A.W. (Mother),1 Appellant/Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee/Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.W. (“Mother”) and C.B. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of K.B. and A.B. (collectively, “Children”), born on February 3, 2019, and August 5, 2020, respectively. In February of 2023, Children were removed from Parents’ care after Parents failed to seek prompt medical attention for a sibling of Children who had suffered a broken femur. In April of 2023, Parents admitted that Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”) and were ordered to participate in several services. Over the course of the next two years, Mother's ability to redirect and discipline Children did not improve, and neither did her housing or employment instability. In May of 2025, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned to have Parents’ parental rights to Children terminated. Father relinquished his parental rights to Children, and, after a hearing, the juvenile court terminated Mother's. Mother contends that the juvenile court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights to Children. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents are the biological parents of Children. On February 9, 2023, DCS investigated a report that K.W., a sibling to Children, had suffered a femur fracture and that Mother had not taken him to the hospital until two days had passed. The same day, DCS removed and detained K.W. and petitioned to have Children found to be CHINS. The juvenile court authorized DCS to detain Children on February 13, 2023.

[3] On April 10, 2023, Parents admitted that Children and K.W. were CHINS. On May 9, 2023, the juvenile court issued a dispositional order in which it ordered Mother to cooperate with DCS and maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing with adequate bedding, functional utilities, and adequate supplies of food. The juvenile court also ordered Mother to secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income; not use illegal controlled substances or alcohol; participate in homebased counseling; complete a parenting assessment, a psychological evaluation, and follow all recommendations from each; and attend all scheduled visits with Children.

[4] After Children's removal in February of 2023, Mother had had unsupervised visitation with them at her home. Children often escaped from the home and played in unsafe areas, and Mother was unable to contain them. Therapist Karla Eberle performed a parenting assessment of Mother in June of 2023 and recommended a placement for Mother in “1-2-3 Magic[,]” a parenting curriculum that deals with proper redirection and discipline of children. Tr. Vol. II p. 25. In July of 2023, Mother completed a court-ordered parenting assessment, which resulted in a recommendation that she engage in individual therapy. DCS maintained an open referral for therapy but closed it after Mother did not consistently participate. At some point between February and November of 2023, Mother gave birth to another child, “M.”

[5] According to home-based caseworker Chris Dubach, who began providing services to Children in April of 2024, visits remained “chaotic.” Tr. Vol. II p. 62. The home environment was “very loud[,]” and Children were aggressive with pets and each other, behavior Dubach did not observe in their foster placement. Tr. Vol. II p. 62. Dubach did not observe a bond between Mother and Children but did between Children and their foster placement.

[6] In May of 2024, Children reported that they had been sexually abused during an unsupervised visit by an eleven-year-old child Mother was babysitting. The juvenile court denied DCS's motion that all future visitation be supervised but ordered Mother not to allow any other children or adults to be in her home during unsupervised visitation. On July 16, 2024, DCS moved again for all visitation between Mother and Children to be supervised because the alleged perpetrator and associated adults still lived in Mother's home. The juvenile court ordered that all future visitation be supervised.

[7] Even after visitation became fully supervised, Mother did not attempt to use any new parenting techniques to manage Children's behaviors. During supervised visits, Mother did not actively engage with Children and would let child “M” just cry out his tantrums. Mother could not focus on more than one child at a time. Children continued to run out of the room where visits were held, causing concerns that, if left in Mother's care, they would continue to escape.

[8] On May 13, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Children. Mother completed a second parenting assessment in June 2025. Mother still lacked understanding of the different developmental stages of her sons. Mother never smiled at Children. Eberle found “the amount of bond that she had with [Children]” was “worse” than in the first assessment. Tr. Vol. II p. 28. During the visit observation during the second assessment, one child hit his head on the floor. Mother did not try to console the child. Mother was unable to control Children at all during visits.

