K.F., Appellant-Respondent v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.F. (Mother) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her minor child, J.V. Jr. (Child).¹ Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Child was born to Mother and Father in January 2017. E.F-F. (Sibling) is four years older than Child and has been raised in the home as Child's sibling, with Mother having obtained guardianship of Sibling in February 2013. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) became involved with the family in 2018, with substantiations for neglect in 2018 and 2019 involving homelessness, untreated mental health issues, substance abuse, and domestic violence. In August 2019, Child was adjudicated a child in need of services (CHINS). Child was permitted to remain in the home with Mother while Mother received mental health and homebased casework services. Father was precluded from living in the home due in part to his continued use of methamphetamine. The CHINS case was closed in May 2020, as Mother had been compliant with services and was no longer with Father.

[4] Father moved back into Mother's home with Child and Sibling (collectively, the Children) at some point, and then in October 2022, Mother was incarcerated on charges of trafficking with an inmate a controlled substance, possession of cocaine, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and possession of marijuana. During Mother's five-month incarceration, DCS became involved with the family again.

[5] On the afternoon of January 8, 2023, a neighbor called 911 after her three-year-old grandson went missing with Sibling, who was ten years old at the time. Officers of the Evansville Police Department (EPD) responded and eventually located the boys at a gas station several blocks away. During the search, the officers went to Father's apartment and spoke with him. Father had been sleeping and was unaware that Sibling had been missing. The officers observed a strong odor of urine and feces inside the apartment and noted that the home was in complete disarray, with trash throughout. A report of neglect was made to DCS the next day.

[6] On January 11, 2023, EPD officers responded to another report of a missing child, this time involving Child. Upon locating Child and returning him home, the officers observed that the home still smelled of urine and feces.

[7] Meanwhile, DCS obtained the Children's school attendance records for the current year. Children had each been late for school about forty times and absent over forty times. On and after January 12, Father refused to allow DCS into the home without a court order. Then on January 18, DCS received another report alleging that the Children were victims of neglect, as Father had been leaving them home alone at night to sell marijuana. DCS eventually obtained a court order allowing DCS into the home, but Father still refused to open the door even with the presence of police.

[8] On January 26, 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS, and the trial court authorized DCS to take Child into custody that same day.² Mother and Father subsequently admitted to the allegations in the CHINS petition, and the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS. At the dispositional hearing on February 28, 2023, the court ordered Mother to, among other things: complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommended services, such as parent aide and homebased casework; follow all terms of probation; complete a dual psychological and substance abuse assessment and follow treatment recommendations; ensure that any person responsible for physical care of Child is first approved by the family case manager (FCM); maintain suitable, safe, stable housing; maintain a legal and stable source of income; ensure that Child is properly enrolled in and attending school; and not use or consume illegal controlled substances or prescription medications, except as prescribed. In sum, Mother needed to provide Child with “a safe, secure and nurturing environment that is free from abuse and neglect” and to become “an effective caregiver who possesses the necessary skills, knowledge and abilities to provide [Child] with this type of environment on a long-term basis to provide [him] with permanency.” Exhibits Vol. 3 at 249.

[9] Mother was released from jail by the beginning of March 2023, and she and Father were cooperating with DCS. Therefore, on March 6, a trial home visit (THV) with Mother and Father commenced under the supervision of DCS. When Father later tested positive for methamphetamine and failed to cooperate with family treatment court, the court restricted Father from the home beginning on May 9. Child was permitted to remain in the home with Mother on the THV.

[10] On July 31, 2023, DCS filed a request to end the THV, as Mother had been in jail since July 11 on a petition to revoke for violating house arrest, and Father continued to test positive for methamphetamine and otherwise not cooperate with DCS.³ At a CHINS review hearing the next day, the court ordered Child to be placed back in foster care. Further, the court found that Mother and Father were not in compliance with the case plan and had not enhanced their ability to fulfill their parental obligations.

[11] Following a hearing on December 6, 2023, the permanency plan for Child was changed to reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. In its permanency order, the court recognized that Mother had worked with homebased casework to learn parenting skills, had obtained employment, and was compliant with probation.⁴ Mother had also started mental health services to address past trauma and issues with emotional regulation. The court found, however, that Mother was verbally aggressive with service providers and had threatened one provider's life.

