IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationships of A.H. and K.H. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.H. (Father) and A.S. (Mother) [collectively, Parents] have two children together, A.H. (5/1/2019) and K.H. (4/10/2022) [collectively, the Children]. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) removed the Children from Parents’ care in December 2023 due to unsafe home conditions and Parents’ use of illegal substances. In March 2025, DCS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Parents’ parental rights.

[2] After a hearing, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights, concluding: (1) there was a reasonable probability Parents would not remedy the conditions that led to the Children's removal and placement outside of their care; and (2) continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children's well-being, safety, physical health, or life. Parents appeal, arguing that the above conclusions were clearly erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Between December 9 and December 11, 2023, Mother called law enforcement to Parents’ home four different times and reported multiple incidents, including that she had recently been raped, her personal property was stolen, people were knocking on her windows, and there was a person in her basement. Responding officers found no evidence that the events Mother alleged occurred. One officer eventually recommended that Mother seek medical assistance, and he informed her that he would be contacting DCS. On the morning of December 11, after Mother's fourth unsubstantiated report, the responding officer called an ambulance that took Mother to IU Health hospital. When she arrived, Mother was wearing nothing but a t-shirt, and she was erratic—testing positive for methamphetamine. After receiving medication that made her less erratic, Mother told the nurses that she had been taken to a “secret cellar” and raped and that she was being trafficked out of her home. Exhibits at 177. Because the date of Mother's alleged rape had happened outside the five-day window during which sexual assault exams can be performed, no exam was done. The psychiatric team monitored her until she was discharged later that day.

[4] While Mother was in the hospital, another police officer accompanied a DCS worker to conduct a visit at Parents’ house while Father was home. Walking around the first floor, they observed animal feces on the floor as well as trash piled up with flies swarming around it. One of Parents’ pet birds was outside its cage and there was bird seed scattered on the floor. There was minimal food in the home, and the Children's things were strewn amongst the feces throughout the home. A.H.’s hair was matted, and both children “smelled, had no shoes on, and had dirtiness on their feet that could have been dirt or animal feces.” Id. at 178. During the visit, the DCS worker observed that Father was impaired. Father agreed to take a drug screen and tested positive for methamphetamine. DCS learned that Father was unemployed at that time and that Parents were facing eviction. DCS removed the Children from Parents’ care that same day.

[5] Given these circumstances, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were Children in Need of Services (CHINS). After a hearing in February 2024, the trial court found the Children to be CHINS and continued their removal from Parents’ care. That same month, the court entered a dispositional order requiring Parents to participate in services. They were each required to complete parenting, domestic violence, and substance abuse assessments and follow any recommendations made. They were also ordered to complete a psychological evaluation, submit to random drug screens, and attend all visitations with the Children. On the last day of February, Parents were evicted from their home. Eventually, they moved to a new apartment.

[6] Throughout 2024, Parents’ participation in services was minimal. At a review hearing in May, the court found that Parents were non-compliant with its dispositional order as neither submitted to drug screens, had completed the substance abuse assessment, or consistently participated in home-based case management. The same was true in August. Mother hadn't progressed in services, had stopped visiting the Children two months before, failed to appear for her psychological evaluation, and didn't participate in drug screens. Father hadn't participated in services or drug screens and had yet to complete his domestic violence assessment. The condition of their home had also not improved.

[7] That summer, at the court-appointed special advocate's (CASA) request, Parents’ supervised visitation was suspended because of recurring safety concerns during their visits with the Children. At one point, two visit supervisors were assigned to their visits to ensure Parents complied with safety measures. Parents often came to visits without appropriate food or activities for the Children. They had also missed multiple visits, and of the visits they attended, more than half were ended early by Parents. After a permanency hearing in November, the court changed the Children's permanency plan to adoption.

[8] Parents’ participation improved slightly in 2025. Mother completed a substance abuse assessment in January and began therapy as recommended. Mother's diagnosis was that she responded to trauma with PTSD-like symptoms, and she had borderline personality disorder. At a February review hearing, the trial court found that although Parents had completed their substance abuse assessments, neither had followed the recommendations. They also continued to test positive for THC, did not maintain a clean home, and failed to regularly participate in drug screening. In March, DCS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Parents’ parental rights.

[9] After a permanency hearing in May, the court found Parents’ compliance with the case plan had been inconsistent. Mother had been participating in home-based casework and Father had successfully completed inpatient treatment at the end of March. He was also attending individual and group therapy, including a twenty-six-week domestic violence program. However, after leaving inpatient treatment, Father continued to use and test positive for THC. Moreover, Parents’ home still had animal feces scattered around, and the smell of marijuana and lingering smoke was so prevalent that “it burned the [family case manager (FCM)]/C[ASA]’s eyes when visiting.” Ex. at 205.