[9] On August 5, 2025, the juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing. Guardian ad Litem Rachel Walker (“GAL Walker”) opined that “[t]o provide safety for the children, to not neglect them and so unfortunately, I think that you need to terminate parental rights in this case.” Tr. Vol. II p. 110. GAL Walker noted that Mother had refused to get therapy or engage in other ordered services for herself until a month before the termination hearing. For GAL Walker, Mother's unwillingness to recognize her own need for care meant she would not recognize the needs of Children. When child K.B. had disclosed he had been sexually abused, Mother had not only failed to obtain treatment, but also denied that the events had happened. GAL Walker also expressed concern that Mother had continued to ignore court orders to engage in services throughout the case. FCM Caroline Tom, who had been appointed to the case on August 6, 2024, also opined that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Children's best interests. FCM Tom testified that Children would not achieve permanency with ongoing DCS involvement and that Children's current foster parents intended to adopt Children.

[10] On August 6, 2025, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to Children. The juvenile court noted that multiple service providers had testified that they had not observed a parent-child bond between Mother and Children, that Mother was unable to lead Children or manage their behaviors, and that Mother did not express affection toward Children nor Children toward her. The juvenile court also found that Children had been with their placement since February of 2023 and that they were closely bonded to her. The juvenile court also found that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in Children's removal or continued removal would not be remedied and that termination was in Children's best interests.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Mother contends that the juvenile court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights to Children. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Moreover, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in our culture.” Id. (citation omitted). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court has made clear that the “purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children.” Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992). “Termination of parental rights is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened.” In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d at 773. The juvenile court need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[12] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We recognize the juvenile court's “unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court's only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[13] In order to terminate Mother's parental rights to Children, DCS was required to prove the following:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

[․.]

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.²

[14] Mother challenges only the juvenile court's conclusions that (1) there was a reasonable probability that she would not remedy the conditions that had resulted in Children's removal and retention in foster care and (2) termination was in Children's best interests.

I. Conditions that Resulted in Removal Will Not Be Remedied

[15] Mother contends that the juvenile court clearly erred in concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Children's removal and continued foster placement would not be remedied. In determining whether this element is met, the juvenile court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the juvenile court identifies the conditions that led to the child's removal and continued removal from the parent's home. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). Second, the juvenile court must determine whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. Id. In the second step, the juvenile court must judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions—balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014); K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234.

[16] The juvenile court initially ordered Children removed from Mother's care because of she had failed to obtain prompt medical treatment for sibling K.W., who was then eleven months old and had suffered a broken femur. Children remained out of Mother's care because she had lacked stable housing and had continued to be unable to manage Children's behaviors, keep them safe from physical harm, or provide for their emotional and developmental needs. Termination of the parent-child relationship is appropriate when, as here, the evidence shows that Mother's lack of skills left Children at risk of future neglect or deprivation. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234 (concluding that Mother's habitual pattern of drug use resulted in a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation).

[17] Children should not have to wait indefinitely for Mother to demonstrate the ability to provide them with proper supervision and a safe and stable home environment. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. Here, Mother failed to appropriately address sibling K.W.’s significant medical needs and was unable to keep Children safe from harm while in her care. In addition to Children being alleged victims of sexual abuse and Mother's subsequent refusal to ensure they would not be in the same home as their abuser, Mother could not control Children's own dangerous and aggressive behaviors while in her care.

[18] When Children had unsupervised visits with Mother at her first apartment, they would leave without permission and refuse to come back in. A.B. once escaped at night and was found near a road. During visits, Children jumped off of furniture and almost landed on child “M.” Another time, K.B. was found standing on a window sill, leaning against cracked glass in the window. The visit supervisor had K.B. get down, but, moments later, he was back in the window. Children ignored Mother when she told them to stop unsafe behaviors and would mock her efforts to set boundaries for them. K.B. would become angry when Mother told him to stop and would kick toys, throw toys, or knock over the trash can. Mother was never able to balance her attention between her children, especially when “M” was present.

[19] Mother completed two parenting assessments with Eberle, one in June of 2023, when visits were unsupervised, and one in June of 2025, after visits had been supervised for about a year. In both assessments, Eberle noted that visits were chaotic and unsafe due to Children's aggression and violence. Eberle believed the violence and misbehavior was worse in 2025. Mother did not demonstrate being able to use the “1-2-3 Magic” discipline technique or give choices and state consequences. Tr. Vol. II p. 38. Mother became overwhelmed during visits, and Children's behavior was such a safety concern that the community center asked them not to return.

