MCCUSKER v. KINGSMILL HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION INC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Kevin McCusker (“McCusker”), pro se, appeals the trial court's order dismissing his complaint against Kingsmill Homeowner's Association, Inc. (“the HOA”). McCusker argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his complaint. Concluding that the trial court did not err, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred when it dismissed McCusker's complaint.

Facts 1

[3] The HOA was incorporated before 2009. McCusker owns a home in Fishers, Indiana, and the home is part of the HOA. In January 2024, McCusker developed plans to build solar panels in his yard (“the plans”), and he submitted the plans to the HOA for approval. The HOA's architectural review board denied McCusker's request, and soon after, the HOA's board of directors also voted to deny his request.

[4] McCusker filed a complaint against the HOA in July 2024. However, that case was dismissed by the trial court due to McCusker's “failure to satisfy the procedural requirements” of Indiana Code § 32-25.5, the article that covers homeowners associations (“the HOA article”). (App. Vol. 2 at 7). In November 2024, the HOA sent McCusker a notice of impasse letter, which satisfied the procedural requirements required before filing suit under the HOA article.

[5] In January 2025, McCusker filed a second complaint, which is the complaint at issue in this appeal. In his complaint, McCusker asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. McCusker asserted that Indiana Code § 32-25.5-3.5 (“the solar energy chapter”) applied to the HOA and that the HOA was violating the solar energy chapter by prohibiting him from installing solar panels in his yard. Concerning his request for declaratory and injunctive relief, McCusker specifically requested a declaratory judgment that provided that the HOA's denial of his plans to install solar panels violated the solar energy chapter and the HOA article. McCusker's complaint also requested that the HOA be permanently enjoined from taking any further action that prevented him from installing solar panels pursuant to the plans. In his complaint, McCusker also asked the trial court to order the HOA to approve the plans.

[6] The HOA filed a motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). In its motion, the HOA argued that the HOA article did not apply to it. Specifically, the HOA noted that the HOA article explicitly provided which homeowners associations that the HOA article applied to in Indiana Code § 32-25.5-1-1 (“the applicability statute”), and that the HOA did not fall under any of the applicability provisions. The HOA also noted that the HOA article, in a separate subsection of the applicability statute, expressly listed portions of the HOA article that apply to all homeowners associations and that the solar energy chapter is not listed in that subsection.

[7] In his response to the HOA's motion to dismiss, McCusker argued that the solar energy chapter did apply to the HOA. Specifically, McCusker argued that the plain language of the solar energy chapter requires that all homeowners associations comply with the solar energy chapter.

[8] In May 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the HOA's motion to dismiss.² In June 2025, the trial court granted the HOA's motion to dismiss.

[9] McCusker now appeals.

Decision

[10] McCusker argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his complaint against the HOA. We review a trial court's ruling on a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion de novo. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Blue Sky Innovation Grp., Inc., 230 N.E.3d 898, 901 (Ind. 2024), reh'g denied. “A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint: that is, whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief.” Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Nw. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ind. 2006). “In reviewing the complaint, we take the alleged facts to be true and consider the allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing every reasonable inference in that party's favor.” Bellwether, 87 N.E.3d at 466. “In determining whether any facts will support the claim, we look only to the complaint and may not resort to any other evidence in the record.” Arflack v. Town of Chandler, 27 N.E.3d 297, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[11] This case turns on a question of statutory interpretation. Our rules of statutory interpretation are well-established. Statutory construction and interpretation are matters of law, and we review them de novo. Vanderburgh Cnty. Election Bd. v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 833 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Statutory interpretation is a question of law reserved for the court and is reviewed de novo.”). “[O]ur goal in statutory interpretation is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature as expressed in the plain language of its statutes.” Metro. Dev. Comm'n v. Powell, 162 N.E.3d 1100, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “The language of the statute is the best evidence of legislative intent, and all words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” 219 Kenwood Holdings, LLC v. Properties 2006, LLC, 19 N.E.3d 342, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “Consequently, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial interpretation.” Metro., 162 N.E.3d at 1103 (cleaned up).

[12] We now turn to the interpretation of the relevant statutes on appeal. The HOA article, Indiana Code § 32-25.5 et seq. is clearly unambiguous. Specifically, Indiana Code § 32-25.5-1-1, the applicability statute, provides:

(a) Subject to subsection (b), this article applies to the following:

(1) A homeowners association established after June 30, 2009, that is authorized to impose mandatory dues on the homeowners association's members.

