ARTHUR v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After running a red light and crashing into another vehicle, Robert Arthur fled the scene, leaving his mortally wounded passenger behind. Hours later, Arthur provided investigating officers with a false account of his actions in the hours before the traffic collision. The resulting police investigation revealed that Arthur had been drinking in at least two different bars a few hours before the collision. In light of this evidence, the State charged Arthur, inter alia, with Level 3 felony leaving the scene of an accident. While the State did not present direct evidence of intoxication at trial, it presented circumstantial evidence, which the jury found sufficient to prove that Arthur had been intoxicated at the time of the accident. Arthur contends that his conviction should be overturned, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he had been intoxicated at the time of the accident. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] At all times relevant to this appeal, Annette Stewart “was legally blind.” Tr. Vol. III p. 87. Stewart could “barely” see during the day and “definitely” could not “see at night.” Tr. Vol. II p. 87. On June 4, 2023, Stewart was visiting her sister Candi in Indianapolis. Stewart and Candi had spent the day together planning for a family member's upcoming graduation party. That evening, Stewart decided that she wanted to go to the movies. Candi dropped Stewart off at the AMC theater on the southside of Indianapolis, went home, and waited for Stewart to let her know when she needed a ride home.

[3] Between 11:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m., Stewart called Candi, told her that the movie was over, and that she would be at a bar down the street. Stewart walked to the bar, Bert and Den's, and sat down at the bar. Arthur had already been seated at the bar drinking a beer when Stewart walked in. Stewart and Arthur began to chat and eventually Arthur moved so that he was sitting directly beside her at the bar.

[4] Meanwhile, Candi and her boyfriend DeAndre Burrows drove to Bert and Dens and waited in the parking lot for Stewart to come outside. When Stewart exited the bar, Arthur came outside with her. Stewart introduced Arthur to her sister, and the group decided to go to another bar, the Silver Bullet, which was closer to Candi's house. Stewart rode with Arthur in his black Mercedes-Benz. Candi and Burrows stayed with Stewart and Arthur at the Silver Bullet until around 1:00 a.m. on “the morning [of] June 5th.” Tr. Vol. III p. 95. At that point, Candi and Burrows decided to go home, and Candi told Stewart to call her when she was ready to be picked up.

[5] Stewart and Arthur continued to talk and drink. At 2:01 a.m., Arthur purchased a Yuengling Lager, five shots of Don Julio Reposado tequila, one shot of Patron Silver tequila, and two Red Bulls. Less than fifteen minutes later, Arthur purchased two more shots of Patron Silver tequila and another Red Bull. Stewart called Candi around that same time to check in but did not ask to be picked up. Instead, she and Arthur went to the Indy Southwestern Inn. Arthur parked outside of the hotel at approximately 3:01 a.m. Neither he nor Stewart ever went inside. Instead, they remained in his black Mercedes-Benz together.

[6] The next time Candi heard from Stewart was at approximately 5:29 a.m., when Stewart sent Candi a “pin” with her location data. Candi called Stewart and heard Arthur speaking in the background. As they were talking, Stewart remarked that Arthur had just “ran a red light” and then the call went dead. Tr. Vol. III p. 99. Candi received a call back almost immediately, but it was a “dark” Facetime call and the only thing Candi could hear were the sounds of “scruffling.” Tr. Vol. III p. 99.

[7] Approximately twenty minutes later, Arthur drove toward the intersection of Southport Road and US 31 at a high rate of speed. He did not slow down or stop when the light changed to red. Instead, he ran the red light and, at 5:48:29 a.m., collided with a minivan being driven by Sunil Desei. The force of the impact was “violent” and caused both vehicles to spin out of control. Tr. Vol. II p. 173. Stewart, who had been seated in the front passenger's seat, was ejected from the car.

[8] Meanwhile, Desei sat in his minivan for “at least a good minute or two” to collect himself after the collision. Tr. Vol. II p. 174. When he felt capable, he exited the minivan and walked around it to assess the damage. Desei observed a man running northbound from the area where the Mercedes-Benz had stopped. Desei's description of the man running northbound generally matched Arthur's description, i.e., a Caucasian man who looked to be in his “40s.” Tr. Vol. II p. 177. The man stood out to Desei because he was wearing “very casual” clothing as opposed to business or workout attire. Tr. Vol. II p. 177. In addition, he was running away from the collision as opposed to nearly everyone else who was running toward it to help.

[9] Witnesses called 911, and Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Adam Stabb was dispatched to the scene of the collision. When he arrived, Officer Stabb observed Stewart lying on the ground several feet behind the damaged Mercedes-Benz. She had “significant injuries to her head and to her lower extremities” and was moaning in pain. Tr. Vol. II p. 123. Stewart was transported to the hospital but ultimately passed away. Stewart's injuries “included multiple blunt force injuries, including cutaneous lacerations, facial fractures, confluent abrasions, road rash, closed fracture of the right arm, open pelvic fractures, and ischemic changes of organs.” Tr. Vol. II p. 244. A sample of Stewart's blood was taken for toxicological testing and revealed that she had a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) “of 0.134 plus or minus 0.011 grams per 100 milliliters of her blood at the time of her death.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 244–45.

[10] Upon running the Mercedes-Benz's identification number in the BMV database, investigating officers learned that the Mercedes-Benz was registered to Arthur. Public Safety Officer Aaron Himes went to Arthur's residence shortly after the accident and attempted to contact him. Officer Himes knocked on the front door but received no response.

[11] Later that day, Officer Himes received information that a person had been reported missing from Arthur's residence. He and Officer Jason Brown went back out to Arthur's residence at approximately 11:00 a.m. When they arrived, Arthur's son met them outside. Arthur's son explained that he had reported Arthur missing because he had not come home the night before and had not shown up for work. He indicated that Arthur had just returned home before the officers arrived and had claimed to have walked home from Beech Grove because his car had been stolen.

[12] Officers Himes and Brown went into the home, where they observed and spoke with Arthur. While speaking to Arthur, Officer Himes observed that Arthur was “[n]ervous. Pacing back and forth. Looking down at his arms.” Tr. Vol. III p. 4. Arthur explained that he had been at a hotel in Beech Grove the night before and that he had had to walk home because someone had stolen his car. He claimed to have been at the hotel with a woman whose name he did not know. When his son volunteered that it may have been “that Annette Stewart woman,” Arthur replied, “that might be the name, but I think she gave me a false name.” State's Ex. 11 at 3:30−3:38. He could not remember the alleged false name, however, when asked. Arthur stated that he and this woman had spent time together in the parking lot in front of a hotel but that they “didn't even get out of the parking lot” before “some guys pulled up behind” them and robbed them at approximately 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. State's Ex. 11 at 4:42−4:50.

[13] Detective Jason Thalheimer was assigned to the case. During his investigation, Detective Thalheimer reviewed Officer Himes's report and body camera footage. Arthur's behavior and mannerisms “made [him] think something else was going on” so he rewatched the body camera footage and began taking detailed notes of what Arthur had said happened and the places Arthur had said he gone. Tr. Vol. III p. 45. He quickly learned that Stewart could not have been driving the Mercedes-Benz at the time of the collision because she was legally blind and could not see well enough to drive at night.

[14] Detective Thalheimer went to the Indy Southwest Inn, where Arthur had claimed to have been carjacked around 10:00 p.m. or 10:30 p.m. the night before the accident, and reviewed the surveillance footage. The surveillance footage showed that Arthur had not arrived at the hotel until nearly 3:00 a.m. and that he had still been in possession of his black Mercedes-Benz when he left the hotel at approximately “3:20 [a.m.] or so.” Tr. Vol. III p. 54. Detective Thalheimer confirmed with Hiral Patel, the hotel's manager, that there had been no reported carjackings at the hotel on June 5, 2023. Detective Thalheimer also verified that Arthur had never reported his car stolen. Instead, the investigation revealed that Arthur had been with Stewart up until the time of the collision and that he had fled from the scene before the police arrived.

[15] On December 5, 2023, the State charged Arthur with Level 3 felony leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, Level 4 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death, and Level 4 felony leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death or catastrophic injury. On December 13, 2024, the State amended the charging information to allege that Arthur was a habitual vehicular substance offender. A jury trial commenced on May 19, 2025.

[16] During its case in chief, the State called Robert Ruhl, a forensic toxicologist, to testify. Ruhl explained that alcohol goes through four stages in the body: absorption, distribution, metabolism, and elimination. Ruhl further explained that while rates for elimination may vary from person to person, “[t]ypically, for 90 percent of the population, you will metabolize alcohol at a rate of .01 to .025 grams percent per hour. So, your BAC is going to drop by that same level each hour, on average.” Tr. Vol. III p. 122.

[17] With respect to this case, Ruhl testified that he had reviewed two receipts from the Silver Bullet, which showed that Arthur had purchased “a beer and eight shots of various liquor” between 2:00 a.m. and 2:13 a.m. on the morning of the collision. Tr. Vol. III p. 122. From this information, Ruhl provided “an estimate of a range of a maximum BAC that somebody could achieve from those drinks” based on the assumption that Arthur and Stewart had split the drinks with “each of the two people [having] consumed half of the drinks[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 123. Considering only the consumption of the drinks listed on the receipts he reviewed combined with Arthur's height, weight, and age, Ruhl predicted that Arthur's “potential maximum BAC” would have been “between a .107 and a .130” with a “maximum BAC range ․ between 2:43 and 3:13” a.m. Tr. Vol. III p. 124.

[18] After the jury found Arthur guilty as charged, Arthur admitted that he was a habitual vehicular substance offender. At sentencing, the trial court vacated Arthur's convictions for the two Level 4 felony charges due to double jeopardy concerns; entered a judgment of conviction on the Level 3 felony charge; and imposed a thirteen-year sentence, with ten years executed in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) and three years suspended to probation. With respect to the habitual offender enhancement, the trial court imposed an additional four years, all of which is to be executed in the DOC.

Discussion and Decision

[19] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[20] Arthur contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for Level 3 felony leaving the scene of an accident. Indiana Code section 9-26-1-1.1 provides that

(a) The operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident shall do the following:

(1) ․ [T]he operator shall immediately stop the operator's motor vehicle:

(A) at the scene of the accident; or

(B) as close to the accident as possible; in a manner that does not obstruct traffic more than is necessary.

(2) Remain at the scene of the accident until the operator does the following:

(A) Gives the operator's name and address and the registration number of the motor vehicle the operator was driving to any person involved in the accident.

(B) Exhibits the operator's driver's license to any person involved in the accident or occupant of or any person attending to any vehicle involved in the accident.

(3) If the accident results in the injury or death of another person, the operator shall, in addition to the requirements of subdivisions (1) and (2):

(A) provide reasonable assistance to each person injured in or entrapped by the accident, as directed by a law enforcement officer, medical personnel, or a 911 telephone operator; and

(B) as soon as possible after the accident, immediately give notice of the accident, or ensure that another person gives notice of the accident, by the quickest means of communication to one (1) of the following:

(i) The local police department, if the accident occurs within a municipality.

(ii) The office of the county sheriff or the nearest state police post, if the accident occurs outside a municipality.

(iii) A 911 telephone operator.

****

(b) An operator of a motor vehicle who knowingly or intentionally fails to comply with subsection (a) commits leaving the scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor. However, the offense is: ****

(4) a Level 3 felony if the operator knowingly or intentionally fails to stop or comply with subsection (a) during or after the commission of the offense of operating while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury (IC 9-30-5-4) or operating while intoxicated causing death or catastrophic injury (IC 9-30-5-5).

