, Burdine heard shots being fired. When he turned, he saw Wilson firing several shots at Berry. Berry collapsed and later died of the gunshot wounds.

After Wilson shot Berry, Wilson called out to Burdine to leave with him in his car. In the car, Wilson repeatedly told Burdine that “he had to do it” and asked if Burdine was “mad at him.” (Transcript p. 145). Wilson drove to the house of Rochelle, “Big Bird,” where he left the gun. (Tr. p. 148). Then, he drove Burdine to his parent's house. On March 9, 2006, Burdine surrendered to police and gave a statement. The police never recovered the gun used in Berry's shooting.

On March 17, 2006, the State filed an Information, charging Wilson with Count I, murder, a felony, I.C. § 35-42-1-1; Count II, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35-47-4-5; and Count III, carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor. On May 19, 2006, the State amended its Information, by adding a habitual offender enhancement, I.C. § 35-50-2-8. On February 11 and 12, 2008, a jury trial was held. At the close of the evidence, the jury found Wilson guilty of murder, a felony and carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor. The State dismissed the remaining Counts. On February 29, 2008, during the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Wilson to sixty years for murder and a term of three hundred and sixty-five days for carrying a handgun without a license, with sentences to run concurrently.

Wilson v. State, No. 49A02-0804-CR-305, 2008 WL 4938428, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2008). On appeal, Wilson argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the State to introduce certain evidence. We affirmed his convictions.

[4] Wilson filed a petition for post-conviction relief and amended it several times. He filed his final amended petition in March 2023, and he alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Wilson alleged that Burdine, who testified against him at trial, had received a deal with the prosecutor to ignore Burdine's probation violations in exchange for his testimony. And Wilson argued that his trial counsel should have impeached Burdine using that evidence. In support, Wilson submitted an affidavit executed by Burdine as well as transcripts of Burdine's recorded statement to a detective and Burdine's probation violation proceedings.

[5] In preparation for the hearing on his petition, Wilson sought a subpoena for Detective Leinberger (the detective who allegedly knew about a deal for Burdine's testimony), and Wilson sought a motion to compel answers to interrogatories he had submitted to three witnesses. The post-conviction court denied both motions. During the evidentiary hearing, Wilson's trial counsel testified that she did not know whether Burdine had received any benefit for his testimony, but she testified that she would have questioned Burdine about a deal if there had been one. The lead deputy prosecutor who had represented the State at Wilson's trial testified that there had been no deal for Burdine's testimony. Following the hearing, the post-conviction court denied Wilson's petition. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[6] Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a defendant may present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b); Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019). The scope of potential relief is limited to issues unknown at trial or unavailable on direct appeal. See Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681. “Issues available on direct appeal but not raised are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata.” Id. (quoting Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012)). The defendant bears the burden to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. See P-C.R. 1(5). And a defendant appealing from a negative judgment denying post-conviction relief “must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post conviction court's decision.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000)).

[7] Here, the post-conviction court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). Therefore, we will reverse the findings and judgment “only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682 (Ind. 2017)). And we will not reweigh the evidence. See Bradbury v. State, 180 N.E.3d 249, 252 (Ind. 2022) (explaining the post-conviction court is the “sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses”) (citation omitted).

Issue One: Trial Counsel

[8] Wilson claims that the post-conviction court erred when it concluded that he was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. “[C]ounsel's performance is presumed effective, and a defendant must offer strong and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption.” Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138, 1147 (Ind. 2010) (citing Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000)).

When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009). To satisfy the first prong, “the defendant must show deficient performance: representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). To satisfy the second prong, “the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable probability (i.e.[,] a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682 (Ind. 2017). Failure to satisfy either of the two prongs will cause the claim to fail. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002). Most ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone. Id.

[9] On appeal, Wilson argues that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because his counsel did not impeach Burdine with evidence that he had received a deal in exchange for his testimony against Wilson. In support, Wilson maintains that four exhibits support his contention that Burdine received a benefit from the prosecutor in exchange for his testimony against Wilson at his trial. Wilson's Exhibit A is Burdine's affidavit, which states that Burdine “made a [deal] with the State to testify against Robert Wilson in exchange for not being violated for my probation violations.” Ex. p. 3 (brackets original). The post-conviction court found that Burdine's affidavit was not credible, and we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal.

[10] Wilson's Exhibit B is his “Request for Admissions” that he submitted to the State, and which the State did not answer. Generally, Wilson sought the State's admission that Burdine had received a deal in exchange for his testimony against Wilson. The post-conviction court found and concluded in relevant part as follows:

Wilson appears to contend that the State failed to respond to the Request for Admissions and therefore the Request for admissions are [sic] deemed to be admitted per T.R. 36. The primary flaw in his argument is that the Court denied the request for admissions on June 6, 2024, and thus the State cannot be deemed to have admitted a discovery request that was denied by the Court. Moreover, and perhaps more to the point, a simple review of ․ Wilson's filing shows that each “request” i[s] phrased as “the Petitioner offers to stipulate․” Thus, the Court finds that the Request for Admissions were [sic], in fact, not requests for admissions at all, rather they were offers to stipulate to various issues and the State has no obligation to agree to stipulate to anything. Perigo v. State, 541 N.E.2d 936, 940 (Ind. 1989) (“A party may refuse to stipulate to any facts”); State v. Lewis, 883 N.E.2d 847, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Consequently, the Court finds that Wilson's Request for Admissions has no legal effect, and therefore his argument is misplaced.

Appellant's App. Vol. 3, p. 97.

[11] It is well settled that a trial court enjoys “ ‘broad discretion with regard to rulings on discovery matters based upon its duties to promote discovery of the truth and to guide and control the proceedings.’ ” Garrett v. Nissan of Lafayette, LLC, 216 N.E.3d 496, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting State v. McKinney, 82 N.E.3d 290, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)). Wilson has not shown that the post-conviction court abused its discretion either in denying the request for admissions or in disregarding the unanswered requests as evidence.

[12] Wilson's Exhibit C consists of transcripts of Burdine's probation revocation hearings, and his Exhibit D is the transcript of Wilson's trial. Neither of those exhibits support Wilson's contention that Burdine had given testimony in exchange for a deal on his probation violations.

[13] Without any credible evidence to show that Burdine received a deal from the prosecutor in exchange for his testimony, Wilson has not met his burden of establishing that his trial counsel's performance was deficient. The post-conviction court did not err when it concluded that Wilson was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.

Issue Two: Discovery

[14] Wilson also argues that the post-conviction court abused its discretion when it denied his subpoena for Detective Leinberger. Wilson maintains that Detective Leinberger would have confirmed that the prosecutor had promised Burdine leniency with respect to probation violations in exchange for testimony against Wilson at his trial. However, in his brief on appeal, Wilson does not support his argument with citations to the record. Without any evidentiary support that Detective Leinberger's testimony would have been relevant to the evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction petition, and given the contrary evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, we cannot say that the post-conviction court abused its discretion when it denied the subpoena request.

[15] Finally, Wilson argues that the post-conviction court abused its discretion when it denied his request to compel interrogatories. However, again, Wilson has not provided any citation to the record. And, in any event, Wilson does not identify to whom the interrogatories were propounded, and he does not describe the substance of the interrogatories. Without any cogent argument, Wilson has not met his burden on this issue. In addition, as the State points out, Wilson propounded the interrogatories to nonparties, who were not required to respond. See Ind. Trial Rule 33(A).

Conclusion

[16] Wilson has not met his burden of establishing that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Neither did Wilson show that the post-conviction court abused its discretion when it ruled on discovery matters. We therefore affirm the order denying Wilson post-conviction relief.

[17] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.