(2) A homeowners association established before July 1, 2009:

(A) if a majority of the members of the homeowners association elect to be governed by this article; or

(B) if the number of members required by the homeowners association's governing documents elect to be governed by this article if a different number of members other than the number established in clause (A) is required by the governing documents.

(emphasis added).

[13] The applicability statute, in subsection (b), provides that:

(b) The following apply to all homeowners associations, including a homeowners association described in subsection (a)(2), regardless of whether the members of the homeowners association have elected under subsection (a)(2)(A) or (a)(2)(B) to be governed by this article:

(1) IC 32-25.5-3-3(g) through IC 32-25.5-3-3(m).

(2) IC 32-25.5-3-9.

(3) IC 32-25.5-3-10.

(4) IC 32-25.5-3-11.

(5) IC 32-25.5-4.

(6) IC 32-25.5-5.

[14] Indiana Code § 32-25.5-3.5, the solar energy chapter, contains a specific section on a homeowners association's ability to prohibit the installation or use of a solar energy system. Specifically, Indiana Code § 32-25.5-3.5-5(a) provides:

This section applies to a homeowners association:

(1) the governing documents of which prohibit, restrict, or limit the installation of solar energy systems by members of the homeowners association; or

(2) whose board of directors, architectural review committee, or architectural control committee seeks to:

(A) deny a homeowner's request to install a solar energy system; or

(B) require a homeowner to remove a solar energy system installed by the homeowner.

Indiana Code § 32-25.5-3.5-5(b) provides a list of circumstances where a homeowners association may prevent the installation, use of, or removal of a solar energy system.

[15] On appeal, McCusker argues that the trial court erred when it granted the HOA's motion to dismiss because the solar energy chapter applies to the HOA. The HOA, on the other hand, argues that the solar energy chapter does not apply to the HOA because the HOA does not fall under a homeowner's association that is regulated by the HOA article under Indiana Code § 32-25.5-1-1. The HOA contends that, because the HOA does not fall under the applicability statute of the HOA article, it also does not need to comply with the solar energy chapter found within the HOA article. We agree with the HOA.

[16] Our review of the statutes reveals that the HOA article is clear and unambiguous. The applicability statute explicitly provides that the article, Indiana Code § 32-25.5, applies to homeowners associations in specific instances. Specifically, subsection (a) provides that the HOA article applies to homeowners associations formed after June 30, 2009 and to homeowners associations formed before July 1, 2009 that have elected to be governed by the HOA article. Here, both parties agree that the HOA was formed before 2009, and McCusker explicitly included this fact in his complaint. Further, neither party asserts that the HOA has elected to be governed by the HOA article. Therefore, a plain reading of subsection (a) of the applicability statute leads us to the conclusion that the HOA article does not apply to the HOA.

[17] However, our analysis does not end there. The applicability statute, in subsection (b), explicitly lists portions that apply to all homeowners associations, even if the homeowners association did not elect to be governed by the HOA article. The solar energy chapter is not present in the list of statutes that apply to all homeowners associations. Because the HOA article is clear and unambiguous, we conclude that the solar energy chapter does not apply to the HOA and that we need not engage in the exercise of statutory construction. Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917, 922 (Ind. 2011) (“If a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts do not apply any rules of construction other than giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language.”).³

[18] McCusker attempts to argue that, because the solar energy chapter does not expressly list categories of applicability, the solar energy chapter should apply to all homeowners associations. But, this reading of the solar energy chapter would make the applicability statute meaningless and superfluous, and we refuse to do so. See ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep't, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1199 (Ind. 2016) (“when engaging in statutory interpretation, we avoid an interpretation that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous”) (cleaned up).

[19] Because the applicability statute is clear and unambiguous, we conclude that the solar energy chapter found within the HOA article does not apply to the HOA. Consequently, there are no allegations in the complaint that establish any set of circumstances under which McCusker would be entitled to relief. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of McCusker's complaint.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   A transcript of this hearing was not provided to us on appeal.

3.   McCusker also makes arguments that engage in statutory construction, but we need not address these arguments because we have determined that the plain language of the HOA article is clear and unambiguous. See Sloan, 947 N.E.2d at 922.

Pyle, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.