[12] DCS began a second THV with Mother on April 10, 2024. In seeking court approval for the THV, DCS noted that Mother had stable housing and had continued with mental health treatment. Further, the Children's behaviors had “been a concern in placement” and DCS believed that transitioning them back to Mother might help “stabilize” them. Exhibits Vol. 4 at 126. DCS indicated that it would put extensive services into place in the home to help the transition. The court approved the second THV.

[13] On May 2, 2024, three weeks after it started, DCS requested that the court end this second THV. Despite supportive services in the home, Mother had positive drug screens, the Children had been late to school almost every day, and Mother had knowingly allowed a registered sex offender (Boyfriend) into the home and allowed him to care for the Children. At a hearing that same day, the court changed Child's placement to foster care.

[14] A review hearing was held on June 5, 2024, at which the court found that Mother was not in compliance with the case plan. Specifically, Mother had positive drug tests for Oxycodone and/or THC and missed other required drug screens, had not enhanced her ability to fulfill her parental obligations, had missed some therapy sessions, and had been discharged by another provider for making threats. Additionally, Mother actively attempted to hide Boyfriend from DCS during the second THV. DCS indicated that it was planning to move forward with termination of parental rights, and Mother advised that Boyfriend would be moving out of her home. The court noted in its order that Mother still had time to engage in services and that she was employed.

[15] Thereafter, Mother had additional positive drug screens in May, June, and July 2024 and then she went about four months without submitting to random drug screens. When she resumed testing around the end of that year, she still had positive screens, particularly for THC.

[16] At a CHINS permanency hearing on December 4, 2024, the court determined that Mother had “failed to meaningfully engage in court-ordered services” and that she admitted to ongoing use of THC despite claiming, at the hearing, that she was seven months pregnant.⁵ Id. at 231. The court noted in its order that the degree of Mother's use of THC or other substances could not be determined because Mother had refused to submit to random drug screens since around July 2024.⁶ Further, while Mother had regularly engaged in supervised visits during the reporting period, there were concerns that she was not complying with visitation rules and had inappropriate discussions with Child, resulting in a visit ending early on at least one occasion. To obtain reunification, the court indicated that Mother needed to attend all therapy appointments, participate in random drug screens, participate in homebased casework, and improve her parenting skills to “address instability in the home, missed medical appointments, and a lack of structure and routine.” Id.

[17] On December 30, 2024, DCS filed the instant petition to terminate parental rights. At that time, Mother had just been evicted from her home and had been unemployed since October. Thereafter, Mother tested positive for THC in February and positive for THC and Oxymorphone in March, and she missed several other random drug screens.

[18] The termination factfinding hearing was held on March 20, 2025. Mother testified that she had been living in her car since mid-February and started working about two or three weeks before the hearing, after being unemployed for five months. Mother stated that she “lost everything” after losing her job in October 2024, she last paid rent in September 2024, and she was now “working hard on housing” and had put in several housing applications. Transcript at 18, 26. She claimed that she had “pretty much” remained sober during the CHINS case with “a few mess ups.” Id. at 21. Further, Mother noted that she was currently in therapy and “just trying to get [her] life back together” since being in jail in 2023. Id. at 26. Mother agreed that she was not yet ready for Child's return to her care but claimed this was only due to her lack of housing.

[19] FCM Eiras testified that Child had been in a preadoptive foster home since mid-August 2024 and was “doing really well” in that home and in school. Id. at 30. She described the two failed THVs, Child's past concerning behaviors, Mother's continued use of drugs, and Mother's engagement with services. FCM Eiras also addressed concerns with supervised visits, noting that while Mother consistently visited with Child, Mother would often “become escalated, make empty promises” and tell Child not to trust anyone and that FCM Eiras and others were lying to him. Id. at 40. FCM Eiras felt that child and family team meetings were not productive because Mother was argumentative and “not really moving forward in the case.” Id. at 43. She opined that it was in Child's best interests to terminate parental rights so that he could be adopted by his foster parents. Further, FCM Eiras testified that she did not believe the reasons for the CHINS case remaining open had been remedied, as Mother currently did not have stable housing, had recently been unemployed, and still exhibited lack of consistency in parenting skills. And she noted that Child did not do well when he was placed with Mother during the two THVs and that it was not “a positive environment” for him. Id. at 47.

[20] Child's court-appointed special advocate (CASA) similarly recommended the termination of parental rights. While CASA had only been on the case for a little over two months, she had thoroughly reviewed the records. CASA explained that her recommendation was based on three things: this is the third CHINS case involving Child; there had been two failed THVs in this case; and CASA was concerned about Mother's mental health, particularly with respect to an apparent recent faked pregnancy.

[21] Finally, FCM Jordan Englehart testified regarding a new DCS assessment that he completed involving a baby that Mother claimed to have given birth to on or about February 22, 2025. After a two-week investigation that included communication with Mother, Mother's medical provider, and many other individuals, Englehart determined that Mother had not been pregnant nor given birth as alleged by Mother. Englehart also learned that Mother had an alleged history of faking multiple other pregnancies.

[22] In addition to calling the above witnesses, DCS submitted into evidence five volumes of exhibits. These included, among other things, the court records from the underlying CHINS case and the 2019 CHINS case. Records from various service providers during the more than two years that the underlying CHINS case was pending were also admitted into evidence.

[23] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Then on June 3, 2025, the court issued its order terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father. Mother now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Standard of Review

[24] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and thus we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019). In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[25] Our review for clear error is confined to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). Reviewing whether the evidence “clearly and convincingly” supports the findings, or the findings “clearly and convincingly” support the judgment, is not a license to reweigh the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (observing that weighing the evidence under the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to termination cases is the trial court's prerogative, not ours). Further, we must accept any unchallenged findings as true. See Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

Discussion & Decision

[26] Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In re J.W., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[27] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS must allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the existence of one or more of the circumstances described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (Subsection (d)); (2) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and (3) termination is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c); Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2. Subsection (d) contains thirteen circumstances supporting termination, of which the following four were alleged by DCS:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office ․ for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS]; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

(5) That the child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a [CHINS].

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d).

[28] We initially observe that the trial court improperly applied the former version of I.C. § 31-35-2-4, which was substantially amended in early 2024. The trial court did not consider two of the alleged Subsection (d) circumstances alleged by DCS – the first and fourth circumstance listed above – both of which appear to have been clearly established by DCS. Regardless, the other two alleged circumstances were found by the trial court to have been proven, and if we affirm one of these, we need not address the other. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[29] Thus, we turn to Mother's contention that the evidence was insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from or continued placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied. In making such a determination, a trial court engages in a two-step analysis: (1) ascertaining what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home and (2) determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. The latter step requires the trial court to “judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1045 (quoting In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied).

In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through DCS. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.

Id. (brackets omitted). Further, it is within the trial court's discretion to disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and to weigh more heavily the parent's history of conduct prior to those efforts. P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799.

[30] The trial court's findings reveal that the conditions that kept Child out of Mother's home included significant instability in the home, parenting issues, and illegal substance use. At the time of the termination hearing, more than two years into Mother receiving services through the CHINS case, these conditions had not improved. Yes, Mother generally participated in services throughout, but she was often argumentative, uncooperative, dishonest, and threatening toward service providers and thus failed to meaningfully engage. And she had two failed THVs, with the second opportunity ending within a month because she was consistently not getting the Children to school on time, she was continuing to use drugs, and she was secreting Boyfriend, a registered sex offender, in the home. After the second failed THV in May 2024, Mother continued to use drugs and/or miss random drug screens through the rest of the year. That year, she also lost her job in October and was evicted in December. At the time of the factfinding hearing, Mother was living in her car and had been working only about two or three weeks. In sum, she was still in no position to provide Child with a safe, stable home with appropriate parenting.

[31] We recognize that Mother challenges a few aspects of the trial court's findings of fact, but none of the alleged errors rise to reversible error. For example, Mother complains that the trial court found that Child had “remained out of [her] care” since January 26, 2023, which was the original removal date. Appendix at 46. That finding is not erroneous because DCS continued to have “placement and care responsibility” during the THVs. See Exhibits Vol. 4 at 130. Moreover, the trial court's findings detail the THVs and thus recognize that Child was in Mother's home at times during the underlying proceedings.

[32] Mother also challenges the following finding: “Mother continues to have inconsistent employment history and continues to display a pattern of obtaining and losing multiple jobs.” Appendix at 46. We agree with Mother that the only testimony at the hearing was that she lost her job in October 2024 and then was rehired by the same employer five months later, just before the hearing. There are indications in the documentary evidence, however, that Mother had other periods of unemployment in the underlying CHINS case and the 2019 CHINS case. See e.g., Exhibit Vol. 3 at 59 (May 4, 2024 visitation report noting that Mother “expressed her availability for visits due to her current unemployment status”); Exhibit Vol. 5 at 29 (2019 predispositional report indicating that Mother was currently unemployed and had been offered services to assist with obtaining employment).

[33] Finally, with respect to specific findings, we agree that the trial court's finding that Mother had failed to submit to a drug screen since around July 2024 was technically incorrect, because she did submit to some tests beginning around the end of that year and leading up to the termination hearing in March 2025. But we fail to see how this clarification helps Mother's cause, as she tested positive on several of these tests and missed others.

[34] Mother has failed to establish clear error regarding the trial court's specific findings or its conclusion that the conditions keeping Child out of Mother's home were unlikely to be remedied. Accordingly, we turn to Mother's final argument that termination of parental rights is not in Child's best interests.

[35] When making a best-interest determination, a trial court must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parent's interests to those of the child, with the child's need for permanency being a central consideration. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Further, “we have previously held that recommendations of the case manager and [CASA], in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests[.]” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[36] Mother concedes that “Child needs permanency in a stable environment where his needs would be met” and that FCM Eiras and the CASA both recommended termination of parental rights. Appellant's Brief at 18-19. Mother argues, however, that she had substantially complied with the dispositional order and that the CASA had only been on the case for two months and had not observed Child with Mother or with the foster parents. Further, Mother asserts that she should be given additional time to obtain housing and to show that she can maintain employment.

[37] We reject Mother's request to reweigh the evidence. Despite generally complying with the required services throughout the CHINS case, Mother failed two THVs and thereafter remained unable to appropriately parent and to provide a safe, stable home for Child with a sober caregiver. “[S]imply going through the motions of receiving services alone is not sufficient if the services do not result in the needed change[.]” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 50 (quoting In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). As set forth above, at the time of the termination hearing Mother was living in her car, had just obtained employment after five months of unemployment, was still using substances, and had not significantly improved her parenting abilities.

[38] In contrast to Mother's minimal progress, Child, who was eight years old at the time of the final hearing, was finally “doing really well” at home and in school since being placed in his current preadoptive foster home in August 2024. Transcript at 30; see also Exhibits Vol. 3 at 106 (February 2025 homebased case report noting that placement reports Child's “behaviors have improved substantially”). In addition to improved behaviors, he was “becoming healthier” and his anxiety had “gotten a lot better.” Transcript at 30, 31. Child calls his foster parents “Mom and Dad” and has told service providers that “he is ready to be adopted.” Id. at 44.

[39] After being adjudicated a CHINS multiple times and enduring years of instability, Child deserves permanency now.⁷ Further, FCM Eiras and the CASA agreed that termination of parental rights and adoption by his foster parents is in Child's best interests, as Mother remained unable to provide appropriate care and supervision of Child despite extensive services provided by DCS. In sum, the totality of the evidence supports the trial court's best-interests conclusion, and Mother has failed to establish clear error.

[40] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.V. Sr.’s (Father) parental rights were also terminated, but he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   There were also CHINS proceedings involving Sibling, but our focus is on Child in this appeal.

3.   DCS had allowed Father back in the home around June 20 after Mother informed FCM Breanna Eiras that she had to go to the hospital for a c-section and there was nobody else to watch Child. Upon further investigation, FCM Eiras determined that Mother had lied about giving birth and had sent FCM Eiras a picture of a baby obtained from the internet. Mother claimed that the baby died after being born.

4.   It appears that Mother was released from jail and returned to probation and/or house arrest around mid-August 2023.

5.   Father had not engaged in services for many months, and his whereabouts were unknown. In January 2024, he was arrested and charged with strangulation and domestic battery of Mother. After his release from jail in April 2024, he did not comply with probation, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

6.   Elsewhere in this CHINS order, the court indicated that Mother had refused to submit to drug screens since January 2024. This is an apparent scrivener's error.

7.   Mother asserts that Child cannot yet achieve permanency through adoption because Father's whereabouts are unknown and he had not been served. On the contrary, at a hearing on April 29, 2025, the trial court determined that Father had been properly served by publication. See Appendix at 7. The court then terminated both Mother's and Father's parental rights on June 3, 2025.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.