[10] In June and July 2025, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on DCS's termination petitions. Mother, Father, the FCM, the CASA, and multiple service providers testified. DCS also introduced evidence of the unsuccessful informal adjustment Parents had with DCS in 2023; their eviction earlier on in the case; Father's prior convictions for intimidation, criminal confinement, and battery against Mother; and their drug screen records.

[11] Parents testified about their participation in services and their struggles throughout the case. Mother testified that despite these struggles, she could adequately provide for the Children at that time. She also testified that at the time of the hearing they were living in a motel and their eviction was prompted by the landlord's sale of the building. However, DCS introduced records from the eviction cause that the eviction was from Parents’ failure to pay rent. Mother explained that she and Father expected to move into a new, suitable home a few days later. Parents both testified that they did not smoke marijuana, but only consumed THC found in Delta-8 and Delta-9, which they purchased at the gas station and which they believed was legal.

[12] Multiple service providers testified about Parents’ progress in services. Mother's therapist stated that Mother recently began opening up about her past trauma but her poor attendance prevented her from progressing further. Mother had missed four of their nine scheduled sessions since January 2025. The leader of Father's abuse intervention group testified that, as of the time of the fact-finding hearing, Father was almost halfway through the 26-week domestic violence program and had only missed two weeks since he enrolled. Parents’ home-based caseworker testified that her role was to help Parents reach certain goals—specifically, to maintain the condition of their home and participate in services. When she visited Parents’ home, typically, it was in poor condition with “feces covering the puppy pads” and trash and debris from the birds scattered on the floor. Tr. Vol. 3 at 63. On three separate occasions, she had also seen drug paraphernalia in the home. However, a few weeks before the hearing, their home was in a better state, with no feces on the floor, no dishes in the sink, and no visible drug paraphernalia. The caseworker testified that despite recent improvements, overall, Parents had not successfully completed either of the specific goals they had set. She believed Parents’ biggest barrier was their lack of accountability.

[13] The FCM testified that the original concerns expressed by DCS regarding Parents’ ability to provide for the Children remained: “[p]oor home conditions, housing stability, substance use, mental health, and domestic violence.” Id. at 185. She and the CASA testified to the consistently poor condition of Parents’ home, describing it as “filthy” with “lots of animals, lots of feces” and “so filled with [marijuana] smoke that it was hard to breathe[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 59; Tr. Vol. 3 at 186. The FCM explained that Parents had not demonstrated sobriety or housing stability to DCS and that, despite some recent willingness to participate, Parents had not substantially participated in any services in 2024.

[14] The CASA and the FCM testified that the Children were doing well in their pre-adoptive placement. The CASA explained that K.H. had previously struggled with speech but since placement had improved after completing speech therapy. A.H. had dental concerns that were also being addressed by their placement. The CASA testified that termination was in the Children's best interests because “[P]arents had adequate time to get things prepared to make life better for their children, and they [ ] failed to do so within that time.” Id. at 62.

[15] In August, the trial court entered its order terminating Parents’ parental rights, which included detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court concluded that: (1) DCS proved there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that caused the Children's removal and placement outside of Parents’ care would not be remedied and there was a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children; (2) termination of parental rights was in the Children's best interests; and (3) there was a plan in place for the Children to be adopted by their placement. Parents now bring a consolidated appeal challenging the court's termination of their parental rights.

Discussion and Decision

[16] Parents have a fundamental liberty interest “in the care, custody, and control” of their children. In re Z.B., 108 N.E.3d 895, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)), trans. denied. Given the importance placed on the parent-child relationship, the involuntary termination of parental rights is subject to a high bar. Id. Nonetheless, “a trial court must subordinate the interest of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination.” In re K.T., 137 N.E.3d 317, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[17] In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must allege and prove that termination is in the child's best interests, that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child, and of most relevance to this appeal, that one of the following is true:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2), (3), (d)(3), (4). DCS must prove these elements “upon clear and convincing evidence.” I.C. § 31-37-14-2.

[18] If the trial court finds DCS's allegations to be true, it must order the termination of the parent-child relationship and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c). On appeal, we owe the trial court significant deference given its “unique position to assess the evidence,” and we review its findings and conclusions only for clear error. K.T., 137 N.E.3d at 326; Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). We determine “whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether these findings support the judgment.” Z.B., 108 N.E.3d at 900. In our review, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. Lastly, we accept any unchallenged findings of fact as true. Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[19] Because Parents assert the same arguments on appeal, we address them together. Both contend that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to the Children's removal from their care would not be remedied and that continuing the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children.

[20] We begin with their first contention. To determine whether it was unlikely that Parents would remedy the conditions that resulted in the Children's placement outside of their care, we first identify the conditions that led to the Children's removal and out-of-home placement. K.T., 137 N.E.3d at 326. Next, we consider “whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quoting In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014)). The trial court was required to judge Parents’ fitness to care for the Children at the time of the termination hearing as well as consider any “habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the” Children. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied), trans. denied. “The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent ․ and the parent's response to those services[ ] as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied.” Id. In this respect, DCS only had to prove “that there [was] a reasonable probability that [Parents’] behavior [would] not change.” Id. (quoting In re Kay.L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).

[21] Here, the Children were removed from Parents’ care due to unsafe and unsanitary home conditions, Parents’ substance use, and Mother's unaddressed mental health concerns. The Children remained outside of their care because Parents showed very little progress in addressing those concerns. Specifically, the trial court concluded there was a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the Children's removal would not be remedied in light of the following: (1) Parents continued to use THC to cope and help themselves fulfill their daily responsibilities; (2) neither had shown much progression in the services offered over the nineteen months of the case; (3) neither had acquired safe coping mechanisms outside of THC; and (4) Parents’ overall housing situation remained unstable, and they failed to maintain safe and sanitary housing conditions. We find ample support for these conclusions in the court's detailed findings. For example, the court found that:

Father was using Delta-9 THC in place of his ADHD medication, and he felt THC use helped him treat his ADHD symptoms.

* * *

On one occasion[,] Mother confided in [the homebased caseworker] telling [her] [she] would kill herself if she had to give up smoking marijuana, but Mother explain[ed] this [was] because she fe[lt] DCS ha[d] taken her medication and children, and Mother need[ed] to be able to smoke to think straight and help with her depression. She [did] not get a high feeling from smoking, but instead it help[ed] her cope and study.

Father's Appendix Vol. 2 at 28, 29-30.

[22] The trial court also found that every service provider who visited Parents’ home during the case described the conditions as unsanitary, often with animal feces and trash on the floors, stacks of dirty dishes in the sink, and the haze and smell of marijuana in the air. The findings and record show that Parents’ housing circumstances were also persistently unstable, as Parents were evicted from the home they lived in at the outset of the underlying CHINS case, were evicted from their next home as well, and were living in a motel at the time of the termination fact-finding hearing. There were also numerous findings about Parents’ lack of participation and progress in services, including that they each failed to call in for dozens of drug screens, did not follow through with a majority of the recommendations from the assessments they completed, and did not consistently attend supervised visitation with the Children. Specifically, not only had Parents failed to attain an unsupervised visitation status with the Children, but their perpetual attendance and safety issues had resulted in them losing visitation privileges for over a year prior to the termination hearing.

[23] The trial court gave credence to the FCM's “concerns for the safety of the [Children] because of the [P]arents’ continued lack of sobriety [and] lack of stable housing,” concerns which were echoed by the CASA. Id. at 37. Parents challenge none of these findings. Instead, they argue that they were making progress in many of the areas of concern, particularly in maintaining safe home conditions and in their court-ordered services. We note that the court acknowledged some of the efforts made by Parents and some slight progress in a few areas. Nonetheless, the court was permitted to weigh their progress against Parents’ unwillingness to change their circumstances and break patterns that had persisted throughout the proceedings. We will not reweigh that evidence.

[24] Parents also take issue with the trial court's focus on their marijuana use. Father specifically asserts that “the use of marijuana alone is not necessarily inconsistent with providing children with necessary care and supervision.” Father's Brief at 9. In support of this statement, he cites to a conclusion by a panel of this Court that “one parent's use of marijuana and evidence that marijuana had been found in the family home, without more, [did] not demonstrate that a child has been seriously endangered” so as to support a CHINS adjudication. In re Ad.M., 103 N.E.3d 709, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Ad.M. is distinguishable. First, that case dealt with serious endangerment in the CHINS context, not remedying conditions for involuntary termination purposes. Second, both Mother and Father—not just one parent—are using marijuana here. Third, the concern here was not merely Parents’ usage, but their reliance on it to fulfill their responsibilities and cope with mental health issues. Lastly, Parents’ use of marijuana was not the sole basis for the court's conclusion, as there were additional concerns that, in conjunction with Parents’ inability to stop using marijuana, led the court to conclude that the conditions resulting in removal would not be remedied.

[25] Given the trial court's unchallenged findings, we find its conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that Parents would not remedy the conditions that led to the Children's removal was not clearly erroneous. Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) requires proof of only one of the scenarios listed in the statute, the clear and convincing evidence presented by DCS of the reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Children's placement outside of Parents’ care would not be remedied was sufficient to support the trial court's decision. See A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158 n.6 (finding it unnecessary to address the trial court's “threat to the [child's] well[-]being” conclusion because there was sufficient evidence supporting the conclusion that the conditions causing the children's placement outside the home would not be remedied). Therefore, we do not address whether the trial court's conclusion regarding the threat to the Children's well-being was clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[26] For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment terminating Parents’ parental rights as to the Children.

[27] Affirmed.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.