HAWKINS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Erik Brandon Jackson Hawkins appeals his conviction for domestic battery, a Level 5 felony, claiming that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence of his prior conviction for domestic battery “in Phase I of the trial, rather than in Phase II, of what should have been a bifurcated trial.” Appellant's Brief at 4. Hawkins argues that he was prejudiced by this evidence and that his right to a fair trial was violated.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 18, 2023, Hawkins and his girlfriend, W.H., were visiting Jerry Ingram at his Elkhart apartment. Hawkins and W.H. had been arguing and at some point, Hawkins told W.H. that she “needed to leave.” Transcript Vol. II at 43, 51–52. As W.H. stood up and started to walk away, Ingram told her to stay. When W.H. sat down, Hawkins “out of nowhere” struck W.H. on her forehead. Id. at 53–54. He hit W.H. again and pulled her hair.

[4] When Hawkins ended the attack, W.H. escaped through the back door of the apartment. Shortly thereafter, W.H.’s father picked her up, and W.H. called the police from her father's house and reported the incident. Officer Eon Johnson of the Elkhart Police Department responded to the call and obtained W.H.’s statement about what had occurred at Ingram's apartment. Officer Johnson observed that W.H. had blood on her nose and shirt, scrapes on her knees, and scratches and bruises on her face.

[5] On September 22, 2023, the State charged Hawkins with domestic battery, a class A misdemeanor, and strangulation, a Level 6 felony. The State further alleged that Hawkins had a prior conviction for domestic battery against W.H., thus elevating the charge to a Level 5 felony.

[6] Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to introduce “404(b) evidence,” because a domestic violence event had occurred between Hawkins and W.H. two months prior to the May 18 episode. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 29-31. The trial court determined that it would rule on admissibility when the evidence was offered.

[7] During the trial, the State asked W.H. about the earlier incident. Hawkins objected, claiming that such evidence was “overly prejudicial.” Transcript Vol. II at 44. The State responded that Hawkins and W.H. were in a “hostile relationship” and that it was offering the evidence to establish motive. Id. at 45. The trial court overruled Hawkins's objection and permitted the State to question W.H. about the “act itself, not anything beyond that as far as what happened legally.” Id.

[8] W.H. testified that on St. Patrick's Day in 2023, Hawkins pulled her out of a chair and “dropped [her] on [her] head on the concrete floor.” Id. at 47. W.H. further testified that it “hurt,” that she had a “bump” on her head from the incident, and that she had called the police. Id. at 47-48.

[9] The State also called Officer Thomas Cripe of the Elkhart City Police Department as a “404(b) witness.” Id. at 98, 100. Officer Cripe testified that he had responded to the call on St. Patrick's Day, that he had observed injuries on W.H., that she was taken to the hospital, and that he had arrested Hawkins. Hawkins did not object to Officer Cripe's testimony.

[10] Following the State's presentation of evidence, Hawkins testified and acknowledged that he had an altercation with W.H. on St. Patrick's Day in 2023. On cross-examination, the State asked Hawkins if “there was another incident in March of 2023.” Id. at 205. In response, Hawkins testified that he had “committed domestic battery” against W.H. in March 2023, and that he “went to jail for that.” Id. at 206–07. Hawkins, however, denied that he had injured W.H. and further testified that “[s]he didn't even get hurt. We [were] laughing and joking that day.” Id. at 210. When the State asked Hawkins which version of the events was true, Hawkins responded

What I'm saying is that's what the courts—that's how it goes when it goes to the court. You know, this—if I touched her, it's ‘cuz ․ that's what she says, and I have to go ․ along with that, right? Like, the same thing that's going on now, you know?

Id. at 211.

[11] In response, the prosecutor replied, “I guess I don't know,” and Hawkins continued:

Well, you are the court ․ [a]nd I'm sitting here being ․ [p]rosecuted, right? I'm sitting here and I plead guilty, that's what goes along with it. You have to plead guilt—you know, if—you don't have to plead guilty, but you plead guilty, and that's what comes along with it, right?

Id. at 211-12. The State then asked Hawkins about his guilty plea, and Hawkins admitted to pleading guilty to domestic battery as a result of the earlier March 2023 incident. Hawkins did not object to the questioning.

[12] Following the presentation of evidence, the jury found Hawkins guilty of domestic battery and not guilty of strangulation. Hawkins then admitted to the previous domestic battery conviction, and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on the present offense as a Level 5 felony. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Hawkins to five years of incarceration at the Indiana Department of Correction.

[13] Hawkins now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Ind. Code § 35-34-1-2.5 (the Bifurcation Statute) provides that “if the penalty for an offense is, by the terms of the statute, increased because the person was previously convicted of the offense, the state may seek to have the person sentenced to receive the increased penalty by alleging, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, that the person was previously convicted of the offense.” One of the purposes of bifurcation “is to keep prior convictions away from the jury in their initial determination of guilt for the substantive crime charged.” Russell v. State, 997 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind. 2013) (emphasis added). We generally review a claim that the trial court did not properly bifurcate a trial for an abuse of discretion. Id.

[15] Below, Hawkins objected to evidence that related to the prior battery solely on the grounds that the admission of that evidence was prejudicial and inadmissible in accordance with Indiana Trial Rules 403 and 404. As Hawkins contends for the first time on appeal that the admission of this evidence violated his rights to a fair trial under the Bifurcation Statute, the issue is waived. See, e.g., Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Ind. 2010) (holding that a party may not add to or change the grounds for objections in the reviewing court).

[16] Because Hawkins failed to preserve this claim for review, he acknowledges that he may prevail only if fundamental error occurred. Carter v. State, 754 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind. 2001). Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule that applies when the error is “so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” Munford v. State, 923 N.E.2d 11, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The trial court's actions must “constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. at 14.

[17] Hawkins asserts that fundamental error occurred because the State improperly established during the first phase of the trial that he had been previously convicted of domestic battery. The testimony regarding the prior battery was presented when W.H. testified about what Hawkins did to her in March 2023, along with Officer Cripe's testimony that he arrested Hawkins after observing W.H.’s injuries. Neither W.H. nor Officer Cripe testified about Hawkins being charged or convicted of any offense.

[18] Rather, the only evidence of Hawkins's prior conviction was his own voluntary testimony. More specifically, when Hawkins's counsel asked him on direct examination whether he “had an altercation” with W.H. in March 2023, he admitted that he did. Transcript Vol. II at 197. And on cross-examination, Hawkins testified that he “went to jail” for that offense. Id. at 206. It was only when Hawkins began to deny the prior assault later during his testimony that the State mentioned his conviction for the offense. It was not impermissible for the State to do so. See, e.g., Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 27 n.1 (Ind. 2011) (holding that when a defendant volunteers information on a subject, he may open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence on that subject).

[19] Finally, to the extent that Hawkins's argument could be construed as a challenge to the admissibility of the State's T.R. 404(b) evidence, it is well established that “where a relationship between parties is characterized by frequent conflict, evidence of the defendant's prior assaults and confrontations with the victim may be admitted to show the relationship between the parties and motive for committing the crime.” Iqbal v. State, 805 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. When prior acts of domestic violence are directed against the same partner, evidence of the prior acts is admissible and demonstrates the defendant's hostility toward the partner. Whitham v. State, 49 N.E.3d 162, 166-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. And evidence of motive “is always relevant in the proof of a crime.” Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2002).

[20] Here, the State offered evidence of the prior incident of violence against W.H. to show motive by establishing the volatile nature of their relationship. The trial court was within its discretion to admit that evidence to show the nature of the relationship between Hawkins and W.H. See Iqbal, 805 N.E.2d at 408.

[21] In sum, Hawkins has failed to establish that the trial court erred—much less that it committed fundamental error—in admitting evidence of Hawkins's prior conviction for domestic battery. At no time did the State during its case-in-chief establish that Hawkins had been charged and convicted of the prior domestic battery offense against W.H. Rather, it was Hawkins who admitted that he had been convicted of the prior offense. For these reasons, we reject Hawkins's contention that he was denied his right to a fair trial.

Altice, Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.