Thus, in order to prove that Arthur committed the Level 3 felony offense, the State was required to prove that he had failed to remain at the scene of an accident, the accident had resulted in serious bodily injury or death, and the operator of the vehicle had been intoxicated at the time of the accident. Arthur does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he failed to remain at the scene of the accident or that the accident resulted in Stweart's death. Arthur only contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he was intoxicated at the time of the collision.

[21] As is relevant to this case, “ ‘[i]ntoxicated’ means under the influence of: (1) alcohol ․ so that there is an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person's faculties.” Ind. Code § 9-13-2-86. There are many ways to show impairment from intoxication. For instance, “ ‘[i]mpairment can be established by evidence of (1) the consumption of significant amount of alcohol; (2) impaired attention and reflexes; (3) watery or bloodshot eyes; (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath; (5) unsteady balance; (6) failure of field sobriety tests; (7) slurred speech.’ ” Poortenga v. State, 99 N.E.3d 691, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Fought v. State, 898 N.E.2d 447, 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). In addition, any other relevant “evidence that leads to a reasonable inference should be included.” See generally West v. State, 22 N.E.3d 872, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (indicating that a list of factors relevant to the question of whether a person had operated a vehicle was not exclusive because the factfinder should consider any relevant evidence that leads to a reasonable inference), trans. denied.

[22] While the State did not present any direct evidence of intoxication at the time of the collision, the State presented circumstantial evidence of intoxication. We have previously concluded that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to prove that an individual operated a vehicle while intoxicated. See Jellison v. State, 656 N.E.2d 532, 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove that the defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated.”).

In a circumstantial case, no single piece of evidence in isolation—no “smoking gun”—is offered to persuade the jury to convict. Yet a jury may be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, by looking at a web of facts in which no single strand may be dispositive. Indeed, the evidence in the aggregate may point to guilt where individual elements of the State's case might not. Just as in the probable cause context, when presented with a sufficiency challenge we look at the whole picture without taking a divide-and-conquer approach to individual pieces of evidence.

Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176–77 (Ind. 2022) (internal quotations omitted).

[23] The evidence demonstrates that Arthur purchased numerous drinks during the two o'clock a.m. hour and had been drinking previously. Taking only into account half of the drinks purchased by Arthur at the Silver Bullet together with Arthur's height, weight, and age, Ruhl opined that Arthur's “potential maximum potential BAC” would have been “between a .107 and a .130” with a “maximum BAC range ․ between 2:43 and 3:13” a.m. Tr. Vol. II p. 124. This did not take into account any of the drinks that Arthur had drunk earlier in the night. The jury could infer from the evidence that Arthur had been drinking previously to the drinks considered by Ruhl coupled with Ruhl's testimony regarding the typical timeline for alcohol to leave one's system that Arthur had been intoxicated at the time of the collision.

[24] Moreover, Arthur fled the scene and attempted to avoid arrest, suggesting a consciousness of guilt. The evidence established that, shortly after the collision, Desei had observed a man running northbound from the area where the Mercedes had stopped. Desei's description of the man running northbound generally matched Arthur's description. The jury could reasonably infer that the man running away from the accident was Arthur, attempting to avoid arrest by fleeing the scene. “Evidence of flight may be considered as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.” Brown v. State, 563 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. 1990).

[25] Arthur also lied to police, sharing a fictional story about being carjacked in the ten o'clock hour the night before. When Detective Thalheimer viewed surveillance video of the hotel in question, the surveillance video conclusively proved that Arthur's claim that he had been carjacked was false. Arthur's attempt to remove himself as the individual having control of the Mercedes at the time of the collision supports a reasonable inference that Arthur had concocted a false story in an attempt to avoid arrest. “Evidence of an attempt to avoid arrest tends to show guilt.” Wilson v. State, 455 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind. 1983).

[26] The circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support the jury's determination that Arthur had been intoxicated at the time of the collision. Arthur's claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

[27] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.