[20] During the 2025 parenting assessment, Eberle still observed unsafe chaos between Mother and Children, with everyone screaming and yelling at each other. Mother did not follow through with consequences to manage behavior, and Children were fighting all the time. Mother had no control and exhibited no leadership. One child fell and hit his head. Instead of going to see whether the child needed help, Mother looked for the visit supervisor to give her permission. Mother did not nurture him or explain they should do something else, just patting him on the head three times and saying “okay we need to stop now.” Tr. Vol. II p. 51.

[21] Mother also showed herself to be unwilling to address her own medical needs. Both of Mother's parenting assessments recommended that she receive individual counseling to address her own past trauma. DCS referred Mother for this service, but each referral closed because Mother did not attend appointments. After DCS filed its termination petition on May 13, 2025, Mother did complete an initial intake for counseling but missed two of the next three sessions scheduled in July of 2025. The juvenile court was under no obligation to credit Mother's testimony that she finally believed therapy would be helpful. See In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 920 (Ind. 2011) (noting that trial judges are in the best position to assess witness credibility). Promises of future compliance are not evidence of the situation at the time of the termination hearing. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[22] In any event, it is not enough just to attend services if the parent does not demonstrate positive changes in the ability to provide for Children's physical, developmental, and emotional needs. See Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 50 (Ind. 2019) (acknowledging that parents had completed most of the required services but that receiving services alone is not sufficient if the services do not result in the needed change). While Mother attended some sessions with some providers, she never demonstrated any improved ability to manage Children's behaviors.

[23] Mother also did not improve her ability to provide Children with a safe and stable home or to provide for Children financially. Mother was homeless for a time, had lived in an apartment, and had lived with her sister for a week. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother had lived with her parents for about a year. The juvenile court, however, could only speculate on the suitability of grandparents’ home because FCM Tom had not been inside the home for approximately one year.

[24] As for Mother's ability to provide for Children's financial needs, at the time of the hearing Mother testified that she was babysitting for a friend, making about $100.00 a week. Mother had once had the opportunity to work at Dollar Tree but had refused to do so unless her father let her get another dog. Mother never obtained reliable transportation.

[25] Mother's primary argument on appeal is to point to evidence that she had, in fact, made some progress in her ability to parent Children; had maintained housing and employment; and was still attending services. The juvenile court was in the best position to evaluate this and other evidence, and we will not second-guess its determinations. Mother's argument amounts to nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Matter of Eq.W. 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2019).

II. Best Interests

[26] Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred in concluding that termination was in Children's best interests. In considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted).

[27] We agree with the State that Mother does not actually make a distinct argument that DCS failed to establish that termination was in Children's best interests. In the interests of caution, however, we choose to address the question. GAL Walker opined that “[t]o provide safety for the children, to not neglect them and so unfortunately, I think that you need to terminate parental rights in this case[,]” Tr. Vol. II p. 110, and FCM Tom, who had been appointed to the case on August 6, 2024, opined that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Children's best interests. GAL Walker's and FCM Tom's testimony supports the juvenile court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Children's best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, GAL, or a court-appointed special advocate regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests). There is, however, much more in the record that supports the juvenile court's conclusion regarding Children's best interests.

[28] Evidence establishing the unfitness of a parent may support a juvenile court's legal conclusion that termination is in a children's best interests. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 221 (“A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Child's best interests.”) (citation omitted). We have already discussed at length Mother's failure to address concerns about her ability to redirect and discipline Children, their lack of a bond with her, her inability to recognize and address her and Children's need for medical care, and her failure to obtain stable employment or housing.

[29] In contrast, FCM Tom testified that Children thrived in the care of their foster parents, who provided stability and consistency and displayed a loving and supportive relationship with Children. FCM Tom also indicated that permanency could not occur with ongoing DCS involvement and that Children and their current foster parents shared a strong bond with each other. There is ample evidence to sustain the juvenile court's conclusion that termination is in Children's best interests. Mother's arguments in this regard are nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[30] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective July 1, 2025, but we apply the version in effect when the termination petition was filed, May 13, 2025.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur