IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: L.T. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] L.T. (“Child”) is the biological child of B.T. (“Mother”). Child was adjudicated a CHINS based on Mother's substance abuse, and although Mother engaged in several treatment programs and had periods of sobriety, Mother continued to relapse. The trial court ultimately terminated Mother's parental rights to Child. Mother now challenges that termination and presents one issue for our review, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born to Mother in August 2013. Child has virtually no relationship with his father, who has been incarcerated most of Child's life.¹

[4] In 2019, Mother was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance. Mother was placed on probation, where she remained for at least the next six years. Five petitions to revoke probation were filed due to Mother testing positive for illegal drugs and committing new offenses.² Mother also served three terms of incarceration during this time.

[5] In 2020, Child was removed from Mother and was adjudicated a CHINS based, in part, on Mother's substance abuse. That same year, Mother was convicted of dealing in methamphetamine. During the ensuing CHINS proceedings, Mother initially tested positive for methamphetamine, did not submit to regular drug screening, and was not making progress in treatment. By July 2022, however, Mother was nine months sober, engaging in treatment, and Child was returned to her care. In August 2022, the CHINS case was closed.

[6] In the summer of 2023, Child was again removed from Mother and was adjudicated a CHINS based on Mother's methamphetamine use, unstable housing, and domestic violence in the home. Mother was ordered, in part, not to use illegal drugs and to submit to drug screening, participate in substance abuse treatment, engage in services, follow the conditions of her probation, and obtain stable income and suitable housing.

[7] By September 2023, Mother was engaging in inpatient treatment and testing negative for illegal drugs. Thereafter, however, Mother was “discharged as incomplete” from the inpatient program and missed drug screens in November and December. Ex. Vol. I at 67. Mother then tested positive for methamphetamine several times in early 2024. In May 2024, the trial court adopted a concurrent plan of terminating Mother's parental rights and adoption. Mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine and missed drug screens over the next few months.

[8] In October 2024, Mother began participating in a Seeking Safety program. Although the program was designed to last 12 weeks, Mother took 5 1/212 months to graduate due to inconsistent attendance. January through March 2025, while Mother was in the program, she tested positive for methamphetamine, but Mother did not inform the program instructor of these results. The program instructor referred Mother for moral reconation therapy after Mother graduated, but had Mother informed her of the positive screens, the instructor would have recommended Mother engage in inpatient treatment.

[9] In February 2025, DCS petitioned for involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights. After Mother tested positive for methamphetamine that March, she attempted to enroll in an inpatient treatment program, but the program was not covered by her insurance. Mother then enrolled in a 52-week home-based treatment program. Thereafter, DCS recommended that Mother enroll in an inpatient treatment program at DCS's expense, but Mother declined.

[10] Mother and Child had a strong and loving bond. Child felt “protective” of Mother and “responsible” for her “wellbeing.” Tr. Vol. I at 111.³ Child looked forward to visits with Mother, but due to Mother's positive drug screens, visits went “back and forth” between intermittent and fully supervised numerous times, id. at 174, which caused Child stress and frustration. Mother also missed several visits and therapy sessions.

[11] In May 2025, the trial court held factfinding hearings on the termination of parental rights petition. Mother's probation officer testified that despite yearly periods of treatment and supervision—including inpatient and outpatient programs and day reporting—Mother was unable to sustain sobriety without being monitored. Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Tiffany Cooney testified she did not believe it was reasonable to expect the conditions that resulted in Child's removal to be remedied due to Mother's “limited times of sobriety ․ with then having lapses in her sobriety.” Tr. Vol. I at 201. FCM Cooney recommended termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption by Child's foster placement to ensure stability and permanency in Child's life.

[12] The Court Appointed Special Advocate (the “CASA”) largely agreed with DCS. The CASA did not believe the reasons for removal had been remedied because, based on Mother's positive drug screens in early 2025 and recent enrollment in treatment, Mother was “just starting on th[e] path to get better.” Tr. Vol. I at 168. The CASA believed it was in Child's best interests “to have a safe, stable life” and be adopted by his foster placement. Id. at 177.

[13] Mother testified that she had not used illegal drugs since March 2025 and was still participating in the home-based program and moral reconation therapy. Mother was no longer involved with her abusive former boyfriend, and she requested that the trial court “allow [her] more time” to achieve sobriety. Tr. Vol. I at 238.

[14] After the hearings, the trial court issued an order concluding there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal would not be remedied and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. The trial court accordingly terminated Mother's parental rights over Child. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Mother's Parental Rights over Child Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[15] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over Child. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[16] As relevant here, to terminate Mother's parental rights under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c) (effective March 11, 2024, to June 30, 2025), DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, id. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d)(3); and (2) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests, id. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous if the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, Mother does not challenge the trial court's factual findings, so we accept those findings as true. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.

a. Remediation of Reasons for Removal or Placement

[17] Mother first challenges the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied. In reviewing the trial court's findings in this regard, we first “identify the conditions that led to removal” and then “determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re J.S., 133 N.E.3d 707, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643).

In the second step, the trial court must judge parental fitness as of the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the evidence of changed conditions. The trial court is entrusted with balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct. The trial court has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.

Id. at 715 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting and citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643).

[18] Here, the trial court found Child was removed due to Mother's substance use, unstable housing, and domestic violence from Mother's former boyfriend. The trial court acknowledged that the unstable housing and domestic violence had been largely addressed but found the “primary reason that the case had remained open with little forward progress” was Mother's continued substance use. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 18. The trial court concluded Mother's substance use was not likely to be remedied because Mother demonstrated a “use-treatment-sobriety-relapse pattern that has persisted for at least five years,” including through both CHINS cases, and there was “little evidence [Mother] can maintain long[-]term sobriety without the presence of constant monitoring.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 18.

[19] Mother argues that she was over two months sober at the time of the last termination of parental rights hearing, was engaging in the home-based program, and was “partially compliant” with the dispositional order. Appellant's Br. at 9. The trial court, however, was permitted to place more weight on Mother's habitual pattern of conduct than Mother's efforts made shortly before the termination of parental rights hearings. See J.S., 133 N.E.3d at 715 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643). Mother's argument is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. As the record stands now, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred by finding there was a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Child's removal would not be remedied.

b. Best Interests of Child

[20] Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights over Child is in Child's best interests. To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1235 (Ind. 2013)). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[21] Here, the trial court concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests because Mother's five-year cycle of substance use created instability and harmed Child's mental health and emotional development. Mother's substance abuse caused visits with Child to repeatedly bounce between intermittent and fully supervised status; Child could not predict the circumstances under which he would next see Mother and became frustrated with the lack of progress. Both FCM Cooney and the CASA testified that Child deserved stability and permanency that Mother could not provide.

[22] Mother argues that she and Child shared a close bond and that the family's former DCS-referred therapist ⁴ recommended that Child return to Mother when she could “consistently provide a safe environment free from [ ] risk factors.” Tr. Vol. I at 39. The trial court recognized that termination of Mother's parental rights would be “difficult” for Child; however, the trial court placed more weight on “the long[-]term harm posed to [Child] ․ if the relationship and the instability were to continue.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 19. Mother's argument again requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). The trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination of Mother's parental rights over Child was in Child's best interests and did not clearly err in ordering those rights terminated. Accordingly, we affirm.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother was convicted of theft in 2020, counterfeiting in 2022, and battery in 2023.

3.   Indiana Appellate Rule 28 and Appendix A to the Appellate Rules require a court reporter to consecutively number the volumes of the Transcript, with the first volume containing only the Table of Contents. Ind. Appellate Rule 28(A), id. App. A(11)-(13), see also id. Form # App. R. 28-1. In this record, the Table of Contents and the first transcript of the hearings are both denoted “Transcript Volume I.” We use “Tr. Vol. I” to refer to the first transcript of the hearings.

4.   The therapist worked with Mother and Child until May 2024, when he relocated and accepted new employment. A different therapist took over thereafter.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.